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Abstract
The central question of this thesis is how to conceptualise the impact of collective war 
memories in international politics. The main theoretical argument developed in the 
work is that Jurgen Habermas’ Critical Theory, in general, and his two concepts of 
social learning and political legitimacy, in particular, are useful and hitherto unexplored 
ways of advancing our knowledge concerning that question.
Based on this premise the thesis highlights the importance of political memory groups 
for the formulation of practical imperatives in politics and develops a theoretical 
concept of social learning that can be applied to the remembering of past wars. It further 
argues that societies can learn to remember past wars in different stages and that those 
stages can be identified in the history of Western Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. This is illustrated by the cases of Germany and France in that period.
Delving further into the question of how collective war memories may or may not 
legitimate international politics and foreign policy decisions, the dissertation develops a 
notion of political legitimacy that is based on Habermas’ theory of communicative 
action. The discussions in France and Germany concerning both the attempts to form a 
European Defence Community (EDC) in 1954 and the European Monetary Union 
(EMU) in 1991-1992 are used in this work to illustrate the application of this notion of 
legitimacy.
The thesis concludes that Habermas’ Critical Theory not only helps to advance our 
theoretical knowledge of the impact of collective war memories on international 
politics, but also provides useful insights into possible ways to critically and 
consciously transform such an impact.
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INTRODUCTION
The question o f  what nations should do about a difficult past is one o f  the 
great subjects o f  our time.
Timothy Garton Ash1
Since the 1990s there has been an increasing interest in the phenomenon of collective 
memory among various disciplines of the social sciences, such as sociology, cultural 
studies, history, media studies, anthropology, political science, linguistics, and social 
psychology (Irwin-Zarecka, 1994:10). In fact, although the term ‘collective memory’ 
was coined by the French sociologist and philosopher Maurice Halbwachs back in the 
1920s, it was not until the 1980s that the term became a subject of debate in disciplines 
other than psychology. By then, the post-modern and post-structural critique of the 
social sciences and the subsequent stress on identity formation led to a re-discovery of 
Halbwachs’ writings on collective memory (New German Critique, 1997:3). 
Additionally, the 1990s saw the emergence of a new sub-discipline of cultural studies, 
cultural sociology, that made the study of collective memory as a social phenomenon its 
centrepiece.3
Also, in the 1990s the concept of collective memory gained prominence in the literature 
on International Relations (IR). This was partly due to the echoing of post-modern and 
post-structural critique targeted against positivist IR (George, 1994; and Smith, Booth 
and Zalewski, 1996). This critique coincided with the rising interest in ideational 
phenomena, such as collectively shared ideas, values and norms that challenged 
materialist (in the broad sense) approaches.4 Ideational approaches of IR theory 
departed from approaches or schools which pre-suppose timeless motives or general 
interests attached to states-as-actors, such as Realism, or, which, like Pluralism, focus 
on components of states, such as decision-makers or specific interest groups. Rather, in 
the ideational perspective, collectively shared ideas, such as collective memories, are 
seen as temporary phenomena that exert varying influence on the relations between
1 Quoted in: Cairns and Roe, 2003: 65.
2 On Halbwachs’ theory see: Halbwachs, 1958; Halbwachs, 1980 and Halbwachs, 1992.
3 On this discipline see: Fentress and Wickham, 1992 and Irwin-Zarecka, 1994.
4 On the ideational critique of IR that gave rise to Kratochwil’s constructivism in IR see: Kratochwil and 
Lapid (eds.), 1996; and Katzenstein (ed.), 1996.
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political communities. The interest in studying collective memory in IR, therefore, lies 
in its assumed explanatory power of current behaviour of states in the international 
realm. In other words, these approaches in IR suggest that collective memory influences 
the present formulation of foreign policy objectives and national interests, which, in 
turn, helps to account for the behaviour of states or collectivities (nations, transnational 
or Diaspora groups) in the international arena.
Among the variety of events in the past that may give rise to collective memory, 
traumatic events, such as genocide (including the Holocaust) and wars, occupy a 
prominent position. As Ekkehard Krippendorf claims, “no single act of politics 
interferes so radically and so profoundly in the lives of people, in fact in the life of 
every single human being, as war” (Krippendorf, 1982:29). Following Krippendorf it 
can be assumed that, from all possible collective memories, collective memories of wars 
exert a particularly strong impact on international relations. In fact, in the 1990s the 
presence of the past, the conscious recalling or invoking of past wars, gained 
unexpected relevance for IR. The new regimes in the republics of the former Soviet 
Union, as well as in the Balkans, mobilised people -  often for war or fighting -  by 
making reference to past wars that fuelled territorial or political claims or fears of 
domination or even extinction. Similarly, during the process of German reunification in 
1990 historical references to a return to “Bismarck’s Germany” or even the looming of a 
“Fourth Reich” abounded. Furthermore, in recent years, the consciousness and 
articulation of historical wrongdoings and perceived unjust events in the past -  
sometimes very recent past -  have triggered demands for restitution and reparations 
(Torpey (ed.), 2003 and Barkan, 2000). To be sure, the majority of these claims for 
restitution have taken place at a domestic level in countries like Argentina, Rwanda, 
Cambodia, or South Africa. But there have also been cases of inter-state relations 
heavily influenced by claims for restitution (like the policy of Bolivia toward Chile for 
the lost access to the sea or the Chinese claims against Japan for atrocities committed 
during the Second World War).5 As these examples show, past wars and violent 
conflicts have increasingly influenced the present agenda of the relations between states. 
Despite the undeniable importance of collective war memory for current interstate 
relations and the well-documented influence of the past in German, Israeli, Yugoslav or
5 See the case studies in: Barkan, 2000 and Torpey (ed.), 2003.
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Northern Irish presents; and although much academic work has been produced that 
confirms that collective war memories are important factors in national and 
international politics, it remains unclear just how to conceptualise the impact of 
collective war memories on international politics. As Jan-Werner Muller, referring to 
the Yugoslav wars, states:
[...] while very few would doubt that memory mattered and exercised power 
[...], fewer would be able to explain precisely how it mattered. Thus, despite the 
intense focus on memory in history, sociology and cultural studies, the memory- 
power nexus remains curiously unexamined. And while it has become a 
commonplace to stress the imaginary quality of the nation, tradition, and 
implicitly, memory, that is their sheer ‘constructedness’, just how these 
imaginations and constructions come to have real political consequences is far 
from obvious (J.W. Muller (ed.), 2002:2).
It is precisely this question that the present work aims to tackle. More concretely, in this 
dissertation I argue that a) collective war memories do have an impact on international 
politics; b) this impact varies according to the role and interaction of memory groups in 
the political process; and c) in order to assess the conditions under which this impact 
might actually take place, it is necessary to analyse (1) the level of social learning in 
collective war memories, embedded in the concrete formation of rationalisation 
processes in societies, as well as (2) the conditions of practical discourses in politics that 
generate political legitimacy.
In developing this argument I strongly rely on Jurgen Habermas’ Critical Theory, and 
more specifically, on his theory of social evolution, as well as on his theory of 
communicative action. More concretely, in this work I seek to provide a better 
understanding of the impact of collective war memories on IR by applying Habermas’ 
Critical Theory to (a) the historical rise and possible future transformation of national 
collective war memories, (b) the different levels of social learning in remembering past 
wars, and (c) the formation of political legitimacy. For one thing, Habermas’ theory of 
social evolution offers useful tools for the historical analysis of societies, as well as of 
the changing role of communicative action in them. For another, this theory, with its 
emphasis on the importance of political legitimacy and the conditions necessary to 
create it (practical discourse), constitutes a very useful framework to develop the 
concept of social learning in remembering past wars and a notion of political legitimacy,
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both of which, I claim, help to advance our understanding of the impact of collective 
war memories on international politics.
To be sure, some of the questions posed in this work have been dealt with in the 
literature, although from a different perspective. The theme of collective memory, for 
one, has been, as was stated above, explored since the 1920s. Interestingly enough, 
Halbwachs’ studies were followed by a wave of scepticism in the 1930s, when 
sociologists such as F. Bartlett (1932), advanced the idea that collectivities could not 
have a memory. Halbwachs’ thesis would however experience a revival, when authors 
from different disciplines brought the notion of the reciprocal constitution of collective 
and individual memory to the foreground. Just like Halbwachs did, these authors argued 
that individuals require social frameworks to be able to remember, while social 
frameworks are also influenced and shaped by individual memory (Mahlberg, 1987:23- 
34).
While this approach is illuminating in that it points to the interplay between the 
individual and society, its ultimate focus lies on individual memory, something that 
renders it prone to reification. In fact, by de-linking social memory from individual 
memory, this approach runs the risk of confusing the analytical concept with the 
empirical phenomenon, thus screening out the ‘social sphere’ and leaving the question 
regarding the process or processes whereby individual remembering is transformed into 
a collectively shared state of mind unanswered. For, as Winter and Sivan (1999) have 
pointed out, collective memory is a mediated process, where civil society and 
intermediate groups or lobby groups play a crucial role. Thus, although the mutual 
constitution of and the relationship between individual and collective memory have 
been stated, and despite the fact that the role of intermediate groups as important means 
of communication and transformation between individual and collective memory has 
been mentioned in this approach, neither the political process nor the way in which this 
transformation takes place, is adequately addressed.
In turn, psychologists, psychoanalysts and social psychologists have shed light into the 
mental processes and psychological functions of collective war memory. Recent 
literature on the two world wars, but, above all, recent Holocaust and genocide studies, 
have drawn attention to the presence of past events that are deemed ‘traumatic’, usually
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linked to immense scales of physical and psychological suffering and the loss of loved 
ones (Neal, 1998; LaCapra, 1998; and Douglass and Vogler, 2003). These studies rely 
on psychoanalytical concepts like ‘melancholia’ and ‘working through’, developed by 
Sigmund Freud, to point to the reason for the presence of the past. They argue that, from 
a psychoanalytical point of view, the past pervades the present, because it cannot be 
easily overcome. The traumatic impact of the experiences encapsulated in the memory 
of the past can, according to these approaches, only be overcome through therapeutic 
intervention.
In my view these works have contributed two important aspects to the study of 
collective memory: firstly, they have drawn attention to the fact that memory does not 
simply refer to events, but also to emotions, feelings of guilt, shame, pride. It is indeed 
emotions and psychological mechanisms at work that are to be held accountable for 
possible distortions of eyewitnesses’ perception of past events (both at the time of the 
event and in the later remembering of the event). Secondly, psychoanalytic approaches 
stress that collective remembering and recalling of past suffering, such as that 
experienced during the two world wars or genocides, is actually part of the individual 
and collective mourning process and, thus, part of dealing, of coping, with traumatic 
events. Hence, seen from the psychoanalytical perspective, collective war memories are 
both part of the problem (feelings attached to a certain event in the past) and part of the 
solution, or dealing with the problem (mourning and working-through of those feelings 
attached to past events). Despite these valuable insights, however, these approaches, 
with their focus on the individual level and its projection onto the social level, have 
screened out the political system and the political processes and their interactions with 
collective war memories.
As regards the area of conflict and peace research, most studies on the relationship 
between violent conflicts and collective war memory have relied on social 
psychological concepts such as ‘collective images’ or ‘collective perceptions’ to explain 
the impact of collective war memories in IR (Kelman (ed.), 1970; Larsen (ed.), 1993; 
Rieber (ed.), 1991 and Volkan, Montville and Julius (1991). Some authors have stated 
the existence of a “negative cycle” between collective memory of past wars or massive 
violence and the continuous war. As cases in point they cite the ongoing Northern 
Ireland conflict, the Balkans and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Chirot and Seligman
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(eds.), 2001; Kaufman, 2001; and Caims and Roe (eds.), 2003). Yet, such theorising 
relies on an analogy between individual and collective psychological phenomena, 
screens out politics and fails to address the contested and communicative nature of 
memory. Furthermore, these approaches fail to address the becoming, stabilising and 
transformation of collective images. Thus, while insightfully pointing to the cognitive 
dimension of collective war memories, this literature fails to highlight the link to 
politics and to understand the contested process character of collective war memories.
Post-structuralist authors in conflict and peace research, such as Vivienne Jabri (1996), 
also highlight the relationship between a “negative cycle” of discourses on collective 
war memories, which reproduce the image of the enemy through discourses about ‘the 
other’, and continuous wars or violence (Jabri, 1996:134).6 Such functionalism and 
single-effect models, however, do not match with the variety of empirical cases. Neither 
the case of West Germany nor the case of South Africa confirm the general claim that 
collective memory of past wars and massive violence leads automatically to the 
reproduction of enemy images. Much to the contrary, the evidence of such cases shows 
that collective war memories may have many different outcomes. These different 
outcomes point to the shortcomings in theorising about the translation of war 
experiences into collective war memories that contradict social-psychological or post­
structuralist assumptions. Moreover, although post-structuralist authors shed light onto 
the contested nature of collective war memories and the fact that the past is 
“reconstructed” according to present needs, they fail to include a notion of politics and 
highlight the interaction between these contending discourses on collective war memory 
and politics.
Collective memory has also been a subject of attention of the discipline of cultural 
studies. Works from this perspective stress that collective memories are no passive 
‘imprints’ on people, but rather, the result of ongoing activity among the collective 
forms of remembering. Collective war memories are reproduced and reinforced by 
conscious action both by governments and society at large in cases like monuments, 
museums, history textbooks or publications on the past, as part of the repertoire of 
national ‘memory sites’ (lieux de memoire, in Pierre Nora’s words). These mechanisms
6 This is very similar to the theoretical assumptions of psychological approaches. On the parallels see: 
Volkan, 1988.
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of organised and structured remembering acquire even more importance where ‘first­
hand experience’ by those who were present at certain events (like World War I) slowly 
disappears. Thus, from this perspective, collective memory is much more than the result 
of mental activities.
Interest in the practices involved in collective remembrance has also triggered research 
about collective war memory as a process and an outcome of contested versions of 
particular memories. This contested nature of collective war memories is exemplified in 
the controversies that often take place over war memorials, even films, or war 
commemoration ceremonies. The observation of this phenomenon has prompted the 
emergence of a widespread literature on the ways in which politics shape collective 
memories and the representations of past events. Drawing from the notion of “invention 
of tradition” (Hobsbawm and Ranger (eds.), 1983), which in the 1980s emerged in the 
literature of nationalism to denote the role of the modem state in the construction of 
tradition and “the past”, this literature on war memories stresses the use and abuse of 
the past by political forces to legitimate their position on or claims to power and their 
policies in the present. Thus, the manipulative grip of politics on the formation and 
representation of collective memories is fairly well documented in the literature. By 
contrast, the opposite question, central to this thesis, of how collective war memories 
influence politics, especially international politics, has hardly been addressed by these 
authors.
Similarly, a considerable stock of literature in the sub-field of foreign policy analysis 
highlighted in the 1980s and 1990s how collective memories informed specific 
decision-makers, particularly in times of crisis. According to these works, decision­
makers tend to reduce the complexity of decision-making by drawing on historical 
analogies and specific lessons from the past or myths in order to come to decisions, 
particularly in times of foreign policy crises (Buffet and Heuser (eds.), 1998; Neustadt 
and May, 1986). While this argument points to a very concrete influence of memory on 
foreign policy, the literature on this approach leaves out of its analysis the wider social 
and political context in which the decision-making process takes place.
Finally, Ashplant, Dawson and Roper (2000:3-85), have noted that two major 
paradigms dominate our understanding of the construction of shared memories of past
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wars: the top-down and the bottom-up-approach. The top-down approach focuses on 
activities and manipulations by states to ‘invent’ traditions, to repress certain 
information and to mould collective war memories to present public needs and interests. 
The opposite approach also identified as the “social-agency”-approach (Winter and 
Sivan (eds.), 1999) focuses on individual and group memories that struggle with other 
groups and government agencies for dominance and privilege and in order to silence 
alternative voices.
This approach also finds support in oral historians and scholars who advocate a “history 
from below” to highlight the gap between “official” memory and popular memory of 
past wars or violence. In other words, personal, non-official accounts are seen as 
critique or alternative voice to the official version. At present, this trend of thought sees 
the construction of collective war memories predominantly as a struggle. Yet, lacking a 
notion of politics, these types of approaches fall short of explaining how the different 
interests are reconciled -  unless a crude philosophical realism is given the preference 
here. This, again, points to two important deficits in the current literature on collective 
war memories: a lack of any notion of politics and an insufficient attention to 
intermediary agents as well as processes of mediating those interests with the 
constructed collective war memory. Moreover, these approaches suffer from two 
methodological and epistemological flaws that need to be avoided by any theorising on 
the impact of collective war memories on international politics: first, they reify 
collective memories by approaching them as something apart from social groups or 
social and political processes within societies and giving them a life and existence of 
their own; and, second, they fail to question the “official” or “public” memory, often 
influenced, if  not outright controlled, by governments or influential groups and not
n
synonymous with the memory that many individuals hold on a past event.
This brief review of the literature on collective memory points, on the one hand, to the 
need to inquire into the political and social processes whereby collective war memories 
come into being and are transformed; for focusing exclusively on the outcomes, be they 
a decision, a representation of memory or a policy, is clearly insufficient to establish to 
what extent, if  at all, collective memories have an impact on international politics. On
7 The emerging sub-disciplines “history from below” and “oral history” highlight the often extreme 
difference between the two forms of memory of the same past event.
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the other hand, it makes it evident that specific tools are needed to assess the actual 
impact of these memories on international politics. It is the aim of this work to make a 
contribution towards filling these gaps. In order to do so, and based on Jurgen 
Habermas’ Critical Theory, I propose to analyse the communicative process through 
which collective memories are both shaped and contested. By communicative processes 
I refer to communicative action of societies and the practical discourse to create 
political legitimacy. Both terms will be discussed and introduced in more detail below.
It is in fact my contention that, by looking at a) the level of social learning in 
remembering past wars, b) the level of societal rationalisation and, c) a communicative 
concept of political legitimacy, it is possible to provide a theoretical framework to 
answer the empirical question regarding if and to what extent collective war memories 
have an actual impact on international politics.
Given the contested nature and the lack of general definitions of the term ‘collective 
memory’, it seems important to clarify basic concepts in Chapter 1. Based on a re­
reading of Maurice Halbwachs, the concepts of collective war memories and “political 
memory groups” are developed. Chapter 2, in turn, introduces Habermas’ Critical 
Theory of social evolution and, as one strand of that theory, his theory of 
communicative action and relates it to political memory groups and collective war 
memories. By the end of chapter 2, the general approach of Habermas is explained and 
the proposed application of his Critical Theory to the study of collective war memories 
in IR spelt out. In chapter 3, the rise and transformation of national collective war 
memories in modernity will be discussed with reference to the Habermas’ theory of 
social evolution and, as one of the strands thereof, the concept of social learning. In 
order to illustrate the change in the levels of social learning in remembering past wars, 
the case of Germany (chapter 4) and of France (chapter 5) are discussed. These two 
chapters explore how both France and Germany, on very different roads and for very 
different reasons, are currently engaged in a process of remembering past wars at what 
Habermas calls a post-conventional level of social learning.
The second application of Habermas’ theory of social evolution is the concept of 
political legitimacy, which is developed in chapter 6. This concept provides the 
theoretical framework to analyse the empirical impact that specific collective war
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memories have on particular decisions or courses of international politics. To illustrate 
the application of this framework, chapter 7 looks at two specific decisions in 
international politics in France and Germany; namely, the decision to form a European 
Defence Community (EDC) in the 1950s and the decision to form a European Monetary 
Union (EMU) in 1991 after the negotiations in Maastricht.
In the final remarks I highlight some of the areas, where approaches of a critical 
practice, based on a Habermas-inspired Critical Theory of collective war memories, 
might be applied. This final section emphasises the fact that Habermas’ theory is not 
only heuristically useful, but also a reliable guide for critical action with regard to 
collective war memories and their possible impact on international politics. A brief 
section of final remarks restates the main arguments and findings of the thesis and 
recapitulates on the salience of the past in our understanding of the present.
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Chapter 1
Conceptualising Collective Memories and Collective War
Memories
Whatever epoch is examined, attention is not directed toward the first events, or 
perhaps the origins o f  these events, but rather toward the group o f  believers and 
toward their commemorative work
Maurice Halbwachs (1992:234-235)
James Fentress and Chris Wickham have characterised the topic of social memory as “a 
vast subject, and a complete treatment would range from psychology to philosophy, 
from neurology to modem history, and from zoology to Proust’s petite madeleine” 
(1992:202). Similarly, Ana Douglass and Thomas Vogler have commented on memory: 
“Perhaps nowhere are there more unexamined assumptions and unargued assertions 
than in the memory business, and few issues are as ideologically charged” (2003:14).
The underlying premises are in fact too diverse even within one discipline, let alone 
across disciplines, to give a comprehensive and still meaningful overview of the 
discussion about memory. This may be one of the reasons why hardly any author on 
collective memory provides a general definition of the subject. Another obstacle may be 
caused by the absence of an agreed understanding about one of the main questions - if 
not the question -  posed by the subject; namely, how to conceptualise the interaction 
between individuals (who are finally the ones who remember) and collective memory.
Given the lack of agreed definitions or characteristics of collective memory, it seems 
important to clarify the key terms used in this thesis. It is my contention that Maurice 
Halbwachs, who is sometimes identified as the founding father of the study of collective 
memory, has offered a convincing conceptualisation of the relationship between 
individual and collective memory, which has not been appreciated until recently in the 
literature. Thus, the first part of this chapter will briefly introduce Halbwachs’ 
conceptualisation of collective memory and highlight how this guides the study of 
collective memory in epistemological, but also methodological terms. The second part 
of this chapter will look at another central question in the study of collective memory:
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the relation between history and memory. This discussion highlights not only the 
relationship between historiography and lived and constructed collective memory, but 
also the role of critique of collective memory by historiography. The third part 
introduces the practices or, in the words of Connerton (1989), “bodily practices” of 
collective remembering that are involved in collective memory. This part also shows 
that remembering is not only a cognitive or mental act, but also entails directed 
activities. A fourth part clarifies the three central dimensions of collective memory, the 
cognitive, the emotional and the practical-moral dimensions, that are also of primary 
importance to the thesis.
Based on the previous discussions, the fifth part of the chapter develops the notion of 
‘political memory groups’, which is central to the conceptualisation of the way and 
extent to which collective war memories influence national and international politics, 
which will be carried out in the following chapters. The chapter then moves on to the 
specificity of collective war memories and clarifies how the term ‘collective war 
memories’ will be used in this thesis, thus preparing the ground for the introduction, in 
chapter 2, of the theoretical framework of the thesis, i.e. the Critical Theory of Jurgen 
Habermas.
1.1 The role of social groups in collective memory: Maurice Halbwachs
The French philosopher and sociologist Maurice Halbwachs (1877-1945) wrote 
extensively on conceptual questions concerning the study of collective memory. He was 
the first to refer to the phenomenon of ‘group memory’, which he described as “[...] 
remembrances of events and experiences of concern to the greatest number of [group] 
members. This memory arises either out of group life itself or from relationships with 
the nearest and most frequently contacted groups” (1980:32). Halbwachs explored this 
phenomenon in four of his writings: “The Social Frameworks of Memory” {Les Cadres 
Sociaux de la Memoire) published in 1925; “The Legendary Topography of the Gospels 
of the Holy Land” {La Topographie Legendaire des Evangiles en Terre Sainte), 
published in 1941; “The Collective Memory of Musicians” {La Memoire Collective 
chez les Musiciens) published in 1939; and “Collective Memory” {Memoire Collective)
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published post mortem in 1950.1 With his death in 1945, his writings and, therewith, the 
study of collective memory fell almost into oblivion until the late 1980s.
Even after the renewed interest in the phenomenon of ‘collective memory’, Halbwachs’ 
analyses were briefly mentioned, but not made the subject of reflection or departing 
point in the theorising on the subject. Often he was dismissed as a ‘social determinist’ 
and not given particular attention. This seems unjustified, given the fact that the author 
addressed, in a rather rigorous and detailed fashion, central questions of the study of 
collective memory, in particular, the question regarding how individual and collective 
memory are related to one another. Yet it is only recently that Halbwachs’ writings 
have been given more attention in the literature on collective memory and the careful 
balance, which Halbwachs tries to strike between individual and collective memory, has 
been re-discovered, as well as his critical edges toward the study of collective memory 
(Devine-Wright, 2003:9-33; Winter and Sivan (eds.), 1999:24-25).
In this first section, I aim to demonstrate that Halbwachs’ answers and suggestions 
concerning the relation between the individual and collective memory, as well as about 
the importance of social groups, are of great usefulness to the study of collective war 
memory. For one thing, Halbwachs provides a conceptual framework that clarifies the 
relationship between individual and collective memory while avoiding the pitfalls of 
social determinism, on the one hand, and the individualism on the other hand. For 
another, he tries to come to terms with the task of “how to relate a conception of 
memory which, while doing full justice to the collective side of one’s conscious life, 
does not render the individual a sort of automaton, passively obeying the interiorised 
collective will” (Fentress and Wickham, 1992:ix).
The psychologist Frederick Bartlett wrote in 1932 about Halbwachs’ work: “[wjhether 
the social group has a mental life over and above that of its individual members is a
1 The first two articles are included in Halbwachs, 1992; the last two in Halbwachs, 1980. The last essay 
was meant to be a reply to the critics of his earlier essays. However, his sudden death in the concentration 
camp of Buchenwald in 1945 left this essay a fragment.
2 The four main treatises of Halbwachs on collective memory, written between 1925 and 1941, were 
translated into English in the 1970s and 1980s.
3 See in particular the reply to his psychologist critics in Halbwachs, 1980: 13-17.
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matter for speculation and belief’ (1932:300).4 Without denying the possibility that 
something like a collective memory may exist, Bartlett considered individual memory 
as the only form of memory that could qualify for scientific research. Halbwachs 
engaged at length with that critique. It seems to me there are seven claims central to 
Halbwachs’ response to Bartlett’s critique that characterise in brief his approach to the 
study of collective memory.
First claim: individual memory requires social frameworks
Halbwachs declared any individual, monadic memory of the past to be impossible. He 
had three sets of arguments for that claim: Firstly, any individual requires a social 
group, or, to be more precise: social frameworks (<cadres sociawc), in order to establish 
the meaningful links between events and facts that make up a memory (1992:53 and 58; 
1980:27-32). Without a socially constructed awareness of past, present and future 
marked by certain remembered events, an individual would not be able (a) to link 
individual events or circumstances on a linear time scale (past-present-future) and (b) to 
establish meaningful links between them. Thus, individuals establish links between 
events by socially established meanings (1980:58). These social meanings make 
memories communicable and meaningful.
Secondly, memory of the past serves the purpose of social bonding and requires thus the 
coincidence and agreement with others. For many critics this assertion gave too much 
emphasis to the social environment of individuals, thus describing the individual’s 
memory as a mere result of group memory.5 Individuals have more than shared 
memory, but membership of a group is linked to the reproduction of a certain group 
memory by remembering certain facts deemed important to the group. This sharing of 
memory, which is different from the idea that each member has the same kind of 
memory, is what renders certain memory collective.6 However, the shared memory is 
not an individual property (like a common denominator everybody possesses) but,
4 Such a critique against the concept of collective memory has been echoed by Gedi and Elam, 1996:30- 
50.
5 On these critics see: Halbwachs, 1980: 16-17.
6 This is why Halbwachs does not immediately regard a deviant memory present within a group as 
evidence against the existence of collective memory. See: Halbwachs, 1980: 52.
29
rather something that is only present when group members meet regularly and jointly
n
remember the past.
Thirdly, individuals seek confirmation by other group members of their recollections of 
the past. One reason for this is that the consciousness of shared experience itself 
provides a form of bonding between these individuals and makes it possible to relive 
this event in the presence of other witnesses, for example through re-enactments of past 
events. Any event or date remains, however, essentially contested because of its
o
embeddedness in different social groups or societies. This renders the ‘official history’ 
of a group or nation one form of memory, but by no means the only one. There are, in 
fact, many memories about groups and nations (including the memory of the group or 
nation about itself). This claim also rejects the idea that any social group has a 
homogenous, static or uncontested memory. Resulting group identities supported by 
collective memory can be described as a temporary reconciliation between these 
different memories. While collective memory contributes to the necessary condition of 
identity for social entities, it is always a temporary form of reconciliation.
Second claim: memory depends on language and communicable categories that are 
social by necessity (deep hermeneutics argument)
The two most important tools to remember, language and social categories, which any 
individual requires, are also of a social nature. Halbwachs makes that reference to the 
embeddedness of individuals in specific social-cultural environments that provide 
important tools to grasp natural and social environments in the first place:
People living in society use words that they find intelligible: this is the 
precondition for collective thought. But each word (that is understood) is 
accompanied by recollections. There are no recollections to which words cannot 
be made to correspond. We speak to our recollections before calling them to 
mind. It is language, and the whole system of social conventions attached to it, 
that allows us at every moment to reconstruct our past (Halbwachs 1992:173).
7 “Our confidence in the accuracy of our impression increases, of course, if it can be supported by others' 
remembrance also. It is as if the very same experience were relived by several persons instead of one.” 
Halbwachs, 1980: 23.
8 The contested nature o f memory was, thus, stated long before post-structuralism. It is therefore 
surprising that the study o f collective memory is not prominent in post-structuralist writings. See: 
Hodgkin and Radstone (eds.), 2006: 3.
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As Durkheim and later Wittgenstein insisted, a private language is a logical 
contradiction and an empirical anathema. So if  ‘individual thought’ from a language 
point of view is nonsensical, so is the concept of ‘individual memory’. Both rely on 
tools that are always social by nature.9 Here Halbwachs draws on arguments developed 
by hermeneutics in the sense that any individual or even society, at a certain period, is 
embedded in a lifeworld, i.e. the sum of all cultural codes, habits and interaction that 
creates a level of understanding necessary for interaction and collective survival, and 
which is usually assumed unconsciously.
But Halbwachs goes further and insists that collective memory is even the pre-condition 
of any knowledge. While Kant argues in his Critique o f Pure Reason (1998) that 
perception, concepts and ideas require each other for knowledge, Halbwachs includes 
collective memory in this triangle. Perception is only possible with the help of 
meaningful words. These words owe their meaningfulness to a shared memory. This 
shared character of memory makes understanding of and communication about objects 
possible. Collective memory is, therefore, a necessary element of perception 
(Halbwachs, 1992:168). The ontological claim implies that any knowledge is 
conditioned by collective memory and fundamentally time- and group-bound.10 The 
ultimate consequence of this argument is the rejection of there being any knowledge 
prior to language and to experience. This argument was put forth by the nineteenth 
century romantics against supporters of the Enlightenment (epitomised in the 
controversy between Kant and Herder) and the philosophical hermeneutics.11 This 
creates a consciousness of what I call the hermeneutic condition:
The conceptual world in which we live conditions us. If thought is to be 
conscientious, it must become aware of these prior influences. It is a new critical 
consciousness that now has to accompany all responsible philosophising, and 
which takes the linguistic and thinking habits built up in the individual in his 
communication with his environment, and places them before the forum of the 
historical tradition to which we all belong (Gadamer, 1975:xv).
9 Connerton makes a similar argument and refers to “habit-memory” as a precondition of understanding 
(1989:23), which seems very close to Gadamer’s concept of deep hermeneutics. On Gadamer’s 
philosophical hermeneutics see: Gadamer, 1975, in particular pp.311-324.
10 For a more elaborated discussion on the problematique of memory-free knowledge see: Fentress and 
Wickham, 1992:4-7.
11 On the debate between hermeneutics and Enlightenment see: Riedel (ed.), 1994:7-18.
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Third claim: collective memory is established and maintained through public 
discourse (including narratives) and public commemorative activities of the group
In order to carry out the function of social bonding, activities are required and, 
necessarily, they have to be carried out in the public sphere of the group. Without that 
public sphere, the support of social identity and bonding will not be achieved by 
reconfirming the sameness of interpreting and valuing certain pasts. As Winter and 
Sivan have stated:
Collective remembrance is public recollection. It is the act of gathering bits and 
pieces of the past, and joining them together in public. The ‘public’ is the group 
that produces, expresses, and consumes it. What they create is not a cluster of 
individual memories; the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. Collective 
memory is constructed through the action of groups and individuals in the light 
of day (Winter and Sivan (eds.) 1999:6).
Halbwachs develops that argument by drawing attention to the fact that memory is not 
something passive or fixed in the individual human brain, but needs communication and 
joint remembrance activities by the group to maintain a certain shared memory of past 
events. Collective memory requires constitutive and supportive social action. Public 
rituals, commemorations or conversations, interactive remembrance of group members, 
provide the space for reinforcing recollections of the past, reconfirm (or challenge) 
narratives or attached meanings of past events. Such activities presuppose, but also 
reproduce, shared meanings or constitute a ground to test whether the hitherto dominant 
meanings of past events are still valid.12
Through shared memory, bonding across generations in a group is also expressed and 
established by public celebrations and ceremonies. By remembering the significance of 
certain events that not even all group members may have experienced first-hand, they 
all share first-hand a joint and certain experience of that significance. In other words: it 
is the meaning and significance that a group attaches to an event and that is shared, not 
necessarily the experience of the original event itself. While later generations cannot 
experience an event first-hand, they are personal witnesses of the significance of a 
commemoration of an event. Group members realise and often share the importance of,
12 A similar notion of collective memory is proposed by Douglass and Vogler: “What is ‘collectively’ 
remembered is not in this sense the sum of isolated personal experiences but something that was an 
intensely shared communal experience [...] (Douglass and Vogler, 2003:17).
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say, a parade or a celebration of a certain event. But this experience is only possible if 
an individual grasps the significance of a commemoration through a social framework. 
Additionally, there are experiences made by the group that further provide material for 
shared group memory. Memory attaches significance to facts and events and this makes 
differences between the facts and events (important/unimportant; positive/negative; 
affirmative/repulsive).
This claim has important methodological implications for the study of collective
memory: collective memory, which serves the purpose of social bonding and sharing
meanings, is present, I would argue, when the group comes together and practices that 
1 ^bonding and sharing. Thus, joint discourses, the struggle between different versions 
and the sharing of narratives of past events or joint commemorations and ‘bodily 
practices’ are not a ‘proof of collective memory, but actually the practices by which 
collective memory is established in the first place. It is in those two areas, public 
discourses and commemorative activities by the group, where collective memory can be 
identified and analysed. They are part of the bonding and the reconfirmation of the 
group as a group. This interactive element makes commemorative practices different 
from ‘memory resources’ such as films, history books and museums, since they are 
offers for collective memory frameworks which may or may not be used or applied.
Fourth claim: collective memories of the past are constructed by the present needs 
of the group
In contradistinction to Henri Bergson, his earlier mentor, Halbwachs assumes a 
‘presentist view’ on collective memory14: the present group or society reconstructs the 
memory of the past according to its present needs (Halbwachs, 1992:182-198; 
Halbwachs, 1980:80). Halbwachs argues that a group will only remember events that 
have significance for it in the present. If external circumstances or the composition of 
the group change (generational changes, for instance), it might happen that a certain 
event might lose significance, and, thus, any meaning for the group as a whole 
(Halbwachs, 1980:80). Some authors regard this view as being too constructivist and
13 See also Connerton: “If there is such thing as social memory, I shall argue, we are likely to find it in 
commemorative ceremonies [...]” (1989:4-5). On the importance of public commemoration see also: 
Gillis (ed.), 1994.
14 On the term ‘presentist view’ and the debate on this approach see Lewis Coser’s introduction in 
Halbwachs, 1992:1-34.
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caution that this presentist approach does not explain the sustained presence of certain 
events or facts in social entities. In other words, the ‘internal context’ and structure of 
an old memory only allow a transformation to a certain degree.15 While this argument 
highlights the limited transformability of the content, it does not really contradict 
Halbwachs’ ‘presentist view’. If a certain event becomes irrelevant for the sustaining 
group, it will vanish from the collective memory of that group -  however long this 
process might take.
Fifth claim: collective memory necessarily prioritises sameness over difference of 
group experience
The group itself influences the selection of experiences that have been chosen, accepted 
and jointly remembered by the group. It is in particular experiences that are similar 
which reconfirm the dominant values in the group. Halbwachs identifies a need for 
groups to recognise a shared similarity, or even identity, with each other and with 
manifestations of the same group in the past -  despite all changes of persons and 
circumstances within the group -  in order to accept a we-ness and not dissolve into its 
component parts. This quest for unity is supported by collective memory, in that it 
focuses on similarities of experience: “When it considers its own past, the group feels 
strongly that it has remained the same and becomes conscious of its identity through 
time. The greatest part of its memory spans time during which nothing has radically 
changed” (Halbwachs, 1980:85-86). Collective memory, then, contributes to a sense of 
continuity that helps to foster a sense of identity and thus enables the group to survive 
as such.
Collective memory is well suited to maintain a ‘we’ over time, argues Halbwachs, by 
connecting the past with the present, focusing on sameness or similarities (1980:87; 
1992:83).16 Therefore, one other (and very powerful) source for changes in collective 
memory over time is the need to smoothen out differences between members of a group 
or between groups in a society; to focus on sameness and to forget acts that highlight 
differences (Halbwachs, 1992:182-183).
15 On the difference between ‘external or social context’ and ‘internal context’ of narratives see: Fentress 
and Wickham, 1992:71-72.
16 See also: Fentress and Wickham, 1992:30. This does not exclude particular cases where social groups 
are created from collective memory: “In its most direct meaning, a community of memory is one created 
by that very memory.” (Irwin-Zarecka, 1994: 47).
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Sixth claim: Collective memory needs to provide a useful framework of individual 
experiences
While Halbwachs insists on the need to use social frameworks to appropriate experience 
when members participate in group activities, he also underlines the fundamental role of 
individuals: if  social frameworks and the resulting collective memory are not firmly 
grounded in specific time and space and connected with the experience of individuals, 
the stated collective memory in the group remains without emotional attachment. There 
cannot be such a thing as universal memory for Halbwachs (1980:84). Memory is 
linked not only to concrete social entities, but also to concrete experience of events and 
facts. Without the possibility for individuals to structure, control and link their own 
experiences to group memory, that memory either changes or remains without 
emotional attachment by its members (Halbwachs 1980:58-59). The importance of 
experience is closely linked to the claim that remembering constitutes meaningful 
relations between events.
Collective memory requires specific ‘landmarks’ (events, persons, places, dates) for its 
existence. These landmarks provide ‘rules of attention’: that is to say certain dates,
1 7persons and events are deemed important to the group. Group members use these 
landmarks in order to locate their own experience in the group memory. This claimed 
link between experience and memory renders any concept of the latter inevitably 
historical and attached to specific groups. Thus, Halbwachs claims that collective 
memory forges the recollection of experience, but does not invent a group memory from 
nothing. The link between memory and experience influences the relative importance an 
individual attaches to the collective memories provided by the different groups of which 
she is a member. The relative strength of group frameworks depends to a large extent on 
whether the individual uses that framework for interpreting his or her experience. Here 
Halbwachs stresses the impact of the individual and defies any ideas that suggest that 
individuals are simply bent into pre-constructed collective memories that have no 
significance for them. This view is in line with authors who have pointed to the limited 
success of fabricated memories in societies where the public sphere is tightly controlled 
-  for example in former and present Communist countries (Irwin-Zarecka, 1994:91).
17 This necessity of collective memory is analysed in Halbwachs’ study “The Legendary Topography of 
the Gospels of the Holy Land”. See also: 1992: 175.
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While Halbwachs acknowledges the potential for using collective memory for political 
purposes, he does not regard collective memory as a pure means of propaganda. The 
author points to the necessary balance between manipulation and the usefulness for 
individual experience in order to be accepted and used as a means of bonding with the 
group and structuring past experience. In line with Halbwachs, Irwin-Zarecka points 
out:
The essentially mythical structure of remembrance, the often all-too-obvious 
ideological bents, the emotional charges of symbols and disputes, in short, the 
expected departures from objective (and dry) facts do not make collective 
memory into a terrain of pure fiction. What they do is necessitate a closer look at 
their own truth claims. For in order to understand how collective memory works, 
we must appreciate how it is framed in relation to its base- collective experience 
(1994:145).
Halbwachs makes the social groups the fundamental building blocs of collective 
memories. However, there are horizontally competing social groups and there are 
different social groups on the vertical axis, from family to class to the nation. 
Halbwachs argues that all these different groups provide different social frameworks for 
remembering experiences in different ways. The importance of the group for the 
individual depends, as in the case of different horizontal groups, upon the 
connectedness to the personal experiences of the individuals (Halbwachs, 1980:76). 
Additionally, the more affected the group members are by an experience, the more they 
look for collective memories that are connected to that experience (Halbwachs, 
1980:83-84). This is why Halbwachs assumes that broader frameworks such as that of a 
nation have a lesser impact on the individual than do social groups such as families, 
classes, or religious groups (Halbwachs, 1980:77).
In his work, Halbwachs also shows the relevance of collective memory for the 
formation and transformation of political and social groups. He illustrates this point in 
his analysis of classes. He argues that one basic component of class is the mutual 
recognition of class members of a shared experience. Against Marxist or structuralist 
theorists, Halbwachs insists that the specific manifestation of class goals and class 
action can only be understood if a double process of interpretation within the class is 
taken into account. First, the membership of a class at a particular period depends upon
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the specific recognition of shared experiences. Second, the specific formulation of class
interest, then, depends upon the temporarily dominant collective memories emanating
1 8from the remembering of those experiences.
In recent years feminist writers have identified ‘memory projects’ for the formation and 
formulation of collective interests (Irwin-Zarecka, 1994:130).19 Others have pointed to 
sub-groups within nations, such as aborigines in Australia or African Americans within 
the USA, that claim a different memory of the past that is more in agreement with their 
own remembrance of the past (Mellor and Bretherton, 2003; and Conley, 2003). 
Through discourse, singular individuals realise that they share certain experiences. The 
sense of sharing a certain experience enables the formulation of common viewpoints 
and interests. These memory projects challenge the current political and social order in 
two ways: first, they expose the marginalising and silencing aspect of the current 
official or dominant formulation of collective memory, and, second, they bring to 
consciousness that certain experiences are not the result of idiosyncratic factors, but, 
rather, a structural feature of the current social and political order. These examples 
coincide with Halbwachs’ definition of class and the necessity of identity among group 
members. Any collective memory has to be reconciled with particular experiences. If 
this reconciliation fails to materialise, new collective memories -sometimes causing the 
re-grouping of members -  will occur.20 As long as members of the group have that 
feeling of shared experiences, the group is able to reproduce itself and represent itself to 
itself through memory work. But if  this feeling vanishes, either group memory will be 
transformed or group membership will change or, in the worst case, disappear.
Seventh claim: only hurtful experiences on the national level supersede other social 
frameworks in structuring experience
The many intermediary groups on a vertical scale provide social memories that connect 
much more easily with the particular individuals under normal circumstances. This is 
why Halbwachs never seemed interested in analysing the collective memory of nations. 
However, Halbwachs did concede that extreme events, such as wars or catastrophes,
18 For a further elaboration on Halbwachs’ notion of class see: Halbwachs, 1958 and Halbwachs, 
1992:181-182.
19 For a documentation of a feminist ‘memory project’, see: Haugg (ed.), 1987.
20 Such an option is only available in groups with voluntary membership.
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might have a deep enough impact for people to provide a national framework of 
memory that supersedes other frameworks (Halbwachs, 1980:77). However, even in 
those rare cases where national history, which Halbwachs defines as the ‘faithful 
summary of the most important events that have changed the life of a nation’ (1980:77), 
are predominant, there is still no homogenous view as to how to remember this event. 
Halbwachs mentions the fact that important landmarks of national history may be 
remembered differently within the nation.
What are the implications of those claims by Halbwachs for the study of collective 
memory? How appropriate are Halbwachs’ concepts for the study of collective war 
memories? I believe that the claims regarding social groups (admittedly a very broad 
category, ranging from family to towns, nations or classes) help to highlight some of the 
interactions between individual and collective memory: the shared significance is re­
confirmed and established through common practices. This implies that collective or 
shared memory is only to be identified during those activities where such shared 
meanings are established or rehearsed, i.e. during discourses, ceremonies, parades, 
speeches, debates etc. Methodologically, this means that collective memory is only 
present in those gatherings and can only be read off from those gatherings and activities. 
Those activities are given preference over other ‘memory resources’, since they directly 
aim at establishing bonds and shared meanings. The disadvantage of analysing those 
memory resources lies in the necessity to infer the assumed sharing of a collective 
memory that is offered by that resource. I would claim the increase of those resources, 
ranging from buildings to songs is what causes the (justified) uneasiness that many 
authors feel with regard to memory studies, given that scholars infer an acceptance and 
sharing of certain meanings that are sometimes unintentional and far from certain to be 
accepted by group members. It therefore seems useful to follow Halbwachs’ insistence 
to concentrate on public commemorations and discourses for the analysis of collective 
memory.
Halbwachs convincingly rejects the idea that ‘collective memory’ refers to identical 
memories among the members of a group or a common minimum denominator. Rather, 
it refers to something sufficiently shared by group members. The individual memory 
includes many more memory traits than that of a single group and thus will only be a 
part. But Halbwachs’ insistence on the public nature of remembering seems not only to
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be in line with many current scholars, but also follows from his reasoning of bonding 
and sharing meanings. Although public commemorations and discourses on the past are 
identified as the locus of collective memory, I understand Halbwachs in that he does not 
imply any uncritical acceptance of “official collective memory”, but, on the contrary, 
alerts us to the need to use oral history and history from below to see how far those 
social frameworks of collective memory are accepted and applied. Furthermore, I would 
argue that from Halbwachs’ concept of collective memory, there is a need to reflect on 
the conditions of public discourse and public commemorations in order to avoid 
reification and confusing officially paraded collective memory with shared memory, 
while not abandoning the idea that those occasions are the main locus where collective 
memory can be established.
Halbwachs offers one selection criterion of collective memory, sameness of experience, 
which helps us to understand why and how certain events are remembered or forgotten. 
While this is a useful insight, it seems important to add to that other mechanisms, 
particularly psychological, are also at work in the process. These will be discussed 
below.
The link between personal experience, group experiences and the memory of past
events is an important and also a critical one. I would argue that Halbwachs already laid
9 1the foundation for the idea of ‘history from below’ or ‘oral history’. While it would be 
futile to claim that eye-witnesses or testimonies are necessarily “truer” than recorded 
history, documents or reflections on an event, oral history does provide an insight into 
whether or not there is a sufficient match between perceived personal experience and 
collective memories and the variety of remembrances of the same event.
The claims that individual and collective memory is preformed by language and social 
frameworks help limit the range of possible forms of individual and collective memory. 
These relational aspects of individual memory show that memories need to be 
communicable to and shareable with others. Furthermore, the deep-hermeneutic 
condition reminds authors that we will always grasp only part of the layered cultural 
memory within a society, most of it being unconsciously followed and not made the
21 On oral history see: P. Thompson, 1998; and Perks and Thomson (eds.), 1998.
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subject of reflection. A conscious remembering of the past means that people use 
categories (including linguistic ones) of the past in the present in order to grasp 
consciously specific events or parts of that past. One might even go as far as to say 
collective memory is a form of self-reflection of the past about itself via the present. 
While this reflection fosters a consciousness of the embeddedness of knowledge in 
experience encapsulated in language and social concepts via memory, the fact that this 
applies to entire societies and works mainly unconsciously makes it difficult to draw 
specific insights* into the study of collective memory.
As was mentioned above, Halbwachs’ interest is more with smaller social groups, 
particularly social classes. The marginalisation of national frameworks is due to the fact 
that “in normal times” that framework seems less appealing to the experience of many 
individuals and citizens. However, it is precisely what Halbwachs deemed “the 
exception”, traumatic events or wars, which are central to this thesis. Although 
Halbwachs does not analyse specifically collective war memories, it seems appropriate 
to apply his thoughts also to collective memories of different types of war. In those 
memories, the relation between individual and collective memory, as well as the need 
for a social framework, and the usefulness for individual experience seems to apply, too.
In sum, individuals require certain instruments provided by a wider social arena. Those 
instruments exert an influence on the formulation and articulation of individual 
memory. At the same time, being part of social groups, the members create, through 
practices and discourses, a shared memory, which is not over and above the individual, 
but which is established and reconfirmed by those public and collective 
commemorations. Thus, the role of social groups seems pivotal in the reasoning of 
Halbwachs on collective memory. Based Halbwachs’ notions, I propose the following 
working definition of collective memory:
Collective memory is the public reconstruction o f  a selected past by the members o f  
social groups that has significance and perceived relevance to the experience o f the 
group as a whole, as well as o f its members -  a significance which they convey through 
the memory by attaching meanings and values, and which group members share 
through joint public discourses and commemorative practices.
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This definition takes Halbwachs’ points into account (the bearers of collective memory 
are social groups, in relation to experience, established and reproduced through joint 
action and discourse), but also includes other aspects of collective memory, which 
deserve attention and go beyond Halbwachs’ treatises. These are what I now turn to.
1.2 The relationship between history and memory
Halbwachs himself juxtaposed history and memory. Pierre Nora also sees both as being 
directly opposed (Halbwachs, 1980:82-83; Nora, 1990:12-13). The first was identified 
with “dry” analysis of facts, based on a method that seeks knowledge by extracting in a 
structured manner information from the past. By contrast, memory was seen as the 
malleable and -  almost irrational -  omitting of facts and forgetting of contexts, while 
sometimes even inventing other facts. Halbwachs, and many other authors with him, 
pointed to the psychological mechanisms of memory (social bonding with other group 
members, aim to establish a positive image of the group, self-esteem), which influence 
the selection of events and facts (Hodgkin and Radstone, 2006:9). History is therefore 
seen by many authors as a necessary corrective devise in order to avoid too much a 
diversion from verified facts:
Historians are able to reject something explicitly told them in their evidence and 
to substitute their own interpretation of events in its place. And even if they do 
accept what a previous statement tells them, they do this not because it is judged 
to satisfy the historian’s criteria of historical truth. Far from relying on 
authorities other than themselves, to whose statements their thought must 
conform, historians are their own authority; their thought is autonomous vis-a- 
vis their evidence, in the sense that they possess criteria by reference to which 
that evidence is criticised (Connerton, 1989:13-14).
Thus, history should “critically test memory” (LaCapra, 1998:8) by applying a 
professional method testing the empirical evidence. However, I would question the 
strict juxtaposition of memory and history on the ground of truth claims and also lower 
the expectations of a “critical correction” of history against “too Active” a remembering. 
The clearest evidence of a corrective function of history is produced when factual errors 
occur in the public remembrance of past events. If, for example, the historical site was 
somewhere else or the date was different. However, the corrective potential of history
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and historiography is much more limited if it comes to what E.H. Carr defined asv
‘historical facts’: Historical facts refer to plausible or even causal links between 
historical events supported by sufficient evidence. Historians use specific methods to 
gain information in order to make an informed judgment about the question, say, 
whether US president Roosevelt knew in advance about the attack of Pearl Harbour, 
whether Germany took a “special path” in the nineteenth century or whether Napoleon 
III provoked the Franco-German War in 1870/71 (as many German historians claim) or 
was tricked by Bismarck naively into a war he did not want (as many French historians 
claim). Historians judge the available information (whom they grant a certain status of 
truth) as to whether it sufficiently supports a historical fact or not. While history has the 
support of evidence, it also relies on a series of judgments. Thus, as E.H. Carr pointed 
out: “Its status as a historical fact will turn on a question of interpretation. This element 
of interpretation enters into every fact of history” (1992:12-13). The difference between 
the ‘rational’ history and the ‘irrational’ memory melts: both judge the past, although 
based on very diverging efforts to find evidence in support of their judgments.
Collective memory directs attention to specific events deemed worth mentioning, 
remembering and studying. The ‘agenda-setting’ in historical science and 
historiography seems heavily informed and influenced by the political sphere as well as 
society as a whole. If collective memory is predominantly reproduced by social 
(including political) groups, there is certainly an influence on the agenda of historical 
science, as some examples suggest. Germany, for instance, commissioned huge 
volumes of historical research from the historian Thimme in order to prove the injustice 
of the famous article 231 of the Versailles Treaty (sole responsibility of Germany for 
the First World War) (Wilson (ed.), 1996:11). In fact, some authors even claim that 
collective memory should direct historical science to “problems that are still alive or 
invested with emotions” (LaCapra, 1998:8). History, as Halbwachs claimed, attaches an 
equal value to any historical fact, while memory clearly judges historical facts for their 
significance as well as their moral meaning. Yet, even here I would caution against 
stretching that difference too far: critics of ‘official’ national history claim that, in the 
final analysis, this is also a dominant memory of a specific generation of historians or
22 As Hodgkin and Radstone have argued: “Often, it seems, history is willing to question the 
epistemological status of its object of study -  the past -  but less ready to engage with how ‘the past’ itself 
is variously conceptualised and constituted as history, memory, or archives” (2006:3).
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political and social class that establishes rules of significance for historical research. 
Here, again, I think that collective memories of social and political groups do have a 
considerable impact on the agenda setting of historical research, which limits the 
autonomy of history. As Fentress and Wickham have stressed:
Memories die, but only to be replaced by other memories [...]. We may, 
sometimes, it seems, only be deluding ourselves when we think we are 
‘debunking’ social memory by separating myth from fact: all we may get is 
another story. This does not mean that we must accept social memory passively 
and uncritically. We can enter into dialogue with it, examining its arguments, 
and testing its factual claims. But this interrogation cannot uncover the whole 
truth. It is a mistake to image that having squeezed it for its facts, examined its 
arguments, and reconstituted its experience; that is to say, having turned it into 
‘history’ - we are through with memory (Fentress and Wickham, 1992:202).
In sum, although in the literature on collective memory “history” is often juxtaposed as 
“the opposite” of memory, this claim seems highly overstated: history plays an 
important role in testing evidence and challenging popular held meanings about past 
events. Although historians are in a position to dwell more systematically on 
information and sources, they are also faced with the challenge to judge historical facts 
for their plausibility. The more fundamental the judgment, the more contested any 
claims for historical facts are likely to be. This often applies to judgments concerning 
international war and peace. However, what oral history can very well contribute to 
within the instruments of historical science, is showing the existence of different 
remembering and perceptions of the past and the different effects that past events had 
for those involved or those witnessing an event.
Finally, historians have begun to analyse the history o f  specific memories and their 
effects. Henry Rousso (1991), for example, analysed how the French were haunted by 
the “Vichy Syndrome”. Thus, history can treat memory (official and local) as a 
legitimate object of historical research and contribute important insights.24 As such, it
23 For example, Alessandro Portelli identifies a huge gap between the local and the national-official 
memory of a mass execution by German troops at the Fosse Ardeatine during the Second World War. 
See: Portelli, 2006.
24 See: Evans and Lunn and their analysis of the memory of eyewitnesses mentioned in the study by 
Ronald Frasier (“The blood of Spain”) in: 1997: xvii.
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will highlight the history of the effects of certain events in the past, but also the effect of 
certain memories of those events.
1.3 Practices of collective memory
Politics is seen as being heavily involved in providing important ‘memory resources’, in 
particular, in the cases of monuments, museums, school textbooks, and curricula of 
official history classes. Governments are depicted as occupying the realm of ‘gate- 
keeping’, i.e. letting certain information and interpretation pass, while withholding 
others. But this evident influence of governments is sometimes overstated. Recent 
literature claims that there are many other forms of memory ‘resources’ that cannot be 
tightly controlled by political means, ranging from narratives to buildings, songs, 
dresses, books, films, documentary or memory as re-enactment of events in the past 
(Irwin-Zarecka, 1994:11-13; Assmann, 1995:125-133). Also, those ‘memory offers’ 
that are heavily informed by politics do not have to match with ‘experience supply’. 
Marginalised groups within societies reproduce their memory of a remembered 
common past often quite successfully - even if the public sphere (or the public sphere of 
a group) is controlled by the government or by dominant individuals. Public 
commemoration requires a certain permissiveness of the public spheres in order to 
provide a suitable framework for the groups’ experiences.25 Although the influence of 
politics on the provision of those resources is very high, the impact on the actual use of 
those resources for the remembrance of experience may be limited. This reinforces the 
point made earlier that frameworks of memory need to be reconciled with individual or 
sub-group experience.
There is a common thread through the literature on collective memory, namely, that it is 
used by politics to legitimate policies and the present political order. However, if  the 
link between legitimising political orders and collective memory is stated as a general 
proposition, how are cases, where political legitimacy is produced without collective 
memory, to be explained? If it is only collective memory that is responsible for political
25 This aspect, as I will show in the next chapter, is of central concern to Habermas.
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legitimacy, the key concept of politics needs to be presented and the relation to 
collective memory clarified. And if there are other aspects besides collective memory 
that are deemed influential for the establishment of political legitimacy, then those other 
factors and the relation between them have to be conceptualised. In any of those 
questions raised by this assumed link, it is of paramount importance to provide a 
concept of political legitimacy. If such claims are to be sustained, I argue, there needs to 
be a notion of politics that helps to understand the impact of collective memory on 
political legitimacy; for, otherwise it remains a simple statement whose opposite can 
claim to be just as true.26
Many commemorative events sustain collective memory by the mere fact of repetition, 
which supports an idea of continuity. One of the important practices of collective 
memory is a collective re-enactment of past events. As Halbwachs has pointed out, 
commemorations and ceremonies are central means of establishing collective memory. 
They help to bond as group or nation, to express the meanings and significance attached 
to the events of the past in public. A ritual as “rule-governed activity of a symbolic 
character which draws the attention of its participants to objects of thought and feeling 
which they hold to be of special significance” (Steven Lukes, quoted in Connerton, 
1989:44) is an important type of practice that helps to establish and represent collective 
memory. As with rites, the force of parades, commemoration ceremonies and other 
bodily practices (Connerton, 1989: passim; Winter and Sivan (eds.), 1999:29-39) lies in 
their repetitiveness.
Those practices are complemented by numerous memory sites, places, habits or events 
that represent the continuity of the group or society and its perceived characteristics to 
themselves in time. Those sites are often identified with museums, memorials or 
commemoration sites. However, as Pierre Nora claims, those ‘memory sites’ can be 
much more, not being designed specifically for remembering the past or expressing 
continuity of a society, but, willingly or not, contributing thereto (see: Nora (ed.), 1996; 
and Nora (ed.), 2001c). However, as Hodgkin and Radstone (2006:12-13) insist, 
memorials and museums spark particular controversies because they are conscious 
efforts to collectively remember a past. This is much more contested than other memory
26 Given the importance of the question of how politics relates to collective memory, a notion of political 
legitimacy will be provided in chapter 6.
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sites mentioned by Nora, such as the Eiffel Tower for the case of France. Other sets of 
‘memory resources’, such as songs, films, art, cloths, photographies, etc., are provided 
by the cultural realm (Turim, 1989; Lipsitz, 1990; Middleton and Woods (eds.), 2000). 
However, following Halbwachs’ claim that collective memory depends on joint 
practices (including discourses), it is my contention that public discourse and joint 
commemoration, as well as the debates around memory sites are particularly powerful, 
because those interactive elements are central to the establishment and reproduction of 
shared memory, while other ‘memory resources’ often leave open the question whether 
the meaning transported there is actually shared.
In complex groups such as modem societies, where members do not know each other, 
the practices of joint commemoration become more important, although the question 
remains whether or not members of the group actually feel their experiences and 
meanings they attach to an event in the past are being represented. This is why so many 
authors (including Halbwachs) warn against taking national commemoration 
ceremonies, organised by ruling political actors and classes as an expression of 
collective memory. Commemorations and joint practices are also very important means 
in the transition from first-hand experience to represented joint experience. This, again, 
points to a need to develop a critical yardstick or criteria to judge the permeability of the 
public sphere were collective memory is established. This is the case, for example, in 
the commemoration of the First World War (as, in fact, of many other earlier events): 
while collective memory was heavily informed by eye-witnesses, testimonies and 
original documents at the beginning, with the vanishing of the first-hand generation, 
commemorations and joint discourses on the war became more important, only to yield 
their role of places to create and reproduce the collective memory of World War I, to 
memory sites and cultural memory resources.
Governments have many means to control access to information and monopolise in 
some areas dominant representations of collective memories, such as in the organisation 
of national commemorations or in history classes. While governments effectively 
control the availability of information in the context of history classes, some analysts of 
history school books warn against reading off from the text of those books the 
appropriation and use of those frameworks by the pupils (Barton and McCully, 2003).
46
1.4 The emotional, cognitive and practical-moral dimensions of collective 
memory
As has been previously discussed, Halbwachs claims that the collective memory of a 
group also influences the perception of that group: collective memory attaches certain 
meaning to a specific past, which, in turn helps the group to interpret similar events or 
facts in very much the same way. This is what I regard as the cognitive dimension of 
collective memory: members of a group recognise a certain event as being similar or 
alike to something remembered or as being related to a remembered past. In those cases 
the remembering leads to similar meanings’ being attached to new situations and events 
based on the collective memory. This is what some authors refer to as ‘societal beliefs’ 
or ‘societal images’ (Bar-Tal, 2003:85). Thus, collective memory has a cognitive 
dimension that directs perception, helps to interpret situations and provides orientation. 
Images are picture-like subjective imaginations that direct our thinking and our action. 
Experiences are processed by images in such a way as to create certain expectations and 
social patterns of interpretation, which directs our attention and our processing of 
information in the present. Thus, they show an amazing stability despite changes in the 
environment.
The more distant the image becomes, the more details get lost, and the more the 
concrete and specific image turns into a general notion (Halbwachs, 1992:188). When 
we construct an image of a person or an event, we do not want to depict all the details, 
but rather, to present the characteristic, the typical. An image, therefore, compresses the 
historical dates by constructing one situation or characterisation that captures the 
assumed essence of that event or person (Halbwachs, 1992:61). From the rather 
concrete image further transformations can take place to make it a general notion: the 
concrete details of the event or person are suppressed and a general notion, bare of any 
limitations caused by references to a specific person or event, is created. The movement 
from event over image to concept could be seen as a ‘de-contextualisation’ of 
experience:
Images can be transmitted socially only if they are conventionalised and 
simplified: conventionalised, because the image has to be meaningful for an 
entire group; simplified, because in order to be generally meaningful and
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capable of transmission, the complexity of the image must be reduced as far as 
possible (Fentress and Wickham, 1992:47-48).
In addition to the cognitive dimension, there is also an emotional dimension of 
collective memory: it is not only that certain events or dates are remembered, but also 
the emotions that are attached to them (which may change of time due to present
77interpretation). Feelings of hurt, grief, guilt, shame, pride, accomplishment, or others 
are part of the remembering past events. Often this emotional dimension is very clearly 
identified by the naming of the remembered event. Be it the ‘betrayal of Dunkirk’ or the 
‘Diktat of Versailles’, naming the event is often linked to the attachment of the feeling 
that a group holds toward a past event. As psychologists point out, grief and mourning 
gain particular importance when violent pasts, such as wars, are remembered:
Those people are involved in memory work, that is, public rehearsal of 
memories, quite often [...] act in order to struggle with grief, to fill in the 
silence, to offer something symbolically to the dead, for political reasons. In 
most of their immediate concerns, they tend to fail. The dead are forgotten; 
peace does not last; memorials fade into the landscape (Winter and Sivan (eds.), 
1999:18).
The massive loss of loved ones, for example in wars, is a heavy burden for all survivors 
and a clear imprint to structure collective memory. Psychologists have long insisted 
that the commemoration of past wars and remembering traumatic events or tragedies is 
also part of dealing with the feelings that event provokes (Winter, 1994). Part of the 
reasons for the selection by groups and societies of specific events is precisely the 
emotions they recall. Douglass and Vogler, paraphrasing Nietzsche, suggest that 
“History is what hurts” (Douglass and Vogler, 2003:5). In other words, collectively 
experienced painful events are particularly remembered in order to treat them in one 
way or another. By contrast, other authors like Anthony Smith (1999) claim that often a 
‘glorious past’ is remembered to elevate the self-esteem of the group or society. 
Whatever the specific emotion or feeling that influences the selection of certain events, 
it is important to keep in mind that collective memories do not only remember facts or 
meanings established between facts in the form of a narrative, but they also remember -  
and, thus, reproduce -  certain feelings and emotions held by the group.
27 On this aspect see: Schudson, 1995:346-364; Pennebaker, Paez and Rime (eds.), 1997.
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Now, the way the group or society deals with the feelings and emotions they remember 
exerts considerable influence on the process of remembering. In the case of war or mass 
violence, one possible, and, often, common, way is repression of those feelings and 
consequent avoidance of public remembrance. Another often identified mechanism is 
victimisation, whose consequences Daniel Bar-Tal describes:
As the numbers of human losses grow, societies develop beliefs about being 
victimised by the opponent. These beliefs focus on the losses, death, the harm, 
the evil and atrocities committed by the adversary, while they delegate the 
responsibility for the violence solely to the ‘other’ (Bar-Tal, 2005:86).28
A more dramatic form of victimisation is what Vamik Volkan (1988) calls ‘narcissistic 
victimhood’, where one’s own atrocities are seen as a mere defence, while the adversary 
is dehumanised and de-rationalised. All three types of reaction (repression, 
victimisation, narcissistic victimhood) are examples (and not an exhaustive list of 
possible reactions) that suggest an influence on the selection and interpretation of past 
events and facts. Thus, the remembering of certain feelings and the dealing with those 
remembered feelings influence each other, but should be kept separated analytically, 
because they are part of different practices and structuring processes.
Collective memories also entail a practical-moral dimension. Through collective 
memory, the group represents the group to itself by using the past. This collective self­
representation is one important element for collective action. A consciousness of a 
collective ‘we’ is the precondition of what this ‘we’ wants to do as a group. In other 
words, collective memory has a practical dimension. As was mentioned earlier, events 
and persons are not remembered for the sake of it, but because of their significance for a 
specific group. This significance, imbued in a meaning attached to those events or facts 
also includes a value judgment on the content of remembering in the form of good/bad, 
pride/shame, etc. Memory therefore also includes a moral judgement that directs action 
toward those events. For example, if  the remembered event was traumatic, the memory 
also contains an answer to the question of what should be done to avoid such an 
experience in the future. Or a particular memory may imply an obligation to the dead or
28 See also: Devine-Wright, 2003:15.
29 One practical prescription to deal with those traumatic feelings is trauma work. On trauma work see: 
LaCapra, 1998 and Caruth (ed.), 1995.
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the group as a whole. If a region, ritual, person has been deemed important or sacred, 
current group members might be imbued with the obligation of worship or to imitate 
them. The concrete practical-moral imperatives deriving from collective memory may 
vary over time within a group or between groups. In this context, the study of myths 
provides important insights into the practical-moral aspects of collective memory:
Myth is [...] a shorthand for a particular interpretation of a historical experience 
or policy, or a policy with some acknowledged historical antecedents, that is 
invoked in the present to justify certain policies (Buffet and Heuser (eds.), 1998: 
ix).
For Heuser and Buffet the remembered past event mobilises both emotional and moral 
appeal to support certain causes of action. Thus, it is not that, first, collective memory is 
established and, then, the practical consequences are discussed, but collective memories 
themselves encode practical-moral imperatives. The most accomplished forms of those
<5 A
practical-moral imperatives are “lessons learned from the past”. As some authors have 
observed, those guides to practice are based for most groups on a moral judgment, not a 
pragmatic assessment of options. Remembered pasts, invested with emotions, create 
obligations, a righteous and rightful way.
Although in practice collective remembrance creates a collective memory with these 
three dimensions, thus forming a unity, it is important to separate the three dimensions, 
not only for theoretical reasons. The contested nature of collective memory can be 
identified for each of the three dimensions discussed above: First, there may be 
disagreement and contestation on the cognitive aspect of collective memory, 
disagreement on the narrative or the linking of specific events by meanings and 
significance. This means, the remembered past would be labelled in a different form, 
while other aspects would be preferred. Thus, historical analogies between past and 
present events would be rejected: the situation of, say, Iraq 1991 does not resemble the 
situation of Munich 1938. This is a cognitive disagreement. Second, there may be 
disagreement on the emotions encapsulated in memories. For example, there has been 
widespread disagreement on emotional and moral judgment of the German soldiers on
30 Examples of those lessons that go beyond foreign policy makers are: Dower, 1999; Fromkin and 
Chace, 1985.
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the Eastern front. Recalling those events triggered quite different emotions that were 
also expressed publicly (pride versus shame). Remembering the French Revolution 
triggers very different and opposing emotions in France. Some remember it as a source 
of pride, of Enlightenment others remember it as the greatest carnage in modem French 
history and the beginning of France’s international and domestic decline.
Finally, there may be very different ‘lessons learned’ for different groups. What are the 
lessons of World War II? What was the lesson of the Vietnam War? Even the 
consensual claim “Never again” may have different practical consequences: “Never 
again Hiroshima” may mean never to allow a militaristic regime to take over Japan 
again; it may mean never to be disadvantaged technologically; it may mean to refrain 
from producing, possessing and using atomic weapons. Thus, even if there is agreement 
on the cognitive or emotional dimension of collectively remembering, say, Hiroshima, 
there may be disagreement on the practical-moral imperatives that follow from that 
remembered event. This last dimension has a potentially high impact on the formulation 
of policies and politics in general.
All three dimensions are analytically, and from the nature of discourses, to be separated: 
the cognitive discourse looks at the truth claims regarding the appropriateness of 
analysing a situation (whether or not it resembles a remembered situation in the past); 
the practical-moral imperatives are part of a practical discourse, which inquires about 
the right course of action, while the emotion evoked by a remembered past is very much 
informed by personal experience or the position of the group in this event. In practice, 
however, those three dimensions are related to each other, condensed in historical 
analogies and myths, providing a package of answers to all three aspects. 
Notwithstanding, one important analytical task of studying collective memory is to 
separate those three dimensions.
At the same time, not all social and political groups are necessarily equally interested or 
active in all three dimensions of collective memory. Although they might have ideas 
about practical-moral imperatives from, say, the Holocaust of the European Jews during 
the Second World War, their activities might be more directed towards the emotional 
and cognitive side of it. It is my contention that cognitive and emotional memory groups 
have been much more researched and documented than political memory groups, who
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advance predominantly practical-moral imperatives derived from the past. It is that 
latter type of social group that is at the centre of this thesis. In this work I argue that 
they are important intermediary groups that explain the impact of collective war 
memories on international politics. It is to these groups that I now turn.
1.5 Political memory groups
Politicians are well aware of the weight that political-moral imperatives derived from 
past experiences exert on the political debate, especially if those are clearly identified as 
‘lessons’ learned by society from an event that this society deems important -  even if 
for negative reasons. This is why the arguments based on collective memory, in general, 
and collective war memories, in particular, are powerful in the political discourse.
In the past, single politicians have been cited as having their own memory of the past, 
according to which they guide their actions in the present (for example, Charles de 
Gaulle or Helmut Kohl). However, following Halbwachs’ insistence on the need for 
social support, it seems pertinent to draw attention not to individuals, but rather to social 
groups engaged in public remembering. Memory groups come, thus, to the foreground. 
The term ‘memory groups’ refers here to those groups, which actively take part in joint 
commemoration that goes beyond their own group boundaries. In other words, they are 
groups that participate in the creation of a collective memory, of which they are but one 
part. Transcending their own self-commemoration, memory groups may be interested, 
for instance, in the cultural realm or in the emotional dimensions of collective memory.
Within the larger set of social groups participating in the collective remembering of past 
events, there are groups that have a particular interest in advancing the practical-moral 
imperatives they derive from collective memories. These groups, which are central to 
this dissertation, will be referred to as ‘political memory groups’ and are to be 
understood as interest groups or social movements, which, lacking a broader political 
agenda, advance specific policies based on a remembered past -sometimes, but not 
always, through the existing political parties. As a case in point the 1950s-“without 
me”-movement against rearmament in West Germany comes to mind.
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The relationship between political parties and political memory groups deserves a closer 
look. While political parties fulfil the fundamental function of transmitting ideas, values 
and interests from society to the state authorities, something that might include 
furthering policies explicitly based on practical-moral imperatives derived from a 
particular interpretation of the past, they do not limit themselves to that. By contrast, 
political memory groups exist solely with the purpose to advance narrower political 
demands or policy preferences, derived explicitly and predominantly -  if  not 
exclusively- from a collectively remembered past. In their quest to further their 
demands, political memory groups often resort to political parties; yet on - rather 
exceptional -, occasions they may also act outside the existing party structure.
By focusing on ‘political memory groups’, so conceived, this work seeks to 
conceptually grasp those -  admittedly rare -  cases that go beyond party politics. 
Moreover, the emphasis on political memory groups enlarges the picture beyond 
governmental statements and policies regarding the past. In this context, the risk of 
taking the national, official memory for granted, or at face value, as the framework that 
citizens use in structuring their experience and remembering, is reduced.
Given these additional considerations on the study of collective memory, the definition 
of collective memory should be extended:
Collective memory is the public reconstruction o f  a selected past by the members o f  
social groups that has significance and perceived relevance to the experience o f  the 
group as a whole, as well as its members - a significance they convey through the 
memory by attaching meanings and values to them, and which group members share 
through public discourses and commemorative practices. As a result, collective memory 
forges the individual memories o f group members, directs perceptions, helps them to 
remember and deal with emotions and prescribes morally-bound action.
The main interest of this thesis lies with political memory groups that draw practical- 
moral imperatives from collective war memories. What exactly is meant by these latter 
and why they should be approached as a specific type of collective memory will be 
discussed in the next and final section of this chapter.
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1.6 The characteristics of collective war memories
Like in any form of collective memory, in collective war memories there is a 
competition between social frameworks about the meaning, emotions, and practical- 
moral imperatives of past wars. Much of what has been stated for collective memory 
also applies to collective war memory. Collective war memory can, therefore, be 
defined as:
The public reconstruction o f a selected aspect o f  wars or organised violence by the 
members o f social groups that has significance and perceived relevance to the 
experience o f the group as a whole, as well as its members- a significance they convey 
through the memory by attaching meanings and values to them, and which group 
members share through public discourses and commemorative practices. As a result, 
collective war memory forges individual memories o f group members, directs 
perceptions, helps to remember and deal with emotions, and prescribes morally-bound 
action.
Experience of war should by no means be reduced to the experience of battles, but, 
rather, it encompasses the entirety of the experience of soldiers, partisans/resistance 
fighters, non-combatants and civilians being affected by war, occupation, liberation and 
the perceived consequences of war. For Winter and Sivan the complete war experience 
is a traumatic one:
War is trauma, a situation of overwhelming, extreme, and violent pressure with 
enduring impacts. It disrupts equilibriums and requires an effort to restore them. 
That effort (intentionally or not) contributes to the processes of remembrance 
[...] (1999:9).
Central to remembered war is the fact that, at the heart of remembering, there is the
- j i
massive loss of life of loved ones by the conscious action of another group or country. 
Hence, the mourning or remembering of consciously inflicted death is one of the 
essential aspects of collective war memories.
31 For Bar-Tal, it is the massive violation of the “sanctity of life”, with its irreversible effects, that makes 
war memories so painful, albeit necessary (2005:79).
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War may create new memory groups or affect the bonding of existing memory groups. 
As authors like Daniel Bar-Tal have argued, in the specific form of war memories, often 
lays the seed for ongoing violence and war:
The monuments and cemeteries, then, are constant and enduring reminders about 
the losses suffered in conflict, the sacrifices made by patriots and heroes and the 
malevolence of the opponents. In one sense and during certain periods they 
represent concrete investments in the continuation of the conflict. [...] Rituals 
and ceremonies related to the violent conflict, which commemorate particular 
battles, wars and especially fallen members of the society, are another 
expression of the culture of violence. [...] They glorify battles and wars, the 
heroism of those who participated in the events, the martyrdom of those who 
fell, the malevolence of the enemy and the necessity to continue the struggle in 
fulfilment of the patriotic ‘will’ of the fallen (Bar-Tal, 2005:89).
The nature and kind of war also influences the possibility of collective remembering. To 
be sure, the most difficult wars to be remembered are civil wars and unsuccessful 
secession wars. In both cases the adversary or enemy is still within the polity and may 
feel as the ‘loser of war’, while others are perceived to be the ‘winners of war’ and 
behave accordingly (Adam, 1999). This renders social bonding and the construction of 
shared meaning around the war an extremely difficult and often futile task. Another 
difficulty for the emergence of a shared war memory is posed by the ideological 
cleavages and alignments that cut across state boundaries during the war. The Second 
World War, for instance, was characterised by ideological alliances between 
Communists in one country and the Soviet Union, or Fascists or authoritarian regimes 
with Nazi-Germany. If the internal allies of foreign regimes continue to exist after the 
war, creating a shared war memory becomes extremely difficult. By contrast, the task of 
creating shared meanings of past wars and recalling, therewith, similar emotions and 
practical-moral imperatives is made easier when the war is remembered as a liberation 
or defence from an outside enemy, without internal allies or collaborators.
As Halbwachs claimed, memory groups need landmarks. This also applies to war 
memories. A war cannot usually be remembered in its entirety. Hence, it is specific 
instances and events (decisive battles, decisions, alliances, victories) or locations (Dien 
Bien Phu for the French or Stalingrad for Germany and the Soviet Union) that condense 
certain experiences, developments or values to be remembered. If those landmarks are 
absent, as Martin Evans claims for the Algerian War, remembering becomes difficult
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(Evans, 1997b:74). Finally, if  wars are carried out on specific ideological or racial 
motives, and if  these motives do not match the values of the present society (such as the 
wars of de-colonisation, or Nazi-Germany’s war of extermination in Eastern Europe), 
those events are also difficult to remember for the perpetrators and their subsequent 
generations. Thus, the nature of wars exerts a considerable impact on the ways of 
remembering the war.
Wars create different memory groups. Some of them may be lobby-groups for the social 
security of the retired, seriously wounded or incapacitated soldiers, widows and/or 
orphans of soldiers; others might have more explicit political agendas. The fact is that 
since war affects entire societies, there is usually a wider range of political memory 
groups related to war than there might be in other types of memory. As I mentioned 
above, looking at political memory groups, as opposed to focusing exclusively on 
political parties, might help to provide a more accurate picture of the complexities of 
war memories and their impact on politics.
This chapter has sought to clarify key terms such as collective memory, individual 
memory, practical-moral imperatives, political memory groups as well as the 
characteristics of collective war memories. The next chapter, in turn, will introduce the 
Critical Theory of communicative action of Jurgen Habermas and set the ground for the 
analysis of how this can be fruitfully applied to the question of how we can analyse the 
impact of collective war memories on international politics.
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Chapter 2
A framework for the study of collective war memories 
and international politics: Habermas’ Critical Theory1
Collective memories, in general, and collective war memories, in particular, are 
constitutive parts of societies. Understanding changes in the form, and societal function, 
of collective war memories begs questions about the conceptualisation of the wider 
social and political context in which remembering of past wars takes place. For, in the 
absence of such an understanding of society and societal development, I believe, such 
changes go unexplained.
As chapter 1 pointed out, the public remembering of past wars is not only a symbolic, 
but, also, a communicative action that shapes and expresses the three dimensions of 
collective war memories (cognitive, emotional, practical-moral dimension). Habermas’ 
Critical Theory of social evolution, which focuses on the evolution of communicative 
action, provides a valuable lens to look at the wider context in which the collective 
remembering of past wars takes place. Two reasons account for this; first, it highlights 
the becoming of social phenomena and renders them historical, not given objects of 
study. Second, Habermas’ theory provides insights into changes of communicative 
action within societies that also suggest different forms of identity formation, including 
of remembering -this latter being understood as a communicative, not a mental act.
This chapter aims to provide a better understanding of the broader framework in which 
the phenomenon of collective war memories will be discussed. More specifically, the 
general framework provided in this chapter will be used as departure point for tackling 
two specific theoretical concerns; namely, how to apply the concept of social learning in 
remembering past wars in modem societies (chapter 3), and how to conceptualise 
political legitimacy (chapter 6), so that this concept might aid our understanding of the 
impact of collective war memories on specific decisions in international politics. It is in
1 In recent years there has been a proliferation of approaches in the social sciences, which characterise 
themselves as “critical”. In order to distinguish these approaches from the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt 
School, in this text I will capitalise this latter.
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fact my contention that the concept of social learning in collective memory and the 
concept of political legitimacy, as developed in this thesis, provide, together, two 
important instruments in the study of collective war memories in IR.
In this chapter, as indeed in the rest of the thesis, I claim that Habermas’ theory, with its 
emphasis on communicative processes and the historicity of ideas, practices and values, 
enables us to understand the emergence, historical becoming and transformation of 
collective war memories, and, building upon the more general contributions of the 
Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School, can aid our comprehension of the surge and 
transformation of collective war memories, as well as their impact on politics.
The first section of this chapter will introduce main characteristics of the Critical 
Theory of the Frankfurt School, some of whose authors, such as Walter Benjamin, Max 
Horkheimer or Theodor W. Adorno were concerned about the relationship of societies 
to their past -in  fact, the very term “Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheif (“dealing with 
the past”, “coming to terms with the past”) was coined in West Germany by Adorno in 
1963 (Adorno, 1996:125-146). This, and the emphasis of the Frankfurt School on the 
historical becoming of social phenomena renders looking at Critical Theory and its 
application to the study of collective memory a fruitful exercise. The second part, in 
turn, will concentrate on the Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas, who has often been 
referred to as the “second generation of the Frankfurt School”. Habermas’ participation 
in the so-called “Historians’ Debate” in 1986-1987 in West Germany, on the role of the 
remembered past for present identity-formation, encapsulates this author’s awareness 
of the importance of collective memory for the constitution of present societies. In the 
third part, I will focus on two specific aspects of Habermas’ theory that are particularly 
relevant to this work. I refer to his concept of social evolution as rationalisation and his 
theory of communicative action -including his discourse ethics. In the fourth and final 
part, I will discuss the application of Habermas’ Critical Theory to specific questions 
regarding the study of collective war memories.
2 This aspect will be dealt with extensively in chapter 4.
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2.1 Characteristics of the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School
To comprehend something we must, to begin with, perceive it in its immanent 
connections with other things and examine the conditions under which it exists 
and becomes (Theodor W. Adorno).3
‘Critical Theory’ refers to a type of theory developed by the Frankfurt School in the 
1920s -  1960s, and later modified by Jurgen Habermas. To be sure, there exists not one 
Critical Theory, but many Critical Theories. In fact, the boundaries of Critical Theory 
are a matter of continuous scholarly debate.4 Despite the shifting focus and demands of 
their individual approaches, all Critical Theorists coincide in their critique of empiricist 
science and metaphysical thinking: on the one hand, they all see metaphysical or 
abstract theories as a product of subjective reason and imagination, without any 
grounding in either empirical facts or the historical processes themselves. On the other 
hand, Critical Theorists maintain that empiricism neglects history as a socio-historical 
process and, thus, reifies the observed.5 Out of this “double front” against abstract 
theorising, on the one hand, and a limitation to research of the empirical environment, 
on the other hand, the Frankfurt School developed an approach that aimed to combine 
empirical research with social philosophy into one form of reflection, for which, in 
1937, Max Horkheimer coined the term “Critical Theory” (Horkheimer, 1992:205-259).
In other words, Critical Theory supports social research by analysing objects in the 
present but, at the same time, seeks to reflect on the developments (beyond historical 
circumstances) that gave rise to this phenomenon (say, nationalism, or, the modem state 
etc.) and are responsible for this phenomenon’s becoming. Following Marx and Hegel, 
Critical Theorists do not seek to identify arbitrary or circumstantial factors, but focus, 
rather, on essential factors they call praxis. For this -  ambitious -  task Critical Theories 
have -  despite the many different versions -  three characteristics in common:
3 Quoted in: Held, 1995: 214.
4 On the specific research interest of the Frankfurt School between 1920 and 1950s see: Dubiel, 1988. On 
the different manifestations of Critical Theory within the Frankfurt School see: Held, 1995. For a general 
introduction to Critical Theory that focuses on the period of the Frankfurt School see: Arato and 
Gebhardt, 1982 and Jay, 1973.
5 Adorno, Marcuse and Habermas departed from that critique against empiricist science to develop their 
respective versions o f Critical Theory. On Adorno and Habermas see: Adorno et al. 1976.
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1) The central role of human praxis: Critical Theory does not focus on ‘practices’ at 
random, but focuses on essential collective human practices that are necessary for the 
reproduction and collective survival of societies. This anthropological reflection has 
given rise to the notion of praxis as developed by Marx (and different from the use of 
the word by the ancient Greeks), which refers to essential collective human activities 
that can be found in any society and whose different organisation explains the social 
formation of societies.6 In its early stage (1920s to 1930s) the Frankfurt School 
followed Marx and identified social labour as the praxis that produces and reproduces 
societies. Habermas, in turn, made the same reflection, but identified both 
communicative “interaction” and “social labour” as two parts of praxis. Consequently, 
for Critical Theory, the becoming of empirically observed phenomena is the result of 
praxis.
2) The mediation of different spheres of society through one another: Critical 
Theorists claim that the effect of praxis on society and individuals is neither direct nor 
straightforward. Assuming such a direct impact would render a theory deterministic or 
mechanistic (Jay, 1973:42). Instead, Critical Theory identifies different spheres of 
society that are mediated through one another in historically different ways and both 
influence and are influenced by praxis. Within the tradition of the Frankfurt School, not 
only has praxis been defined in different ways, but also the definition of the spheres (or 
systems) and their relative importance in the reproduction of societies has differed. 
However, the actual impact of those spheres on each other and on praxis is a matter of 
historical research, not a matter of theoretical debate. Thus, the analysis of society has 
to “grasp and investigate the context of relations and mediations, the developments and 
transformations, the whole of human practice of which any given object is a part” 
(Marcuse, quoted in Held, 1995:228).
3) The task of self-reflection: Critical Theorists maintain that any theory is part of 
social praxis and, therefore, needs to rest on a ‘double reflexivity’. That is to say, it 
needs to understand (i) the factors that created the need for a certain theory (genesis of 
theories) and (ii) the use (including the political use) that will be made of this theory 
(application of theories). The neglect of self-reflection is a charge made by Critical
6 On the notion of praxis as developed by Marx and modified by the Frankfurt School and a critique of 
both see: Bubner, 1971. On praxis and the difference to action see: Bernstein, 1972. On the privileged 
position of social labour within collective human action in Marx see: Riedel, 1994:6.
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Theorists against empiricist theories. By highlighting the becoming of phenomena and 
by identifying the forces that go into the reproduction of a certain phenomenon or order, 
Critical Theory seeks to create a consciousness, not only of its historicity, but also of the 
possibility to transform it. A seemingly natural object, institution or social formation, 
thus, turns into a historical one and may require legitimating for its continuous 
existence. Being conscious of those forces is a precondition for changing them in such a 
way as to emancipate oneself from their impact, which might have been hitherto 
regarded as natural or inevitable.7
In sum, Critical Theory’s critique of empiricist science leads to three common features, 
which should enable Critical Theory to go beyond empiricist science, rather than to 
reject it altogether: its notion of praxis, its definition of different social spheres and their 
interaction, and its self-reflexivity. Furthermore, the reference of Critical Theory to 
“praxis”, as the essential collective human activities that structure societies, also 
prevents a random selection of “practices”. The insistence on “praxis”, as opposed to 
post-structuralist “practices”, rests on the assumption that essential activities can be 
found in any society, something that justifies their privileged position in the analysis.
By its own standards, Critical Theory should contribute to advance the study of 
collective memory by helping to account for the becoming of national war memories 
and by highlighting the factors that may lead to a transformation of the current 
manifestation of this phenomenon.
2.2 The main features of Habermas’ Critical Theory
Between the 1960s and 1980s, Jurgen Habermas developed a theory of social evolution 
based on a notion of praxis and the definition of different spheres of society. While in 
his theories Habermas ultimately abandoned many assumptions of the Frankfurt School, 
most notably, a philosophy of history and historical materialism as methods of analysis,
7 As Habermas points out, the subject experiences the emancipatory power of reflection with itself to the 
degree that its formation process becomes transparent to itself. See: Habermas, 1991b: 243-244.
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he continued to adhere to the three elements of Critical Theory mentioned above as 
fundamental for the study of societies.
The aim of this section is to introduce Habermas’ theory; first, by explaining the core 
assumptions and categories related to Habermas’ notion of praxis and, later, by 
introducing the different evolutionary stages that Habermas identifies for each sphere of 
praxis. Since the critical approach to the study of collective memory presented in this 
work will be derived from Habermas’ theory, the following discussion relies mainly on
o
Habermas’ own writings, rather than on secondary interpretations of his work.
2.2.1 Habermas9 notion of praxis: work and interaction
Habermas identifies two different types of social action as praxis: work [Arbeit] and 
interaction [Interaktiori]. “Work” refers to those activities that are aimed at securing the 
material survival of societies. Controlled observation, empiricist social science and 
natural science are part of work: through the establishment of causal links and models, 
the knowledge about objects allows predictions and increases the likelihood of 
successful intervention in the natural and social world. Work produces a science that 
aims at explaining, predicting and controlling external objects and puts it at society’s 
disposal (empirical science). By contrast, “interaction” refers to activities that create 
inter-subjectively valid meaning between humans, such as the definition of situations 
and events, the validity of certain norms and the self-understanding of social entities 
(identity-formation). Interaction produces a science that focuses on understanding 
(hermeneutics). The difference in knowledge, which each form of praxis produces, also 
implies a different method to analyse the current state of work and interaction within 
any given society.
Habermas refers to all institutions of work as “systems”, and to all institutions of 
interaction as “lifeworld”. Each set of institutions integrates its members in different
8 For an introduction into the different debates concerning Habermas’ theory see: Rasmussen (ed.), 1996;
and McCarthy, 1978. While for this work I have consulted some English translations of Habermas’ 
writings, most of the sources quoted are originally written in German. In such cases the translations are 
mine, and so I state it in the pertinent footnotes.
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ways. Institutions of lifeworld integrate their members through communicative action 
and fulfil the function of socialisation, social integration and identity formation:
Under the functional aspect of mutual understanding communicative action 
serves to transmit and renew cultural knowledge; under the aspect of co­
ordinating action, it serves social integration and the establishment of solidarity; 
finally, under the aspect of socialisation, communicative action serves the 
formation of personal identities. The symbolic structures of lifeworld are 
reproduced by way of the continuation of valid knowledge, stabilisation of 
group solidarity, and socialisation of responsible actors. The process of 
reproduction connects up new situations with the existing conditions of 
lifeworld [...] (Habermas, 1987b: 137-38).
A hermeneutic analysis of the narratives helps us understand the spheres of interaction. 
An understanding of social integration reveals, in turn, the intentionality of action (what 
does a society, according to its self-understanding, want or aim to do?), the self- 
understanding and meaning framework of a society (who and what are we?) and the 
normative structure accepted by its members. This analysis, Habermas claims, can only 
be made ‘from within’, from the self-understanding of collective actors [Verstehen 
approach], because controlled observation cannot unlock the shared norms, meaning 
frames and identity formations that are central to lifeworld, which can be found in any 
society.
Systems, by contrast, integrate their members through system integration, which, 
according to Habermas, refers to:
[...] The specific steering performances of a self-regulated system. Social 
systems are considered here from the point of view of their capacity to maintain 
the boundaries and their continued existence by mastering the complexity of an 
inconstant environment. [...] From the system perspective, we thematise a 
society’s steering mechanisms and the extension of the scope of contingency 
(Habermas, 1976:9-10).
Systems increase their complexity in order to control the external environment and to 
offer technical solutions to problems and threats to the physical and material survival of 
society. Systems require factually true statements about the external environment in 
order to develop that complexity (Habermas, 1988a:34; 1995b:222-223). They integrate
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their members into the acquaintance of technical rules to follow and co-ordinate action 
through generalised media, not communicative action (as lifeworlds do).9 Habermas 
regards the spheres of production, public administration and warfare as systems 
specialised in securing the survival of societies (1988b:288).
Furthermore, for Habermas, societies need to be seen as systems that must fulfil certain 
functions and imperatives in order to survive, disregarding the individual intentions of 
action. Those imperatives structure possible outcomes of action and their impact on 
outcomes of action cannot be understood through hermeneutics, which reveals only the 
self-interpretation and self-understanding of societies. Societies need to be thought of as 
self-adapting systems that have to overcome problems of material reproduction or other 
threats to their survival, whose successful counter-strategies limit the range of possible 
options- options members of the society may not be aware of. This aspect of social 
praxis, Habermas argues, can only be grasped by an observer’s perspective [Erklaren 
approach] that looks from the outside at society.
Work and interaction influence each other in historically specific forms, and both are 
mediated through the normative structures of societies (laws, rules, norms, written 
customs): the imperatives of systems need to be anchored in the normative and 
institutional structure of lifeworld, otherwise they will not be systematically fulfilled 
(Habermas, 1988a:457-458). According to Habermas, systemic imperatives need to be 
included into the normative structure and the self-interpretation of collectivities in order 
to trigger and stabilise the action that is necessary to carry out functions that are vital for 
systematic survival (1988b:240). Habermas regards, therefore, the normative structure 
of societies as the ‘fault line’ between system and social integration10: while rules, 
norms and laws need to stabilise action that satisfies the imperatives of systems, they 
also need to be reconciled with the self-interpretation of collectivities and their 
normative traditions:
[...] the flexibility of normative structures [...] does not depend solely, nor
primarily, on consistency requirements of the normative structures themselves.
The goal values of social systems are the product, on the one hand, of the
cultural values of the constitutive tradition and, on the other, of the non-
9 On the idea of generalised media see: Habermas, 1988a: 457-459.
10 For a further elaboration on this dual structure of norms and laws in Habermas see: Rehg, 1996, 
especially p. 177.
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normative requirements of system integration. In the goal values, the definitions 
of social life and the survival imperatives that can be reconstructed in system 
theory, are connected (Habermas, 1976:7).
Thus, argues Habermas, the current state of normative structures of societies gives a 
good indication of the part of praxis that dominates overall societal reproduction.11
To sum up, in Habermas’ theory, societies show a particular form of work as well as 
interaction, and both dimensions of praxis need to be taken into account in the 
understanding of the reproduction of a specific society. Work and interaction refer to 
empirically identifiable, different sets of institutions. Habermas refuses to reduce 
societal reproduction either to systems or lifeworld: for one thing, if the analysis of 
societies is reduced to identity formation, discourse analysis or the self-interpretation of 
participants, the analysis is based on three unsustainable assumptions: (a) the 
independence of culture from other, non-communicative aspects of society; (b) that the 
self-interpretation of societies is correct (not an ideology, conscious lie or simply 
wrong) and (c) that participants are autonomous in their reproduction of lifeworld.
For another, reducing the formation and transformation of societies to the systemic 
perspective leaves out all aspects of social integration, in particular the intentionality of 
societies. Habermas proposes a two-step analysis of the historical manifestation of 
praxis in societies (1976:8-9), where a hermeneutic approach reveals the cultural 
reproduction, the social integration and socialisation of members (interaction), while a 
system theoretical approach of the same society identifies the imperatives for physical 
and material survival (work) (1988b: 180).
2.2.2 Rationalisation processes according to Habermas
Habermas, like the late Frankfurt School, abandoned the idea that History follows a 
certain path or moves toward a certain goal that is described by the term of Reason. 
While Habermas rejects the idea of telos in History, he still defends the Enlightenment 
idea in the sense that certain “rationalisations” are possible. So Habermas’ description
11 Habermas, 1988b:458. Habermas regards the evolution of normative structures as the ‘pace maker of 
social evolution’, because it enables the implementation o f new forces of production and the increase 
societal complexity. See: Habermas, 1995b:35.
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of the rationalisation of praxis is both a potential for a more rational society (normative 
aspect) and a description of societal development (empirical aspect), which is 
conceptualised as “social evolution”:
The theory of evolution does not refer to History in its entirety nor does it focus 
on specific events, as far as those events are conceptualised as a sequence of 
narratable historical events. Instead, the historical material is scrutinised under 
the perspective of social evolution. This is not a macro process that takes place 
within a species [...] Evolution can be identified through the rational 
reconstruction of a hierarchy from closed to more open structures. If we separate 
those structures from events [...] we do not need to assume any one- 
dimensionality, continuity, necessity or irreversibility of historical trends. We 
assume some deep-seated anthropological structures that have been developed in 
the process of hominisation, which mark the starting point of social evolution. 
[...] Those structures are a description of the room for learning that is deduced by 
logic. Whether or when those new structures emerge is a matter of contingency 
(Habermas, 1995b:248).12
Habermas identifies different possible stages or organisational principles in each sphere 
of praxis. In other words, work and interaction change over time; so does the relation 
between the two spheres. The analysis of the different possible stages in each sphere of 
praxis is what constitutes Habermas’ theory of social evolution. However, as the quote 
above indicates, Habermas does not seek to provide a history of civilisation or a 
philosophy of history (in contrast to the early Frankfurt School), where one empirical 
epoch has to follow onto the next by necessity, or where the different forms of praxis 
are deduced by necessity from the previous form. Instead, Habermas describes possible 
stages.
As I mentioned before, Habermas does not only argue that both spheres of praxis 
change over time, but he also claims that there is an evolution within the two spheres, as 
well as in the relation between the two spheres. The possible ascendance from one stage 
of development of praxis to another is what Habermas, following Max Weber, calls a 
rationalisation process. Habermas attaches to different stages of praxis a specific 
capacity for learning (1988a: 104-105). Those potentials for learning, in turn, transform 
systems and lifeworlds. For Habermas societies do not only learn in the evolution of
12 My translation.
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new forces of production but also in interaction, i.e. the way their social norms and 
identities are produced. In sum, Habermas’ theory of social evolution also focuses on 
the evolution of cognitive, communicative and interactive competencies in societies 
(1995b:134).13
2.2.2.1 Rationalisation processes in lifeworld
To be understood and to interact meaningfully at all, a background storage or 
background understanding, that is the ensemble of cultural and meaningful ideas, 
traditions, values, and knowledge, is a necessary pre-condition. Following the 
hermeneutician Hans-Georg Gadamer and the phenomenologist Edmund Husserl, 
Habermas calls this background knowledge “lifeworld”.14 Within his theory of social 
evolution Habermas assumes a rationalisation process between the two spheres of 
praxis, systems and lifeworlds, but also within each sphere:
I understand social evolution as a second-order process of differentiation: 
system and lifeworld are differentiated in the sense that the complexity of the 
one and the rationality of the other grow. But it is not only qua system and qua 
lifeworld that they are differentiated; they get differentiated from one another at 
the same time (Habermas, 1987b: 153).
Habermas takes as an imagined starting point of his theory the social evolution of 
archaic or primitive societies with mythical world-views. Those societies, Habermas 
claims, are dominated by social integration that is carried out by a unified world-view, 
often based on mystical or religious thinking. Unified cultural systems of interpretations 
or world-views guarantee a meaningful context in which the subjective and social 
intentions are coordinated (1988a:73). In those societies the main reason for a very 
analogical and specific interpretation of the external world is the massive uncertainty 
and threats to physical survival from the external world. Those threats are ‘interpreted 
away’ through concrete, super-natural myths that dominate the natural and the social 
world to the same degree.
13 See also: Held, 1995:330.
14 On the notion of lifeworld in Habermas’ social theory see: Habermas, 1988a:107.
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At the same time, those mystical and magic explanations limit the possibility to learn 
about external nature and, thus, to overcome external threats. Furthermore, those 
mythical worldviews do not enable those societies to make a distinction between natural 
objects that can be manipulated and human subjects, who are responsible for language 
and social action. Equally, mystical world-views conflate the external world with the 
social and inner world of the individuals of a society (1988a:81-82). This renders them 
‘closed systems’ of thought in two ways: firstly, they do not allow the differentiation 
between the world of external objects, the social and the inner world. This prevents the 
emergence of a consciousness about the fact that unified world-views prescribe social 
norms, guarantee collective understanding and the sharing of definitions and meaning 
through likewise interpretations of the environment. This lack of differentiation further 
limits the ego-formation and individual identity to prescribed forms- in fact, individuals 
do not have a notion of identity at that stage. Unified world-views also fail to be 
reflexive, i.e. to realise that they are worldviews or a tradition (1988a:85).
The first rationalisation within unified world-views -  Habermas claims - is the 
transition from mystical world-views to polytheistic world-views, followed by 
monotheistic world-views, which are passed on to metaphysical systems of thought that 
grant Reason the place of God as a unified point of explanation or legitimisation. All 
those unified world-views aim at interpreting the world, as such, from a unified concept 
(Reason, Will of God); yet they detach themselves increasingly from the specific 
empirical content and become more formal and, thus, more open to different content 
and critique, than specific manifestations do. Habermas asserts that formal world-views 
are more rational as they allow a greater growth of knowledge (1988a: 103-4).
The next stage of rationalisation of lifeworlds is what Habermas calls the de-centring o f  
world-views. Habermas argues, with the child psychologist Jean Piaget, that societies, 
like human beings, show certain stages of moral and cognitive development: a child 
learns to differentiate a world of objects, a social world and an inner world to which it 
has a privileged access. Through social interaction, the child learns to distinguish 
between the external universe and a parallel separation between the social and 
subjective world. This process is called a ‘decentring of an egocentrically dominated 
world-view’ (Habermas, 1988a: 106). The de-centring of world views (one unified 
source of justification and explanation) means that each sphere of interaction, i.e. the
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self-expression of societies and individuals (identity formation), the legitimisation of 
values and norms and the knowledge on the external world takes place in specialised 
discourses and is no longer deduced from one single logic.
Only with the separation of lifeworld into three distinct spheres, there is a need to co­
ordinate the interpretations and validity claims in those spheres through communicative 
action (1988a: 106). The three different parts, which learn (in principle) through 
communicative action, revolve around different validity claims: theoretical discourses 
inquire into the truth of statements and aim at accumulating those statements in order to 
use them for other means; practical discourses focus on the rightfulness of behaviour 
and sanctions, prohibit or legitimise specific action; and expressive discourses ask about 
the truthfulness of representation, in particular of collective and individual identities. By 
contrast, unified world-views, such as religions, give answers to all three validity claims 
and do not permit a focus on one only. With the de-centring of world-views language 
assumes new tasks of social integration that had been hitherto carried out by religion or 
mythical worldviews:
[...] language no longer serves merely to transmit and actualise prelinguistically 
guaranteed agreements, but more and more to bring about rationally motivated 
agreements as well; it does so in moral-practical and in expressive domains of 
experience no less than in the specifically cognitive domain of dealing with an 
objective reality (Habermas, 1987b: 107).
Language, then, is not only a transmission belt for pre-established validities; it 
increasingly needs to ascertain and reach the acceptance of validity claims.15 With the 
de-centring of world-views there is a consciousness that truth and normativity are not 
given a priori, but that they require justification and good reasons for the acceptance of 
certain truth claims (theoretical discourse) or claims for rightful behaviour (practical 
discourse). The problematisation of validity claims and the possible redemption through 
arguments is the rationalisation of lifeworld that gives communicative action its 
importance for social reproduction. The more this process of decentring advances within
15 This also gives a historical perspective to Halbwachs’ general claim that collective memory requires 
social meaning and bonding. According to Habermas’ theory o f social evolution, this only applies to de­
centred lifeworlds.
69
lifeworld, the more previously unproblematic validity claims in the objective, social and 
internal worlds become contested.
According to Habermas, lifeworld is a storage of interpretation efforts by previous 
generations (1988a:449). This accumulated stock of shared interpretations ‘in the back 
of participants’ is the necessary presupposition for any meaningful conversation or co­
ordination of action. But with the de-centring of world-views, hitherto valid norms or 
traditions become the conscious object of communicative action - that is to say they 
become the object of an attempt (that can fail) to weigh reasons for or against the 
continued acceptance of that value or norm. As such, de-centred lifeworlds undermine 
the pre-established validity claims and replace them with a procedure that re-establishes 
shared understanding and acceptance:
The more the worldview that furnishes the cultural stock of knowledge is 
decentred, the less the need for understanding is covered in advance by an 
interpreted lifeworld immune from critique, and the more this need has to be met 
by the interpretative accomplishments of the participants themselves, that is, by 
way of risky (because rationally-motivated) agreement, the more frequently we 
can expect rational action orientations. Thus [...] we can characterise the 
rationalisation of the lifeworld in the dimension ‘normatively ascribed’ versus 
‘communicatively achieved agreement’ (Habermas, 1984:70).
Thus, while rationalised societies increasingly question validity claims, these are 
necessarily only a small proportion of all validity claims in lifeword, given the 
‘hermeneutic condition’ of lifeworld.
The decentring of a unified world-view into its components allows the development of 
institutions that focus on one validity claim, either the question of true statements about 
external objects (modem empirical science), or questions about legitimate action (legal 
systems and moral institutions) and a set of institutions dealing with self-expression of 
individuals and collectives (aesthetic institutions). Each set of institutions is guided by 
different validity claims for which it needs to provide justifications through 
communicative action. As soon as this separation takes place within world-views, each 
human sphere can learn progressively through specific forms o f  arguments and specific 
forms o f  learning. The objective world through generalised hypotheses, the social world
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through reflexive questioning of norms and the subjective world through aesthetic 
reasoning (Habermas, 1988a:109).
Moreover, Habermas claims, this process of de-centring de-links systems that aim at 
securing the collective survival from lifeworlds. The external world is de-mystified and 
becomes the object of systematic analysis and observation. This objectification of the 
external world allows an enormous increase in knowledge that can be used to control 
and manipulate external objects. Therefore, systems concentrate on true statements and 
use them for instrumental action. At the same time, lifeworlds are released from the 
task of securing the survival of society and limit their functions to the reproduction of 
values and shared meanings, ego-formation and the development of normative 
structures through communicative action. Only in those three symbolically structured 
areas does communicative action assume the role of producing agreement on specific 
validity claims.
The three spheres of lifeworld - culture, society and personality -  are themselves open 
to specific rationalisations after the de-centring of world-views. All three spheres can 
assume three different stages that Habermas develops by drawing on Lawrence 
Kohlberg’s model of moral consciousness. Kohlberg identifies three stages of moral 
consciousness in personal development: the pre-conventional, conventional and post- 
conventional stages. In the pre-conventional stage individuals learn the ascribed roles, 
values, truth and identity; in the conventional stage they recognise the conventionality 
of the content and learn to differentiate between a concrete content and the form of a 
value system, identity or norm - but they do not question the form itself. Only in the 
post-conventional stage do humans question the appropriateness and rightfulness of the 
form. In other words, humans become reflective upon the conventions they acquire and 
apply in social interaction, as well as the form and content of identity. Habermas argues 
that these stages can also be found in the development of societies.16
Habermas applies the three stages of Kohlberg to the development of world-views 
(cultural reproduction), the evolution of normative structures (social integration) and 
identity-formation (socialisation). In each sphere of lifeworld he identifies the pre-
16 For a further elaboration on Kohlberg’s theory and its application to social evolution see: Habermas, 
1999b: 127-206. See also: Browning, 1996:84.
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conventional, conventional and post-conventional stages as potentials for social 
evolution. Each subsequent stage increases the capability of learning and is therefore 
seen as more rational (Habermas 1995b: 179). The first rationalisation leads to the 
structural differentiation between system and lifeworld on the one hand, and between 
the three spheres of lifeworld on the other hand; the second rationalisation within each 
sphere of lifeworld entails an increasing separation of form and content, whereas the 
third rationalisation sees a reflexive appropriation of the sphere of lifeworld (values, 
norms, identities) (Habermas, 1988b:218).
Rationalisation in value systems: Cultural knowledge in mystical world-views is tied 
to specific contents and a specific social entity. The more formal the value systems 
become, the more they are able to detach themselves from concrete empirical examples 
and create a critical awareness between those values and the examples of those values. 
Habermas argues that the universalisation, generalisation of values and concepts creates 
a greater potential for learning and growth of knowledge than concrete, particular sets of 
values. Finally, the more de-centred world-views become, the less agreement is to be 
found a priori. The de-centring of world-views, furthermore, allows the transition from 
a conventional to a post-conventional moral consciousness. The more cultural traditions 
prescribe validity claims that are binding, the less members of society have a 
consciousness or a chance to relate to those validity claims with ‘yes’ or ‘no’ (Habermas 
1988a:107-108).
Rationalisation in normative systems: Although Habermas insists that normative 
structures are not only the outcome of communicative action, he claims that the 
reproduction process of normative structures can also be identified with one of 
Kohlberg’s Stages of moral consciousness. However, Habermas adds that the degree of 
rationalisation in societal norms also expresses a degree of personal emancipation and 
self-realisation (1993:354). Thus, in the pre-conventional stage, only the consequences 
of action are judged: members of society follow norms in order to avoid punishment 
and to achieve positive gratification; in the conventional stage, actors become aware of 
different roles and laws, they understand generalised expectations of behaviour attached 
to certain roles (whoever the person to assume that role) and they judge the intentions 
and orientations to norms; however, they still do not question the norms themselves. In 
the conventional stage of moral consciousness, norms need to satisfy the criteria of
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coherence and stringency. A predictable procedure and a coherence of values encoded 
in the legal and normative system of a society ensure an understanding of the 
conventional normative structure of society. Norms become justified with reference to 
general principles as opposed to particular preferences. But with the de-centring of 
unified world-views those normative structures lack an overall justification, which can 
only come from within - that is, from the members of society themselves.
It is only at the post-conventional stage that the norms themselves are judged 
(Habermas, 1995b:71, table la). This rationalisation of the normative structure leads to 
a formalisation similar to the value systems. In other words, norms become increasingly 
formal and universal (accommodating different contents). Finally norms lose any 
legitimating power from outside (God, King, Reason) and need to be justified through a 
process, a procedure that is itself subject to justification. At the post-conventional level 
any content of norms is subject to a revision by an agreed process. No content is 
accepted a priori as rightful. Norms at this level also need to be seen by participants to 
express a generalisable will to be accepted within a practical discourse. At the post- 
conventional level, legitimacy can only be established a posteriori. Habermas claims 
that with the decentring of world-views and the reflectiveness of normative structures 
there is simply no way back to a previous stage.
Rationalisation in identity-formation: A parallel evolution of norms is possible with 
respect to an ever more inclusive membership: the more norms are applicable to a wider 
range of different members of society, the more universal and abstract they need to be. 
At the same time, the definition of membership itself changes from the acceptance of 
the group one is socialised into (pre-conventional stage) to a reflexive appropriation of 
those criteria for defining membership -  including a conscious change of membership. 
This leads to the third area of rationalisation in lifeworld: identity formation. At the pre- 
conventional level identities are not regarded as such, but appropriated as socialised and 
found. At the conventional level different roles and identities can be discerned without 
the possibility of questioning them in their entirety. Even within that stage Habermas 
identifies a move from concrete role identities (within the family, for example) to more 
abstract and more complex role systems such as that of political order (1995b:24). Only 
at the post-conventional level, however, do members of society make a conscious effort 
to select those parts of their biography that they regard as part of their identity, which
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they choose to take responsibility for (conscious judgement on pre-given personal 
history).
As Habermas points out, collective identities are not homogenous actors writ large; 
instead personal and collective identities are complementary and linked to each other. 
The more concrete and particular a membership of a society is, the more limited is the 
possibility for individuals to relate to their own personal identity. The more abstract and 
formal the definition of membership becomes, the more autonomy do individuals have 
in developing their own identity and the greater the variety of empirical manifestations 
(Habermas, 1988b:88; and 1995b:30).
In modem societies those highly complex individual identities can only be reconciled 
on the basis of general principles. Therefore, collective and individual identities 
stabilise and require each other. No content of personal or collective identities is 
accepted at the post-conventional stage any longer a priori, it is subject to a conscious 
process of construction, selection and judgement. As is the case with norms, the 
reflectiveness of identity leads to a stress on the process rather than on the specific 
content (Habermas, 1995b: 107). Individuals assume an identity in their childhood 
through socialisation and social integration. At a later stage this naively assumed 
identity is put to the test by reflection and selection.
While Habermas rejects a causal link between the different spheres of lifeworld, he 
argues that a post-conventional moral consciousness in culture requires a post- 
conventional stage in society and identity-formation and vice versa (1995b:93-94). For, 
the process of de-centring of world-views and the increased rationalisation of normative 
structures afford individuals the opportunity to develop a greater variety of identities. 
Under the umbrella of universal principles of norms, a greater individuality and 
individual autonomy becomes possible.
In sum, Habermas’ theory of social evolution identifies certain rationalisation processes 
in lifeworld. One is from unified world-views to de-centred world-views, where three 
different discourses are prevalent in each sphere of life-world (norms, values, 
identities). With the de-centring of life-worlds into the three spheres, societies can learn 
enormously, but they also need to re-establish mutual understanding and agreement
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increasingly through communicative action, which had been hitherto provided by 
tradition. Based on L. Kohlberg’s model of moral consciousness Habermas argues that 
after the de-centring of unified world-views, a pre-conventional, conventional and post- 
conventional stage of evolution is possible in the spheres of identity-formation, 
normative structures and the self-expression of cultural values. These rationalisation 
processes in each sphere require, in turn, an increasing universalisation of moral and 
legal norms, of membership as well as different manifestations of personal identities 
that adhere to ever more abstract and formal principles (Habermas, 1988b: 127). The 
more language takes over the function of mutual understanding, co-ordination and 
identity formation through communicative action, the more the rationalisation potential
• 17of lifeworlds can be realised and new forms of social learning become possible.
2.2.2.2 Rationalisation processes in systems
The integration of members of society that takes place via processes of reaching 
understanding is not only limited by the force of competing interests but also by 
the weight of systemic imperatives of self-preservation that develop their force 
objectively through the action orientations of the actors involved (Habermas, 
1984:398).
The decentring of unified world-views also opens up the possibility to develop success- 
oriented thinking (instrumental reason) according to its own logic and its own criteria of 
validity. Systems develop an ever more complex structure (for example through the 
division of labour) in order to increase the capacities that help them to solve technical 
problems of survival. Systems are co-ordinated by generalised media or ‘generalised 
languages’, such as money, that allow a much higher level of complexity and prevent 
failed agreements, as in the case of communicative action. The role of money, for 
example, is to socialise participants into certain behaviour and to prescribe certain 
technical rules if participants want to survive in the system. Habermas characterises this 
de-linking of the economic system from lifeworld as a rationalisation because it 
increases dramatically the control over external nature and provides the conditions for 
an efficient way of organising the material reproduction of society. This de-linking from
17 Habermas 1988b: 132. However, although the shift from unified world-views onto communicative 
action increases the possibility of rationalisation, this process also increases the risk of dissent, of failed 
attempts to reach an understanding. See: Habermas, 1988b:393.
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other spheres of society helps to increase the instrumental rationality through empirical- 
analytical knowledge.
Both forms of social praxis, interaction and work, can assume different forms that are 
not entirely historically contingent, but also subject to certain stages of rationalisation. 
At which stage a specific society can be found at a specific historic time is a matter of 
historical research.
2.3 Habermas’ theory of social evolution and discourse ethics
Habermas not only identifies rationalisation processes in praxis and the role of 
communicative action at a certain stage of rationalisation, but he also asks how norms 
and rules are best re-established in a post-conventional society through communicative 
action. In his theory of communicative action, which is a part of his theory of social 
evolution, Habermas analyses the necessary and conducive conditions in 
communicative actions in order to enhance the chances of re-establishing a mutual 
understanding on norms, values and collective self-expressions (identities). It is this 
area to which we now turn.
The aim of communicative action is to reach consensus or agreement on validity claims 
concerning the rightfulness of norms or the truthfulness of expressive behaviour of 
individuals and groups through argumentative means, i.e. speech acts:
[...] I shall speak of communicative action whenever the actions of the agents 
involved are coordinated not through egocentric calculations of success but 
through acts of reaching understanding. In communicative action participants are 
not primarily oriented to their own individual successes; they pursue their 
individual goals under the condition that they can harmonise their plans of action 
on the basis of common situation definition. (Habermas, 1984:285-286).
Most of the validity claims raised in communicative action are made unconsciously, or, 
in Habermas’ words, “naively”, and go, therefore, unchallenged (Habermas, 
1996c:241). It would be illusory to assume that all mutual understanding is reached by
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communicative action. However, Habermas claims that increasingly validity claims are 
no longer pre-given by tradition, but subject to conscious reflection, debate or 
disagreement. Post-conventional societies increasingly require discourses to re-establish 
agreement where tradition fails to provide mutual understanding: “Normative agreement 
has to shift from a consensus pre-given by tradition to a consensus that is achieved 
communicatively, that is, agreed upon [vereinbart]” (Habermas, 1984:255).
Thus, the inherent goal of communicative action is a co-operative effort of reaching 
mutual understanding. This achievement is unique to communicative action and cannot 
be the result of instrumental or strategic interaction:
Agreement can indeed be objectively obtained by force; but what comes to pass 
manifestly through outside influence or the use of violence cannot count 
subjectively as agreement. Agreement rests on common convictions. The speech 
act of one person succeeds only if the other accepts the offer contained in it by 
taking (however implicitly) a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ position on a validity claim that is in 
principle criticisable. [...] Reaching understanding is the inherent telos of human 
speech (Habermas, 1984:287, italics in original).
As such, communicative action depends upon a certain social development that 
Habermas identifies within modem societies. Once validity claims are no longer naively 
reproduced through communicative action, they need to be dealt with on the level of 
discourses, if  they should command a sense of obligation and agreement again. Post- 
conventional societies are increasingly aware of the naive transmission of values, norms 
and self-expressions through communicative action and challenge their validity. 
According to Habermas, if naively accepted validity claims are challenged, interlocutors 
have three choices:
As soon as this consensus is shaken, and the presupposition that certain validity 
claims are satisfied (or could be vindicated) is suspended, the task of mutual 
interpretation is to achieve a new definition of the situation which all 
participants can share. If their attempt fails, communicative action cannot be 
continued. One is then basically confronted with the alternatives of switching to 
strategic action, breaking off communication altogether, or recommencing action 
oriented to reaching understanding at a different level, the level o f  argumentative 
speech [....] (Habermas, 1991a:3-4. My italics)
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Discourse is for Habermas the reflective form o f communicative action, where 
participants switch to argumentation in order to uphold, modify or abandon validity 
claims. In a discourse participants focus on the validity claims and try to mobilise good 
reasons to uphold, reject or modify them. In order to concentrate on this objective, 
Habermas identifies certain characteristics of discourses. They
• deal only with the subject matter of contested validity claims
• are not decided by producing additional information
• are not settled by certain (pragmatic) requirements for action
• are guided by the only motivation of reaching a co-operative understanding
• treat any validity claim as hypothetical (even those that currently enjoy recognition) 
(Habermas, 1995c:130-131)
In discourses, actors interrupt communicative action, step out of a certain context of 
action and concentrate on an argumentative ‘game’ that decides on contested validity 
claims. On such a level, discourses cannot be decided by coercion or by contributing 
empirical data, but only by arguments, by providing valid reasons. In discourses in their 
pure form, only the “forceless force of the better argument” will decide the outcome. A 
discourse “produces” only arguments, not information; it is not part of an action and is, 
therefore, experience-free. A discourse is also different from a compromise. The latter, 
Habermas claims, has the purpose of striking a balance [Ausgleich] between particular 
and often contradicting interests, whereas discourses try to find a common interest and a 
common ground as a result of arguments (Habermas, 1999b:82-83).
According to the validity claims raised, Habermas differentiates a discourse on the 
claim of truth (theoretical discourse) from a discourse on the appropriateness and 
righteousness of prohibitions, norms, or imperatives (practical discourse). Practical 
discourses on norms, as all discourses, are decided not by an arbitrary approval, but by 
an acceptance of justifications or arguments in favour or against certain validity claims: 
“Yes/no positions on normative validity claims do not spring from a contingent freedom 
of choice but the binding force of good reasons” (1987b:215).
These “good reasons”, Habermas claims, are the binding force of norms that coercion 
cannot replace and that are the ultimate rational basis of practical-moral validity claims. 
In the very last instance actors accept norms, if  they can mobilise arguments to defend 
the validity claim of that norm (or if they could mobilise arguments if they were asked
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to defend the norm). “Good reasons” are not merely a matter of empirical research, 
Habermas claims, but actually an understanding of the logic why these arguments and 
reasons command agreement within a community:
The interpreter would not have understood what a ‘reason’ is, if  he did not 
reconstruct it with its claim to provide grounds, that is, if  he did not give it a 
rational interpretation [....] The description of reasons demands eo ipso an 
evaluation, even when the one providing the description feels that he is not at the 
moment in a position to judge their soundness. One can understand reasons only 
to the extent that one understands why they are or are not sound, or why in a 
given case a decision as to whether reasons are good or bad is not (yet) possible 
(Habermas, 1984:115-116; italics in original).
Habermas identifies those good reasons as the internal connection between the factual
18  ♦validity of norms and the obligation or acceptance to adhere to those norms. This 
result of a successful practical discourse is where the moral obligation comes from. It is 
not -  and cannot be -  the result of coercion or strategic interaction.
Following Emil Durkheim, Habermas claims that any moral norm has to be in the 
interest of all those concerned. This intrinsic claim may and must be tested within a 
practical discourse: If a norm can be regarded as being “good for all those present at a 
practical discourse” it has the chance of being accepted and command a moral 
obligation by all those participants of a practical discourse. The difference in interest is 
where Habermas sees (besides giving ‘good reasons’) the second reason for the moral 
force of practical discourses:
In the process one will cite to another the reasons he has for willing that an 
action be declared socially binding. Each member must be convinced that the 
proposed norm is equally good for all. And this process is what we call practical 
discourse. Any norm that is put into effect via this route can be called justified 
because the fact that the decision is reached through a process of argumentation 
indicates that the norm deserves to be called equally good for all concerned 
(Habermas, 1995d: 71).
18 “Hence the empiricist notion that norms obligate only to the extent that they are backed up by well- 
founded expectations of sanctions neglects the fundamental intuition that the non coercive binding force 
is transferred from the validity of a valid norm to the duty and the act of feeling obligated” (Habermas, 
1993a: 52).
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Through a practical discourse, Habermas claims, the actual gerieralisability of moral 
norms can and should be identified (1991c:22). Accordingly, the moral principle in 
practical discourses is the basis that ensures that the results and side effects, that are 
likely if certain norms are adhered to, can be accepted by all without being coerced to 
do so (Habermas, 1991c: 12). This validity claim remains in force, until a new discourse 
modifies or refutes it (the idea of the fallibility of validity claims).
Habermas admits that most norms are not the result of a practical discourse, but often a 
mixture of strategic and communicative action:
The general presuppositions of argumentation cannot be easily fulfilled because 
of their rigorous idealising content. Rational discourses have an improbable 
character, existing like islands in the sea of everyday practice (1993a:56).
Habermas readily concedes that the rightfulness of norms is hardly ever decided by the 
‘forceless force of the better argument’ alone. But his point is not a normative 
judgement from outside, but actually a reconstruction of the necessary assumptions 
within communicative action and discourses to be conducted at all. Habermas draws on 
the theory of argumentation developed by Karl-Otto Apel (1980), and other theories of 
linguistics and language to argue that everybody who engages in a discourse on validity 
claims necessarily has to assume that certain conditions are met that make it meaningful 
to engage in such a discourse (even if it can be shown that these conditions have been 
hardly present). The approach that identifies the necessary presupposition that 
everybody makes when engaging in a discourse is what Habermas calls “universal 
pragmatics”19:
[...] in every real process of argumentation the participants unavoidably 
undertake [...] a ‘projection’. They must make a pragmatic presupposition to the 
effect that all affected can in principle freely participate as equals in a 
cooperative search for the truth in which the force of the better argument alone 
can influence the outcome. On this fact of universal pragmatics is founded the 
fundamental principle of discourse ethics: only moral rules that could win the
19 “The task of universal pragmatics is to identify and reconstruct universal conditions of possible 
understanding [Verstandigung\. In other contexts one also speaks of ‘general presuppositions of 
communication’ but I prefer to speak of general presuppositions of communicative action because I take 
the type of action aimed at reaching understanding to be fundamental” (Habermas 1991a:l).
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assent of all affected as participants in a practical discourse can claim validity 
(1993a:49-50).
Habermas reconstructs the necessary pragmatic prerequisites that have to be sufficiently 
fulfilled in the eyes of the participants, before they decide to engage in an argument. 
With the help of universal pragmatics, Habermas seeks to illustrate the necessary 
assumptions that one has to make when deciding to enter into an argumentation game. 
 ^ The more those necessarily assumed conditions are present in the discourses, the more 
the potential for rationalisation in norms, identities and values is realised. Thus, those 
conditions are normative and intrinsic within discourses at the same time.
Habermas highlights the reasons why humans refrain from engaging in argumentation 
with, say, a wall, or in a situation where the linguistic goals of arguments cannot be 
attained. In the absence of an assumption that the necessary conditions are sufficiently 
met, there is no meaningful engagement into discourse. Habermas identifies the sum of 
the necessary presuppositions to engage in discourse as the “ideal speech situation”:
The ideal speech situation is neither an empirical phenomenon nor a mere construct, 
but rather an unavoidable supposition reciprocally made in discourse. This 
supposition can, but need not be, counterfactual; but even if  it is made 
counterfactually, it is a fiction that is operatively effective in the process of 
communication. Therefore I prefer to speak of an anticipation of an ideal speech 
situation [...] (Habermas, 1999c:180).20
Habermas characterises the necessary presuppositions of an ideal speech situations as 
follows:
• We assume that the other is capable of understanding our utterances and that she is 
able of using the appropriate medium of communication (this includes the capacity 
to change the level of communication, if  necessary)
• Only generalisable interests can find consensus under those circumstances
• We treat each other as equal and free individuals who participate equally
• Any outside force is absent
9 1• The only force to be accepted is the “forceless force of the better argument”
However, if for the participants it is evident that certain norms are imposed by force 
alone, or that the presuppositions of a practical discourse are not sufficiently met, they
20 My translation.
21 On a full list o f presuppositions see: Habermas, 1995c:171-183; Habermas, 1982. See also: Held, 
1995:345.
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may be made obedient to follow the norms, but they may not grant a moral obligation to 
them (Habermas, 1995c:553). The less the conditions for an ideal speech situation are 
given, the less likely is a sense of moral obligation towards certain norms. The presence 
or absence of these conditions can be analysed empirically.
These presuppositions are also the source of Habermas’ discourse ethics, a normative 
claim on when norms should be valid (1991c: 12-13). For Habermas any norm or 
validity claim should only be accepted, or can be regarded as being reasonable, if  it is 
the outcome of a discourse where the presupposed, idealised conditions are sufficiently 
met. The ideal speech situation is, ultimately, the basis for Habermas’ critical standard 
for empirically identified norms, values or forms of self-expression. Habermas 
distinguishes between the facticity of norms and their worthiness of being valid. 
Habermas’ idea of rational practical discourses focuses entirely on procedural matters 
and argues that the results of a practical discourse that meet the idealised 
presuppositions agreed upon by consensus are rational (1991c:201). Thus, Habermas 
departs from a so-called consensus theory of truth that also applies to practical matters 
(1999c). Habermas insists that we cannot deduce from the fact that a norm is adhered to 
or not rebelled against that it enjoys validity in the eyes of those that follow it:
We must distinguish between the social fact that a norm is intersubjectively 
recognised and its worthiness to be recognised. There may be good reasons to 
consider the validity claim raised in a socially accepted norm to be unjustified. 
Conversely, a norm whose claim to validity is in fact redeemable does not 
necessarily meet with actual recognition or approval (Habermas, 1995d: 61).
Habermas rejects the idea that the outside observer can judge the rationality or “true” 
validity of norms. At the same time, he does not refrain from making a critique of 
seemingly socially accepted norms, but uses his ideal speech situation as a yardstick to 
criticise the becoming or current validity of existing norms. Norms may either suppress 
generalisable interests or claim to be in a general interest, while they express only the 
interest of some (Habermas, 1995c:529).
In conclusion, Habermas points to a further rationalisation of lifeworld in the realisation 
of the ideal speech situation. He identifies universal criteria intrinsic in discourses that 
focus on re-establishing mutual understanding and agreement, where a conscious doubt
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about the validity of certain claims has been raised. These criteria can be used to 
criticise existing norms and rules and their inherent claim to express a general interest.
2.4 Developing a Habermasian framework for the study of collective war memories
For the sake of clarity, I would like to recapture the main points of Habermas’ Critical 
Theory that are relevant to the study of collective war memories, before going on to 
develop the specific concepts that will be used in this work. Habermas’ Critical Theory 
is based on a notion of praxis that combines “work” and “interaction”. While the 
rationalisation and changes in what Habermas calls “work” is much better developed 
and documented through authors such as Max Weber, Karl Marx, Niklas Luhmann, in 
fact, it is “interaction” that is of particular importance and interest to Habermas’ Critical 
Theory (without neglecting the role of “work” and “system integration” from the picture 
of societal reproduction). Interaction is based on mutual understanding that needs to be 
established through speech acts of language from a certain level of development 
onwards. For Habermas “interaction” can increase the capacity of societies to learn in 
several possible stages.
Following Lawrence Kohlberg Habermas distinguishes between the pre-conventional, 
the conventional and the post-conventional levels of social learning. He regards the area 
of identity-formation, values and aesthetic self-expression and normative structures 
(rules, laws) open to these three levels. In post-conventional societies, norms, values 
and self-expressions require justification, as does the way of justifying their validity.
The only way to re-establish an agreement, say, for a norm, where citizens have the 
consciousness that it is a norm that requires justification, is through a practical discourse 
that focuses entirely on reaching mutual understanding by mobilising arguments and 
good reasons for the validity of this norm. Habermas describes the procedures in a 
practical discourse and the necessary conditions for it to work at all. One of the 
minimum criteria for Habermas is the assumption by participants that there is a 
sufficient chance of convincing by arguments. If participants feel that this minimum is 
not present (for example in the case of coercion or an impression that no sufficient or 
any openness to arguments), the practical discourse might simply fail. Habermas’ point
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is not that the only way to reach agreement is through practical discourse as defined by 
him. Other possible means are, in fact, coercion or compromise (an agreement based on 
mutual interests without necessarily sharing or even accepting the interests or course of 
action of others) and they may well replace a practical discourse. However, Habermas’ 
argument is that participants who reach an agreement without any practical discourse do 
not feel an obligation towards that agreement. They may respect the agreement out of 
self-interest, tradition, inertia or other priorities.
Habermas highlights the necessary conditions for a moral obligation (however remote 
from empirical reality this might be). These conditions are spelt out in Habermas’ ideal 
speech situation. They provide a critical yardstick against which agreements on values, 
norms or identities can be judged. The more the discussion or discourse approaches 
those conditions, the more we can expect participants in this discourse to feel a moral 
obligation toward the agreements. Finally, using the term of “generalisability” 
Habermas assumes that under conditions of the ideal speech situation, a tendency 
towards universal values or norms is to follow.
Those are, in a nutshell, the main points of Habermas’ Critical Theory, which may help 
to advance our knowledge in the study of collective war memories and to the central 
question posed in the introduction: namely, how can we study or analyse the impact of 
collective war memories on international politics? I would now like to discuss the three 
main areas where, I claim, Habermas can help to further our knowledge on the questions 
posed; namely, (a) an understanding of the rise of national collective war memories 
based on the Habermasian concepts of praxis and rationalisation (chapter 3); (b) an 
application of the concept of social learning to the remembering of past wars (chapter 3) 
and, (c) the development of a concept of political legitimacy, which helps to advance 
our understanding how collective war memories contribute to the legitimating of 
decisions in international politics.
Collective war memories, as defined in chapter one, form part of what Habermas 
identifies as lifeworld: as other elements of lifeworld, they also depend on mutual 
understanding and shared meanings. Thus collective war memories also form part of 
socialisation and social integration processes. Here, we find again the hermeneutic 
condition that Halbwachs already identified for collective memory in general. It is
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interesting to note that Habermas identifies warfare as part of “systems” and not 
lifeworld. This may apply to the actual warfare on the battlefield, but given longer wars 
and the memories of wars, there are clear references to aspects of the lifeworld (such as 
memories, identity, values).
Habermas also provides a notion of praxis that helps to grasp the logic of becoming of 
collective war memories in modem societies. It is my contention that additional insights 
about the emergent role of collective war memories in modem societies can be gained 
by looking at the rationalisation processes in lifeworld and its implications on collective 
war memories (chapter 3). Additionally, as I will argue in the next chapter, the process 
of remembering past wars itself can be distinguished in different levels of social 
learning (pre-conventional, conventional, post-conventional). Thus, collective war 
memories are not only affected by the rationalisation processes of lifeworld, but actually 
show a similar potential for rationalisation themselves. This aspect will be explored in 
detail in the next chapter.
The conditions of practical discourse, in turn, provide important clues as to how to 
understand the ways in which collective war memories add legitimacy to international 
politics in post-conventional societies. Such a concept of political legitimacy, building 
on Habermas’ idea of practical discourse, will be developed in chapter 6. Developing 
these two concepts (social learning in collective war memories and political legitimacy) 
together advances our knowledge of the impact of collective war memories on 
international politics and, ultimately, contributes to the knowledge about collective war 
memories in the study of IR. The suitability of those two concepts to empirical research 
will be illustrated in chapters 4 and 5 (on social learning in collective war memories) 
and chapter 7 (analysing the legitimating impact of collective war memories on 
international politics).
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B. Studying the rise and transformation 
of national war memories with a 
Habermasian concept of social learning
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Chapter 3
National war memories and the Habermasian 
rationalisation processes in Western Europe
Chapter 2 introduced Habermas’ Critical Theory of social evolution and -  in general 
terms -  the steps of rationalisation in what he calls systems and lifeworlds. According to 
the assumption of Critical Theory, the different forms of praxis (defined as the 
combination of “work” and “interaction” by Habermas) help us to understand the rise or 
decline of certain phenomena beyond historical circumstances. In this chapter, I 
propose, first, to describe those processes within the Habermasian categories of system 
and life-world and their rationalisation in more detail for the case of Western Europe in 
order to illustrate them more fully and, second, to highlight the processes that led to the 
emergence and rising importance of national war memories in modem societies as 
means of social bonding and socialisation. The main argument of this chapter is that 
collective war memories were of minor importance to pre-modem societies and that 
they gained increasing importance for societal reproduction in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries.
In the first part (3.1) the chapter looks at the historical process of rationalisation of 
systems (economic system, state bureaucracy, warfare) and lifeworld (identity 
formation, value formation and the creation of norms) in Western Europe; in the second 
part (3.2) it shows how the rationalisation processes that took place with the advent of 
modernity boosted the importance of national war memories for modem societies. In the 
third part (3.3), the chapter goes one step further and develops the argument that the 
process of remembering past wars itself is open to social learning, i.e. that we can 
remember wars in different levels of social learning. Indeed, it is my contention that, 
despite its being an important aspect of collective war memories in the present, this 
potential for social learning has hardly been addressed. I further argue that we are 
currently witnessing a crisis of conventional remembering of past wars as well as some 
signs of the emergence of post-conventional collective war memories (something that
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will be defined in 3.3). This claim, derived from Habermas’ Critical Theory, will be 
illustrated in the following two chapters, where the social learning in collective war 
memories in Germany (chapter 4) and France (chapter 5) will be discussed. Together, 
these three chapters outline a way to approach the becoming of collective war memories 
beyond historical circumstances and the different levels of social learning in 
remembering past wars.
3.1 The rationalisation processes in Western Europe according to Habermas
The masses o f  freed individuals become more mobile - not only politically as 
citizens, but economically as labour force, militarily as conscripts, culturally as 
pupils, who learn to write and read and are thus incorporated into mass 
communication and mass culture (Habermas, 1987a: 165).1
While war has been a constant in human history, modernity brought about fundamental 
changes to warfare and, therewith, to the impact of collective war experiences on 
societies. The term ‘modernity’ is often contested, but there seems to be consensus 
about the fact that ‘modernity’ entails three interconnected processes that began to gain 
momentum in the late eighteenth century: (a) the process of industrialisation and the 
expansion of capital; (b) the process of increased rationalisation and bureaucratisation 
of societies; and (c) the political revolution and process of democratisation that began 
with the French Revolution. This section will discuss each of these processes in the light 
of Habermas’ Critical Theory and will then turn to Habermas’ account of the 
rationalisation of systems (economic sphere, political administration, warfare: 3.1.1) 
and lifeworld (3.1.2), to conclude with a discussion of the impact of those 
rationalisation processes on national war memories (3.2).
As was stated in chapter 2, Habermas characterises the process of modernity as a 
rationalisation process in which systems and lifeworlds became differentiated from each 
other and transformed further in their respective spheres. This process, Habermas 
argues, took place for the first time in Western Europe, where mystical world-views
1 My translation.
were replaced by monotheistic religions and were then followed by the notion of 
Reason in the Enlightenment. This de-centring paved the way for the emergence of 
different sets of institutions that no longer followed one world-view or validity claim. 
This not only made modem jurisprudence and moral philosophy possible, but also the 
rise of empirical-analytical science and the technical use of its results. Moreover, the de- 
centring from religion paved the way for a linear consciousness of time and history. 
Such an understanding furnished the basis for social memory, connecting past and 
present.
After the de-centring of world-views, and the separation of systems and lifeworld in the 
course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Western Europe, further 
rationalisation processes within each sphere of Habermas’ praxis took place. These are 
discussed below.
3.1.1 Rationalisation processes in systems (economic sphere, political 
administration, warfare)
Habermas claims that, with the Renaissance in Europe, empirical-analytical science 
emancipated itself from religion. This was one important ingredient for capitalism to 
emerge. The economic system was de-linked from other parts of praxis and began to 
follow its own logic. This logic also affected the organisation of governments, given the 
mutual dependency between state and economy. A bureaucratic state organisation and a 
capitalist mode of production turned out to be most efficient in securing the material 
reproduction of societies. They were consequently adopted by all countries in Western 
Europe. With the emancipation of the economic sphere from other spheres, the state 
disappeared as entrepreneur. The state left the economic activities to others and began to 
depend on the collection of taxes for its income. Habermas regards this change as a 
rationalisation within the economic system, because the bourgeois society was much 
more capable of securing the material survival than the feudal or estate systems were 
(1991a). At the same time, the capitalist system could only work if  the state guaranteed
2 Reinhard Kosselleck highlights how a changed consciousness of history, from sameness to circularity 
and salvation doctrine by the early Church to Enlightenment introduced a “temporalisation” 
(Verzeitlichung). Thus, according to Kosselleck, having a consciousness of a historical development 
increased the interest in history. This change took place in the course of the eighteenth century in Europe. 
(Kosselleck, 1985:17).
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the freedom of property and investment, as well as the enforcement of the rights and 
obligations of contractual relationships.
During the industrial revolution the capitalist systems increased the mobility of 
people, news and commodities (Habermas, 1995a: 176). Many local bonds and 
structures were severed and people mixed -  even across political boundaries -  much 
more than before. Peasants moved to towns, the workplace became separate from the 
home and the mobility between different workplaces increased due to changes in 
employment trends. This movement brought about the de-rooting of peasant 
communities that had remained in the same area over centuries, as well as movements 
within (and sometimes beyond) political boundaries. Additionally, modem means of 
communication and transport made an increased awareness of other members of this 
political community possible. The expanding industries and their huge demand for 
labour force pressed for more comprehensive, more inclusive definitions of 
membership, i.e. citizenship, and a medium in which those members of a community, 
hitherto unknown to one another, could interact and communicate. This latter required a 
standardised culture and education that was provided by state administration from the 
nineteenth century on.
The political administration is what Habermas calls the ‘political system’ as it evolved 
in Western societies between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries (1988a:169-171). 
The political administration relies on clear hierarchies that distribute powers in such a 
way as to guarantee an effective and efficient bureaucracy. This bureaucracy is able to 
carry out political decisions effectively. Habermas follows Max Weber in arguing that 
the rational bureaucratic state administration was the most successful form of both 
organising the implementation of political decisions and administrating the polity. The 
rationalisation process of the modem state was based on the centralised system of taxes, 
a centralised and monopolised military force, with the monopoly of legislation and law 
enforcement, and a bureaucratic administration that organised given tasks successfully 
(Habermas, 1988a:226-227). Both spheres thus became dependent upon each other, for 
the state only had the means to engage in warfare if it could raise enough financial 
resources. Habermas claims that this mutual dependency still exists today.
3 Benedict Anderson argues that there is a close link between capitalism and integration through 
communication: See: Anderson, 1991:44.
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Legislation and state bureaucracies increasingly penetrated society and regulated 
hitherto private spheres of interaction through formal law. This direct interaction 
between legislation and citizens also triggered an interest in national legislation. 
Citizens became interested in the formulation of national policies, because they were 
increasingly affected by them. With the advent of modernity, the central governments 
not only acquired the monopoly of the use of legitimate force within the political 
boundaries, but they were also seen as the legitimate representation of the nation 
abroad. This assumed an identity between the expressed will of the national 
government, the will of the state and the people it represented abroad. The modem, 
centralised state structure was, furthermore, able to extend the reach of a standardised 
mass education (although in many countries this did not cover the entire territory). This 
new administrative power fostered a new subject of education, history classes. As Smith 
argues for the case of France:
[...] Republican nationalist French leaders sought to ‘create France’ and 
‘Frenchmen’ throughout the area of the French state by institutional and cultural 
means. Military service for all, a regimented mass, public education system, 
inculcation of the spirit of glory and revanche against Pmssia, colonial 
conquests and assimilation, as well as economic infrastructure, all helped to turn 
‘peasants into Frenchmen’ in Eugene Weber’s well-known formulation. But 
there was one field, in particular, which helped to create the imagined 
community of la France: history, or more especially, history teaching (A. Smith, 
1999: 165-166).
This was a new means available to the modem state that helped to disseminate a 
centrally controlled education and a standard answer to the self-definition of the 
political community to many local communities, which had hitherto had very 
autonomous ways of life and, on occasions, an education system of their own.
Furthermore, the industrial revolution brought about a revolution in weaponry and, 
therewith, warfare as well. In fact, the new arms industries with their high demand of 
steel and timber were important pillars of the industrial revolution (Krippendorff, 1982). 
The new weapon technology and the increased quantities of weapons available as a 
result of modem forms of production were, thus, both an outcome and a motor of the 
industrial revolution, but also of the centralisation of the state itself (Mann, 1996: 225).
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Technological changes were accompanied by a transformation in the organisation of the 
army. Heavy artillery, machine guns and tanks all required mass-armed forces for their 
use. This explains the rise of conscript armies that matched well with the level of 
weapon technology until 1945 (Giddens, 1992: 222-254; Posen, 1993). In particular 
mainland countries (as opposed to islands) were forced to recruit a great number of 
soldiers (Hinze, 1932). Governments, with their rational bureaucracies, were now able 
to organise national armies, to advance their professionalisation, to raise the necessary 
revenues and implement the supervision of conscript armies, now required mass armed 
forces from the entire polity. War and war preparations became more total and, due to 
the increasing power of destruction of modem weapons, more brutal (for those at the 
front and at home alike). Rationalisation in warfare meant immense technological 
advancements that considerably elevated the stakes of warfare, the bmtality and the 
sacrifice necessary for a victory.
It should be stressed that the introduction of conscript armies in France and elsewhere 
was not a simple ‘awakening of the nation’ to defend itself. While the increase of 
political rights and the principle of popular sovereignty convoked citizens to fight for 
‘their’ nation, conscription would not have been possible without another feature of 
modernity, i.e. the bureaucratisation and rationalisation of the state. Historically, 
conscription was a means by a poor French revolutionary government to prepare itself 
for an expected attack from a coalition of countries whose combined forces seemed to 
outnumber the revolutionary army by far. Conscription {levee en masse) was not greeted 
everywhere in France as the long-searched-for empowerment of the people - on the 
contrary. Outside of Paris, many young men had to be forced into the army (E. Weber, 
1976). It was only by means of rationalised state power (inherited from the dynastic 
French ruler) that it was possible to organise and enforce conscription even against a 
certain level of resistance within French society. The introduction of conscript armies 
was therefore possible because of both processes of modernity, political emancipation 
and a rationalised state power. In the course of the nineteenth century, one country after 
another in Western Europe adopted conscription (the United Kingdom was the last to 
follow during the First World War).
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3.1.2 The rationalisation processes in lifeworld
Habermas claims that between the Renaissance and Absolutism (fifteenth to eighteenth 
centuries), normative structures became increasingly systematised and based on ever 
more formal and universal principles, without yet being subject to an overall 
justification (1988a:231-233). Habermas also identifies the surge of an ever more 
inclusive definition of membership of the polity, once traditional concepts or kinship 
had been contested. Both developments (more inclusive membership and 
systematisation of norms) are interpreted by Habermas as the result of two 
rationalisation processes, in lifeworld as well as in systems. On the one hand, the 
institutionalisation of capitalism required the concept of formal equality, i.e. the 
individual as bearer of equal rights before the law, the right to property and the 
possibility to enforce contractual obligations through the law. On the other hand, the 
rationalisation of lifeworld increased the pressure of more generalised concepts of 
membership and equal rights within that society that came to be based on universal 
principles (Habermas, 1996d). This expansion and diversification of the members could 
only be accommodated, according to Habermas, by using a more formal concept of 
membership, such as that of “citizen”. This was followed by an increased formal 
equality between the members of society expressed by the law, which also granted 
greater personal autonomy to each member, and thus protected and enhanced this 
diversity. The advantages of formal equality and the subsequent universalisation of 
membership allowed a greater variety of subjectivity and personal autonomy than, for 
example, archaic societies based on kinship, but, according to Habermas, they also 
made the task of reaching understanding through communicative action more pressing 
and difficult.
In the increased institutionalisation of the public sphere Habermas sees the advancement 
of rationalisation in the establishment of post-conventional norms in Western Europe 
(1990). He claims that during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the public sphere 
became the locus of deliberation and the space where communicative action, the 
redemption of validity claims, could take place. The public sphere was meant to control 
the government and to establish legitimacy for political decisions as the result of public 
deliberation. In the liberal period of Western societies (eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries), the public sphere would be limited to public matters and would leave the
93
private sphere untouched. With the progressively greater interference of the state in the 
late nineteenth and twentieth centuries in areas hitherto regarded as private (economy, 
family, social relations), with the rise of the welfare state, and with the penetration of 
society into government via political parties, this liberal separation between the public 
and the private sphere became increasingly blurred. Social groups sought to formulate 
government policies, not only control them through public debate. Habermas tries to 
identify the public sphere as the necessary locus of public reasoning, but also the locus 
of commercial interests and manipulation by the political administration.
It was not only the industrial revolution, but also the political revolution that gave 
warfare and war memories a particular shape. With the political emancipation, first, of 
the bourgeoisie, and, later, of wider parts of society, objects of (dynastic) politics turned 
more and more into the subjects of (democratic) politics. This transformation was part 
of a broader shift that was accelerated and implemented into political reality after the 
French Revolution. Those who had had war experiences had also become political 
subjects, i.e. they could elect or could be elected. The political revolution also triggered 
a process that replaced mercenary armies with national armies based on male 
conscription. The male citizen not only became the bearer of rights and obligations in 
the political process, but also the official defender of the political community. While 
prior to the French Revolution, people had always experienced the war as victims (for 
example during sieges, loots etc.), most people (except the mercenaries) had not been 
involved in the actual warfare.
Only with the political revolution gaining momentum with the French Revolution and 
the increasing need of comprehensive war efforts, first male citizens and ultimately, in 
the twentieth century whole societies, became active parts of warfare. While coercion 
was clearly a factor in implementing conscription, for example in France, the idea of the 
citizen in arms did exert a mobilising effect that augmented the effectiveness of warfare 
(Liddell Hart, 1967). Indeed, without such an appeal to citizens, conscription would not 
have been so successful. Yet, it would only be with the involvement of entire societies 
in warfare during the Second World War, that the claim that war is “a national 
experience” came closer to empirical reality.
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As Mayall argues, the political revolution triggered a shift from dynastic to popular 
sovereignty. The political community was now defined by the people who lived (or 
were supposed to live) within state boundaries and no longer by the dynast ruling over a 
certain territory (Mayall, 1990). This not only led to a reconciliation between existing 
state boundaries and the allegedly ‘chosen’ people living within them, but also to the 
elevation of the individuals living within those present or future state boundaries to 
repositories of national sovereignty. Popular sovereignty, Habermas claims, expressed, 
but, also, advanced the process whereby normative structures became reflexive, i.e. 
when societies became aware that they lived under self-given rules, no content was any 
longer accepted a priori as the rightful norm to follow. Any content was, in principle, 
open to revision and thus subject to change. The agreement of what was accepted 
behaviour depended increasingly upon a procedure, not a specific outcome. The 
reflectiveness of normative structures, thus, brought about a difference between legality 
and morality. Any law could be legitimised with reference to a specific procedure, and 
the rightfulness of law was increasingly guaranteed by the adherence to those 
procedures (Habermas, 1998a). Yet, the procedures themselves also required 
justification. According to Habermas, it is at this point that the universal principles of 
equal political participation and the procedure meet, for those principles need to justify 
the legal system per se. The institutionalisation of the democratic principle made laws 
self-referential and changed the social basis of politics (Habermas, 1995a: 176-177).
With the advance of secularisation in the course of the nineteenth century, the role of 
religion in the creation of solidarity and a sense of community clearly declined. This is 
when “civil religions” began to rise. Nationalism, “an ideological movement for 
attaining and maintaining identity, unity and autonomy of a social group some of whose 
members deem it to constitute an actual or potential nation” (A. Smith 1999:18) was 
one of the contenders to combine the universalist values of the political revolution while 
maintaining the particularity of the political community (Habermas, 1996d). As many 
authors on nationalism claim, within this ideological movement, one ingredient clearly 
was the attention to collective memory and collective war memory to construct that 
solidarity among members who did not know each other personally. Therefore, I would 
argue, that national collective war memories were a means of reconciling the 
contradiction between universal values of the political revolution and the particularity of
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the polity between the late eighteenth and the early twentieth century in Western 
Europe.
The more inclusive the definition of membership became, the more formal the definition 
of the body politic had to be. This enhanced inclusiveness referred to universal 
principles in order to reconcile the increased diversity within the body politic 
(Habermas, 1987a: 165). The universal principles of freedom and equality, which were 
part of the political revolution sparked by the French Revolution, advanced 
democratisation, universal suffrage and the ever more accepted equation of the 
sovereign with the people in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This equality was 
institutionalised in formal law and expressed in the general concept of citizen; at the 
same time, this equality fostered a notion of “nation” that appealed precisely to the 
equality of the citizens of the body politic:
The invention ‘popular nation [ Volksnation/ ’ (Hagen Schulze) had a catalysing 
effect on democratisation processes. There would have been no democratic basis 
for a legitimisation of power without a national consciousness. Only the nation 
constructed the context of solidarity between persons who had been unknown to 
one another (Habermas, 1995a:176).4
The more diverse and the more inclusive membership became the more collective 
identity formulations had to embrace the whole political community. This idea of equal 
members of a community is precisely what the different formulations of nationalism 
and -  as a result of nationalism -  national identities should achieve. Habermas argues 
that without such an inclusive programme, any appeal to such a community would have 
receded into particularism and would have been hardly capable of mobilising a society 
(Habermas, 1995a:90).5
The previous paragraphs have briefly tried to outline the changes leading to modem 
societies within the categories of Habermas’ theory of social evolution (rationalisation 
of systems and life-worlds), drawing strongly on the analysis Habermas made himself
4 My translation.
5 This accounts for civic nations as well as for ethnic nations. Even civic nations that appeal to a 
togetherness due to birth in a specific territory need to justify why membership should only apply to a 
particular territory. On the distinction between “civic” and “ethnic” nations see: Anthony D. Smith, 
National Identity, pp.9-13.
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of that process, when modernity turned the objects of warfare, politics and state 
sovereignty into subjects of warfare, politics, and state sovereignty. Habermas himself 
draws heavily on writings by Marx and Weber, but adds his own aspects of 
rationalisation in lifeworlds to that. Although many authors have described this process 
of modernisation, it is my contention that the Habermasian conceptual framework 
provides some insights into the current diagnosis and a future outlook of the societal 
role of collective war memories in modem societies that would be lost in, say, a Marxist 
or Weberian analysis of modernisation. This transformation from object to subject in 
those three areas (political revolution, definition of sovereignty, advances of warfare) is 
characterised by a double and seemingly contradictory move: On the one hand, the 
means of external and social control by the modem state bureaucracy over the citizens 
increased enormously via modem laws, mass education, conscription and other means. 
On the other hand, there was a move towards more independence and autonomy of 
individuals from the community expressed by the equal status of citizens, the formal 
rights granted to each citizen by law, who also became the defender of the political 
community. The historical introduction of conscription highlights the crossroads of 
these rationalisation processes in the nineteenth century.
Capitalism also led, at the same time, to more freedom and independence (from 
serfdom, guilds, freedom of contract) and new and drastic dependencies and controls 
(through the market). Those processes required larger communities, given the formal 
equality within those communities and the de-rooting caused by capitalism. Thus, a 
different frame for the political community was required for members who did not 
know each other personally, but had to imagine that community living in the same 
political borders: the national frame. Those processes also led to a new type of warfare; 
namely, a mass-armed force warfare. Every Western country became transformed in a 
different way through these processes, according to its specific political, economic, 
demographic, military and geopolitical conditions. In other words, there were different 
roads to modernity defined as rationalisation processes of systems and lifeworlds, but 
all of these countries were somehow on one of these roads (Greenfeld, 1992).
97
3.2 The role of collective war memories in the rationalisation processes in 
Western Europe
In this section I wish to argue that the processes discussed above triggered three 
important developments concerning collective war memories: (1) the social framework 
for remembering wars shifted from a more localised context to the national context in 
the course of the nineteenth century in Western Europe. National war memories became 
an important means to perceive the imagined community as a national community; (2) 
the object of those memories, i.e. wars, shifted from the local to the national level. 
Given the requirements of modem warfare and the results of the political revolution, 
warfare shifted onto the national level; and (3) national governments had a necessity to 
engineer more national frameworks of remembering, in order to reconcile the arbitrary 
territory of the political community with universalistic values.
On the shift from local to national war memories: The new mobility brought about 
by capitalism dissolved many established bonds and, therefore, memory groups, and 
gave an impetus to the de-localisation of collective memories. In other words, the 
industrial revolution induced a mobility of individuals that supported the shift from 
smaller to larger frameworks. This shift was by no means automatic. New frameworks 
may always be created within classes, regions or towns, but it was the greater mobility, 
that enhanced the possibility of bonding through experiences that were shared 
throughout the (national) political boundaries (Lipsitz, 1990:6; Gellner, 1983:8-38). The 
industrial revolution made national frameworks possible.
In addition to the new mobility, the means of the modem state bureaucracy (mass 
education, control of archives, organisation of commemorations) facilitated the 
emergence of national war memories. Furthermore, the new means of communication, 
provided by the modem era -  especially by what Benedict Anderson calls “print 
capitalism” (1991) - became important for a collective war memory to be used on the 
level of the national, imagined community, where the dominant form of oral history that 
had been used in local communities for generations was clearly no longer suitable. 
Modernity, thus, shifted the main interpretation of warfare to the national level and 
replaced, in many cases, the predominance of local frameworks, where memory was not
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consciously generated or documented, but rather lived in stable and static communities 
and passed on by oral accounts from one generation onto the next.6
Pointing to the societal acceleration process caused by capitalism, some scholars have 
regarded collective memory -  with its stress on continuity by linking past and present 
and its focus on sameness -, as a necessary counter-balance to the ever faster changes 
occurring through the spread of capitalism.7 Furthermore, modernity, with its 
concomitant mobility, not only rendered, as Habermas states, a common legal 
framework necessary, but also triggered a need to engineer a ‘national culture’ as a 
medium of communication. As Gellner points out:
In general, each such [modem] state presides over, maintains, and is identified with, 
one kind of culture, one style of communication, which prevails within its borders 
and is dependent for its perpetuation on a centralised educational system supervised 
by and often actually run by the state in question, which monopolises legitimate 
culture almost as much as it does legitimate violence, or perhaps more so (Gellner, 
1983:140).
Collective memory, in general, and collective war memories thus, acquire the status of a 
medium through which members of an imagined community with no personal bonds 
can communicate and find common ground. As Halbwachs claimed, the national 
framework for structuring experience is usually quite remote from the experience of 
individuals. Therefore, other social frameworks seem much more relevant to the 
individual’s experience. Yet, wars are not only one of the few events that have a 
profound impact on each and every member of the nation, but they are actually one of 
the few occasions where the nation is supposed to have acted as such- as a nation. War 
and war memories are not only an important means of state-building, of forging a 
national framework of memory, but, often, the primary provider of the form (national 
identity) as well.
6 Pierre Nora deplores the disappearance of the “milieux de memoire” and regards memory sites “lieux de 
memoire” as a lesser substitute to reconstruct a form of memory that is not extracted from lived memory. 
See: Nora, 1990:11-12.
7 “But the celebration of recurrence is a compensatory device. Capitalism, in Marx's famous phrase, tears 
down all social immobility, every ancestral confinement and feudal restriction; and invented rites, 
however implicated they often are in that very process of modernisation which capitalism drives 
remorselessly on, are palliative measures [...].” (Connerton, 1989: 63-64).
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The political revolution and democratisation starting with the French Revolution, as 
documented, among others, by Eric Hobsbawm (1985) and Michael Mann (1993), 
meant that collective memory had to appeal to the members of a territory and a body 
politic. This explains the rising importance of “national” history and the “national” past 
(Hobwbawm, 1985; Mann, 1993:167-213). Additionally, as Hobsbawm points out, 
political elites and intellectuals propagated the idea that individuals should regard 
certain events or values as ‘theirs’ and interpret them in a particular way, thus 
remembering them. These means of advocacy of a particular framework were expressed 
in different forms of nationalism. This is not to say, however, that collective memories 
account for national identity; while clearly, experiences allegedly shared by the whole 
of the body politic are powerful instruments of self-representation, and they are far from
Q
being the only ones. Thus, the creation of a sense of ‘we’ on a national level included 
more than collectively shared memories (A. Smith, 1991).
On the shift from dynastic and local warfare to national warfare of citizens: With 
male conscription and the involvement of entire societies in warfare (especially during 
the twentieth century), the ideological claim made in the nineteenth century, in the sense 
that two or more peoples had fought against each other, became, increasingly, an 
empirical reality, which rendered national framework central for the collective 
remembering of past wars, as opposed to other, more localised, forms of collective 
memory. Wars fought together on the same side reinforced the sense of a shared past 
even further and provided powerful ‘material’ for a collective memory that now 
embraced the whole political community. Collective memory became, thus, a self- 
reinforcing argument that was a new dimension of military survival in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. Collective national memory became, in fact, an important 
element of the advancement of national identity and nation-building in the nineteenth 
century in Western Europe.9 Thus, collective memory and, especially, collective war 
memory, owe their increased importance in socialisation, social integration and ego- 
formation to a historical combination between rationalisation processes within societies 
that met with a distribution of power across states.
8 For the debate on national identity, nationalism and their relation to modernity see: Anderson, 1991; 
Gellner, 1997; A. Smith, 1998.
9
According to Hobsbawm the army was, next to the primary school, the most important institution o f the 
nineteenth century to create a national consciousness and to actually spread a national language. See: 
Hobsbawm, 1990:115.
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However, the fact that more and more parts of society became actively involved in 
warfare did not mean that the experience of war was the same for all participants. Here I 
would argue, that with increased totalising warfare, in particular during the Second 
World War, experiences of war actually became strongly differentiated This hampered 
the possibilities of governments to control post-war memories, given the fact that many 
citizens themselves had experienced war first-hand.
The increasing engineering of national war memories by governments: The
privileged position within one political community has given modem governments 
powers not only over warfare, but also over its remembering. While modem 
governments cannot claim a monopoly of the interpretation of war experience, they 
have considerable influence on the shaping of memory of war by means of selective 
information dissemination. Governments and military staff are the central planning 
agencies during a war and thus have a privileged knowledge of, say, how the different 
war efforts were tied together, how the armies reacted to expected or actual moves by 
the enemy. All this information is withheld from the majority of citizens and soldiers 
not only during, but also after the war. It is here where national governments are very 
powerful. Most of the documents are stored away in high security archives. In other 
words, the political system increasingly controls the “documented memory” of past 
wars, i.e., particularly, national archives. Information dissemination is extremely 
censured during and after wars. In the name of national security and national interest, 
governments decide which information is released when and to whom. Furthermore, 
governments can discipline historians, politicians or journalists who try to challenge 
their policy of information control by charging them with high treason or damaging 
release of state secrets (Wilson (ed.), 1996:3).
The withholding or release of confidential documents is heavily influenced by the 
present situation between states. If it seems favourable to the positions of the country or 
to the fostering of certain relations, governments generously ignore any time limits put 
on the release of secret documents. In other words, archive politics becomes an integral 
part of current foreign policy. In this respect, governments often instrumentalise 
historians interested in sensitive foreign policy issues for the promotion of their 
objectives by giving them access to selected archive material (Wilson (ed.), 1996:2-6; 
Nora, 200Id).
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However, those government restrictions and policies have their limits. Faced with the 
secrecy of the government, historians can refer to other sources, including archives in 
foreign countries. Moreover, with the advent of modem mass media, the capability to 
store information and document events increased exponentially, thus reducing 
considerably the ability of governments to exert effective control over all information. 
This notwithstanding, governments do have a specific access to delicate information 
they may or may not open to historical research or the general public.
Heads of states or former statesmen also try to influence collective war memories 
through memoirs in which they describe how dramatic events of official national history 
‘truly’ happened (Egerton (ed.), 1994). More and more memoirs are published while 
their authors are still alive, and these authors often take part vividly in the debate about 
their memoirs. Given the privileged position of former statesmen, those memoirs are 
often regarded as ‘authentic’. This influence on the information available can be 
increased through influencing or controlling mass media. Additionally, and particularly 
during the twentieth century, governments used ever more often mass media to create 
the sense of a simultaneity in the war experience of those who were not physically 
present at the battles, be it at home or abroad (Lipsitz, 1990:6). This mediated form 
provided a surrogate experience of war, often neglecting the fact that there were 
intermediaries that made this ‘experience’ happen. This new opportunity to ‘experience’ 
war without physical presence through modem mass media (news broadcasts, cinema, 
and newspapers) and its assumed simultaneity have also created new opportunities for 
manipulation by governments.
After the French revolution, governments progressively ritualised the supposedly shared 
national history, which often entailed a notion of a common descent and shared 
experiences, through public ceremonies, monuments and festivals. Additionally, the 
educational and military revolution gave governments hitherto unknown means of 
penetrating and organising socialisation and social integration. Collective memory, 
therefore, contributed to a necessary ‘nation-building’ by governments to either limit 
the application of universal principles to particular polities, or, conversely, to extend 
citizenship to the borders of a body politic. They also had to combat those movements 
that tried to transgress state boundaries, such as class coalitions or universalist religions 
(Habermas, 1974).
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The ever-increasing sacrifice citizens were asked for made commemoration of the dead 
a vital task for governments in order to show that dead for the community were 
honoured. Diane Barthel considers war commemoration by governments and civil 
society one important aspect for the continuation of a willingness to die for that 
community:
Sacrifice is an important concept and considered crucial to a nation’s survival. If 
people are no longer willing to sacrifice for their nation, can the national long 
exist? Commemoration serves to encourage future acts of sacrifice, as it 
promises the would-be heroes that they will not die in vain and that they will be 
remembered by future generations. It is an unwritten pact between the dead, the 
living, and the unborn, and it is enacted through social rituals- the acts of 
commemoration (Barthel, 1996:80).
However, those commemorations also have the important social function of collective 
grief, as was pointed out in chapter 1. Thus, governments face the ever more pressing 
need to organise commemorations; nonetheless, since World War I, they have had to 
share that task with war veterans’ associations and numerous other organisations 
(Winter, 1999:47).
The level of societal mobilisation and the sacrifices asked by all participating countries 
in the First World War triggered a dichotomisation between the ‘us’ versus ‘the enemy’ 
that increasingly allowed only one outcome: total victory of the own side and total 
submission of the enemy. The proclamation of a partial victory or a moderate peace 
agreement was seen as insufficient in exchange for the sacrifices that the national 
governments demanded from their people (Fussell 1975:75-79). This was an impact that 
total mobilisation had on the technical system of warfare at a time, where those fighting 
could -  as they still can - influence war aims as citizens. While the development from 
experience to image is seen as part of any collective memory, the emergence of widely 
shared and accepted dichotomies between self and enemy after wars only gained 
momentum in the nineteenth century. One corollary of that dichotomisation was 
totalising images of ‘us’ and ‘them’, fuelled by the increasing level of sacrifices by the 
citizens. The clear physical separation of sides, the attachment of moral values to each 
side during the war, the separation in uniforms, all fit well with the pre-established 
dichotomies and often directed the forming of images after the war. Thus, to use
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Habermas’ terms: here, lifeworld limits the options of the technical system of warfare. 
The dichotomisation also has important cognitive and practical-moral implications for 
the war memories that follow. As will be shown in the next two chapters, the First 
World War was a watershed in France and Germany in this respect.
In this chapter I have sought to identify and discuss the processes and trends that help to 
explain the rise of national war memories and the role of collective war memories 
within the Habermasian framework of rationalisation of work and lifeworld. It is my 
contention that an analysis within that framework of those same rationalisation 
processes after 1945 allows an informed diagnosis regarding the fact that the 
prominence and importance of national war memories might be about to change. At 
least, I would claim, there are several challenges from a number of angles, which 
suggest that they will not continue to be as it first developed in the nineteenth century. 
Furthermore, I would even argue that the very same processes that gave rise to national 
collective war memories could now be leading to their transformation in the future.
The first aspect is modern warfare with the high technology and nuclear weapons that 
have characterised it since 1945. This is a type of warfare that technically achieves 
higher levels of destruction than mass-armed forces and seems, therefore, rational. Such 
warfare does no longer require the mobilisation of entire societies for the act of warfare 
(more for the political and moral support). One indicator of the new prevalence of this 
changed type of warfare is the fact that most European countries abandoned 
conscription after the Second World War (van Doom, 1975). Modem weapon 
technology, in particular nuclear and electronic weapons, has made mass armed forces 
obsolete. Conscript armies have become unnecessary and so have army and military 
service as means of supporting a preference of the national framework for war 
memories. Thus, modem countries with nuclear and high technology weapons may 
confront low-intensity warfare, but not repeat a history of warfare like the Second 
World War. This also has important implications for the ‘material’ of future war 
memories, as wars are now more likely to be either ‘out of area’ (and thus far away 
from the ‘home-front’) or civil wars, thus involving members of the same polity. As 
was discussed in the first chapter, civil wars are particularly difficult to remember in a 
way as to create bonding (van Creveld, 1991).
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A second aspect is the arbitrary end of the political revolution at the borders of states. 
This is an argument put forward by Habermas himself. After the French revolution, 
popular-national sovereignty replaced dynastic-territorial sovereignty in Western 
Europe. The political community was now defined by the people who lived (or were 
supposed to live) within state boundaries, rather than by the dynast ruling over a certain 
territory Mayall, 1990; Hall, 1999). While the processes leading towards a post- 
conventional moral consciousness that enshrined popular sovereignty occurred within 
societies, the realisation of the universalist potential of this consciousness found its 
limits in the distribution of political power among states that had been inherited from 
absolutism. The control over territory and people was the result of the use of force, 
tactics and relative strength, but hardly the result of post-conventional moral 
consciousness.
Governments had an interest in maintaining an order established in Westphalia and the 
retention of political power, while their possibilities were limited by the hitherto 
achieved rationalisation of the lifeworld and the systems.10 As Habermas points out:
Citizens constitute themselves out of their own will as a political association of 
free and equal; fellow nationals recognise themselves in an ethnic community 
characterised by a common language and historical experience and destiny. The 
nation-state has this in-built tension between the universalism of an egalitarian 
politico-legal community and the particularism of a historical community 
(Habermas 1995a: 179).11
A third aspect is the continuous drive of mobility of labour and capital that led to 
significant mobilisation within national borders. Habermas states that the same pressure 
towards greater mobility that accompanied the industrial revolution now exerts pressure 
towards a greater inclusion than national citizenship can offer. This pressure is 
increased through migration waves from areas that have a surplus of labour to areas 
where there is a perceived demand of labour. With the same logic that applies to the 
national level, capitalism further expands and requires labour where it is needed. This 
increasing mobility challenges the obstacles put by national boundaries -  a similar 
development that had challenged local obstacles during the industrial revolution.
10 On the engineering efforts by governments in nation-building between the eighteenth and twentieth 
centuries see: Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1992.
11 My translation. Emphasis added. For the contradiction between universal, cosmopolitan man and 
specific citizen in IR see: Brown, 1992; Linklater, 1990b.
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In conclusion, Habermas’ analysis of the rationalisation processes that have taken place 
in both spheres of praxis suggests that national war memories have been both important 
means of socialisation and of identity-formation since the nineteenth century, as well as 
a result of rationalisation processes in warfare and political administration. Therewith 
Habermas sheds light on the fact that national war memories are a modem 
phenomenon. Interestingly enough, if those developments that took place in the realm 
of praxis are followed after 1945, one might find evidence that national war memories 
are changing both in their form and function. National war memories may, in fact, be 
giving way to broader frameworks (given the tendencies of political revolution and 
globalisation) or may even be in frank decline, because there is now a different type of 
rationalised warfare that makes mass mobilisation and, thus, mass experience of war 
less likely. Additionally, I would add to that diagnosis that the experience of warfare by 
societies in the First and Second World Wars seems ambivalent for sustaining a national 
framework of remembrance: on the one hand, it increasingly becomes a national or joint 
experience, on the other hand, the diversity in experiencing war makes it more and more 
difficult to construct a framework that accommodates all those experiences.
3.3 The current crisis of national war memories: on the road to post­
conventionality?
Memory o f  war, and indeed memory per se, has often been understood in new 
ways since 1945. While some authors make the Holocaust the turning point, 
others see in it merely one last and most horrible stage in a development already 
underway [...] on the road topostmodemity.
(Olick and Coughlin, 2003:55)
As was discussed above, collective war memory is important for modem societies in 
several ways: (1) as one of the means of communication among citizens who are de­
rooted and live as an ‘imagined community’, it is (2) a consequence of modem warfare 
as well as (3) of the political revolution brought about by modernity. At the end of 
section 3.2, I argued that all three areas of praxis are currently changing, and the 
assumption is that the role of collective war memory should change as well. This is not 
to predict the future or to speculate on near changes, but is in line with the idea of 
Critical Theory to analyse the becoming, the necessary conditions that bring a certain
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phenomenon into existence, at a certain historical epoch. Furthermore, once the 
rationalisation processes that brought national war memories into existence, or, at least, 
rendered them a significant cultural device of collective identity in modem society, have 
been identified, it is possible to theorise on the transformations this role might undergo 
when those processes change as well.
So far, however, the view has been from without. That is to say the focus has been on 
the rationalisation of “work” and “interaction” and its impact on the becoming and 
transformation of national war memories. In this section, I would like to suggest a view 
and analysis from within, i.e., from the point of view of the remembering of past wars 
itself. Here I argue that this is a practice within lifeworld, a representation of the past to 
the present, a form of collective self-reflection. Given these characteristics it seems 
possible to assume that the remembering of past wars, and thus collective war memories 
themselves, is conducive to a process of social learning from the pre-conventional to the 
post-conventional level, like the one Habermas assumes for the dimensions of lifeworld 
in general.
As was stated in chapter 2, Habermas applies Kohlberg’s child-development theory to 
the evolution of societies. As Kohlberg does, within lifeworld, Habermas distinguishes 
the area of creating and justifying norms, the area of ego-formation as well as values, 
and the claim that each sphere is open to the possibility of three learning levels. The 
development of social learning moves from a very clearly defined, empirically specific 
content of identity, norms (and roles of actors) and values that is very closed toward 
ever more formal categories (norms, values, identities) that accommodate a greater 
empirical variety and become more open. At the same time, the change occurs from a 
fixation on the object (value, norm, identity) in an early conventional stage toward a 
reflecting and active subject: while individuals accept specific empirical forms at an 
early conventional stage, they become aware of the abstract form (identity, value, and 
norm) and, finally, reflect upon the right form of value, norm and identity. The 
increased level of social learning moves from a pre-established level of acceptance to a 
post-conventional level which makes form and content of lifeworld a matter of 
reflection and critique.
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It is my contention that these three levels of social learning can be applied to the 
collective remembering of past wars and, that, in the course of the twentieth century, a 
tendency towards the emergence of post-conventional collective memories, in general, 
and post-conventional collective war memories, in particular, has evolved. Following 
the logic of Habermas and Kohlberg and taking into account the three aspects of 
lifeworld, I will argue that social learning of remembering past wars (1) can take place 
and (2) has done so in Western Europe between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
but more particularly, since the Second World War. Based on Habermas* theory, I will 
define three stages of social learning in the collectively remembering past wars as 
follows:
Pre-conventional level: there is no awareness that memories of past wars are sought or 
socially reproduced. War is only remembered by its effect and the usefulness on the 
basis of action-reaction. Bonding is maintained by communal contexts and is mostly 
unconscious and not a subject of reflection.
Conventional level: Participants are aware that memories exist and link them to specific 
empirical contents. There is no awareness of the three dimensions (cognitive, practical- 
moral, emotional) of collective war memories. There is an early conventional stage 
which looks at empirical sameness through time and tries to identify “natural traits” of 
social entities (of own society as well as others). At an advanced conventional level, 
there is a consciousness about the constructed nature of collective remembering, but it is 
still limited to a particular empirical sameness of experience. At that advanced level 
memory groups try to foster social bonding through presumed positive (empirical) 
events in the past that allow an affirmative collective identity.
Post-conventional level: There is a conscious selection and reflection of past events for 
the present. The remembering clearly separates the emotional from the practical-moral 
and cognitive dimensions of past events. Each is made subject to different public 
discourses. The remembering does not focus on particular empirical sameness (content), 
but on a practical-moral reflection on the past, which identifies values and norms 
supported or rejected by that reflection. Social bonding is the result of shared values and
108
norms, derived from the reflection on the past and no longer on the sameness of 
empirical experience (form). Memory groups try to foster social bonding through a 
successful joint reflection upon a presumed shared past that reconfirms or rejects certain 
practical-moral imperatives.
The remembering of past wars follows the logic of increased openness as described by 
Habermas in his theory of social learning: while in an early stage, membership is 
limited by the claim of empirical sameness, in later, more advanced stages, the 
reflection on past events in three different dimensions (emotional, practical-moral, 
cognitive) becomes more open and thus more inclusive. In other words, it is no longer 
the claim of having experienced war in the same way that creates social bonding, but a 
shared reflection of that past event that is of particular interest and value for a political 
community. Such a reflection is more open, because it allows the accommodation of 
different empirical experiences of war and is, therefore, more open.
It is my belief that a growing challenge to conventional remembering of past wars has 
been taking place, especially after 1945, which has led, in some cases, to the emergence 
o f signs of post-conventional war memories. Above all, narratives of unified, joint, 
‘national’ experiences of the past are being challenged both from below and from other 
countries. For example, in the 1970s in Europe, the Jewish communities succeeded in 
asserting their distinct experience during the Second World War. Regional and local 
communities have also strongly challenged the national, all-encompassing, narratives 
of, say, the Spanish Civil War, the French Resistance, or The Great Patriotic War in the 
Soviet Union (1941-1945). Thus, the notions of assumed empirical sameness of a 
unified national war memory have been put into question by sub-groups. Similarly, the 
Japanese view of itself as victim of US American aggression has been more and more 
disputed by countries that suffered Japanese occupation during the Second World War 
or by the USA itself (Barkan, 2000:46-64). Given the circumstances of the twenty-first 
century (and the level of both rationalisation of praxis and social learning of 
remembering past wars), it seems increasingly difficult, according to Richard Werbner 
(1998), to repeat the strategy of nineteenth century-Western Europe in former colonies 
o f Africa. If atrocities have been committed and a war, that is morally rejected by the
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subsequent generation, has been fought, denying the facts or to throwing a veil of 
silence over them becomes ever more difficult.
Those examples, I would argue, are signs of a crisis of conventional remembering of 
past wars, as well as of past events in general. We are not only increasingly aware of the 
different memories of the past, but also ask questions about the process whereby they 
were selected. This is significantly different from the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, when nationalist movements discovered an interest in the past, but felt like 
archaeologists of a given, empirical wealth to be discovered. Today many groups 
increasingly pose those questions of selection and inclusion. In this sense, the practice 
of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries was predominantly within the 
conventional level of social learning on collective war memories, whereas since the 
mid-twentieth century signs of advanced conventional -  or even- post-conventional 
social learning in war memories have become apparent. To be sure, it is the selection 
process of memories itself that has been increasingly challenged by counter-memories. 
More concretely, the selection of empirically present values in the past that are 
portrayed as positive or affirmative for the present is what has now come to be under 
attack.
Several strategies to deal with the crisis of national war memories are applied by 
different societies or suggested by the literature. Firstly, governments or societies may 
stick to the claim of empirical sameness of experience and marginalise differing voices. 
The case of the memory of the Algerian War suggests that a strategy of forced 
forgetting may still be feasible (Evans, 1997a) -  but ever more difficult to sustain 
(Grosser, 1990). Others may reject the idea of a collective remembering of past wars 
altogether (maybe with the exception of collective grief). Another strategy may be an 
increased acceptance and “celebration of difference”, acknowledging the different, 
partial experiences of groups in wars and reject any claim of sharedness beyond the 
social groups concerned.
Yet another option is suggested by Habermas’ theory of social evolution, which I wish 
to put forth, namely, to advance from conventional to post-conventional remembering
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of past wars. Instead of suppressing certain unwanted aspects of the past or reducing the 
empirical variety of war memories, post-conventional remembering would make it 
possible to engage in an open debate on that past and to derive moral conclusions or 
moral judgments about that past. In this context, History does not become “magistra 
vitae” (Cicero), a guide to life, but, rather, a rare opportunity to have a discourse on 
ethical and moral standards of the community, on the things that political community 
should or should not do. Thus, the main change from conventional to post-conventional 
remembering of past wars lies in the qualitative shift from selecting empirical sameness 
or particular values of the past, to a memory that accepts the different voices and 
achieves sameness and bonding through collective reflections or judgments on the past, 
leading to the affirmation of the result of that reflection, not the empirical data of the 
past.
A practical discourse based on collective war memories might, as Habermas has pointed 
out, fail. In other words, there is no guarantee that an attempt to create agreement in a 
pluralistic society of different memory groups, that the efforts to arrive at a practical 
discourse on collective war memories, will always succeed. Groups may arrive at 
different practical-moral or ethical conclusions from the past. However, given the 
greater inclusiveness of a reflexive agreement on past wars, such a practical discourse 
still harbours a greater chance of bearing an agreement than the (increasingly 
challenged) claim to empirical sameness of past events.
Since Habermas explicitly aims to focus on a logic of a certain rationalisation and not 
prescribe or describe a specific dynamic of development, his theory of social learning 
cannot be directly applied to empirical research. For such a purpose, not only 
circumstantial factors have to be taken into account, but also the relationship between 
the different social and political actors. Thus, Habermas’ social theory needs to be 
expanded in order to be able to provide guidance to empirical research.
The first step in this sense is to include the memory groups of a given time. If we follow 
Halbwachs’ claim that any collective memory needs social groups for its support, it is 
important to identify those. Furthermore, as I claimed in chapter 1, there are sub-groups
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within those memory groups, namely, political memory groups, which derive practical- 
moral and political claims from their interpretation of past events. They are the basis 
and bearer of collective war memories and those who are central to the practical 
discourse regarding collective war memories. Focusing on the constituting memory 
groups not only helps to understand changes over time in a political community, but 
also helps to avoid the danger of reification of political communities, countries or 
nations, mentioned in the introduction. It is those political memory groups who need to 
be identified in the first step.
A second step derives directly from the different stages of social learning applied to 
remembering past wars: it entails overcoming the claim to empirical sameness or 
difference of the object of remembering and the subject that remembers. As long as 
there is an essentialist view of both, there is little learning possible, since subject and 
object try to reconfirm empirical traits over time. In other words, if  the remembered 
‘other’ is regarded as an unchanging object, the learning is reduced to confirming the 
sameness of the object over time. The same applies to the remembering subject. This is 
completely different when both the subject and the object are regarded as historically 
changing entities. In such a case, the remembering of more options of behaviour, more 
possibilities of change need to be taken into account. Such consciousness of change also 
allows different practical-moral imperatives toward that object, albeit is still fixed to the 
object of empirical remembering.
Finally, the more remembering of past wars becomes a reflection of the political 
community on itself, the more the community uses the memory of a past as a means for 
that reflection, by detaching itself from that object. In other words, the remembering 
subject reflects upon itself by using collective war memories as a mirror. The 
remembering of the past is directed consciously toward a practical discourse of the 
values and priorities of those groups remembering. The social bonding is achieved 
through a joint reflection on values and norms, rather than on any presumed empirical 
sameness of experience caused by an object writ large or experienced by a subject writ 
large.
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To sum up, an analysis of three particular aspects in remembering past wars helps to 
highlight the historically dominant level of social learning in remembering past wars:
• The analysis of political memory groups and their position within the political 
system and their practical-moral imperatives derived from collective war memories
• The level of sameness or change that is assumed of the remembered object as well 
as the remembering subject
• The level of detachment of the remembered object from the practical-moral 
discourse on collective war memories by the remembering subject
This chapter has, on the one hand, sought to offer an insight into the processes that led 
to the rise (and, maybe, future decline) of collective war memories in modem societies. 
On the other hand, it has put forth a concept of social learning and has applied it to the 
remembering of past wars. Based on these discussions, one of the answers to the central 
question of the thesis; namely, “how can we study the impact of collective war 
memories on international politics?” would be “by looking at the level of social learning 
in the collective activity of remembering past wars”. In particular the practical-moral 
dimension of collectively remembering past wars looks different and causes different 
impacts on politics, depending on the level of social learning. It is these three areas of 
social learning developed above that I would like to turn my attention to in the next two 
chapters, where I intend to show that Germany (chapter 4) and France (chapter 5), for 
very different reasons and on very different paths, developed signs of post-conventional 
collective remembering of wars in the twentieth century.
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Chapter 4
Social learning in remembering past wars in Germany 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
Chapter 3 introduced Habermas’ Critical Theory of social evolution, as well as his 
theory of the three stages of social learning (pre-conventional, conventional, post- 
conventional) and applied it to collective war memories. As I stated in the previous 
chapter, I believe that Western European countries have experienced a development 
towards post-conventional remembering of past wars, especially after 1945. In this and 
the following chapter I attempt to illustrate the signs of that development, first, in the 
case of Germany and, then, in the case of France. My aim is to show that in both 
societies, for very different reasons, a transformation in the way past wars, particularly 
the Second World War, are remembered, took place. In accounting for these 
transformations, Habermas’ categories of conventional and post-conventional 
remembering are particularly useful.
Taking into account Halbwachs’ claim that social groups are the necessary bearers of 
collective memories, focusing on memory groups within political currents and parties 
appears justified. This implies that one may be able to identify co-existing memory 
groups that show different levels of social learning. Hence, any periodisation of 
collective learning in remembering past wars has to be taken with a note of caution. As 
will be shown, there are prevalent forms of social learning, but there are always 
differences and groups with different social learning as well.
Both this and the next chapter look at the process of social learning from 1871 (after the
fhFranco-German War) to 1995 (the 50 commemoration of the Second World War). 
That period may, at a first glance, appear too extensive for substantive research in only 
two chapters. Two reasons account, however, for the selection of this time-frame: first, 
identifying different levels of social learning in remembering past wars requires an 
analysis of more than one generation; and, second, there are important continuities and 
transformations of political memory groups in both countries that could not become
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apparent, if  a shorter period had been chosen. This also means that particular issues 
concerning collective war memories, such as amnesty laws, particular trials, debates on 
particular events, cannot be exhaustively discussed here. Rather, the idea is to illustrate 
the way of remembering and the link to different levels of social learning. Far from 
being exhaustive case studies, both chapters aim to illustrate the process of social 
learning in two specific Western European countries.
These two chapters will look at political currents (such as liberals, conservatives, 
socialists) and try to identify the specific political memory groups within them. This 
means that several political memory groups, understood as “the particular social groups 
that have a particular interest in advancing practical-moral imperatives they derive from 
collective memories”,1 may be found in one political current. Often, political memory 
groups may have a shared experience from the past which informs a specific political 
claim. Yet, it is not the experience they necessarily have to share, but rather, a meaning 
attached to that experience.
The first step in the analysis of how collective war memories influence politics is to 
identify memory groups within political parties. The second step is to analyse the 
prominence of practical-moral imperatives derived from remembering past wars in their 
public political discourses. These two steps seem necessary given that political currents 
or, more specifically, political parties need to reconcile different demands, different 
agendas for political action. Political memory groups, thus, compete with each other, 
but also with other groups, which put forward demands that are not derived from 
practical-moral imperatives of collective war memories. Moreover, the mere presence of 
memory groups within parties neither means an automatic formulation of practical- 
moral imperatives, nor that such imperatives are prominent within the parties or 
political currents.
The focus on political memory groups tries to avoid the reification of entire societies. 
However, it is important to stress that, even at that level, there is no monolithic memory, 
but, rather, a constant process of transformation. The social basis, outside events or the 
internal process of reflection and communication might cause transformations of social
1 See: chapter 1, section 1.5.
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memories of the past within memory groups and political parties. These two chapters 
can, therefore, only hint at transformations within political memory groups, but it would 
be beyond the reach of this work to inquire into the reasons for those internal 
transformations. By focusing on political memory groups, however, a reification of 
“French” or “German” collective war memories is avoided without a historical and 
social explanation of their social and political basis and thus their transformation.
These two chapters not only look at the prominence of political memory groups within 
political currents and parties, but also discuss the role and position of political parties 
within the political system and political power. In carrying out such an analysis, my aim 
is to explain why certain political memory groups had more possibilities to implement 
their practical-moral imperatives than others and to point to the different means they 
had to impose their views on politics and collective war memories within societies.
This chapter’s focus on wars that involve France and Germany leaves aside other wars 
(such as the war in Indochina or Algeria in the case of France) that may be very 
important for politics in general or international politics in particular, but may not 
necessarily have an impact on Franco-German relations. It would simply be beyond the 
scope of this thesis to apply the approach to other wars as well. The empirical analysis 
of this and the next chapter will focus very much on public debates (in parliament, in 
public discussions, public trials, interviews etc.) and public commemorations.2 This 
methodology derives from the claim developed in chapter 1, in the sense that collective 
memory is established and reproduced in the public sphere. Although opinion polls are 
sometimes quoted, they have a different quality to them, in that they are the collection 
of individual opinions and memories. As Halbwachs claims, the sum of individual 
memories is not necessarily a shared memory, as this latter requires a medium, such as 
the public sphere, for creating a shared meaning. This is the reason why this and the 
next chapter focus on issues of public remembrance and public speeches and leave out 
an interpretation of symbolism or symbolic representation, which has become a popular 
branch of analysis of collective war memories in recent years.
2 It therefore relies heavily on primary sources in German and French. All translations are mine.
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This and the following chapter are structured in a similar way. Each chapter is 
chronologically ordered and highlights in its first part the political memory groups 
within political parties and their practical-moral imperatives. The first section of this 
chapter looks at the period between 1870 and 1945 in Germany. It analyses the political 
currents and the prominence of political memory groups within them. The second 
section looks at the post-1945 period until 1990 (reunification of the two Germanys). In 
this part, East and West Germany are discussed separately. As I will argue, the 1980s 
were an important decade in both Germanys, which signalled the emergence of a 
different form of remembering by some political memory groups within both polities. 
The third section briefly discusses the remembering in the unified Germany.
4.1 Essentialising and conventional remembering of past wars with France 
in Germany between 1870 and 1945
The idea that a people must endure a specific fate because of special and unchanging 
collective character traits is a testimony o f intellectual laziness and, in the final 
analysis, o f mean intentions.
Jacques Droz3
With the help of three wars; namely, the Prussian-Danish war in 1864, the Austro- 
Prussian war in 1866 and the Franco-Prussian war in 1870, the borders of the unified 
Germany, which was proclaimed in 18 January, 1871, in Versailles, were decided by 
military force. Those wars ended, in fact, a discussion that had taken place over much of 
the nineteenth century on the precise borders of Germany. As a result, unified Germany 
would fail to include the whole of Austria-Hungary, the rival of Prussia and the home of 
German emperors for centuries. At the same time, those three wars triggered a wave of 
forgetting about, or distancing from, the Holy Roman Empire of German Nations and 
the alleged cultural ties of Germany to Austria.4 Moreover, from 1871 German 
historiography fostered the remembering of those three wars as the inevitable result of 
the compelling drive to establish a strong, modem Prussia-led Germany.
3 Quoted in: Godde-Baumanns, 1987:16.
4 It was controversial whether the terms and “Kaiser” should be used at all in 1871, since the
German liberals opposed any continuity with the medieval Habsburg Empire (Schieder, 1992:88-89).
117
Between 1815 and 1870 the attitude of German political currents and nationalists 
towards France had been mixed. While the ideas and political values of the French 
Revolution were welcome, especially by the German liberals, the French occupation of 
German territory sparked a strong anti-French sentiment among German intellectuals 
such as Arndt, Komer, Fichte and, even, Hegel (Rovan, 1986:82). The dispute of the 
precise border between France and Germany aroused strong anti-French feelings in the 
1840s (during the so-called “Rhine crisis”) for the first time, when French intellectuals 
and politicians demanded a revision of the Congress of Vienna to re-establish the Rhine 
River as the natural border between Germany and France (Godde-Baumanns, 1987:4). 
With the military victory and the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine from France after 
the signing of the Peace Treaty of Frankfurt in 1871, the admiration of France among 
German intellectuals and politicians was replaced in some political currents by a sense 
of superiority that prevailed until the outbreak of the First World War in 1914.
With the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, a war of a hitherto unknown 
magnitude of suffering came to an end (Fussell, 1975 and Winter, 1994). The sheer 
number of soldiers returning from the front, often physically wounded or maimed, 
constituted a visible reminder of the First World War and triggered a proliferation of 
organisations by former soldiers and their families, as well as state agencies, to deal 
with those physically or mentally affected by war. With the end of the First World War 
there was also an increasing shift in Germany as well as France - or Great Britain, for 
that matter - from glorifying the act of warfare, to highlighting the negative 
consequences thereof.
In Germany, the 1918-1919 capitulation and its conditions were difficult to comprehend 
for large segments of the population, as the German army had surrendered before any 
foreign soldier had set foot on German soil. At the same time, the end of the First World 
War also heralded the end of the constitutional monarchy and the establishment of 
democracy. This also led to a shift of political currents in power from volkisch 
Conservative groups to the Social Democrats, the Liberals, the Catholic Centrum Party,5 
which also gave some new memory groups access to power.
5 These three parties formed the so-called “Weimar coalition” and were the staunchest defenders of the 
Weimar Republic.
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During the Weimar Republic (1919-1933), the Versailles Treaty and its overcoming 
was the dominant topic that shaped the relationship between (democratic) Germany and 
(democratic) France. When Hitler assumed power on 31 January, 1933 many in 
Germany hoped the time would be ripe to dispense with the Treaty of Versailles. With 
the rise of the Nazis, but also the Communists in Germany and elsewhere, ideologies 
gained a new prominence in politics, and so did warfare. For the first time, war aims 
included the extermination of entire peoples or parts of society. At the same time, 
occupiers (such as Nazi-Germany or the Soviet Union) would treat people in the 
occupied territories differently, according to ideological and, in the case of Nazi 
Germany, racist criteria.
The total defeat of Nazi-Germany in May 1945 also meant a shift in political currents 
having access to political power in what later became East and West Germany. In East 
Germany the Communists very soon monopolised power. In West Germany, a political 
Conservatism shaped politics for the next 20 years that differed from the political 
Conservatism during the Imperial period or the Weimar Republic, especially in its 
attitude towards democracy and the acceptance of Western values.
At the same time, the victorious powers of the Second World War assumed political 
control, which included the forging of war memories in both Germanys. With the 
unification of the two Germanys in 1990, there was, again, a shift of political currents in 
the former East Germany, which replaced and marginalised the hitherto dominant 
Communist regime and party, and, therewith, the political memory groups it harboured. 
Thus, Germany not only experienced very different types of warfare (as other countries 
did), but also dramatic changes in the political currents in power and fundamental shifts 
in the access of political memory groups being able to shape the official versions of 
collective war memories. Finally, each world war meant a change of the political system 
in power in Germany. For the Germans, therefore, remembering past wars also often 
implied remembering regime changes.
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4.1.1 Political currents and their respective memory groups between 1871 and 1945
Despite the dramatic changes that took place between 1871 and the German defeat in 
the First World War in 1919, a remarkable continuity among certain political currents 
and their respective memory groups can be identified. This is not to deny that some 
political memory groups appeared only after 1919, and that others went through 
important transformations. Yet, the continuities are striking and, as such, they should be 
highlighted.
4.1.1.1 The conservative political current and its memory groups: remembering 
the eternal self and the hereditary enemy
With the establishment of a German Empire in 1871, there emerged a conservative 
protestant Right in Germany. In 1871 the Conservative Party (since 1876: the German 
Conservative Party) and the Free Conservative Party, since 1871 renamed German 
Reich Party were formed. They gathered Conservatives of different strata with a focus 
on military tradition, a strong state and many with a Juncker background (landowners of 
territories in Eastern Prussia). This political current also harboured many high-ranking 
generals and soldiers and had close ties with organisations that popularised expansionist 
policies in Germany, such as the Colonial League, the Naval League and the All- 
German League (Poidevin and Bariety, 1977:197) a strong, military state and an 
authoritarian rule, particularly in Prussia. This political current was the backbone of the 
Chancellors from Bismarck to Bethmann-Hollweg (1871 to 1914) and secured a 
parliamentary majority together with the National Liberals throughout the Imperial 
period.
The Right fostered the idea of a German people with eternal traits and pictured France 
as the “eternal and hereditary enemy”, who had always tried to dominate and invade 
Germany. These essentialising views of Germany (which had just come into existence 
as a polity) and France dominated the remembering of past wars within this political 
current. Earlier French intrusions into German territory, particularly in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, were remembered and interpreted as a proof of these traits of two 
naturally opposed peoples, while periods of peaceful coexistence were neglected (Mitter 
(ed.), 1981:149, footnote 9). Conservatives and many high-ranking military officers saw
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this as a confirmation of the need for an inevitable future revenge and, thus, war with 
France. Many Conservatives even asked for that future war to finish “once and for all” 
the French will of intrusion into Germany.
As in France, the German Conservatives also shared the idea of an eternal dispute with 
France and oppositional character traits of the two peoples that made conflict and war 
inevitable and foreclosed any initiative of rapprochement or peaceful coexistence. 
While Germans were regarded by Conservative politicians and writers as being honest, 
diligent and strong, the French people were associated with weakness, falseness and 
moral decline (Jeismann, 1992:380). The defeat in the 1870-1871 war was seen by that 
political current as a proof both of French moral decay and Germany’s superiority. 
There was a repeated emphasis “that France was in moral and biological decline”, 
which, in turn, had significant consequences for its future political and economic 
position in the world (Mitter (ed.), 1981:143-144). This view was repeated time and 
again by General Bemhardi, leader of the powerful All-German League and author of 
the popular book Germany and the next War published in 1914 (von Bemhardi, 1914).
Based on such a remembering of past wars, Germany had to be prepared against any 
threats emanating from the international sphere and the next war that was sure to come. 
The ability to face those threats had priority over domestic issues, thus the defence and 
preparedness of Germany for a possible war was paramount.6 The Conservatives used 
propaganda among German public opinion to brand anyone in France, who rejected the 
Peace Treaty of Frankfurt, which had ended the Franco-German War in 1871, as a 
revanchist with aggression intentions towards Germany (Groh, 1990:435). The 
usefulness of this discourse for internal purposes is evidenced by the fact that Otto von 
Bismarck, the German chancellor between 1871 and 1890, resorted frequently to the 
argument of the “French threat” to get military budgets passed through Parliament 
(Ritter, 1977:248-249).
After the loss of the First World War, the former Protestant Conservatism gathered in 
what became the German National People’s Party (Deutschnationale Volkspartei -  
DNVP). This party held on to its prominent political values, opposed the newly
6 This priority was expressed by the historian Leopold von Ranke with the term “primacy of foreign 
policy over domestic politics” (Primat der Aussenpolitik). See: Behrens and Noack, 1984:98.
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established Republic, democracy and the Versailles Peace Treaty. It had close ties with 
the largest organisation of returning soldiers after the First World War, the ‘Steel 
Helmet’ (Stahlhelm) and glorified war and sacrifice in wars. Many generals, such as 
Ludendorff (who ruled Germany from 1916 almost in a dictatorial manner) and 
Hindenburg (the ‘hero of Tannenberg’), were both to be found in this party (Poidevin 
and Bariety, 1977:244).
The German military and, above all, General Ludendorff, consciously fostered the myth 
that it was the revolutionaries and those opposed to monarchical and military rule that 
had weakened the military in combat and were to blame for the defeat in the First World 
War and for the Versailles Treaty. This was how the stab-in-the-back-myth 
(“Dolchstosslegende”) against the German military, which was popularised by the 
Conservatives, was bom in 1920. This myth not only fostered military and conservative 
traditions, but also undermined the legitimacy of the newly established democracy and 
republican rule in Germany, as well as the forces that supported that political system. 
For the Conservative Right, remembering the First World War meant, above all, the 
remembering of a betrayal by the political Left (Social Democrats, revolutionaries, Left 
Liberals).
Hatred against France was fuelled both by a continuous essentialising view on the 
opposition between France and Germany and the current views on the Versailles Treaty, 
which were exacerbated by the occupation of the Ruhr area in 1923 by French and 
Belgian forces, in response to a delay in the reparation payment by Germany. In the 
Right, which participated in some governments and, through Hindenburg, held the post 
of the president from 1925, there were still many currents of the Protestant Right from 
the old Imperial Germany that saw in the behaviour of France a confirmation of the 
decadent and misleading character of the French, the eternal enemy. Thus, there was a 
widespread continuity within this political current in the level of social learning.
4.1.1.2 Opposing the essentialised enemy: the Social Democrats
The German labour movement that, since the 1860s, found a political voice in the 
Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands - SPD) openly 
pledged for a rapprochement with France and rejected the negative and essentialising
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stereotypes of France and the French. It further opposed the Sedan Day celebration, the 
official commemoration day of the German victory over France in 1870/71 on 1 
September, celebrations since the 1880s and organised counter-commemorations on 18 
March (day of the German Constitution and the French Commune in 1871), where the 
friendship with France was celebrated (Groh, 1990: 438). Through the Socialist 
International, the German Social Democratic Party sought ties and common policies 
with their French counterparts. However, the Social Democratic Party had no access to 
state power and acted from political opposition between 1890 and 1918.
Thus, the SPD clearly rejected any essentialising forms of remembering and sought 
rapprochement with France. It made a clear distinction between political community 
and political currents in France, and rejected the self-definition of the Germans as a 
people with eternal traits that had been confirmed by past wars. This attitude remained 
prominent during the Weimar Republic, although it was difficult to advance these views 
in the face of the Treaty of Versailles and its conditions.
4.1.2. Transformations of political currents and their respective memory groups 
between 1918 and 1933
Parties on the Centre and Left (the Catholic Zentrum, the liberal parties German 
Democratic Party - Deutsche Demokratische Partei, DDP -  the German People’s Party 
- Deutsche Volkspartei, DVP - and the SPD) assumed power for the first time in their 
history in 1919. Within that political current there was, however, also a strong sense of 
the need to overcome the enmity with France and a rejection of the war memories that 
assumed any structural or natural rivalry with the Western neighbour. However, just 
like the question of Alsace-Lorraine bore a heavy weight on every attempt at 
rapprochement between France and Germany in the period between 1871 and 1914, so 
did the Versailles Treaty between 1919 and 1933. Until 1925, there existed strong anti- 
French sentiments among the members of the Weimar coalition. But after 1927-1928, 
following the rapprochement between France and Germany in Locarno, a marked 
change towards France took place among the liberal and left political scene in Germany.
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While the Conservative Right (DNVP) and the moderate Right (DVP) supported a 
strong state and a strong military as the means of overturning the unfortunate results of 
the Versailles Treaty, there was also a growing pacifist movement in Germany that was 
to be found in sections of the Left (Communists, SPD, some members of the DDP). 
Reflecting upon the experiences of past wars (not only, but above all with France) these 
groups advocated a general disarmament and de-militarisation. They were supported by 
many novelists or artists who focused on the horrors of the First World War and 
rej ected future wars.
4.1.2.1 The liberal political current and its memory groups
In contrast to the Protestant Right, the Liberals (mostly to be found in the South and 
West of Germany) kept close and traditional ties to France (Rovan, 1986:88-89). After 
its failed attempt to democratise and liberalise the German political system in 1848, the 
liberal movement split into the National Liberal Party and the Free Democratic Party. 
While the latter stressed democratisation and liberal rights as the predominant political 
agenda and remained mainly in opposition, the former joined coalitions with the 
Protestant Right in several governments and pleaded for a strong German state, which 
supported nationalistic policies.
This sense of pride in the German state, the German status and German strength was 
contrasted by German politicians with what they perceived as French weakness and 
deception. But the Liberals also re-read the last wars as part of a teleological, inevitable
n
outcome of a united, modem state of Germany under the leadership of Pmssia. By 
contrast the Holy Roman Empire of German Nations, which lasted until 1806, and the 
German League that existed between 1815 and 1866, were remembered as a time of 
weaknesses, disunity and predominance of a backward Habsburg Empire and, was, 
therefore, rejected. Within this political current there was, thus, much less essentialising 
remembering: Instead, the past wars (1864, 1866, 1870) were remembered as a clear 
break with a less than glorious German past.
7 On this teleological re-reading of the past toward a kleindeutsche German state after 1871 see: H. 
Schulze, 1985:70.
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After the First World War the Free Democratic Party of Imperial Germany turned into 
the DDP, while the National Liberals gathered in the DVP, the latter having strongly 
supported the war aims of the German governments during the First World War. The 
Liberals supported the Weimar Republic, but also tried to overcome the results of the 
Versailles Treaty for Germany. The German People’s Party, with Gustav Stresemann as 
its main figure, clearly abandoned the nationalistic and state-oriented reading of the past 
and reflected upon the causes and consequences of the First World War. Holding strong 
ties with diplomats and civil servants, the DVP rejected an essentialising reading of the 
past wars and stressed, rather, the errors in judgement that had been made by the 
German chancellors.
4.1.2.2 New political currents at the extremes
On the two extremes of the political spectrum there were the newly formed Communist 
Party (Kommunistische Partei Deutschland, KPD) founded in 1918-1919 and, since 
1923, the German National Socialist Worker’s Party (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche 
Arbeitspartei, NSDAP), the Nazis. The Communists were in favour of a social 
revolution, which enjoyed preference as a programmatic priority over the defence of 
democracy or the reversal of the Versailles Treaty. When the Nazi Party assumed 
complete power with the passing of the emergency laws (Ermachtigungsgesetz) in 
March 1933, other political parties were proscribed and the NSDAP was the only 
political party allowed until 8 May 1945.
4.1.3 The rise of racial essentialising remembering between 1933 and 1945
Past wars, particularly the First World War, were remembered in a different way with 
the rise of National Socialism and its racist Aryan theories, which, although with 
reservations, counted France somewhat among the Aryan camp. At that time the notion 
of France as an eternal enemy disappeared. Instead, the idea of a racist war with the 
Slavic East and against the “Jewish Bolshevik conspiracy” gained importance and 
supplanted older anti-Semitic feelings of the Right in Imperial Germany. With the clear 
focus set on the East and the internal enemies of Communism and the Jews, earlier 
confrontations between France and Germany lost prominence under the Nazi regime.
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However, the contempt for the ‘decadent’ France, cultivated by the Conservatives 
remained a topoi under the Nazis and was reinforced by the perceived weakness of 
France expressed by pacifist movements on the political left and right in France in the 
1930s.
That the Nazi’s new race-bound vocabulary was more than rhetoric was evidenced by 
the very different ways in which, between 1940 and 1945, Germany fought the war on 
the Western and Eastern fronts. In fact, while the latter was a war of extinction, not only 
against the Jewish population but also against the Czech, Polish and Russian 
intelligentsia, as well as against Communist leaders, in some occupied Nordic countries, 
as well as in the Netherlands, fraternisation between Germans (including soldiers) and 
the local population was, under Hitler’s orders, welcomed on racist grounds. Moreover,
o
in France, ordinary German soldiers were ordered to respect the civilian population. 
This notwithstanding, the German occupants of France pursued the concentration, 
extradition and later extermination of Jews and Communists, as they did in other 
occupied countries, and carried out massacres in reprisal of attacks against the German 
army by resistant fighters and partisans (as in France in Oradour-sur-Glane in 1943). 
Those different strategies in the Eastern and Western front indicate that, for the National 
Socialists, racial belonging and political affiliation were more important than national 
belonging as criteria to define the enemy. This, in turn, had implications for different 
parties and, later, for the formation of memory groups concerning the Second World 
War.
4.1.4 Public commemorations of past wars between 1871 to 1945
From 1875 the German nation, a nation without a national anthem and without a 
national flag until the 1890s (when the commercial fleet was ordered to use an imperial 
flag besides the state flags), celebrated the Day of the Battle of Sedan (Sedanstag), on 1 
September, as both the victory of Germany over France and the birth of a united 
Germany. Yet, on that proclaimed “national” holiday particular political values were 
celebrated as well: Prussian militarism and its rulers were glorified, while the Social
8 On the perception of the “cultivated German soldier“ in occupied France during the Second World War 
see: Rovan, 1986:109.
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Democrats and political Catholicism were consciously excluded (Schellack, 1990; 
Leiner, 1988; H. Muller, 1969). The Social Democratic Party, in turn, regularly 
organised counter-celebrations and counter-rallies on that same day. Thus, the 
commemoration of the victory over France was never a unifying event and several 
attempts by Social Democrats and Free Democrats to abolish this celebration were 
made.
For the National Liberals, this victory had not merely been a victory of one nation over 
another, but was also the victory of a political regime, of certain political values that 
celebrated themselves thereafter. This example of the commemoration of the Sedan Day 
highlights the political definition of the German nation after 1871; namely, one 
characterised not by territory or ethnic belonging, but rather by political features, as the 
deliberate exclusion of Social Democrats and Catholics proves. The commemoration of 
the Franco-German war may have therefore triggered a certain image of France, but it 
did not achieve an internal unity -  as it did in France during that same period.
This lack of shared meaning during Imperial Germany was even more visible during the 
Weimar Republic, when public commemorations of the First World War led to a clash 
of different memory groups and political currents. The stab-in-the-back myth of the 
Conservative Right and the Nazis made a common commemoration for all political 
memory groups difficult, if  not impossible: the reason for the defeat and a political 
imperative detrimental to those of other political memory groups left no common 
ground for commemoration.
Equally, the Conservatives and the Nazis, on the one hand, and the Centre and Left, on 
the other hand, differed about the way of remembering the last war. While the former 
continued to glorify war (exemplified by Ernst Junger’s book In Stahlgewitter), the 
latter focused on the horrors of war (exemplified by Paul Maria Remarque’s novel Im 
Wes ten Nichts Neues). Thus, there was neither a commonly accepted commemoration 
day nor a commonly accepted war memorial. In other words: there was no shared 
mourning, no shared remembering of the First World War, despite the undeniable 
trauma it had caused.9 The controversy emerging from the war of 1870-1871 and the
9 Illustrative examples for this polarisation were the two war memorials from 1919 and 1934 in Hamburg. 
See: Reichel, 1999:61-68.
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two provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, played virtually no role in German politics and 
German memory in the inter-war period (Poidevin and Bariety, 1977:242).
Between 1933 and 1945 there was a clear death cult celebrated by the Nazis. However, 
there were few commemorations of specific dates related to past wars. During the Nazi 
period of Germany there were only four public commemorations: Thanksgiving (end of 
October), the Day of the Fallen Heroes (16 March), Labour Day (May 1), Day o f the 
Fallen Martyrs of the Nazi movement (9 November) (Reichel, 1999:225).
4.1.5 Levels of social learning in remembering past wars between 1871 and 1945
Between 1871 and 1918 many German politicians and writers referred to nations as 
persons, with monolithic characters, attitudes and features. Conservative political 
memory groups in power, which also dominated the Imperial public sphere, had a 
tendency to regard social and political features of the neighbouring society as a natural, 
not as a historical phenomenon. This way to personify and naturalise nations and their 
past and the subsequent structuring of collective war memories is very much in line 
with an early stage of conventional learning. However, this feature of antagonism 
between France and Germany is a modem invention and does not stand a historical 
analysis (Mitter (ed.), 1981:26).
Michael Jeismann (2002) has argued that in the nineteenth century an enemy was 
necessary to create a national consciousness and the invocation of the enemy had a 
unifying effect among all the parties both in Germany and France. One’s presumed 
eternal character was increasingly defined in opposition to the other. This created a sort 
of double-bind, a way of defining oneself in contrast to the “other”. German 
Conservatives, but also some Liberals felt to be the opposite of France (and vice versa). 
This is a very rigid way of structuring memories and of directing acts of forgetting: 
anything that does not fit into the traits identified in the present and the past is 
marginalised. Conservatives and some National Liberals explained the French 
revanchisme no longer in historical terms, i.e. with reference to the Peace Treaty of 
Frankfurt, but, rather, essentialised and seen as a proof of an eternal national character. 
Each nation, in fact, identified the other nation as being the ugly side of modernity
128
(Jeismann, 2002, passim). The negative ‘other’ became, thus, an important ingredient of 
both polities’ political project and self-definition.
However, even if those essentialising forms of remembering past wars with France 
prevailed between 1871 and 1918, there were different war memories that also led to 
different practical-moral imperatives, especially challenging the inevitability of war 
with France. National-liberal circles still assumed a possible conflict with France, but 
not as a result of historical inevitability, but rather, for reasons of competition. Free 
Democrats and Social Democrats clearly distinguished between the political community 
(France, Germany) and the political actors in the past and present. It might be suggested 
that the perspective of (national and international) historical class struggle was an 
important factor that prevented the Social Democrats from using eternalised 
personification of nations. The different forms of remembering the past were evident in 
the controversies on Sedanstag.
The structuring and the level of reflection on memory of past wars diversified during 
the Weimar Republic. For the Conservatives, the memory of the last war was confirmed 
by current events during the 1920s. Despite grief about the lost war and the misguided 
scapegoating of the new political system for this defeat, essentialising forms of 
remembering past wars prevailed within this political current. After the First World 
War, the national liberals clearly changed their views on war and the relationship to the 
former enemy France. Thus, the National Liberals and the Free Liberals joined the 
Social Democrats and many writers that used the remembering of the First World War 
to reflect on political values and actions to prevent future wars. Thus, signs of advanced 
conventional learning were visible and dominated politics in the second half of the 
1920s.
With the rise of National Socialism, another form of essentialising that also embraced 
the remembering and framing of past wars took place. This time the frame was not a 
national character (as during the Imperial period) but a race one. Thus, war lost its 
potential for moral reflection and became an inevitable part of life (as the death cult of 
the Nazis suggests). In fact, the level of social learning was reverted during National 
Socialism in Germany from a diversity of remembering to a race-based essentialising of 
remembering past wars.
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4.2 The divided war memories in West and East Germany: 1945-1989
Due to technological advances, the level of destruction increased tremendously in the 
Second World War. This led to an increase in casualties, wounded, physically and 
psychologically affected by war. At the same time, the ideologically-based will to 
exterminate an entire people or groups of people and the Holocaust added another 
extreme experience and" further blurred the boundaries of conventional warfare (in 
particular, since the war was declared to be “a war against a race”) and atrocities against 
civilians. This suggests, firstly, that the collective memory of the Second World War 
had a new quality and, secondly, that being so powerful, it sidelined many earlier war 
memories.
The course of Second World War was heavily informed by ideologies, which cut across 
national boundaries, such as Fascism, Liberalism, Communism. National war memories 
were, therefore, in some countries much more difficult to establish and reproduce in the 
aftermath of the war and still are, more controversial and prone to being contested. To 
further complicate the picture, German occupation forces did not treat all citizens in the 
occupied zones equally, but made clear distinctions on racial and ideological grounds. 
This renders the memories of this war difficult to approach along exclusively national 
lines. There were ideologically-based coalitions or closeness between a certain group of 
people, say, the Communists and the Soviet Union or the Nazis and Vichy France. At 
the same time, there was a general, nation-wide, resistance to the German occupation 
that often united otherwise very heterogeneous or antagonistic groups. These webs of 
coalitions render collective war memories of the Second World War much more 
complex and compartmentalised than, for instance, the memory of the First World War. 
Memories of the Second World War, in sum, appear to be more controversial and more 
difficult, but very powerful for memory groups.
When Germany surrendered to the Allies on 8 May, 1945 the defeat had been total. A 
repetition of the stab-in-the-back myth, as after the First World War, was simply not an 
option, given the absolute depletion of the German army (Herf, 1997:203-204). In 
August that year the Allies met in Potsdam, Germany, to discuss the way in which they 
would jointly shape the future of Germany. In fact, part of the Joint Allied Control
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Council that was created at the Potsdam Conference, was meant to shape German 
memories of the Second World War through its programmes of democratisation, re­
education and de-nazification. In October 1945 the Nuremberg trials began, where the 
Allies charged many leading German members of the Nazi Party, as well as members of 
the military and paramilitary organisations, with crimes against humanity and with 
planning and carrying out a war of conquest. The trials lasted about a year with great 
media coverage in Germany and the rest of the world.
In May 1945, there were about eight million members of the Nazi Party and related 
organisations, many millions of returning soldiers from the Western and Eastern fronts 
and civilians who had suffered air raids since 1943 and the occupation by different 
troops. There were about twelve millions of German refugees who had been expelled 
from the Eastern provinces of Germany (Silesia, Pomerania, East Prussia) but also from 
other regions where ethnic Germans had lived for centuries (for example the Sudeten 
Germans from Czechoslovakia). These expelled groups later organised themselves in 
“Landsmannschaften”.10 There were also some Jewish Germans returning to Germany 
(often with Allied troops) and Germans (Communists, Social Democrats, opposition 
leaders from the two Christian Churches, Roma and homosexuals) released from 
concentration camps such as Dachau, Neuengamme or Buchenwald or returning from 
exile (Hudemann, 1984). This far from exhaustive enumeration of groups strongly, yet 
differently, affected by World War II, is meant to stress that, despite the joint 
experience of war and its horrors, the end of the war meant quite different things to 
different groups. Some of them found manifest political expression, whereas others 
remained in the private or public cultural sphere.
4.2.1 The remembering of the Second World War in West German politics (1949-
1989)
The West Germans had little option but to remember the Second World War and the 
crimes committed in the name of Germany for several reasons. As a matter of fact, West 
Germany regarded itself as the legal heir to 1937 Germany (before the annexation of
10 This term, however, was historically laden, as Yvonne Bollmann points out: “Landsmannschaften” 
referred to small, informal units of the German army in the 1920s and now, after 1945, referred to a 
representation of a specific region. See: Bollmann, 1998:69.
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Austria and the Sudetenland). The Federal Republic of Germany assumed, thus, the 
legal and financial obligations derived from events and crimes committed in the name 
of Germany in the Second World War, such as payment of restitution to Israel, 
compensation to forced labour in state enterprises, as well as for earlier events, such as 
the payment of the outstanding debt from the First World War.
This was a very different attitude from the ones adopted in East Germany, Austria or 
post-war Italy. East Germany, for one, regarded itself as representing a clear break with 
the old Germany, resuming certain traditions, but definitely departing from the 
militarism and capitalism that characterised pre-war Germany. In this sense, East 
Germany portrayed itself as the new and better Germany. Austria, in turn, regarded 
itself as the first victim of German aggression and not as an integral part of a common 
subject that committed certain crimes. Italy went down a similar path and elaborated the 
myth of the resistenza as the foundation of post-war Italy, thus giving birth to the notion 
of another, non-Fascist Italy (Dubiel, 1999:278-279; and Reichel, 1999:22). These three 
countries made a conscious distinction between “political regime” and “country” and 
rejected therewith all ideas that suggested that there existed a “national” trait or a 
national continuity that bore responsibility for the past.
4.2.1.1 Associations related to the Second World War
Unlike in France, there was never a Ministry of War Veterans either in West Germany 
or in reunified Germany. Between 1945 and 1949, the Western Allies consciously 
prevented any association of former soldiers from being formed.11 Associations with 
Nazi content were forbidden from the very beginning, as were associations of former 
soldiers, wounded or permanently disabled in war. Under the Allied rule these groups 
were forced to integrate in associations that represented civilian victims. This is when 
the Imperial League of Civilian and Military Victims [of war], Pensioners and Relatives 
of the Fallen (Reichsbund der Kriegs- und Zivilgeschadigten, Sozialrentner und 
Hinterbliebenen, often referred to as “Reichsbund”) and the Association of Military
11 This was based on Allied Control Council proclamation no. 2 from 20 September 1945 that was later 
confirmed by the Allied Supreme Council law no. 34 from 20 August 1946. For a discussion on the 
Allied policy to prevent any “regrouping” of former combatants see: Meyer, 1984: 82-85. The only 
exceptions were the so-called “Notgemeinschaften” at the level of federal states {Lander), which dealt 
with the material conditions of many soldiers.
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Victims, Relatives of the Fallen and War Pensioners (Verband der Kriegsgeschadigten, 
Kriegshinterbliebenen und Sozialrentner Deutschlands, often referred to as VdK) were 
formed to represent, inter alia, the many military and civilian victims of war. Yet, even 
the associations of war victims awoke the suspicion of the Allies, as the latter feared the 
emergence of possible militarist traits in such organisations (Hudemann, 1984:25-26). 
In July 1950, the League of German Victims of War and Relatives of the Fallen {Bund 
Deutscher Kriegsgeschddigter und Kriegshinterbliebener, BDKK) was formed as the 
first association that focused entirely and exclusively on war victims. However, it never 
replaced the two established organisations, Reichsbund and VdK, which remained the 
strongest associations for material claims of war victims. Attempts in the 1950s to form 
a single association between the two failed. Thus, this dual structure of associations 
with mixed membership (war-related and non-war-related) existed throughout the 
period under consideration (1945-1995) and has survived until today (2006).
After the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949, associations of
war veterans could be formed. Thus, former German soldiers gathered since 1951 in the
Association of German Soldiers {Verband deutscher Soldaten - VDS), or the German
Military Society {Gesellschaft fur Wehrkunde). Both associations excluded former
members of the SS or the Waffen-SS. In turn, the private organisation “Popular League
of German Tombs-Care” {Volksbund deutscher Kriegsgraberfursorge), which was
already active after the First World War, took upon itself the task to provide and care
for the tombs of the German soldiers. Since the 1950s the “Aid Organisation on the
Principle of Mutuality” {Hilfsgemeinschaft au f Gegenseitigkeit- HIAG), of former
members of the Waffen-SS was tolerated by West German authorities until 1992, when
it was finally forbidden. Indeed, the memory of the Waffen-SS was particularly
controversial in post-war Germany, for some argued that the Waffen-SS had simply
been a special unit of the German military, while others claimed that its members were
the most fanatic Nazis and had been authors of the destruction, particularly on the 
1
Eastern front. The victims of the Nazi regime were represented by the Association of 
the Persecuted by the Nazi Regime {Verein der Verfolgten des Naziregimes -W N ). 
From the outset, this association was dominated by Communists from East Germany.
12 This controversy about the Waffen-SS re-emerged in 1985, when US president Ronald Reagan visited 
a German military cemetery near Bitburg, where Waffen-SS members were buried. On the Waffen-SS 
see: Stein, 1966.
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When the controversies with other groups included in the W N  increased, West 
Germany founded its own association of persecuted by the Nazi regime, the League of 
the Persecuted of the Nazi Regime (Bund der Verfolgten des Nazi-Regimes - BVN).
As chapters 1 and 3 pointed out, both governmental policies on archives and amnesties 
are vital issues for collective memories. The pursuit of punishment and the 
identification of personal responsibilities are important ingredients of public memory. 
The three aspects are interrelated: access to archives is often the precondition for trials, 
but it is even more important for research that might influence collective memory. 
Trials, in turn, attract public attention and may spark general debates or increased 
research on the past. Periods of silence or conscious attempts at forgetting in democratic 
societies are often caused by amnesty laws, restrictive archive policies or attempts to 
avoid public trials. Without clarifying these conditions for public memory to develop, 
the analysis of public discourse on collective war memories might be misleading.
Between 1945 and 1955 the Allies had the overall responsibility for the prosecution of 
war criminals in West Germany. In the French and British zones, prosecutors from both 
countries were clearly overburdened with that task. But so were the German federal 
courts when, in 1955, the Federal Republic of Germany acquired the responsibility for 
the prosecution of war and Nazi crimes. In order to meet this new responsibility, the 
ministries of justice of the states (Lander) of the Federal Republic of Germany created 
in 1958 the Central Investigation Bureau of Nazi Crimes in Ludwigsburg. This office 
was entrusted with the preliminary investigations of each case. Should sufficient proof 
be found, the office had to hand it over to the district attorney where the person charged 
with war crimes was registered. Between 1958 and 1983 about 89,000 charges were 
filed, less than 10% (6,565) leading to a conviction. By 1983, 1,767 trials were still 
pending (Suddeutsche Zeitung, 25 May, 1983). Thanks to the work of the Ludwigsburg 
Centre important trials began in the 1960s (the Auschwitz trial in Frankfurt) or 1970s 
(the Maidanek trial from 1975 to 1981). By contrast, about 12,868 persons (12,500 until 
1950) were convicted in the same period in East Germany (Herf, 1997:72-73). From 
1965 on, most minor crimes, manslaughter, for instance, were no longer prosecuted in 
West Germany. But the issue of limitation on the prosecution of murder and crimes 
against humanity during the Second World War, after intensive parliamentary debates in 
1960, 1965, 1969 was definitely settled in favour of lifting any time limit and of
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opening the way of continuous prosecution in 1979. Many of those considered “minor 
offenders” or simply members of the Nazi Party were rehabilitated in the 1950s.
Most archives in West Germany were opened and made available for research in the 
early 1960s, although many documents had been lost through the bomb raids, 
evacuations and transfers of files abroad during and immediately after the war (Kwiet, 
1989:186-187). Yet, the most important archive on Nazi members in Germany (over 25 
million files), remained in the custody of US forces in West Berlin, in the so-called 
Document Center. The German government and the governments of the German states 
had access to those archives upon request. This Centre was only handed over to the 
German authorities in July 1994 and became the Berlin Document Centre {Berliner 
Dokumentationszentrale) of the Federal Archives of Koblenz (Bundesarchiv Koblenz).
4.2.1.2 Political memory groups within political parties
The Federal Republic of Germany, formed by the three Western zones in 1949, had a 
fairly wide-ranging political spectrum which resembled, at first, the one of the Weimar 
Republic, but was transformed to a high and stable concentration on three parties from 
the mid-1960s onwards: the Conservative Christian-Democratic Union (CDU) together 
with its sister party in Bavaria, the Christian Social Union (CSU), the Social Democratic 
Party (SPD) and a unified Liberal Party, the Free Democratic Party (FDP). This high 
concentration on few parties meant that many compromises between different memory 
groups had to be sought.
Many leaders, who had actively resisted the Nazi regime and, as a result, had to flee the 
country or suffer in concentration camps, gathered in the Social Democratic Party and 
the Communist Party in West Germany. Both parties had a clear reputation of having 
opposed the Nazi regime. As the leader of the Social Democratic Party, Kurt 
Schumacher, explained in 1945:
The Social Democratic Party is the only party in Germany that has held on to the 
lines of democracy and peace. This is why it is the only one who can claim that 
the principles of its policies have been approved by the judgement of history.13
13 Quoted in H. Schulze, 1982:191.
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With the memory of its own past and the memory of the two world wars, the SPD 
regarded itself as the party that defended freedom and democracy and claimed moral 
and political leadership in the shaping of the post-war political system.14 The 
Communist Party {Kommunistische Partei Deutschland, KPD), in turn, was banned by 
the West German Constitutional Court in 1956 for being anti-constitutional. It re­
grouped in 1969 as the German Communist Party (Deutsche Kommunistische Partei, 
DKP) and was tolerated thereafter. The DKP never gained seats in the federal 
parliament (nor any state parliament). The exclusion of the Communist Party from the 
West German political scene also meant a diversion of the resistance memory groups of 
the Left in West Germany mainly to the Social Democratic Party.
A significant transformation of political Conservatism took place in West Germany in 
stark contrast to the developments that had taken place during the Weimar Republic. 
After 1945, politicians such as Konrad Adenauer and Jakob Kaiser for the first time 
succeeded in gathering conservatives of both confessions, i.e. Protestantism and 
Catholicism, to form the Christian Democratic Union (Christlich-Demokratische Union, 
CDU). From the very beginning, the CDU considered itself within the Christian and 
democratic tradition of Germany. This self-understanding broke clearly with the 
authoritarian and anti-democratic conservative tradition of Protestant and Prussian 
conservatism that had existed between 1871 and 1933, and offered German 
Conservatism a Rhenish and democratic alternative (Herf, 1997:215.216). After the 
Second World War, there was no longer any significant volkisch conservative political 
current in West or East Germany, which had often been the mainstay of anti-French 
sentiments on conventional memory grounds in Imperial and inter-war Germany. Under 
the chairmanship of Konrad Adenauer, former mayor of Cologne, the CDU, opened up 
its membership to former “ordinary” members of the Nazi Party. Together with the 
Liberal Party (Freie Demokratische Partei, FDP) and the conservative German Party 
{Deutsche Partei, DP), the CDU received most of those former ordinary members of the 
National Socialist Party, as well as many former soldiers and diplomats of the Third 
Reich (Dubiel, 1999:55 and 66-67).
14 For Schumacher, the Social Democratic Party had always been the ‘other Germany’, in 
contradistinction to National Socialism and imperial expansionism. See: Herf, 1997:251.
136
In the 1950s, the group of ethnic German expellees had their own political expression 
and party, the League of the Homelandless and Right-Deprived/All-German Bloc (Bund 
der Heimatlosen und Entrechteten/Gesamtdeutscher Block - BHE), which also formed 
part of Adenauer’s government from 1953-1957 (together with the national- 
conservative German Party, and the national-liberal Free Democratic Party). In 1961, 
the BHE and the German Party fused, but failed to reach any significance in the 
subsequent elections. Thus, leaders of the German expellees from the East found a 
political home, first, among the Social Democrats (in opposition to Adenauer’s policy 
of Westintegratiori) and, later, in the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social 
Union (in opposition to Brandt’s Ostpolitik). As a result, the memory group of the 
expellees was very influential in formulating government policies in the 1950s.
In the 1950s the German Party received some of the DNVP politicians of the Weimar 
Republic. In 1961 the German Party formed a coalition with the BHE and was renamed 
All-German Party (Gesamtdeutsche Partei, GDP). However, this party could not enter 
the federal parliament after 1969 and the remaining members joined the CDU/CSU, 
which became, and still is, the sole conservative force in the German parliament.
The Liberal Party, FDP, was the home of most of the former public and diplomatic 
servants in West Germany and also allowed former ordinary members of the Nazi Party 
in its ranks. The FDP was increasingly able to unite the national liberal wing and the 
free democratic wing of the liberal movement that had split and opposed each other 
during the Imperial and the Weimar Republic periods, although, at the beginning, it had 
a clear bent towards the national liberal wing.
Finally, former and current convinced Nazis gathered since 1950 in the Socialist Reich 
Party (Sozialistische Reichspartei - SRP) that considered itself the legal heir to the Nazi 
Party and the political force of former soldiers (Meyer, 1984:90). Its most prominent 
figure was Major Remer, with whose help the uprising against Hitler by General 
Stauffenberg and others on 20 July 1944 had been crushed. The SRP was proscribed by 
the High Court in 1952, after having had a significant success in the state elections of 
Bremen and Lower Saxony. After its dissolution, some -  mostly moderate - members of 
this party joined, above all, the FDP and CDU, and, to a lesser degree, also the SPD 
(Hoffmann and Jesse, 1993:215). Some other members of the SRP re-emerged in the
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1965-founded National Party of Germany (Nationalpartei Deutschlands, NPD), which 
gathered the German extreme Right, and had some limited success in two state 
elections. In the period under discussion the NPD never entered the federal parliament.
4.2.1.3 Practical-moral imperatives in West Germany based on war memories
With the demise of the anti-democratic, volkisch oriented Conservatism, and the 
exclusion of former Nazi-members from the political system, there was widespread 
willingness among the West German political elites and memory groups to overcome 
the long-standing enmity with France. In fact, memory of the two World Wars strongly 
pointed towards the need to seek rapprochement with France. This imperative was 
shared by CDU/CSU, the Liberals (FDP) as well as the Social Democrats and was one 
important element favouring European integration.
The moral-practical imperatives, which were shared by all political forces present in 
post-war West Germany, stressed the need to renounce any military aggression, 
militarism or military expansionism.15 This was reflected in the Basic Law (the 
constitution of West Germany), which, in Article 26 rejected wars of aggression or 
conquest. The reflection about World War II also brought about a widespread rejection 
of military means to solve international disputes, the military in general and 
nationalism, chauvinism or racism, all of which had been prominent in Nazi ideology. 
As a result, even terms such as ‘patriotism’, ‘national consciousness’ and ‘nationalism’ 
became suspect.16
In Germany, the Left and the Right drew very different practical-moral lessons from 
“Munich 1938”: The widespread commitment to pacifism that resulted from the 
conscious reflection upon the memories of the Second World War was particularly
15 From the lessons of the last war “grew the deep conviction that another war must never start from 
German soil. This vital interest is a central claim of our policies. It is borne by the wish for reconciliation 
and understanding.” “Erklarung des SPD-Vorstands anlasslich des 40. Jahrestags des Ausbruchs des 
Zweiten Weltkrieges” reprinted in Frankfurter Rundschau, 9 August 1979.
16 “National Socialism rendered nationalism in its maddest form, namely racism, so absurd that only some 
fools in Germany dare flirting with it. In that respect, the change of the Germans after the Second World 
War is completely different from the situation in Germany after the First World War.” President of the 
German Parliament, Eugen Gerstenmaier, in 1964 in Paris reproduced in: „Frankreich und das deutsche 
Nationalbewusstsein“, Special print from: Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsdienstes der 
Bundesregierung, Nr. 158/64 and 161/64.
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strong in the Centre and the Left. However, conservative groups, such as the CDU, also 
referred to Munich, albeit drawing from this image a different practical-moral 
imperative:
Adenauer focused on the need to avoid repeating the mistakes the democracies 
had made in the 1930s. [...] For Adenauer, a foreign policy of Western 
integration and rearmament [...] was the result of his interpretation of the 
‘lessons of Munich’ (Herf, 1997:298).
Thus, different political currents drew different political-moral imperatives from the 
German past that clashed in the 1980s during the debates on the Euromissiles in the 
German parliament (Herf, 1991). Similarly, in the heated debates on pacifism, that 
regularly took place between the CDU and the Green Party, “Munich” appeared as an 
argumentative figure in favour of strengthening and against seeking non-military means 
(Dubiel, 1999:193-199).
Another practical-moral imperative emerging from the reflection upon the recent war 
was a clear commitment to Western style democracy, freedom and human rights (Herf, 
1997:201). This conclusion had, for example, priority for the CDU under Chancellor 
Adenauer and implied pursuing a strict orientation towards the West (Westintegration 
und Westorientierung). This was in stark contrast to the policy preference of the SPD in 
the 1950s. Reflection on and rejection of the gross and systematic violations of human 
dignity and life during the Nazi period gave rise to a strong imperative to protect human 
dignity (which became Article 1 of the Basic Law), human rights and to embark on a 
clear road to democracy.
The imperative towards democracy and human rights, that later came to be known as 
the “anti-totalitarian consensus” in West Germany, also found support in the memory of 
the recent past from 1871 to 1945. The lessons of history in favour of democracy, 
freedom and human rights were often (at least until the 1970s) combined with an attack 
against East Germany, in particular by the conservative CDU. For example, in 1964, on 
the occasion of the 30th anniversary of 30 January 1933 -when Hitler assumed power- 
the CDU wrote:
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We all have the duty to remain vigilant and sensitive against open and 
clandestine moves that could be the beginning of totalitarian developments. But 
even more urgent is the still unresolved task of bringing freedom, human rights 
and rule of law to that part of Germany, where this has not existed for the last 30 
years (Johann Baptist Gradl, CDU, Deutscher Unionsdienst, 29 November 
1963:1).
This political lesson from German history was reinforced and supported by the German 
historiography which, from the 1960s, began to reflect upon the reasons for the 
becoming of the Third Reich. This reflection prompted a significant production of 
literature on the continuities between the German Empire and Nazi Germany, and 
identified common traits or deficits that had paved the way of Nazism to power. The 
weakness of the liberal movement, the lack of a democratic revolution and the 
unification of Germany under an authoritarian political regime were all regarded as 
specifically German factors that had contributed to the rise of Nazism in the twentieth 
century. It was in the context of this intellectual endeavour of historians to explain 
Germany’s recent history that the notion of the “special path” of Germany to modernity 
was coined (Grebing, 1986; Plessner, 1959; Faulenbach, 1998).
As regards foreign policy, the “special path” literature identified significant continuities 
between the Second and the Third Reichs. In the late nineteenth century and the first 
half of the twentieth century, so runs the argument, the German foreign policy was 
regarded as highly unstable, unpredictable and detrimental to the interests of Germany. 
Indeed, it has been argued that Germany’s moves between different allies and enemies, 
oriented towards the East, then to the West, and back again, contributed to the 
perception of Germany as unpredictable and, therefore, aggression-prone. Among the 
post-war political class of Germany, particularly in the CDU, SPD and FDP, the 
reflection on Germany’s allegedly unpredictable foreign policy gave rise to a strong 
concern with predictability and reliability (Berechenbarkeit and Verlasslichkeit) of 
German foreign policy. In this context, European integration was often hailed as a way
1 7to serve these two imperatives.
17 “The emphasis on the national inevitably leads to a loss of predictability. The trust in the predictability 
of German politics that has been built up over a long time would be affected. As you can see, my 
colleague Schauble [CDU], how irritated European governments react to your recent proposals!” 
Contribution by Hans-Ulrich Klose, spokesman on foreign affairs of the SPD during a parliamentary 
debate in 1994. See: Klose, 1994:1-2
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If European integration was seen as a way to guarantee a predictable and reliable 
foreign policy, it was also strongly advocated by the West German political class, for it 
represented a rejection of nationalism and appeared as a means of reconciliation and
1 ftrapprochement with France. As Heidemarie Wieczoreck-Zeul from the board of the 
SPD declared in 1994:
Europe was the answer to Fascism, National Socialism and barbarism. This is 
why we will defend the binding of Germany into the European Union and the 
close ties to our neighbouring country, France, as an achievement, which is not 
only in Germany’s immediate interest, but also a guarantee for a civilised 
development inside of Germany. The European Community has turned enemies 
into partners, even friends {Sozialdemokratischer Pressedienst 49, 111, 14 June 
1994, pp.7-8).
The different access of political memory groups to political power gives one answer to 
the question of what shaped West German public discourse on past wars, especially the 
Second World War. Another aspect that is central to this thesis, is the level of social 
learning in the process of public remembering. It is this aspect we are turning to now.
4.2.1.4 Levels of social learning in West Germany between the 1950s and 1980s
Konrad Adenauer became the first Chancellor of West Germany in 1949 with a narrow 
lead over his rival from the Social Democrats, Kurt Schumacher. The Christian 
Democratic Union of Adenauer and Erhard governed West Germany for seventeen 
years (1949-1966), mostly with its liberal ally, FDP, its sister party in Bavaria, the 
Christian Social Union (CSU), but also with the Party of the Refugees (BHE) and/or the 
conservative DP {Deutsche Partei). In 1966, there was a grand coalition between the 
Social Democrats and the CDU under the chancellorship of Kurt-Georg Kiesinger, 
which was replaced by the first SPD-led government in 1969 under Chancellor Willy 
Brandt (who had been the foreign minister under the grand coalition).
The 1950s and 1960s were dominated by conservative-liberal governments with the 
support of the German Party and the BHE. This favoured political memory groups of 
former expellees, Church-based resistance and included many ordinary members of the
18 For instance, both Chancellor Brandt (SPD) and Chancellor Erhard (CDU) referred to the European 
integration as a means “to take away any ground for exaggerated nationalism”. See: F. Neumann, 
1975:78.
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Nazi Party and soldiers. The 1950s and 1960s saw a period of silence and a focus on 
own, German, victims and loss. The first German government under Konrad Adenauer 
pressed for an amnesty of many lower and medium-ranking officials that resulted in a 
wide-ranging amnesty in 1950. On 11 May 1951 article 131 of the Basic Law was 
passed by the West German parliament, allowing the return to office of many public 
servants that had been removed by the Western Allies after 1945.
Between 1945 and 1949 Western Allies carried out the de-Nazification process, which 
was highly unpopular among West Germans (Herf, 1997:202). The Western Allies and 
West German politicians felt they faced a dilemma: they wanted to promote a vivid and 
open memory of the Second World War but they sought to attain democratisation at the 
same time. Adenauer gave a clear priority to democratisation over justice and memory 
(Meuschel, 1999:119). His concern was that many citizens might reject the young 
democracy, as had happened to the Weimar Republic. The memory of the failed 
German “democracy without democrats” clearly guided Adenauer’s strategy to urge for 
an early end of de-Nazification and to limit the prosecution to leaders of the Nazi 
regime. West German politicians obtained a wide-ranging amnesty by the Western 
Allies as a price for integration into the West (Dubiel, 1999:47-48).
The Social Democratic opposition insisted on the need to carry out more public debates 
and reflection about the widespread support of the Nazi ideology that had led to the 
Second World War. The discussion the SPD advocated would be, however, delayed 
until the late 1960s. Many authors, such as the philosopher Hermann Liibbe and the 
historian Jeffrey Herf, have argued on a similar line with Adenauer, that the relative 
silence in West Germany on the collective past was a necessary trade-off both to win 
over a majority either still sympathetic to Nazi ideas or not really enthusiastic about 
democracy, and win in parliamentary elections at the same time.19 Moreover, according 
to Siegrid Meuschel,
19 On Hermann Liibbe’s claim regarding the need for „communicative silence" (kommunikatives 
Schweigen) in the 1950s and 1960s see: Maier, 1997:90. On this trade-off between democratisation and a 
weak memory see: Herf, 1997:6-7.
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[t]he young republic distanced itself clearly from the [Nazi] dictatorship, 
prosecuted its successor organisations and apologists. But it did not dispute the 
character of National Socialism and the Second World War, the alignments and 
responsibilities of society. Rather, it rehabilitated the army, the police and the 
bureaucracy en bloc. Instead of focusing on remembering the Holocaust and the 
crimes of the German Wehrmacht and instead of seeking judicial justice, it 
focused on an end to de-Nazification and a philosemitic ‘reconciliation’ 
(Meuschel, 1999:116).
The 1950s have often been described as the decade of amnesia in West Germany (Frei 
1996). Using Habermas’ categories of social learning, this might be reformulated in the 
following way: The governing parties and their governments made a radical break 
between the political community as such and the political regime in power between 
1933 and 1945. At the same time, they identified with their own suffering at the front or 
at home, in fact, the suffering under the political regime as well. The principle 
separation between political regime and political community facilitates a social learning 
that reflects upon the past regime and passes a moral judgement on it. This is what 
happened, even as early as the 1950s, and marks a difference to the behaviour of many 
Conservatives after the First World War.
While the joint effort at the front was still positively connoted, political values and the 
regime were separated from this effort. This judgment was expressed by the 
identification with the victims of the regime. At the same time, the public rejection of 
that regime was so complete, that no responsibility could be assumed for the deeds 
carried out in the name of the German people, i.e. the political community. This resulted 
in a peculiar remembering and forgetting: while many West Germans remembered the 
Second World War in the 1950s as victims of war and the political regime, thus 
separating the political regime from the political community, the deeds of perpetrators 
made in the name of Germany were either blamed on some leading figures of the Nazi 
regime or simply not made subject of public discussion and therefore forgotten. Those 
who felt personal victims of the political regime, however, such as the Communists, the 
Social Democrats and many others interned, tried in vain to ignite a more open and 
moral debate on the recent past. The silence of the 1950s was, thus, both a sign of 
advanced social learning (separating political community and political regime) and a 
sign of limited social learning (not making the actions of the political regime subject to 
public reflection).
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Another expression of that peculiar form of social learning is the fact that politicians 
and historians referred to the recent past in the 1950s as “accident” (Betriebsunfall), 
which had been caused by Hitler and his “system”. They made a clear separation 
between “the people” and “Hitler/Nazis/the vicious system”, which completely 
overlooked the totalising efforts of the Nazi propaganda, which precisely tried to close 
the gap between regime and people. For many citizens, politicians and historians the 
way to describe the end of the war was that of “the German catastrophe”. This topoi was 
acceptable to many Nazis, opposition leaders who had suffered in the hands of fellow 
Germans, soldiers and those deploring having lost the war. It was the historian Friedrich 
Meinecke who, in 1946, coined that phrase in his book of the same title. The “German 
catastrophe” meant, in fact, something that had come over Germany and the Germans, 
something uncontrollable. Needless to say, this formulation omitted the responsible 
subject from the equation (Reichel 1999:11).
Another example of this way of remembering is the war commemoration culture in the 
1950s in West Germany. The memory sites of the Second World War were often 
inscribed with “To all victims of war and terror regimes” (“Allen Opfern von Krieg und 
Gewaltherrschaft”). This formula abstracted from the very different sources and reasons 
of suffering during the Second World War.20 It included soldiers at the front, those 
tortured and killed in the concentration camps, civilians tortured and killed on racist 
grounds, forced labour and, finally, Nazis who died in the Allied air raids, as well as 
expellees from Eastern Germany. This abstraction gave all these groups an equal status 
of victim.
The speeches of politicians in the 1950s focused entirely on the suffering of German 
soldiers. No word was uttered about the reasons that had led to the war, hardly a word 
on other, non-German victims of the war. In the 1950s alone, over 30,000 monuments 
were erected in West Germany to commemorate the fallen soldiers (Reichel, 1999:86- 
87). It was only a handful of Social Democrats, the first West German president, 
Theodor Heuss, and the Communists in West Germany, who pleaded for an open 
encounter with the recent past -  without much success (Dubiel, 1999:42; Herf, 
1997:209-239). The discussion was very much informed by the question of personal
20 Peter Reichel claims that the Volksbund fur Kriegsgraberfursorge had a great share in this general 
formula on war memorials (1999:20).
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responsibility and guilt. In the 1950s West German politicians from all parties were 
adamant in rejecting any idea that suggested that all Germans were responsible for the 
crimes committed in the German name during the Second World War. As Kurt 
Schumacher, head of the SPD, claimed in 1951: “One must not depart from false
* 91collective judgements and make democracy pay for the sins of the dictatorship.”
That rejection of collective responsibility and guilt nurtured the suspicion (already 
formulated by a few such as Theodor Heuss) that the rejection of collective guilt 
(Kollektivschuld-These) had, in fact, turned into a collective innocence hypothesis 
(Kollektivunschuld-These), which blamed some Nazi leaders and “the system” for the 
wartime crimes. Thus, during the 1950s and 1960s a positive identification with the 
German soldier, in a broader interpretive framework of the victim of a political system, 
was prevalent. The 1950s saw, hence, the development of two different, even mutually 
exclusive attempts to reconstruct a collective German identity in the light of the 
memory of the recent German past:
While some politicians on the Left were of the opinion that the new Republic 
could only gain democratic legitimacy so far as it broke up with the previous 
tradition of National Socialism, the conservatives in the CDU and the DP clang 
to the ghost of a national tradition that had not been damaged by National 
Socialism and expected only from this tradition a cultural-political integration of 
the Federal Republic. [...] Some few Nazi leaders were to be made responsible 
for what had happened, but the far-reaching identity-creating traditions of the 
Germans should be spared from the liability of genocide (Dubiel, 1999:63).
Thus, the Conservatives of the CDU and the German Party hoped to retain a positive 
memory even of the Second World War, focusing on the military (forgetting the Nazi 
crimes) while the SPD, the Communists and many intellectuals asked for an ethical and 
reflective-moral debate on the Second World War, which, was often conflated with 
discussions on personal guilt or responsibility. One of the reasons for this lack of moral 
debate in the 1950s might be found in the rising anti-totalitarianism and anti- 
Communism in the 1950s as one deputy of the SPD suspected in a parliamentary debate 
in 1979:
21 Quoted in: Zitelmann, 1993a:246.
145
For thirty years in the existence of the Federal Republic there has been no 
institutional or moral start. At the same time, anybody who publicly pointed to 
fact of this scandalous absence was indiscriminately denounced as Communist 
(Deputy Hansen quoted in Dubiel, 1999:171).
Whatever the reason, it is clear that a moral debate did not take place in the 1950s and 
early 1960s. This was advanced in the late 1960s and 1970s, partly due to some 
prominent trials in Germany, but also due to the rise of a new post-war generation. The 
late 1960s and 1970s saw a rise and self-assertiveness of the Jewish memory of the 
Second World War. Triggered by public trials on former officials of concentration 
camps such as the Maidanek Trial or the Auschwitz Trial, but also popularised by 
documentary movies such as Holocaust in 1978 or the Diary of Anne Frank, there was 
an increasing awareness of the fate of German and foreign Jews during the Second 
World War (Kushner, 1997). This challenged the identification of many Germans as 
victims and caused repulsion towards anything German among some members of the 
post-war generation in the 1980s, to be found in some anti-Fascist groups on the far Left 
(Dubiel, 1999:147).
The new awareness of the fate of the Jews in the Second World War rendered the 
identification with a common national memory increasingly difficult in West Germany. 
For one, the abstraction of “victims of war and terror regimes”, which had been current 
since the 1950s, clearly failed to grasp the different fates and memories of the multiple 
groups that had been, some way or another, affected both by the Nazi terror and the war. 
In this context, the Jews took it as an insult to be lumped together, indistinctly, with 
other memory groups of the Second World War. Yet, the differentiation of victim 
groups made it increasingly difficult for the Germans to identify simply with the brave 
German soldiers fighting for their country.
As in France, the student revolts of the 1960s challenged the status quo, and with it, the 
hitherto dominant memories of the Second World War. Indeed, a generation that was 
not biographically connected to the Nazi period, but still felt close enough to reflect 
upon the meaning and the consequences of “its” National Socialist past, had grown up 
(Dubiel, 1988:5-8, especially 6). The “sons and daughters” generation asked questions 
about the responsibility of the previous generation and challenged the myth of the 
Germans’ having been the victims of Hitler and his vicious regime. This generational
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debate still focused very much on personal responsibility and guilt. It did not foster a 
moral debate on the past war and what it meant for present morality.
The interest in the fate of the Jews during the Second World War also augmented the 
interest in the War at the Eastern front. This interest marginalised the war at the Western 
and Northern front as being “comparatively clean”, despite oppressions and crimes 
against civilians in the West. The fact that the war in the East had been declared, from 
the outset, a “war of extermination” (Vernichtungskrieg) rendered the distinction 
between war against civilians and military war much more difficult to make. As it was 
continuously stressed during the Nuremberg trials, the army and its special forces 
(.Einsatzgruppen, Sicherheitsdienst, Waffen-SS) cooperated very closely with ordinary 
military units in the war on the Eastern front to attain military victory, but also to 
exterminate Communist commissars, Jews and the Eastern European intelligentsia 
(Heydecker and Leeb, 1985/1958:291-448). This notwithstanding, popular memory, 
nourished by testimonies of former generals living in West Germany, created and 
reproduced the image of an overall “clean and honourable war” fought by the regular 
army (Wehrmacht), while attributing the cruelty against the civilian population and acts 
of extermination to the SS (Janssen, 1990:48). It was only in the late 1980s and early 
1990s that this myth -  which since the Nuremberg trials had been known by historians 
to be a myth - was openly and publicly challenged (Herf, 1997:217-218; Giardano,
1990). But even within this distinction between the war in the East and the West there 
were events, such as the massacre of over 600 citizens of the village of Oradour-sur- 
Glane, carried out by the Waffen-SS in 1943 in France that faced the threat of
99marginalisation by the focus on the War on the Eastern front.
With the rise and assertion of different memory groups concerning the Second World 
War, a narrative that made all Germans victims of the Nazi regime to the same degree 
became ever more challenged. Furthermore, the positive identification with the German 
Wehrmacht was strongly undermined in the 1970s and early 1980s. However, at that 
stage, a moral debate was still absent.
22 What made that massacre even more controversial was the fact that some Alsatians were members of 
the Division Das Reich of the Waffen-SS, which carried out the massacre. Thus, French people 
participated in a massacre against French people. On the French trial regarding Oradour see: Klarsfeld 
andRousso, 1992:24; Grosser, 1990:110.
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This should change in the 1980s, where different forms of remembering the Second 
World War openly and publicly clashed. One catalysing aspect was the fact that a new 
political party, the Greens, entered parliament in 1979. This party was integrated by 
sons and daughters of the war generation. At the same time, there was a conservative 
policy, put forward by Helmut Kohl, to carry out what he called a “spiritual-moral 
turnaround” (geistig-moralische Wende). Kohl wanted to assume collective 
responsibility for the Nazi past and the Second World War while embedding this part of 
national history into (a) a longer period of German history and (b) contrasting it with the 
positive history of the Federal Republic of Germany. In other words, the recent past 
after the Second World War should be made part of German collective memory, but 
also periods before the Second World War should be added to create an overall 
affirmative national history, where the Second World War was but a deplorable part. In 
this vein, Kohl advanced two museum projects, one on German history in general, the 
Deutsches Historisches Museum (German Historical Museum) to be opened in Berlin 
1998 and a museum on the (successful) history of West Germany, Haus der Geschichte 
(“The House of History”) in Bonn. Helmut Kohl resumed therewith a project that had 
already been formulated in the 1950s; namely, the historisation of National Socialism 
and the re-discovery of a “healthy” national history, of which National Socialism was 
but one -  regretful - period.
The 1980s and the 1990s were actually the belated public confrontation of different 
memories of the Second World War coming forth. This conscious policy by Helmut 
Kohl, aided by the historian Michael Sturmer, of creating an affirmative collective 
German memory, became the subject of a very heated debate in 1986, known as the 
“Historians’ Debate” between several historians and the philosopher Jurgen Habermas 
(Maier, 1997). To be sure, this debate covered several important issues, but one of its 
central aspects is of particular relevance to this work, namely, the role of historiography 
itself in engendering an affirmative collective memory. As Habermas claims:
The inevitable [...] pluralism of interpretations only mirrors the structure of 
open societies. Only this provides the opportunity to become aware of one’s own 
ambivalent, identity-relevant traditions. This is necessary for a critical 
appropriation of traditions with multiple means, [ ...] something that is 
incompatible with closed and secondary natural historical images as well as with 
any form of conventional, namely affirmatively and pre-reflexively shared 
identity (Habermas, 1987a:42).
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In his contribution to the Historians’ Debate, Habermas asked for a moral debate on the 
past and what he called a “reflective appropriation of the past”. By that he meant a 
judgement of the past and identification with the positively reflected moral values of 
that judgement. This debate, which transcended academic circles, is, I would argue, a 
first instance of public awareness of post-conventional elements in the reflection upon 
the past. Indeed, the debate shed light on the fact that different memory groups were not 
willing to subsume under an affirmative, state-engendered version of collective war 
memory. Furthermore, many were not willing simply to forget the negative facts of 
German memories of the Second World War. Conservative politicians and historians 
had lamented for a long time the “weak German national identity” that needed to be 
overcome by “stepping out of Hitler’s shadow”. The fundamental strategy, made 
explicit in the 1980s, was, as has been mentioned, to search for affirmative grounds in 
German history and to present National Socialism as one period. The alternative model 
by the Left was the “critical reflection of tradition” which meant “not a break with 
tradition but the competence for a historically open und productive encounter and a 
reflective acceptance or rebuttal of values and elements of tradition” (Dubiel, 
1999:239).
The Historians’ Debate was by no means simply a debate among intellectuals. It had 
ample resonance, especially in political circles, as the fierce exchanges in the German 
Parliament, in particular between the members of the Green Party and the Christian 
Democratic Union show. Alfred Dregger, speaker of the (CDU) majority, and one of the 
most important advocates of a memory of the “clean” war of the front soldiers, insisted 
in 1977: “History has the task to counter-balance the loss of identity in a mass society” 
(quoted in Loreck, 1985:3). On another occasion Dregger made a plea for a “healthy” 
affirmative national history:
We are worried about the lack of history and the lack of care towards our nation. 
Without a profound patriotism, which is normal to other peoples, our people will 
not be able to survive. Those who abuse the ‘Dealing with the Past’, which was 
certainly necessary, so as to make our nation unfit for the future, will be faced 
with our resistance (quoted in: Broszat, 1986:12).
The Conservatives and the Liberals, in power since 1982, fostered a new affirmative 
memory by conscious attempts to contrast the enemy image of the Second World War-
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Germany with the post-war NATO-member-West Germany. With the aim to show that 
modem Germany had turned into an ally of former foes, the conservative Chancellor, 
Helmut Kohl, staged in 1984 a reconciliation ceremony with French Prime Minister, 
F rancis Mitterrand, at the battlefield of Verdun. Kohl did the same with US President, 
Ronald Reagan, in Bitburg, Germany, in May 1985. This planned event caused an 
outcry among the Jewish community in the US, who, having learnt that the cemetery of 
Bitburg also housed tombs of members of the Waffen-SS, opposed President Reagan’s 
participation (Herf, 1997:352). When Alfred Dregger, heard of the objections presented 
in the US Congress to Reagan’s participation in the act, he wrote to the US Congress:
If you demand your president not to make that noble gesture at the military 
cemetery of Bitburg, I shall have to interpret [this demand] as an insult to my 
brother and my dead comrades [...] I ask you whether you regard the German 
people as your ally, a people that was subdued under a brown dictatorship and 
that has stood on the side of the West for forty years (quoted in Reichel, 
1999:239).
Dregger was an exponent of a political memory group within the CDU that repeated 
many of the forms of remembering from the 1950s: he held on to the positively 
remembered Wehrmacht and saw the Germans victim of a “brown dictatorship”, i.e. the 
Nazi regime; at the same time, he appealed to the recent past of the Federal Republic of 
Germany as an ally to the USA. The outcry in the USA as well as in Germany signalled 
that different memory groups, especially the Jewish memory groups in both countries, 
were not willing to accept that form of remembering as one great narrative orchestrated 
from above.
Public remembering of the Second World War also became a controversial issue in the 
1980s. Prior to the 1970s there had been no general debate in parliament about the 
recent past, apart from the discussions linked to specific laws (like amnesty laws, 
restitution laws). Post-war West Germany commemorated the end of Second World 
War on 8 May and 1 September as the beginning of the Second World War. In the 
1950s and 1960s West Germany made no public commemoration on 8 May at all, there 
were only short speeches broadcasted by radio (F. Neumann, 1975:77-78). It was only 
in the 1970s that Chancellor Willy Brandt and president Heinemann held speeches in 
parliament. First and foremost, 8 May was remembered as the end of the Second World
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War, hardly as the end of Nazism. In the 1970s and 1980s the 8 May was officially 
called the “anniversary of the end of the Second World War”. While many 
conservative politicians wanted this day to be reserved for the commemoration of one’s 
own dead and suffering, politicians on the Left favoured the idea of a commemoration 
of the liberation from the Nazi regime. Also in the 1970s, Jewish memory began to play 
an increasingly important role in German commemorations, 26 January (liberation of 
Auschwitz) and 9 November 1938 (Pogrom night, often referred to as 
Reichskristallnacht, night of crystals in the Reich) became, thus, important dates in the 
German national calendar for commemorating the Second World War in the 1980s.
Since the 1980s the conspiracy of Stauffenberg on 20 July has been remembered as a 
day of resistance to the Nazi regime, as the “rise of the conscience” (“Aufstand des 
Gewissens”). Interestingly, the contribution of the Communists to the resistance against 
the Nazis was consistently ignored in public commemorations in West Germany. 
Additionally, there is a “National Day of Grief’ (“ Volkstrauertag ”) that had already 
been introduced during the Weimar Republic and continued to be celebrated under the 
Nazi regime as the “national commemoration of fallen heroes” (Heldengedenktag). On 
that day Germans commemorate the fallen soldiers of all wars and take care of the 
tombs. This national day of grief usually takes place on the second Sunday before the 
first Advent in November and is not accompanied by public commemorations but is 
rather a private, individual, usually family-oriented activity (Hudemann, 1984: 35; 
Knischewski and Spittler, 1997:242). It should be stressed that 11 November (Armistice 
Day ending the First World War) has never been a public commemoration day in 
Germany.
4.2.2 The remembering of the Second World War in East German politics: the 
structural overcoming of fascism
In the immediate aftermath of the war, East Germany had a similar wealth of memory 
groups like West Germany. However, with the access to power by the Soviet-backed
23 “As if agreed beforehand, Scheel, Schmidt, Heinemann, Brandt, Erhard and Kohl all speak 
unanimously on the ‘anniversary of the end of the Second World War’. [...] ‘The day of liberation’ is not 
used by any of those leading politicians.” (Neumann 1975:77).
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Communists and the beginning of the Cold War, many memory groups were 
marginalised:
A very differentiated and plural memory culture of victims, resistance fighters 
and returning emigrants and their respective initial moral weight were, so to 
speak, expropriated by those elites gaining political power [in East Germany] 
and re-constructed as a new system of identity-forming images of orientation 
and enemies (Danyel, 1999:134).
The discourse on the German past was very quickly monopolised by the Communists, 
while other groups had no possibility to include their memories in the official state 
memory. Among the Communists, it was those exiled politicians in Moscow (in 
particular Wilhelm Pieck and Walter Ulbricht) who had the lead over the Communists 
who had gone into exile to Mexico City or had stayed in Nazi Germany (Danyel, 
1999:134 and Herf, 1997:162-200). In East Germany a very swift policy to include 
former members of the Nazi Party into the state apparatus and society was implemented 
(McLellan, 2004; Fox, 1999). As in West Germany, political currents sympathetic to 
Nazi ideologies had no space for articulation or participation in politics (Danyel, 
1999:136).
For the East German government, there was also a clear hierarchy among the political 
memory groups of the last war. The first distinction was between “fighters against” and 
“victims o f ’ National Socialism (similar to post-war France). The former were regarded 
as being more valuable than the latter. Within the resistance against the Nazi regime, 
Communist resistance was pivotal, followed by other forms of active resistance (Herf, 
1997:80). Many former concentration camps in the territory of West Germany were 
“forgotten” for more than ten years, before the West German governments thought 
about creating and securing memory sites there. This contrasts starkly with the situation 
in East Germany, where the Communist governments created memory sites in the 
former concentration camps from very early on. However, those memory sites clearly 
privileged the Communist memory of the camps and celebrated the Communist 
resistance fighters, thus neglecting other groups, who had been detained there as well. 
Furthermore, the memory of those camps was often connected with the heroic struggle 
of the Red Army that, according to the Communist reading, with great sacrifices, had 
freed Germany from Fascism.
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The Communist regime in East Germany always celebrated 8 May as a day of liberation 
from Fascism. East Germany universalised its memory of the Second World War, 
portraying it as the struggle between Communism and Fascism, which concluded with 
the final victory of Communism. Parties to that struggle had been (on the same side) the 
German and foreign Communists and the Soviet Union. The Communist regime in East 
Germany avoided talking about German Nazism, but referred, in general terms, to 
Fascism. And since Fascism had been caused by (a certain stage of) capitalism, in 
adopting Communism as a political and economic system, East Germany -  so it claimed 
- had structurally overcome and dealt with Fascism once and for all. This interpretation 
of the past fit very well into the worldview that would prevail during the Cold War, a 
period during which East Germany would continue to fight capitalism and remnants of 
German Fascism hand in hand with the Soviet Union.
In the view of the East German ruling class, National Socialism was a heritage that the 
Federal Republic of Germany had to deal with. The GDR portrayed itself in the 
tradition of the attempted German revolutions, such as the liberal revolution in 1848 and 
the socialist revolution in *1918/19 (Reichel, 1999:22). Given this state-organised 
collective war memory, the resistance of the Communists and the Left, opposition 
groups to Hitler organised in the Soviet Union (such as the National Committee of Free 
Germany (Nationalkommittee Freies Deutschland, NKFD) and the military victory of 
the Red Army enjoyed a monopoly. While the Jewish memory was able to assert itself 
in West Germany and France from the 1970s, in East Germany it continued to be 
silenced (Herf, 1997:15-16). The use of Communism as legitimising ideology, which at 
the same time proclaimed a successful “dealing with the past” (the GDR declared itself 
repeatedly the “winner of history”) was dominant from the mid-1950s to the mid-1980s, 
when, for the first time, two representatives of the Church-based opposition tabled a 
paper that challenged the official reading of the East German past.24
Using Habermas’ categories of social learning as criteria, there was a clear reflection on 
the political system and a moral judgement of the past. In that sense East Germany was 
an example of post-conventional remembering. However, this reasoning was not the 
result of public debate, thus creating a shared meaning, but rather proclaimed by the
24 On the paper by the two leaders of the Protestant Peace Movement in East Germany, Markus Meckel 
and Martin Gutzeit, „8 May -  Our responsibility", see: Herf, 1997:363-365.
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ruling regime. It is the absence of public debate in East Germany that authors like 
Jeffrey Herf and Siobhan Kattago make responsible for a decisive difference in the 
development of collective war memories in East and West Germany. In West Germany, 
they argue, a public sphere developed that was increasingly used to challenging, 
discussing and arguing over issues of collective war memory (Kattago, 2001:3). By 
contrast, in East Germany there was no one who could publicly recall the counter­
history about the collective past, thus impeding the critical reflection, appropriation and 
rejection of specific values or a comparison between the personal memory and the 
official memory. Thus, while there was a post-conventional reflection by a small group, 
it lacked a broader debate within East German society which could have created a 
shared meaning or collective reflection on the Second World War.
The East German regime also drew explicit practical-moral conclusions from the 
memory of the Second World War. The commemoration of the International Day of 
Remembrance for the Victims of Fascist Terror in September later turned into a rally for 
East Germany’s “struggle for peace”.25 In the official reflection of East Germany there 
was, like in the West, a strong sense of pacifism, of rejection of militarism and military 
expansionism. In fact, in the 1980s the West German Left appealed to the common 
pacifism as a point of coincidence between East and West Germany, when they spoke 
about a “community of responsibility” (Verantwortungsgemeinschaft) for peace 
(Bender, 1983:3).
Collective war memories in East and West Germany were, similar to those of Gaullists 
and Communists in France, seen in the context both of one’s own political project and 
of political competition, here even exacerbated by the beginning of the Cold War. 
Whereas East Germany claimed to have eradicated Fascism through the establishment 
of a popular democracy, West Germany combined its “anti-totalitarianism” with a 
rejection of National Socialism and Communism, while stressing, at the same time, the 
need to defend and strengthen democracy. Thus, collective war memory in the two post­
war Germanys was also influenced and formed by different political currents and, above 
all, the Cold War and the ideological conflicts that bore it. Similarly, the fact that the
25 “They [the Communists] thus lent past heroism a specific ideological purpose that reinforced the 
current ‘struggle for peace’ of Soviet diplomacy.” Herf, 1997:164.
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political projects of East and West Germany were diametrically opposed blocked in 
each society a confrontation of the past for thirty, in some cases for almost fifty years:
The self-critique of the West Germans that was due disappeared under the 
shadow of the critique against Communism -  just like the “anti-Fascism” of the 
SED elites prevented the rigorous self-examination of the East Germans -  this is 
the moral drama of the post-war period (Dubiel, 1999:171-172).
4.3. The remembering of the Second World War in unified Germany: 1990 - 1995
With the unification of the two Germanys in 1990, different strands of political memory 
groups came together (K. Neumann, 2000 and Frei, 2005). However, this was not a 
fusion or melting of two equal strands of memory, but, rather, an extension of the West 
German variety of war memories to East Germany. On the one hand, there was an entire 
elite change in former East Germany, which allowed the non-Communist memories to 
come forward. On the other hand, the political parties of the West expanded eastwards 
and dominated the formulation of the collective war memories of their newly affiliated 
members (marginalising the former Communists even further). The official war 
memory of former East Germany was therefore transformed both from within (regime 
and elite change) and from outside (expansion of Western parties eastwards). Thus, the 
official East German memory of the Second World War quickly vanished from public 
commemorations. Some members of the former SED still have a voice in the newly- 
found successor party Party o f  Democratic Socialism, PDS, where anti-fascism as a 
common self-understanding is still present.
It is my contention that the 1990s, particularly the period 1990 to 1995 (with many
tVicommemoration ceremonies remembering the 50 anniversary of many events) showed 
a continuing clash of different levels of social learning with regard to the Second World 
War. I seek to illustrate this claim through three examples: (1) the commemoration of 8 
May, including the commemoration in 1995 in Berlin, (2) the commemoration of 
resistance against the Nazi regime, and (3) the question of national identity.
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Commemorating the 8 May: With reunification the question of commemoration dates 
of World War II became a subject of debate. While many countries in Europe celebrate 
8 May as the day of liberation from both foreign occupation and the Nazi regime, in 
Germany this commemoration remained ambivalent. The former celebrations in East 
Germany of the liberation from the Nazi regime found no resonance in united Germany. 
With West German president von Weizsacker’s speech in 1985, in which he stated for 
as first president all the different memory groups (perpetrators, victims, bystanders) of 
the Second World War, the specific experience of each group was acknowledged 
publicly for the first time. Von Weizsacker also clearly defined 8 May as “an end of a 
wrong path of German history” and as a “day of liberation”, although not a day of joy 
(von Weizsacker, 1985:15). He also used consistently the term “we”, thus assuming 
collective responsibility “from the perspective of a generation of perpetrators that 
reflected upon its responsibility” (Dubiel, 1999:209) and avoided the identification with 
either the victims (preferred strategy of the Left), with the victorious powers united in 
anti-totalitarianism or anti-communism (preferred strategy of the Right) or anti-Fascism 
(preferred strategy of the East German Communists).
Von Weiszacker’s speech did not, however, put an end to the discussion about the 
significance of 8 May. Ten years later, on 8 May 1995, as the 50 anniversary of the 
end of the Second World War was celebrated together with the former Allies, German 
politicians reinitiated the discussion. Alfred Dregger and Conservative politicians 
rejected the idea that 8 May had been a day of liberation from a political regime, but, 
was, rather, a day of loss, suffering and expulsion for the German nation (Dubiel, 
1999:263-270). By contrast, many politicians from the Left and Centre, including some 
of the CDU such as Rita Sussmuth, president of the German parliament, pleaded for a 
clear moral judgement on the political values and the political regime instead of taking 
the political community as reference.
The commemoration of resistance against the Nazi regime: The government under 
Chancellor Kohl of the 1990s wanted to create a national museum of German resistance. 
Kohl advanced the idea to put the conspiracy of General Graf Schenck von Stauffenberg 
at the centre of that permanent exhibition. Yet, the attempt to kill Hitler on 20 July 1944 
by a group of generals led by General von Stauffenberg was predominantly regarded as
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treason in the 1950s and 1960s, and had, consequently, not been celebrated. But with 
the increased awareness of the murderous and vicious character of Nazism that began to 
develop in the 1970s, the resistance to that regime and the commemoration thereof 
gained in importance. It is interesting to note that the conspiracy led by Stauffenberg 
was publicly remembered, because -  it was argued — the conspirators wanted to save 
the honour of Germany. This conservative memory of “honourable resistance” as 
opposed to Communist-inspired resistance is even more noteworthy given the fact that 
Stauffenberg and the other conspirators had actually no intention of installing a republic 
or a democracy. Interestingly, political memory groups on the Right were generous in 
forgiving those “early errors” (Helmut Kohl), while the SPD admitted repeatedly that it 
continued to have strong reservations about the commemoration of this conspiracy 
against Hitler, because it happened quite late in the war and did not aim at democracy 
(Miller, 1984).
Nonetheless, the conservative parties and their memory groups persistently and 
consciously denied Communist-inspired opposition groups the status of honourable 
resistance to the Nazi regime. Throughout the history of West Germany, German 
soldiers who had joined a network against Hitler in the Soviet Union were regarded as 
traitors and excluded from restitution. This has not changed even after unification. 
Finally, the permanent exhibition now shows all the different types of resistance against 
the Nazi regime, including the Communist resistance. There is a striking similarity 
between the commemoration of 8 May and this exhibition: while there is an increase in 
the different groups portrayed as victims or resistance members, a moral debate on the 
Second World War has been rejected by many conservative groups as well as the Kohl 
government. This was precisely what politicians from the opposition (especially SPD, 
PDS) asked for.
Forging a national identity that includes a memory of the Second World War:
While the German Party, the Free Democrats and the Conservatives had favoured a 
search for positive elements of the German past in the 1950s and 1960s, in the 1990s the 
call for a moral debate on the German past (and thus a rejection of Kohl’s strategy in the 
tradition of the 1950s and 1960s) became louder. Although a group around Alfred
26 Until the 1960s 25% of those interviewed regarded this act as treason. See: Reichel, 1999:255-256.
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Dregger continued to identify with the brave soldier and searched for positive elements 
of the German past, a group led by Rita Siissmuth (president of the German parliament) 
also supported a reflection upon the German past during the Second World War as a 
means to attain moral strength. Ms. Siissmuth advocated this form of remembering 
against party fellows from the CDU in 1994:
Memory of the negative aspects of our past does not weaken us, as we once 
feared. Rather it frees us from its burdens, transforms weakness into strengths, 
brings us together rather than opposing one another. Vigilant and alert memory 
[wachsame Erinnerung] is the protector of freedom. If we forget the lack of 
freedom, persecution and annihilation, we endanger our own freedom [...] 
Memory does not stop when the Germans regained freedom and unity (quoted in 
Herf, 1997:367).
As Jeffrey Herf rightly noted, the memory of the Second World War and the Holocaust 
actually became more salient in the 1990s and did not -  as some foreign observers 
feared -  wane (1997:355). The 1990s in Germany showed the parallel existence of 
conventional as well as post-conventional memory groups within the political parties. 
Thus, no claim can be made in the sense that Germany collectively moved to a post- 
conventional remembering of the Second World War. However, the fact that increasing 
importance has been given to the moral reflection on the Second World War, even 
within the CDU, is a sign that post-conventional remembering might be on the rise in 
united Germany.
In united Germany there are signs of the acceptance of different empirical memory 
groups of the Second World War, as well as an increasing call for a moral debate on the 
German past. This renders a conventional form of remembering past wars increasingly 
difficult, as the development from the 1950s to the 1990s show. With Habermas this 
development can be interpreted as a move towards a post-conventional remembering of 
past wars.
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4.4 Conclusion
The collective memories of the Second World War that were publicly formulated after a 
decade of amnesia focused on the war on the Eastern front and the Holocaust. Thus, the 
general discourse on the memories of the Second World War gave a memory of war 
with France rather limited prominence. This might have been a result of the fast victory 
in 1940, the rather limited level of atrocities committed by the German occupation force 
and the rather limited amount of casualties of German troops during battles and 
occupation between 1940 and 1944. This is in stark contrast to post-war France, where 
Germany still occupied the central place in collective memories of the Second World 
War.
It is my contention that for the post-war period in West Germany, four groups or types 
in reflecting upon German memory of the Second World War can be identified: First, 
there was one group to be found on the extreme Left, among anti-Fascist groups who 
rejected anything German or nationalistic, any reflection that had a national reference 
point. Second, there was a large coalition conformed by the Green Party, the Social 
Democratic Party and some members of the liberal FDP and the CDU, who were 
willing to accept the negative memories of the Second World War and to draw lessons 
from them, in other words: to accept them and remember them in a reflected way. There 
was, thirdly, a Right that dominated the 1950s and was later, in the 1980s and 1990s 
spearheaded by Alfred Dregger and Helmut Kohl that sought to re-establish a positive 
German identity by identifying with the brave German soldier (Dregger), the recent past 
of West Germany and the longer national German history (Kohl). Finally, there was an 
extreme Right current that rejected any wrongdoing of the Germans during the Second 
World War and denounced a reflection on the past that included repentance as “national 
masochism”.
With the emancipation of Jewish memory (but also other victim groups such as Roma, 
Sinti, homosexuals, forced labour) in the 1970s to the 1990s, the conservative way of 
remembering lost more and more currency. The ambivalence in Germany about the 
commemoration of 8 May stems from both the different memory groups who remember 
different things on that date and the tension between two levels of social learning in
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collective war memories. The more post-conventional memory makes a clear difference 
between an abstract political collectivity and a specific political regime and the political 
values it represented, thus celebrating liberation from that political regime. The 
conventional memory of the Second World War highlights the loss and the suffering of 
the political collectivity and regards it as the date of defeat of the German nation. I 
believe that the struggle between those different memory groups and their different 
ways of remembering can be framed within a difference of social learning in
77remembering the Second World War.
Probably the fact that too many German citizens were personally involved in the horrors 
carried out during the Second World War and the fact that they needed to be won (a) for 
democracy in general and (b) for winning democratic elections, led to a delay of the 
debate on the past, which eventually took place in the 1980s and 1990s. As has been 
discussed throughout this chapter, this debate goes far beyond the question of who 
remembers what (and how), but, actually, points explicitly to the practical-moral aspect 
of remembering: memory implies an orientation of action, it is not only a memory chip 
of dates and emotions. This practical-moral aspect has now been made the subject of 
reflection and conscious debate in Germany.
The analysis of political memory groups and their collective war memories in Germany 
from 1871 to 1995 shows a remarkable development from an essentialising enemy 
image to signs of moral reflection and judgement on the past. Many circumstantial 
factors contributed, no doubt, to this development. Yet, it seems important to note that 
the sheer scale of destruction, the wide affectedness of war and the growing diversity of 
memory groups all led to a challenge of a master narrative and an increasing 
impossibility to invent memories as well as to a significant difficulty to forget parts of 
one’s history. Thus, the conventional strategy of “remembering the positive, forgetting 
the negative” has become increasingly ineffective. However, as the debate in the 1980s 
shows, once the plurality of memories and the plurality of practical-moral imperatives 
advanced by different groups is accepted, the only way to try to re-establish shared 
meaning and accepted memories is on the basis of a practical discourse. This discourse
27 Dubiel argues in a similar way that the conservative and Left answer to the memory of the Second 
World War is between a traditional national identity and a post-national identity (1999:235-236)
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may not lead to consensus and fail. But as long as there is no voluntary or forced silence 
of different memory groups, this discourse remains without alternative.
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Chapter 5
Social learning in remembering past wars in France in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries
Since 1815 and well into the 1910s, the definition of the borders of France was a matter 
of discussion, despite the fact that French national history and historical continuity have 
always been closely linked to the “Hexagon” with the orientation towards “natural 
borders” (Pyrenees, North Sea, Atlantic, Rhine River, and Alps) (Nordman 2001:119). 
This alleged uncertainty notwithstanding there has been a very strong link between the 
state of France and its rulers, on the one hand, and the definition of the French political 
community on the other hand (unlike in Germany). As Pierre Nora points out:
No other country has established such close links between the national state, the 
economy, the culture and the language. [...] So it is not surprising that the 
French have written their history largely as the history of the state, the various 
forms assumed by the state, the struggles for power, and the men who held 
power (2001b:xxxvi)
The outcomes of the Congress of Vienna did not arouse any anti-German or anti- 
Prussian feelings in France, not even in those provinces occupied until 1818 by Prussian 
forces. On the contrary, Germaine de Stael formed a positive, sometimes nostalgic, 
view of Germany with her popular book De VAllemagne, published in 1814. In that 
book, Germany was portrayed as a positive alternative to the rationalised France, in 
coincidence with earlier French interpretations of Germany and Germans that came 
from Montaigne and Voltaire (Leiner, 1988:28-9; Mitter, 1981:78).
From 1815 to 1870, French intellectuals, historians and politicians discussed the attitude 
that French society and politics should assume towards the German efforts to attain 
national unification. While some historians and political scientists (like Alexis de 
Tocqueville, Jules Michelet or Edgar Quinet) supported German unity on moral-cultural 
grounds, throughout the nineteenth century, the French governments -  be they 
republican (1848-1851, after 1870) or monarchical -  had as one of the goals, if not the
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goal, of French foreign policy the prevention of the emergence of a unified German 
state on the grounds that it threatened French hegemony and might lead to a “Habsburg 
encirclement” (Godde-Baumanns, 1987:5).
The positive attitudes among French intellectuals towards German unification would 
change, however, after the war in 1870-1871, which had so obviously exposed the 
powerlessness of France to prevent both military defeat and the loss of Alsace and 
Lorraine. Former admirers of Germany, such as Ernest Renan, now regarded Germany 
as a militarised society with no literature, spirit or talents (Godde-Baumanns, 1987:7). 
Between 1870 and 1890, there was a growing French patriotic literature that portrayed 
revenge as inevitable. Spearheaded until 1878 by Leon Gambetta, the Republicans 
claimed for revenge. In the 1880s the Minister of War, Boulanger, with the help of the 
Radicals, called revenge the prime objective of France. But from the 1890 onwards, and 
although a true cult had emerged to remember the “lost sisters”, Alsace and Lorraine 
(Ernest Lavisse, quoted in Poidevin and Bariety, 1977:113), French politicians seemed 
less and less willing to go to war for a revision of the Frankfurt treaty. Despite several 
attempts at rapprochement between the two countries between 1871 and 1914, notably 
during the Moroccan crisis in 1911, the memory of the two lost provinces, Alsace and 
Lorraine, remained the main obstacle for real change in the Franco-German 
relationship.
Unlike in Germany, in France there was no change in the political regime after the First 
World War, nor in the staunch support for the right wing of the Radicals and Liberals, 
such as Clemenceau, and Poincare in the general elections in November 1919. This 
“national bloc” formed the governments in France between 1919 and 1923. All political 
parties except the Socialist Party supported the government’s insistence on the strict 
implementation of the Versailles Treaty -  anything else would be to betray the many 
dead who had fought for France (Poidevin and Bariety, 1977: 241). In 1924 there was a 
shift to the Left, when the “Cartel de Gauche” (Radicals and Socialists) took over. 
Thereafter and until 1932, French politics would be split into two camps on the 
treatment of Germany: “the Left insisted on the only solution being a negotiated one 
[...] that led to peace; [while] the Right feared that France was on the way of giving 
away the victory and to compromising peace itself’ (Poidevin and Bariety, 1977:241).
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While between 1871 and 1918 there was scarce interest in Germany, the interwar-period 
saw a huge increase in interest in German architecture, culture, and philosophy (Rovan, 
1986:102). Two very prestigious journals devoted to Germany were founded: Revue 
d'Allemagne (founded in 1927) and the Cahiers Franco-allemands (founded in 1929) 
(Mitter, 1981:188). Between 1926 and 1929 certain rapprochement took place and trade 
agreements between France and Germany were signed (Bariety, 1988:101-127). But, 
just as during the last quarter of the nineteenth century the sticking point had been 
Alsace-Lorraine for France, this time it was the Versailles Treaty for Germany that 
made it difficult to cooperate more. With the collapse of the financial markets in 1929 
and the end of moderate parliamentary rule in Germany this brief period of 
rapprochement ended.
After shifting coalitions, in 1936 the Socialists and Radicals formed a government 
headed by Leon Blum and supported by the French Communists (Front Populaire) that 
was opposed by the French extreme Right (Hohne, 1989). Reacting to the occupation of 
the Rhineland, the German support for Franco in the Spanish Civil war and the 
introduction of three-year conscription in Germany, Blum and his foreign minister, 
Daladier, decided to rearm France and abandon “integral pacifism”. At the same time, 
negotiations were under way to form a coalition with the Soviet Union. However, many 
politicians felt that the Franco-Russian alliance prior to 1914 had borne responsibility 
for the outbreak of the First World War and, under their pressure, the negotiations were 
postponed and ultimately failed (Poidevin and Bariety, 1977:298-300).
In the face of the German attack in June 1940, the French parliament granted the 
“vainqueur de Verdun”, General Petain, all emergency powers of government. On 8 
July, 1940 Petain signed a truce with Germany, which occupied the northern part of 
France, while Petain was allowed to create a puppet state with the capital in Vichy. 
What became known as the “L'Etat Frangais” (as opposed to “La Republique 
Frangaise”) of Vichy lasted until November 1942, when German troops occupied all of 
France. Parts of the military and political elite of France went into exile to London 
(among them General de Gaulle), others went to Algiers.
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5.1 Essentialising and conventional remembering of past wars 
with Germany in France between 1871 and 1944
While in Germany the different leagues popularised pan-German ideas and anti-French 
sentiments, in France this role was assumed by writers, journalists and publicists, who 
often had a military background. An analysis of the French literature on Germany 
suggests that, from the 1880s onwards, there were several authors claiming the 
existence of two (dichotomised) Germanys within the German Empire: There was the 
aggressive, brutal, powerful and restless Germany, that was also associated with 
militarism and economic growth, on the one hand, and the romantic, sometimes 
irrational, cultural and aesthetic Germany, on the other hand (Rovan, 1986:98). Between 
1871 and 1930 there was, therefore, a theory of the “two Germanys” that sought to 
accommodate contradicting, but timeless features attributed to Germany: its idealism- 
spiritualism and its militarist-hegemonic aspirations (Leiner, 1988:38). Interestingly, 
however, both Germanys were seen, for different reasons, by these writers as being 
opposed to French character traits:
[...] between the irrational Germans [...] and their counterparts, [there is] the 
French who feel obliged towards objectivity, towards Reason and social duties. 
This results in a historically insurmountable contradiction between the German 
Protestantism and the French Catholicism, between German mystics and Roman 
ratio, between the German imperialist polity [...] and the French liberal polity, 
between German Geist as serfs of the material world [...] and the reflective 
French spirit that goes beyond the link to nature (Mitter, 1981:208).
The war in 1870-1871 clearly strengthened the view on Germany as aggressive and 
obedient, which was captured in images such as the “barbarians” or “the Huns” 
(referring to King Attila and the Huns who invaded Europe in 451). The military defeat 
in 1870, thereafter referred to as “Vannee terrible”, was described by many French 
contemporary historians as the “invasion by German hordes”. At the same time, as 
Christian Amalvi shows, this image of France’s being invaded by barbarians led to a re­
reading of past history. Historical examples in the past such as the Roman invasion of 
the Gauls, the Hundred Years War and the invasion of France by Prussian troops in 
1813-1814 became a confirmation of this defensive perspective (1990:452).
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With the outbreak of the First World War, there was a vast propaganda on both sides of 
the Rhine. In France there was a “patriotic hysteria that [...] created an image of 
Germany, which was characterised by a paroxysm of hatred and sometimes exposed 
features of madness” (Heitmann, 1966:176). This propaganda reinforced the idea of a 
“barbaric Germany” which seemed to be the natural enemy of France. The perception of 
Germany after 1918 was heavily influenced by writings published before and during the 
First World War. While some authors continued to write on Germany as a barbaric and 
deadly enemy, others repeated the idea of a two-Germanys-theory, which also included 
an aggressive, unpredictable Germany. Thus, there were continuities in the writings on 
Germany between 1871 and 1940. However, practical-moral imperatives derived from 
those images would be different among the political currents, as the next section will 
show.
5.1.1 Political currents and their respective memory groups between 1871 and 
1945
Despite the many different political parties and movements that were transformed or 
reformed rather quickly in France, in the period between 1871 and 1944 three main 
political currents can be identified in France that, I wish to stress, included political 
memory groups towards Germany: the ruling liberal and radical parties, who supported 
the Third Republic; the far-right monarchical movement and, finally, the socialist 
movement.
5.1.1.1 The liberal-radical political current
The ruling liberal elite under Thierry or Leon Gambetta defined France and the current 
political system as heirs to the French Revolution and saw France as the defender of 
universal human rights and self-rule. As such, they considered themselves to be 
safeguards of the French Revolution and its political heritage. This political current, 
which shaped the official memory of France during the Third Republic (1875 to 1940), 
regarded Germany and, in particular, Prussia, with great suspicion, given what was 
perceived as Prussia’s political authoritarianism and strong militarism (Poidevin and 
Bariety, 1977: 259). Thus, the main suspicion of French liberal-radicals towards 
Germany had its origins in the otherness of the political system of the neighbouring 
country. This otherness, however, was not seen in historical but in essentialist terms, as
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being linked to a romanticist and “irrational” character trait of the Germans, which 
found its expression in Historicism (or, as Nietzsche called it, the “monumental 
historicism”: Nietzsche, 1998) that contrasted with the French rational way of analysing 
historical and social developments (Jeismann, 2002:172).
The Third Republic was regarded by the French liberals as no less than the “incarnation 
of civilisation” that was threatened by the German barbarians. Thus, Liberals and 
Radicals contributed to the memory of the war in 1870-1871 as an invasion of France 
by barbaric Germans (Jeismann, 1992:173-190). Many prominent liberal and radical 
politicians were members of the “Ligue des Patriotes”, founded in 1882, which made 
the revision of Treaty of Frankfurt and the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France its 
primary goal.
5.1.1.2 The monarchical, anti-revolutionary Right in France and its love-hate 
relationship with Germany
Throughout the Third Republic, the monarchical, traditionalist conservative Right in 
France was excluded from political power. Nevertheless, this political current exerted a 
considerable influence on the French views on Germany through publications and 
discussions in the public sphere. Its most important organ became the journal L 'Action 
Frangaise, founded in 1899, turned into a daily newspaper in 1908, as well as the 
Institut d ‘Action Frangaise, founded in 1905. Leading authors of this journal were 
Charles Maurras and Jacques Bainville, the latter having been in charge of the “foreign 
policy section” of the daily newspaper (Weber, 1962; Mitter, 1981:125-126).
This political current defined France in monarchical, hierarchical, Christian and anti- 
Semitic terms and rejected the heritage of the French Revolution. For the conservative 
Right, the French Revolution was to be equalled with the anarchy that had weakened 
France since 1789. The “7errewr” against those opposing the French Revolution and the 
Jacobin rule, in particular the Catholic and monarchist Western provinces, such as the 
Vendee, was to be remembered for its cruelty by the revolutionary government. In fact, 
while the ruling liberal-radical elite forced into oblivion both the Terreur and the 
excesses of the Jacobin rule in their official representations of France, it was precisely 
these two aspects that the conservative Right focused upon in their remembering of the
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Revolutionary Wars and the critique of the current situation of France (Sirinelli, 
1992:352-354).
The French monarchical right despised Germany as an inferior people and also referred 
to the Germans as barbarians. At the same time, members of this political current 
embraced many of the political values that were prevalent in Imperial Germany, such as 
authoritarianism and monarchical rule. In its antagonism to Germany, the monarchical 
Right in France focused, rather, on the religious aspect and equated Germany with 
Prussian Protestantism. More importantly, however, it made Germany responsible for 
the decline of France, above all for the fall of the monarchy in 1870. The defeat in 1870 
was seen as proof of the fact that turning away from its Catholic and Roman heritage 
was weakening France. By rallying for a Catholic and monarchical France, the political 
Right opposed, at the same time, the Republican idea of France and Protestant- 
dominated Germany (Amalvi, 1990:453-4).
After 1890 the monarchical Right, under the leadership of Maurras and Barres, 
advocated a “defensive nationalism” (“nationalisme defensive de la droite”) that 
focused on the defence of the French culture and included certain elements found in the 
otherwise despised neighbour in the East, such as economic strength as well as natural 
and rural romanticism. This defensive nationalism was undoubtedly still very anti- 
German, yet its focus was neither revenge nor the redemption of Alsace-Lorraine 
(Poidevin and Bariety, 1977:154-6).
Those views of Germany by the French monarchical Right found a popular expression 
in the book Histoire de Deux Peuples published in 1915, by Jacques Bainville. This 
work portrayed Germany as the eternal “deadly threat”, who could only be successfully 
contained by monarchical French rulers. In more than one hundred editions and more 
than 88,000 copies sold up to 1961, this book formed, together with a second work of 
Bainville’s, published in 1918, Histoire de Trois Generations, the image of Germany of 
two generations in twentieth century France (Heitmann, 1966). Bainville, who 
succeeded Poincare as a member of the Academie Fran9aise, made the “crusade against 
Germany” his lifelong task, even claiming that, from the beginning of time, there had 
been an unsolvable eternal enmity between France and Germany caused by the conflict
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about the Rhine frontier (Godde-Baumanns, 1987:8-9).1 I wish to argue that this love- 
hate relationship of the French monarchical Right with Germany was a feature to be 
found throughout the period between 1871 and 1944: The monarchical Right demanded 
the destruction or decisive weakening of Germany, with Bainville and Maurras being 
the most fervent advocates of a complete dismemberment of Germany after the First 
World War (Heitmann, 1966:178-179). The call for revenge or for a new war had 
remained strongest in this political current. Yet this call for war did not only refer to the 
issue of Alsace-Lorraine, but was also based on more wide-ranging attitudes or ideas 
about the French and the German nations and their inevitable course towards war. 
Nonetheless, in the 1930s, Maurras and Bainville showed increasing sympathy to the 
Nazi ideologies of Germany. The monarchical Right became more and more brothers in 
spiritual and ideological arms with Nazi Germany, although it did even more so with 
Fascist Italy (Rovan, 1986:104):
For the nationalistic Right, Hitler offered a spiritual closeness. His system 
coincided in all essential points with that of Barres and Maurras: the mythical 
cult of blood and soil, the anti-intellectualism, the enmity to Jews and Marxists, 
the doctrine of the superiority of one’s own nation and the inferiority of 
neighbouring people and others (Heitmann, 1966:185).
This love-hate-relationship between the French monarchical Right and Nazi Germany 
continued throughout the 1930s. While some authors, such as Jacques Bainville, 
continued producing writings against the German character, other authors and 
politicians of that political current tended to sympathise with Nazi ideas. In the 1930s, 
this political current turned inwards in its antagonism and directed its hostility not 
against Germany, much less against Nazi Germany, but rather against the French 
Republic. Theirs was an “aggressive, antidemocratic and anti-Bolshevist pacifism”, a 
“curious defeatism” that longed for a regime change in France even if this was to be 
attained through defeat (Rovan, 1986:104-5).
Apparently, Charles Maurras and some thousand of his followers celebrated the victory 
of Germany over France in late-summer 1940, since this represented the chance to
1 It may be more than coincidence that Bainville rs books were translated into German in 1939 and 
generally regarded by the Nazi as a confirmation of the enmity with France (Godde-Baumanns, 1987:8).
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establish a non-revolutionary, non-republican, authoritarian, Catholic, monarchical 
France the French monarchical Right was hoping for -  with the help of the Germans 
(Heitmann, 1966:185). Thus, while there was a proclaimed national antagonism 
between Germany and France, there was a political and, later, ideological closeness 
between the monarchical Right in France and both the monarchical and Nazi Germany.
In the interwar period, the French military was heavily influenced by the Action 
Frangaise. They shared many of this movement’s convictions about Germany and the 
Germans. Colonel de Gaulle expressed similar ideas about the “German character” in 
his book Vers Varmee de metier in 1934 (Mitter, 1981:210). Thus, liberal-radical, as 
well as monarchical politicians contributed to the view of Germany as being barbaric. 
This view was reconfirmed by linking recent memories of the war in 1870-1871 with 
further distant memories of German incursions into France. While the French 
republicans regarded militarism and anti-rationalism as the barbaric traits in Germany, 
for the French Catholics it was, rather, its Protestantism and its ugly side of modernity, 
the modem economy that rendered Germany barbaric. Different traits attributed to the 
German nation were thus highlighted by the image of the “German barbarian” with the 
identical aim of vilifying the Eastern neighbour:
[...] in France, in the second half of the nineteenth century, the ‘enemy’ was 
seen by the royalists and Catholics as the eternal opponent of the sacred national 
and Catholic history, while for the Republicans and laicists [Germany was] the 
eternal opponent of the achievements of the Revolution (Jeismann, 2002:167-8).
At the same time, monarchists and the far Right, on the one hand, and the liberal- 
radicals, on the other, drew very different practical-moral conclusions from that image 
(return to monarchy as the only way of dealing with Germany or: defence of liberty and 
freedom more necessary than ever).
5.1.1.3 Opposing the eternal enemy: the Socialist Movement
The Socialist movement, in particular under the charismatic leader Jean Jaures claimed 
to follow the tradition of the French Revolution, but also that of the uprising of the Paris
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Commune, led by the Paris working class, and crushed in March 1871. The Socialists 
sought a rapprochement with Germany, in particular with their German Socialist 
counterparts, and to that end they resorted to international bodies such as the Socialist 
International. The Socialist Party was excluded from political power until 1936, when it 
joined the Popular Front {Front Populaire) until June 1940, when power was handed 
over to Marshall Petain. Thus, the possibilities for the Socialists to shape official war 
memory in France were, in the period under discussion, rather limited. The view of 
French Socialists on Germany was shaped by the perspective of international class 
struggles. Germany was seen as an advanced industrialised country that was on the way 
to a socialist revolution.
Within the Left, in particular the socialist movements, there was a growing anti­
militarism that opposed revenge and war as policy option, but that rejected German 
militarism as well (Poidevin and Bariety, 1977:156). It was only the Socialist movement 
under Jaures that opposed war, but was increasingly worried about or even hostile 
towards a militarised Germany and asked for means of caution. The French Socialists 
were the only political group that did not accept the nation as the pivot of moral values 
and supported international friendship with Socialist counterparts in Germany also 
(Jeismann, 1992:379).
5.1.2 Transformation of political currents and their respective memory groups 
between 1918 and 1945
With the prevalence of the “Cartel de Gauches”, a more conciliatory and pacifistic 
approach towards Germany slowly gained ground. Interestingly, the Communist Party 
also supported a more conciliatory approach towards the former enemy, even before the 
Hitler-Stalin pact in i939. Nonetheless, this attitude of the French Communists should 
change dramatically in 1941, when Germany attacked the Soviet Union. Ironically, 
while the Socialists in France gained influence and supported a more appeasing 
approach that rejected an essentialised and personalised view of Germany, in Germany 
itself, a fusion of old conservative, volkisch ideas and racist theories gained ground.
2 Jean Jaures even gave France the sole responsibility for the war of 1870/71 and was one of the few 
French politicians who rejected all criticism against Bismarck’s alleged tactic to trick France into war 
(Godde-Baumanns, 1987:11).
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With the rise of the Nazi party to power, however, this attitude among French Radicals 
and Socialists changed. The Left opposed Nazi Germany while the Right, which had 
been strongest in demanding a weakening of Germany, now saw Nazi Germany as an 
ally against international Communism and the Soviet Union (Mitter, 1981:216-218).
5.1.3 Public commemorations of past wars between 1871 and 1945
In the Jacobin tradition the liberals of the Third Republic promoted a national 
historiography, exemplified by the writings of Ernest Lavisse, as well as national 
history classes that reinforced the idea of France as a symbol of universal human rights, 
and of French history as a constant march towards the attainment of those values, 
towards that telos, which had started even before the French Revolution. The particular 
manifestation of those universal human rights gave France a “mission civilisatrice” in 
relation to other countries. The Third Republic was, thus, the Golden Age of patriotic 
history classes and of national memory, as Pierre Nora points out:
Everything changed in the last third of the nineteenth century, when history 
became a science and the Republic turned it into a national institution. It had its 
temple, the newly restored Sorbonne. [...] History and memory were being 
brought together in such a way as to become another point of reference for the 
nation: in this sense, national history was becoming the French memory (Nora, 
2001a: xvi).
In his interpretation of French history, one that had been specifically elaborated to be 
taught, Lavisse cultivated a memory of Alsace and Lorraine and offered a successful 
fusion of the conservative and republican myths regarding the origins of the French 
nation. Indeed, prior to Lavisse’s synthesis, the Left identified the origins of France in 
the rebellious Vercingetorix and the Gaules, while the monarchists focused on Clovis 
and his baptism in Reims in 496, the Franks and Joan of Arc. Lavisse fused both 
memories and declared both, Clovis and Vercingetorix, the founding figures of France 
(Sirinelli, 1992:348). Together with Joan of Arc, these three figures were seen as French 
heroes against outside intrusions, in general, and Roman-Germanic intrusions, in 
particular. Therewith Lavisse helped to foster a clear revival of the notion of common 
roots in the aftermath of the defeat in 1870.
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The Third Republic did not have a commemoration day for the war in 1870-1871. One 
of the reasons may be found in the controversy surrounding that war, which recalled the 
regime change, the crush of the Paris Commune and a painful military defeat. Liberal 
politicians and governments institutionalised in 1880 instead the celebration of the 
French Revolution on 14 July (Bastille Day) (Hobsbawm, 1992:271). But this 
commemoration of the French Revolution and its legacy remained controversial 
between 1871 and 1945. In fact, authors such as Jean-Fran9ois Sirinelli consider this 
question to be “an almost permanent civil war in historiography” between 1814 and 
1945 (Sirinelli, 1992:384). In the interwar period, some historians on the Right 
reiterated that the French Revolution had been the role model of genocide, while official 
France, dominated by Liberals, Radicals, Socialists and Communists, all of whom 
subscribed to the heritage of the French Revolution, continued to celebrate the memory 
of the French Revolution as the basis of modem France and the rise of universalist 
values such as human rights and political emancipation.
In 1922 the French National Assembly decided to commemorate 11 November (1918) 
as the victory of the French* democracy over Germany. This date is still commemorated 
in France today (2006). But the First World War was ambiguous in French memory. On 
the one hand, it was the great victory of the nation and the Republic, while, on the other 
hand, it embodied an incredible scale of suffering and sacrifice.3 The only blind spot for 
many years to come would be the 1917 mutiny and the mass repression and executions 
that followed it (Grosser, 1990:172).
5.1.3 The level of social learning in remembering past wars between 1871 and 
1945
The predominant mode of remembering past wars with Germany in France between 
1871 and 1940 shows elements of a conventional level of social learning: Character 
traits of the Germans were essentialised, therewith explaining past and current 
behaviour and providing a guide to future action. Both liberal-radicals and monarchist 
politicians conceived, for different reasons, of the Germans as a people of uncivilised 
barbarians. While the former stressed the political otherness of Germany, for many
3 On the creation of the memory of the First World War through monuments in the inter-war period in 
France see: Sherman, 1999.
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intellectuals and the latter it was an essential feature of the Eastern neighbour. 
Historians close to the monarchical Right, such as Bainville and Barre, stressed the 
notion that there was a natural antagonism between the two peoples; that the Germans 
were “the devil” (Barres) that led “naturally to a holy war” between the two countries. 
Many interesting parallels between the essentialising attitudes of the enemy in Germany 
and France in the 1870-1918 period can be found. For one, the political consequences 
drawn by the political Right in both countries were similar: to both war seemed 
inevitable, in the name of revenge, even desirable. With the exception of the Socialist 
movement, political groups both in France and Germany made no differentiation 
between the political entity they identified as the enemy and the political forces shaping 
that image.
As in Germany, the creation of a nation in France called for an invention, an abstraction, 
which required the same level of abstraction in the imagining of other national entities. 
In the final analysis, it is the stage of nation-building that might help to explain the 
prevalence of that level of social learning. Although the existence of the two-Germanys- 
•theory already signals the differentiation between different, opposing perceived 
characteristics, they are still defined in essentialist terms.
In the 1920s essentialising views on Germany as barbaric as well as the two-Germanys- 
theory remained strong in the French literature on Germany. The suspicion of a “Pan- 
German dream” (reve pangermaniste) and a will of expansion and hegemony was 
something attached to Germany as a whole. This resulted in a clear animosity, or at least 
a very suspicious attitude towards Germany, as is shown in Louis Reynard’s popular 
work “The German Soul” (L'ame allemande). In the 1920s, the “incertitudes 
allemandes” (uncertainties concerning Germany) and the “menace pangermanique” (the 
pan-German threat) were popular rhetorical figures from the essentialising memory of 
liberal-radical and monarchical writers alike, that reinforced the insistence by French 
politicians on the annexation of all German provinces on the left part of the Rhine, as 
well as security guarantees against Germany (Mitter, 1981:192-195).
While in the 1920s a conventional, essentialising image of Germany prevailed 
(including the popular “Two-Germanys-theory”) among the liberal-radical political 
current, this image of Germany became increasingly “ideologised” in the 1930s,
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depending openly on the political closeness or distance to the regime in power in Berlin. 
The clearest change of politics -  if not so much of rhetoric -  is to be identified in the 
monarchical Right in France. The defeatism and support for Nazi ideas contrast with the 
attitude -  often by the very same people -  prior to 1914. The same changes -  in the 
opposite direction -  can be identified among the Left: While there was a growing will 
for rapprochement with republican Germany (from which the Nazi regime still profited 
in the first years in power), the Left became increasingly hostile on political and 
ideological grounds. Thus, both political currents (monarchical Right and Left) 
transformed their perception of France’s Eastern neighbour in response to the political 
changes that took place there. In other words, there was a growing distinction between 
the German political entity and the political regime in power.
Such a differentiation made by the monarchical Right was, nonetheless, only partly a 
result of conscious reflection as defined in chapter 3. The growing Nazi ideology simply 
replaced one collective abstraction (“nation”) by another (“race”) which happened to 
elicit sympathy within France. The conscious reflection upon collective war memories 
was still absent and essentialising patterns for structuring those memories along 
ideological lines prevailed. This is very much in line with the results of the research on 
Germany during the same period. It was only after the Second World War that this level 
of social learning changed.
It is interesting to note that essentialising remembering of past wars with Germany was 
not limited to the monarchical Right in France, but also widespread among the Left 
(above all the Jacobin style Radicals). This is a marked difference to Imperial Germany 
and the Weimar Republic. But, as in the case of Germany, a note of caution has to be 
made. Not only the growing pacifist movement after the First World War, but also 
many politicians avoided this essentialising remembering and drew very different 
practical conclusions from those memories. This was most widespread among the 
Socialist and Communist parties in France in the 1920s and 1930s. However, the 
official policies and the writings and debates on Germany that included an interpretation 
of past wars with Germany at that time were still dominated by such level of social 
learning. The same note of caution needs to be made for the period to be analysed in the 
next section: even after 1944 those essentialising forms of remembering past wars with
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Germany did not disappear but could be found, at least until the 1960s and were only 
gradually transformed.
5.2 Collective war memories in France between 1945 and 1995
With the landing of the Allied troops on D-Day on the coast of the Normandy on 6 
June, 1944 the liberation of France began. On August 25, 1944 Paris was liberated by 
Allied troops, with French contingents under General de Gaulle leading the victorious 
troops into the capital. By the end of 1944, the French territory of 1940 was again under 
French and Allied control. Immediately after liberation purges and trials against 
“traitors of France” began. The liberation itself became a cause of myth-making because 
the French governments celebrated and commemorated D-Day, but, above all, the 
liberation of Paris, as the self-liberation of France by itself, marginalising the majority 
contribution of the Allied forces in this effort (Namer, 1987).
In France there existed diverse memory groups of the Second World War. There were 
soldiers having fought at the front, the deported, the prisoners of war and those having 
experienced German occupation in the North and, after November 1942, in the whole of 
France. There was the Resistance movement within France, which had gained strength 
since 1941 and had soon been dominated by the Communist Party of France (PCF). 
There were also opposition groups in Algiers and London that claimed to have 
supported the Resistance within France. Finally, there were the politicians responsible 
for the Vichy regime that had cooperated with the German authorities in the occupied 
French territory in the North, many of whom had fallen prey to the cleansing actions of 
1944-1945, or were condemned afterwards by French civilian or military courts. Others 
re-entered public service and political life in 1951 and 1953, after amnesty laws had 
been passed.
In France, resistance to the German occupant or to the Vichy system did not become a 
founding myth, as it happened in other countries such as Italy. However, the groups 
who had opposed German occupation and organised the military resistance and 
liberation of France were regarded as the most important political forces to shape
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France’s future. There were several small political parties in the immediate post-war 
period that made explicit reference to their role in the Resistance during the war. 
Nevertheless, several attempts to form one national Resistance party or platform in 1945 
failed (Rousso, 1991:19). There was a “veritable hierarchy of suffering” in France (quite 
similar to the hierarchy in East Germany), expressed by the prominence of memory 
groups in public commemorations after 1944 in France: volunteer resistance fighters 
were regarded as morally higher than “racial deportees”, who, in turn, had a higher 
status than “ordinary POW” and, at the end of the ladder, “slave labour”. Thus, 
returnees from concentration camps were ignored and their participation in parades 
forbidden (Rousso, 1991:24-26).
But the Second World War was not the last and only war in France to be remembered in 
the period under investigation. Most of the French colonies became independent of 
France through a peaceful process between 1958 and 1960. However, in two cases, 
French Indochina (which later became Laos, Viet Nam and Cambodia) and Algeria 
(and, to a lesser degree, Madagascar), the secession of former colonies was 
accompanied by massive violence and even war. France fought from 1946 to June 1954 
in Indochina and from November 1954 to 1962 in Algeria.4 The latter war was 
conducted extremely cruelly on both sides using torture and mass repressions against 
civilians. Although those wars also produced their own memory groups in France and, 
in particular in the case of the Algerian War, parallels to the Second World War in 
France were drawn, it would be beyond the scope of this thesis to include those as well 
in the investigation, which focuses on those French memory groups of the Second 
World War.5
5.2.1 Associations related to the Second World War
One of the largest memory groups from World War II was the Union Frangaise des 
Associations de Combattants (French Union of Combatants Associations, UFAC). 
There was also one single association of prisoners of war (POW), the Federation
4 However, even this description is problematic, because from the point of view of the French 
governments, Algeria was an integral part of France; thus, France could not be at war with itself. On this 
aspect see: Evans, 1997b:74.
5 On the memory of the Algerian War in French society see: Evans, 1997a; Prost, 1999
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Nationale des Combattants Prisonniers de Guerre (the National Federation of 
Combatant Prisoners of War, FNCPG). It was only through pressure from different 
groups of the National Resistance Council that this memory group would be accepted. 
Even in 1944, the fear of dominance of the federation by the Communists was present. 
After the liberation, F rancis Mitterrand was secretary general of this movement and 
remained in close ties with it throughout his political career (Durand, 1984:41-53). The 
French section was also very active in the international POW association, the 
Confederation Internationale des Anciens Prisonniers de Guerre (Deutsch- 
franzosisches Institut, 1995:77).
From the very beginning the French Government founded the Ministry of War Veterans 
and Victims of War. The ministry was sustained by a close cooperation with numerous 
social organisations of war victims, former combatants and deportees. More importantly 
for the purposes of this research, the Ministry was, and still is, in charge of articulating 
and “guarding” the collective memory of the two World Wars in France. Thus, former 
combatants and war victims had their own ministry through which they could exert 
influence on public commemorations.
One of the departments of the Ministry of War Veterans, the Delegation a la Memoire 
et a la Information Historique (DMIH) is in charge of: (1) taking care of soldiers’ tombs 
in France and abroad; (2) preparing commemoration ceremonies in cooperation with 
social associations; (3) taking care of commemoration sites and providing “historical 
information” (for instance through educational programmes for schools about past 
battles or living in war); and (4) “the defence of memory”. This last task is to be 
understood as the collection of information and testimonies about the time of war and 
the organisation of public events to diffuse those testimonies. The Department of 
Memory and Historical Information further acts as advisor whenever laws concerning 
national memory are being discussed, publishes the journal Les Chemins de la Memoire, 
and is in charge of the exhibition areas or small museums of various former 
concentration camps and war memorials (Baudot, 1997-1998).
In the aftermath of the liberation in 1944, there was a widespread purge outside the 
courtrooms against the so-called collabos (collaborators with the German occupation), 
especially in the former territory of Vichy France. Figures vary, but many authors
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assume that about 12,000 persons were killed during the 1944-45 cleansing. As regards 
the official trials, between 1945 and 1950, 127,000 charges were filed, and 80,000 
suspects were found guilty, 6,800 of whom were sentenced to death. 1500 of those 
death sentences were actually carried out (Conan and Rousso, 1994:17-18). In the trials 
after liberation the most common crime was “espionage for the enemy”. Yet, hardly 
anybody was tried in French courts for crimes against the Jews or the general civilian 
population, like those committed by the paramilitary units of Vichy, the Milice. Marshal 
Petain himself was also sentenced to death on the charge of treason, but was later 
paroled and sent to lie de Yeu, where he died on 23 July 1951. The legal foundation of 
the trial against Petain was controversial, though, given the fact that Petain’s 
government had received the power from the National Assembly in June 1940.
In October 1944 the Commission d'Histoire de VOccupation et de la Liberation de la 
France, (Commission on the History of the Occupation and Liberation of France, 
CHOLF) was founded; one year later, in 1945 the Commission d'Histoire de la Guerre 
(Commission on the History of the War, CHG) began collecting government documents 
related to World War II. Both commissions were merged in 1951 to form the Comite 
d'Histoire de la Deuxieme Guerre Mondial (World War II History Committee, CHGM), 
which was attached to the office of the President of the Council and later to the office of 
the Prime Minister. Finally, the CHGM was replaced by the Institut d'Histoire du 
Temps Present (Institute of Contemporary History) in the late 1970s (Rousso, 1992:242 
and 248).6
Many French archives were difficult to access in the post-war period in France, with 
many files being classified. Not just the National Archives but also the departmental 
archives in France restricted the access to the files of the Vichy era (Azema and 
Bedarida, 1992:45). The archives from the German occupants, for example, those of the 
Gestapo (German Secret State Police), were handed over to the Ministry of War 
Veterans or to the military archives, where sixty years would have to pass before they 
could be accessed (Klarsfeld, 1982). The first post-war legislation on archives in France 
was passed in 1970, when the “thirty years of silence” had already gone by in France 
(Conan and Rousso, 1994:90-104). In 1979, the French president, Giscard d’Estaing,
6 The CHGM made a thorough investigation of the purges, establishing the official figure o f 10,000 killed 
during the purge 1944/45, but did little research on Vichy.
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opened up the national archives that dealt with Vichy France and France under German 
occupation. However, numerous archives that were under the administration of the 
departments or regions applied many restrictions on the access to their archives, even in 
the 1990s (Nora, 2001a: ix): for example, research on files regarding trials during the 
Vichy regime is prohibited for 100 years. On 26 December 1964 the French parliament 
unanimously passed a law that stated that crimes against humanity could be charged any 
time without temporal limitation of prosecution.
5.2.2 Political memory groups within political parties and currents
The French political parties from 1944 on mirrored in many ways the party structure of 
1930s France, some party names even remained unchanged (like the French Socialists). 
However, given the fact that many groupings and splinter groups which lasted little, 
before being regrouped again, existed in post-War France, it seems more appropriate to 
refer to political currents instead of political parties and identify the relevant political
n
memory groups within them during the Fourth Republic (1946 -  1958). In the Fifth 
Republic (1958 to date) the party spectrum became more stable and concentrated, above 
all, on more or less five stable parties: the Gaullist Conservatives (RPF/RPR), the 
Republican Centre-Right MRP/UDF (Union pour la Democratic Frangaise), the 
Socialists {Parti Socialiste -  PS), the French Communists {Parti Communiste de la 
France -  PCF), and, finally, since the 1980s, the Green Party {Les Verts).
The party that reigned most prominent among the domestic French resistance against 
German occupation (but also against the Vichy regime) was the French Communist 
Party. Many Communists had suffered under German repression (the Vichy regime not 
only handed over exiled opponents to the Germans, but also French Communists), some 
of them even having been detained or deported to concentration camps, such as 
Buchenwald (Germany). Given the fact that the Communist Party was granted the 
reputation of having made the largest sacrifice in the French domestic resistance and 
having been a central figure of the National Resistance Council {Conseil National de la 
Resistance -  CNR) the memory of the domestic battle against German troops and the 
Vichy government was central to the Communist memory of the Second World War. To
7 On the development of political parties in post-war France see: Huard, 1996.
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stress this sacrifice for France, the Communists referred to themselves as the “party of 
the 75000 shot” (“parti des 75,000fusilles”).
In 1946 de Gaulle founded the Rassemblement pour la France (RPF) that was later 
renamed Rassemblement pour la Republique (RPR) and was generally regarded as the 
political - Gaullist - Right. The RPF was also the home to many high-ranking officers of 
the French army, many of them having been in exile in London with de Gaulle, others 
having been in exile in Algiers. The resistance memory groups from the exile (Algiers, 
London), many of them with military background, clearly dominated the RPF/RPR.
The term “rassemblement made direct reference to the patriotic and republican 
political movements that had been popular during the 1930s in France. The RPF/RPR 
understood itself as an alternative to the Fourth Republic and as an alternative to the left 
Resistance and regarded itself as an “extension of the Free France of 1940”, thus 
excluding both the members of the domestic Resistance and members of Vichy at the 
same time (Rousso 1992: 582). In de Gaulle’s interpretation, the French victory in the 
Second World War had also been a victory of the republic. This afforded the republican 
system strong support from conservative and moderate political groups, although the 
Third Republic had been discredited in the eyes of many politicians, because of its 
alleged disunity and moral defeatism in the 1930s. De Gaulle won, thus, the French 
conservatives for the republic (just like Adenauer won the German conservatives for 
democracy).
While a first attempt to form a right-wing party of republicanism failed {Parti 
Republicain de la Liberte), the People’s Republican Movement (Mouvement 
Republicain Populaire, MRP), succeeded in gathering moderate rightwing politicians 
with a clear commitment to the Republic. Similar to the CDU in West Germany with 
ordinary members of the Nazi Party, the MRP integrated many ordinary members of the 
Vichy administration. Thus, with a wide electorate of the MRP being close to 
“marechalisme”, the relative silence on the occupation period became “key to its 
memory” (Rousso, 1992:565). Many conservatives of the MRP, which was renamed in 
1965 Union for French Democracy {Union pour la Democratie Frangaise, UDF), had 
close ties with the Catholic Church and the party’s regional stronghold were Catholic 
regions such as Alsace or the Western provinces of France. The MRP/UDF considered
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itself as France’s Christian-Democratic, Liberal-Conservative party. The MRP/UDF 
was home to some bourgeois resistance politicians during the Second World War, but 
had no strong foundation in the Resistance; it also gathered some prominent members, 
who had a deportee background, such as Simone Veil, herself a survivor of Auschwitz 
(Rousso, 1992:602). Between 1943 and 1944, the predecessor of the UDF, the MRP, 
was headed by George Bidault, the chairman of the National Resistance Council, CNR, 
after the founder, Jean Moulin, was arrested and executed by the Germans in 1943. 
Thus, while there were some individuals with a strong link to particular memory groups 
of the Second World War, overall no predominant political memory group within this 
political current can be identified, unlike the case of the Communists, the Gaullists or 
the Socialists.
In fact, the Communists’ memory prevailed among the Left-oriented groups, although it 
had to compete with the memory of domestic resistance of the Socialist Party, which 
also had a strong membership of domestic resistants and deported French. The 
Socialists, who gathered since 1946 in the SFIO (French Section of the Workers 
International: Section Frangaise de la Internationale des Ouvrieres), had a strong 
presence of those active in the domestic resistance against the German occupation 
forces and the political opponents of Vichy, many of whom had been sent to 
Buchenwald. Thus, the same memory groups that can be found within the Communists 
are to be found in the SFIO, later renamed Parti Socialiste (PS). With the disappearance 
of the Radical-Socialists at the end of the Fourth Republic, the Socialists also integrated 
increasingly this political current within its ranks. Until today there is a Jacobin wing 
within the PS that feels close to the values and policies of the Radicals.
The Liberal-Radicals, who regarded themselves the heirs to Jacobin-style republicanism 
and who played an important role in the Third Republic, regrouped under different 
names in the Fourth Republic. The most important group was the Social-Radicals, 
headed by Edouard Daladier (French Foreign Minister in 1938 during the Munich 
Agreement) and Edouard Herriot (former French Prime Minister in the 1930s). This 
group later disintegrated and many of its members joined the Socialist Party, while 
others flocked to the newly formed UDF. Thus, the political current of Poincare and 
Clemen9 eau ceased to exist in the Fifth Republic. The Radicals shared the trauma of the 
weakening by external and internal enemies of the Third Republic (which they regarded
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as the mainstay of their party). This political current had fostered a suspicion against 
Germany that had partly been the result of some essentialising features discussed in the 
previous section.
The monarchical Right in France did not have its own political voice between the late 
1940s and the 1960s, although the memory of Marshall Petain was actively defended 
since the 1950s. Rather, many members of the Vichy regime gathered in the UDF, some 
also integrated into the Socialist Party-or the RPF/RPR. According to Henry Rousso, 
after 1944 the former monarchical and anti-republican Right close to the Action 
Frangaise and the political values of the Etat Frangais of the Vichy government were 
discredited for three reasons: its enmity towards the Third Republic, its open support of 
the Munich agreement and the welcoming of the fall of the republican regime in 1940 
(Rousso, 1992:557-8). Thus, the espousal of republicanism (which distinguished the 
moderate right from the discredited monarchical and Vichyite Right) became an 
essential component of the programmes and discourse of conservative parties.
The memory group of the Vichyite Right, however, found a more prominent place in 
the Far Right that emerged in the 1970s, especially the Front National (FN) of Jean- 
Marie Le Pen. The FN was and still is also the political home of the old far-right ideas, 
spearheaded by the Action Frangaise under Charles Maurras and the Vichy government. 
This party, which has gained several seats in the National Assembly and governs in 
several large cities, especially in southern France, has articulated the voice of the anti­
republican, anti-Semitic and anti-French Revolutionist France and supports a positive
o
memory of Vichy France, “the traditional, national, Catholic France”.
5.2.3 Practical-moral imperatives in France based on war memories
The pacifism that prevailed in France after 1918 was entirely discredited by the events 
that followed in the 1930s (especially Munich 1938) and 1940s (Grosser, 1990:172). 
For all political currents in France the lesson from the pre-war period, culminating in 
the behaviour of the Western powers towards Hitler in 1938 in Munich, was that
8 Rousso, 1992:598-9. The journal Present of the Front National, quoted in: Florin 1997:8.
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pacifism was not worth pursuing; a discredited pacifism and, therefore, a need for 
strength and a strong national military had to be acknowledged:
The lesson of 1938 for France is that pacifism does not lead to peace, but that 
yielding to threatening neighbouring regimes cannot ultimately prevent war. 
Pacifism and the weakness of armament of the 1930s not only led to war and the 
shameful defeat in 1940, it also led to a sense that the military defeat had been a 
moral defeat (Picht, 1996:108).
The defeat within six weeks was a very traumatic experience which raised questions 
about the reasons for the absence of effective defence. Here the memory of Munich 
played a very important role as did the abandonment of the French army by the British 
expedition corps in Dunkirk. In fact, one important consequence of this reflection was 
the assertion of the need for independence and to refrain from relying too much on 
others for the national defence of France (Heuser 1998:207). This practical-moral 
imperative was particularly strong among the Gaullists.
De Gaulle himself and the Gaullists combined this imperative for national independence 
with an idea of French grandeur. This imperative of grandeur, however, was not drawn 
primarily from recent memories (the successful resistance to German occupation). More 
distant memories also nurtured it. The idea of grandeur was also supported by the 
Radicals with a clear remembering of the French Revolution, i.e. France portrayed as 
the nation that embodied universal rights and the spread of republicanism.
Another practical-moral imperative that was particularly stressed by associations of 
former deportees was the defence of human rights and combat of racism.9 Since the 
deportees had experienced the inhumane treatment by the Nazis and later realised the 
extent to which the Vichy regime had contributed to it, a particular focus was put on the 
defence of human rights, democracy and the combat of racism or anti-Semitism. This 
imperative was particularly widespread among the Left and Centre in France. Marked 
parallels with post-war West Germany can be identified in this respect (often based on 
joint experience in Nazi concentration camps or forced labour camps).
9 See for example Simone Veil’s speech, quoted in Le Monde, 8 May, 1985, p.2.
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Another imperative derived from the reflection of World War II was related to the role 
of a/the opportunities brought by a common Europe to overcome suspicion, fear and 
hatred (Veil, 1985). European integration appeared as a promising strategy to overcome 
old prejudices and foster Franco-German reconciliation and rapprochement. This 
imperative was very strong on the Left, the Centre and the associations of World War II 
deportees and non-Communist members of the domestic Resistance. However, 
European integration was also frequently seen as the imperative to deal with the alleged 
German economic expansionism and superiority. It combined two practical-moral 
imperatives that were heavily informed by collective war memories in France: a united 
Europe was, on the one hand, a tool of rapprochement and reconciliation; on the other 
hand, it was a tool of containment. Both imperatives can be found side-by-side in the 
discourse of the political Centre of MRP/UDF, represented by Robert Schumann or Jean 
Monnet, but also the Radicals of the Fourth Republic as well as some Socialists.
As this brief analysis highlights, those imperatives were not shared across the entire 
political spectrum, but varied according to each group’s political project. While there 
were some similarities that might have had their origins in similar experiences (such as 
that of the deportees and inmates in concentration camps), there was also a marked 
difference between the societies of both countries, which found clear expression in the 
area of defence: German politicians very much stressed the need for predictability and 
accountability in foreign affairs, while French politicians stressed the need for an 
independent and strong state in particular in defence matters.
5.2.4 Levels of social learning in France between 1945 and 1995
How much confrontation, how much discord, because each memory clashes with a 
'counter-memory', in particular i f  it regards crimes that the French committed against 
the French.
Alfred Grosser (1990:149)
Between 1944 and 1946 General de Gaulle formed a transitory government that was 
replaced in 1946 by a regular government composed of Socialists, Communists and the 
Centrist MRP. Since 1947, twenty-one governments with shifting majorities and
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unstable coalitions followed, which were mainly sustained by the centre-right MRP. 
Thus, during the Fourth Republic there was no Left government, but, rather, a support 
for or sustaining of governing coalitions by Left parties. This gave the MRP an 
influential position in the late 1940s and 1950s.
The Fourth Republic, organised as a parliamentary democracy, lasted until 1958, when 
it was replaced by a presidential democracy. After a succession of governments and the 
political turmoil brought about by the Algerian war, de Gaulle became Prime Minister 
again, and, after the referendum on the constitution of the Fifth Republic that turned 
France into a presidential Republic, he became France’s first president. De Gaulle 
dominated French politics in the 1960s with Gaullist prime ministers at his side, before 
he resigned in April 1969 after a failed referendum. He was followed by another 
Gaullist president, George Pompidou, who governed until 1974. Then, the first 
president of the centre-right (UDF), Valery Giscard d'Estaing, took power and stayed in 
office until 1981. Francois Mitterrand became the first Socialist president in 1981 and 
stayed in office until 1995, when he was succeeded by the Gaullist Jacques Chirac. 
Thus, Mitterrand was in power during Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s policy of “spiritual- 
moral turn” and during the period of German reunification.
From 1947 to 1981 the Right (RPF/RPR and MRP) dominated governmental policies in 
France and gave Gaullist memories of the Second World War a privileged access to 
official commemoration in France. The French Communists, with the significant 
exception of their participation in the first post-war government, were excluded from 
political power until the 1980s, although they remained a very powerful opposition 
force. In its turn, the Socialist Party (SFIO/PS) participated in some governments of the 
Fourth Republic, but was excluded for more than twenty years from power during the 
Fifth Republic. The Communists participated in the first government under Socialist 
rule (from 1981 to 1983) and tolerated in 1997 a Socialist government by Prime 
Minister Lionel Jospin. Thus, the political currents that included important political 
memory groups of the domestic resistance only belatedly and limitedly (in the case of 
the Communists) had access to political power in France.
In the late 1940s and 1950s the dominant form of remembering the Second World War 
was that of resistance in its different forms. Not much unlike West Germany in the
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1950s, where all Germans had been portrayed as victims in one form or another, in 
France all Frenchmen and women were portrayed as having resisted German occupation 
in one form or another. Central to this way of remembering were the Communists and 
the Gaullists, who most strongly shaped the official memory of the Second World War 
and derived their policies and self-understanding from that memory, thus marginalising 
other memory groups from the sphere of politics (Conan und Lindenberg, 1992:8).
Similarly to West Germany in the 1950s, the Conservatives and Centrists in France 
(such as the RPF, MRP, the Radicals) rejected the idea that most Frenchmen were guilty 
of collaboration and criticised the excesses of the purges in 1944-1945. In 1950 the 
Gaullists prompted a debate about an amnesty law concerning the recent past. This 
debate marked the end of the coalition of Liberation. While the French Communists and 
some Socialists opposed the amnesty law, the Right and Centre (MRP, Radicals, and 
UDSR) favoured it (Azema and Bedarida, 1992:46). Finally, on 5 January 1951 the first 
amnesty law, which granted amnesty for crimes committed between 10 June, 1940 and 
31 December, 1945, was passed. On 6 August 1953 the second amnesty law came into 
force granting amnesty for crimes committed between 1936 and 1946. These laws also 
covered the crimes committed during the cleansing (Vepuration) that took place 
between 1944 and 1945. As Rousso notes,
[T]he end of the cleansing, the end of non-eligibility and other restrictions [...], 
the affirmation by the law of judicial oblivion, the progressive release from 
prisons [...] and finally the beginning of a process of social reintegration of 
former ‘collaborators’ marks a decisive turnaround, not only in the collective 
war memory but also in the memory of [French] political forces (Rousso, 
1992:570).
It was Charles de Gaulle who created an abstract notion of resistance, which Rousso 
defines as “resistentialism”, which coincided neither with the domestic resistance nor 
with the resistance from exile and that became the dominant form of remembering the 
Second World War in France until the late 1960s. This vague notion was even able to 
accommodate most “normal” citizens of Vichy France, except for some deplorable 
exceptions:
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[...] first, a process that sought to minimise the importance of the Vichy regime 
and its impact on French society, including its most negative aspects; second, the 
construction of an object of memory, the ‘Resistance’, whose significance 
transcended by far the sum of its active parts [...]; and, third, the identification 
of this ‘Resistance’ with the nation as a whole, a characteristic feature of the 
Gaullist version of the [resistance] myth. (Rousso, 1991:10)
Since “resistentialism” referred to some abstract resistant attitude towards the German 
occupant, members of the Vichy government could, in certain terms, also identify 
themselves with it (Rousso, 1992:576). For de Gaulle, resistentialism was an attitude of 
the “real France” that had never ceased to exist.10 For de Gaulle, resistance meant, in the 
first place, military resistance, because in the General’s view, the war against Germany 
had not ended with 1940, but had only been interrupted by an armistice.11 In fact, de 
Gaulle insinuated that France as a whole had been in resistance and had finally “found 
itself again” in 1944. Creating a memory of the Second World War around de Gaulle’s 
resistentialism meant that the post-war political system was based on a community of 
those who had resisted the foreign occupant (Rousso, 1991:19).
The importance of the Resistance and its public celebration meant, as the other side of 
the same coin, silence on Vichy (Conan and Rousso 1994:21-22). In the 1950s a new 
myth emerged among the French political class, namely that of Vichy France and 
Marshal Petain having made the best of the situation by pretending to co-operate, but, in 
fact, giving the least possible help to the German occupants. General Remy, a renowned 
general of the Resistance, even went one step further. In a newspaper article on 11 April 
1950, he described Petain and de Gaulle as two parts, as the “sword” {Vepee) and the 
“shield” (le bouclier) of French resistance (Rousso, 1984:120). This “doubleyew”-thesis 
was popularised by Robert Aron in 1954, when he also advanced the theory of two 
Vichys, the good Vichy of Petain and the bad Vichy under Laval (Azema, 1996:285 and 
287). However, the whole episode of Vichy remained difficult to tackle in French 
memory and remained marginalised from the 1940s to the 1960s in official French 
commemorations (Rousso, 1992:576; Amouroux, 1997).
10 “La resistance, c'est l'essence meme de la France” Charles de Gaulle, quoted in : Rousso, 1992:574.
11 “This view [resistance as military resistance] offered two notable advantages: the civil war could be 
forgotten because the mission of the army is to fight foreign enemies, not handfuls of domestic traitors 
[...]; and the political and ideological diversity of the actual Resistance could be ignored.” Rousso, 1991: 
91.
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Out of this idea of a successful French resistentialism, de Gaulle formed the idea of 
France, “la Grande Nation”. For de Gaulle France either was a grand nation or it did 
not exist. This claim to greatness extended the view on French history and memory 
beyond the Second World War and went much further into the past. Examples of this 
greatness were to be found in the dynastic, but, especially, in the republican periods of 
France.
However, this form of remembering the Second World War as “France in resistance” 
faced contradictions, oppositions and alternative voices since 1945. The Communists, 
for one, stressed the domestic resistance symbolised by the National Resistance 
Council, while the Gaullists favoured the memory of “Free France”, proclaimed by de 
Gaulle on 18 June 1940 (Rousso, 1992; Nora, 2001c). On that day Charles de Gaulle 
appealed to the French people not to give up the struggle. In post-war France the 
Gaullists celebrated that day, while the Communists organised counter- 
commemorations. Both groups had an interest in fostering the memory of resistance, but 
they also took pains to discredit each other in their role of resistance. In this vein, the 
Gaullists portrayed the Communists as separatists. The Communists regarded the 
resistance from abroad as the easy way and highlighted the high price the Communists 
had to pay for their own resistance.
Despite sporadic mentioning, the Vichyite memory was virtually absent from public 
commemorations in post-war France. However, a group of former ministers and high- 
ranking public servants under the Vichy regime challenged the official silence and 
opposed the accommodation of Vichy France in the idea of “France in resistance” by 
forming the Association pour Defendre la Memoire du Marechal Petain (Association 
for the Defence of the Memory of Marshall Petain, ADMP) in 1951 (Rousso, 1984). 
This association was devoted to far more than just defending the memory of a man; it 
sought rather, to vindicate a whole political system. It based its defence of the memory 
of Vichy France on five essential claims: (1) Vichy was a legitimate regime; (2) the 
founding act of the regime had been the emergency rights in June, not the armistice in 
July 1940; (3) Petain never collaborated with the German occupants but resisted daily as 
much as possible and co-operated to the smallest degree necessary (double-jeu of 
Petain); (4) it was the Germans, not Petain who had been responsible for the anti-Jewish 
laws; (5) Petain did not flee the country, contrary to de Gaulle and others, and remained
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in France even after 1942, when Vichy France was occupied by German forces (Rousso, 
1984:116). Vichy France was thus defended by its supporters as a legal successor to the
19French Republic that had tried to make the best out of the defeat in 1940.
If the memory of “France in resistance” was dominant thanks to the Gaullist and 
Communist memory of the Second World War between the late 1940s and the 1960s, it 
also entailed, as a negative foil, a focus on the crimes of Nazi Germany, as well as the 
marginalisation of internal alternative memories, especially those of the French Jews:
Until the end of the 1960s, the memory of Nazi barbarism was symbolised by
Mont Valerien or Oradour, but not by Vel d’Hiv (which had been destroyed) nor
1 ^Izieu (a place hardly anybody knew) (Conan and Rousso, 1994:20).
In other words, the prevailing form of remembering of the Second World War in France 
during that period was outward-oriented, focusing on the invasion by another political 
community, Germany, and abstracted from the different internal memory groups 
subsumed by the theme of France in resistance. This is a conventional way of 
remembering, where the distinction between political community and political currents 
is absent.
During the late 1940s and 1950s, Germany remained a central point of preoccupation 
for French politicians all along the political spectrum. The Gaullist and Communist 
conventional form of remembering coincided with a perception of Germany in terms 
that showed many continuities with the interwar-period and retained some of the ideas 
prevalent then. Despite the advent of the Cold War and the growing concern with the 
threat of the Soviet Union, the German threat prevailed in the 1950s (Knipping, 
1988:149). As Joseph Rovan points out,
A major part of the [French] population, including many elements of the Left, 
nurtured their outdated fear-hatred towards the Germans, les boches, through the 
memory of the Second World War. This mood was reinforced by the systematic 
propaganda of the Communist Party [...] (Rovan, 1988:156).
12 In fact, given the legal grounding of Vichy France, authors such as Michel Dacier claimed that in 1940 
the French civil war had begun with a resistance against a legitimate government (Rousso, 1992:559).
13 On the discussion of 16 July as commemoration day and the events surrounding the Velodrome d’Hiver 
(Vel d'Hiv), where French Jews had been rounded up in 1942 and later been deported also with the help 
of the Paris police see: Carrier, 2005.
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In the post-war period the PCF was eager to warn against rearmament of West 
Germany, which was seen as the home of the German militarism and capitalism. In a 
certain way, the Communist Party continued the traditional Two-Germanys-Theory, this 
time identifying East Germany with the progressive and West Germany with the 
militarist and reactionary Germany (Heitmann, 1966:191). Furthermore, the PCF 
demanded a strong control of West Germany, given its “expansionist” nature. It is 
interesting to note that the term “expansionist” became an important attribute of 
Germany, whose use went beyond the Communist Party and did not only refer to 
military, but also (and increasingly) to economic affairs.
With the theme of “expansionism” the Communists could connect with older memories 
concerning Germany, such as the military expansion in the nineteenth century, the 
economic expansionism in Central Europe (“Mitteleuropa”, the German word used in 
France stood for that expansionism) in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the 
expansion in the First and Second World Wars. They also connected to the sentiment 
from the nineteenth century between fear and admiration for Germany’s economic 
performance. This motive of expansion was repeatedly used by some French analysts on 
Germany, shifting in focus - from military towards an economic expansionism 
(Poidevin and Schirmann, 1985).
The second dominant political memory group, the Gaullists, declared in January 1944 
as one of its goals to prevent any re-emergence of the “eternal Germanic threat” 
(“menace perpetuelle du germanisme”). De Gaulle’s war aims regarding Germany had 
many similarities with Poincare’s aims after the First World War: special status for the 
Rhineland, the Ruhr and the Saar region; and a loose or federal structure for Germany 
(Poidevin and Bariety, 1977:326). De Gaulle and many Gaullists considered the time 
between 1914 and 1944 as a “thirty years war between France and Germany”. This 
reinterpretation left the war of 1870-1871 out of the picture and declared the entire 
inter-war period as a time of war or conflict between the two countries (Rousso, 
1992:573). The rapprochement between 1925 and 1930 was forgotten or marginalised 
in light of the events that followed in the 1930s and 1940s.
The hostile or, at least, suspicious attitudes toward Germany by the Communists and 
Gaullists immediately after the Second World War were further nurtured by
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contemporary analyses of Germany from a social-psychological and collective point of 
view: Andre Siegfried claimed in 1950 that the Germans lacked personality and were 
internally hollow with an incredible energy ready to use for any purpose. In turn, the 
historian Joseph Rovan insisted that France should live up to Germany (“L 'Allemagne 
est un defi”: Germany as a challenge), while another historian, Edmont Vermeil, 
reiterated the thesis, already advanced in 1940, of the two Germanys in his 
L'Allemagne, reprinted in 1945. This position between suspicion and hatred towards 
Germany expressed a widespread consensus among political parties (except some 
segments of the Socialist Party) in the late 1940s and well into the 1950s. Thus, 
Communists as well as Gaullists, supported the remembering of Germany and the 
experience in the past wars in conventional, almost essentialising ways.
This prevalent form of remembering is different from the one exercised by deportees or 
even non-Communist members of the domestic Resistance, to be found in the Socialist 
Party as well as the MRP. The non-Communist members of the Resistance had made a 
distinction between the German people and the Nazi regime from the very beginning 
and the Socialist wing of the Resistance proposed a socialist Europe that included a 
socialist Germany (Rovan, 1986:108-109).14 In the words of Jacques Delarue, a leading 
member of the Resistance and author of a book about the Gestapo:
The crimes of Nazism are not the crimes of a people. The cruelties, the love of 
force, the religion of power, the blood-thirsty racism are neither the 
characteristics of an epoch nor of a particular nation. They belong to all 
countries and to all epochs (quoted in Mitter, 1981:270-271).
Joseph Rovan, bom in Munich and himself a survivor of a forced labour camp near 
Dachau, suggests that the experience of fellow inmates in the concentration camps led 
to a different view of Germany and the Germans. Thus, initiatives to establish a closer 
relationship with Germany came from non-Communist members of the Resistance and 
returning deportees, but also from former French prisoners of war in Germany (Mitter, 
1981:260; Gascar, 1967).
14 This distinction, Rovan claims, was also motivated by the fact that German emigres had fought in the 
French Resistance, too.
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Those groups were also at the forefront with other initiatives to overcome the old 
enmity with Germany and to support a new, democratic Germany. The Socialist Party 
sought ties to its German sister party from very early on. It was also the French Socialist 
Party that stressed the fact that the Germans had been the first victims of the Nazi 
regime, thus challenging collective images of Germans as perpetrators and occupants. 
From those memory groups further proposals were put forth aimed at encouraging the 
rapprochement between the two countries, such as the union between French and 
German cities (twin-towering-programines), the exchange of young students, an 
increased exchange of information and interest in the other country. The schoolbook 
initiative that had already existed in the inter-war period was revived again and 
institutionalised with the help of UNESCO and the Council of Europe in the Eckert- 
Institut in Brunswick, Germany. The hitherto dominant characterisation of Germany by 
Bainville was also challenged in works on Germany by French historians such as Alfred 
Grosser or Jacques Droz (1970). The latter even convinced the French government in 
1951 to support a Franco-German initiative to settle disputes among historians about 
Franco-German historical relations (Heitmann 1966:193). With the aim of increasing 
mutual knowledge and contacts between Germany *and France, Emmanuel Mounier 
formed the “Comite Frangaise d'Echanges avec VAllemagne nouvelle”, whose 
members mostly came from the non-Communist Resistance or were returnees from 
concentration camps (Mitter, 1981:272). The MRP/UDF, the dominant political force in 
the Fourth Republic, also sought a rapprochement with Germany and combined its 
intentions with a discourse on the pertinence of European integration.
In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War there was a clear prevalence of 
rejection of and hatred against Germany and the Germans among the French public, 
which, however, did not reach the levels of 1918.15 According to Mitter, only five years 
after the end of the Second World War the will to establish closer links with Germany 
increased and calls of fear and revenge slowly disappeared, indicating a fall in 
essentialising forms of remembering Germany and its role in the Second World War 
(1981:271). Surveys carried out between the 1950s and the 1970s register a steady rise 
in the approval of the rapprochement with Germany, from 50% in 1950 to over 70% in 
1959. In 1979 followers of the UDF showed the highest approval rate, while those over
15 Joseph Rovan claims that the French experience with German soldiers during the Second World War 
before D-day was rather positive (1986:107-8). This is confirmed by Mitter (1981: 270).
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65, members of the Communist Party or the rural France were much less enthusiastic 
(between 25 and 37%). The figures also suggest that the number of French who 
believed in a natural antagonism between France and Germany fell sharply and that 
essentialising forms of remembering -  outside the political parties and currents -  were 
in decline. The identified hatred of Germany among the French public remained at its 
strongest among the extreme Right and the Communists (Heitmann, 1966:189-190; 
Rovan, 1988:156).
However, the attitude towards West Germany remained ambivalent, as these same 
surveys show. There remained a fear that the economic power of the Eastern neighbour, 
which caused admiration but also fear (“Sondage: la fin de Tantigermanisme en 
France”, in L 'Express, 24 March, 1979). The topic of “German expansionsism”, 
particularly fostered by the French Communist Party, remained a concern fuelled by 
memories of the Second and First World Wars.
The memory of “France in Resistance” against an outside threat should change in the 
1970s and 1980s. It is my contention that the memory of the Second World War within 
the French society, but also within political currents, turned inwards, i.e. turned towards 
a consciousness of what had happened inside France and what the role of the different 
political groups during World War II really had been. This gradual change came about 
by four developments that will be discussed subsequently and that definitely meant the 
end of the memory of “France in resistance” by the late 1980s: (1) the new prominence 
of the Vichy government and its role during the Second World War, (2) the rise of 
Jewish memory, (3) the rise of a new post-war generation, (4) the first trials in the 
1980s against Frenchmen under the law of crimes against humanity related to the Vichy 
government.
Vichy and its role during the Second World War: It was only in the 1970s with the 
works of three non-French authors, namely the German Eberhardt Jackel (1966), the 
British historian Alan Milward (1970) and the US-American Robert Paxton (1972) that 
the memories of Vichy France that had evolved in the 1950s were challenged. Paxton in 
particular defied the idea of a “double-game” and “daily resistance” by the Vichy 
regime. He claimed that the “national revolution” and collaboration went hand in hand 
with many social and political reforms undertaken in Vichy that had been neither
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imposed nor demanded by the Germans. Finally, Paxton showed that there had been a 
genuine anti-Semitism in Vichy, that was not to be confused with Nazi ideology, and 
which was not a simple concession to German demands. Gradually it became clear that 
a “national revolution” of antidemocratic and authoritarian forces had taken place in 
Vichy, even at the cost of military defeat and subjugation under Nazi-Germany. The 
Vichyites wanted to establish a new political order, similar to Fascist Italy or Franco’s 
Spain and hoped that, by collaborating sufficiently with the Germans, they would have 
the autonomy to carry out the reforms they deemed necessary. This was altogether 
different from a double-j eu-stra.tegy and different from a forced collaboration with an 
occupant. It was a third variant, hitherto not discussed, which however shed much light 
on some of the particularities of Vichy France (Burrin, 2001; Hoffmann, 1992).
The repression of the Vichy period from French memory is first and foremost the 
achievement of de Gaulle’s resistentialism, which lost its grip in the 1970s and thus 
failed to silence the anti-republican and Vichyite memory groups:
[...] the civil war, and particularly the inception, influence and acts of the Vichy 
regime, played an essential if not primary, role in the difficulties that the people 
of France have faced in reconciling themselves with their history - a greater role 
than the foreign occupation, the war, and the defeat, all things that, though they 
have not vanished from peoples’ minds, are generally perceived through the 
prism of Vichy (Rousso, 1991:9-10).
Another step towards the reconsideration of Vichy and its legacy was the documentary 
“The Sorrow and the Pity” (Le Chagrin et la Pitie) by Max Ophuls, which had to be 
shown in cinemas in 1971, because directors of public television channels refused to 
broadcast it. This documentary showed interviews in which the situation and behaviour 
of the citizens under the Vichy regime were described. It became clear that most of the 
people adapted to the new situation and went about their usual business as much as 
possible. The picture painted in this documentary did not fit at all with the self- image 
of “France in resistance” propagated by the Gaullists. In his “Lacombe Lucien”, Louis 
Malle painted in 1974 a similar picture. This led to an intense controversy about Vichy 
France in which criticism of the French as cowards and opportunists was made. 
Although this extremely negative picture of the “French in resistance” was somewhat 
corrected by subsequent research, by the mid-70s the Gaullist myth of France in
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resistance and the idea that just a few French had collaborated with the Germans had 
become untenable.
At the same time, the rediscovery of Vichy also provided new political space to the 
political far Right:
[...] political debate in France erupted into a kind of verbal civil war. The 
vitriolic nature of the debate was reminiscent of the 1940s [...] At the same time, 
the extreme right rediscovered its racist roots and resurrected ideas, or rather 
ideologies, which resembled [...] the racist ideologies of the wartime years 
(Rousso, 1991:132-133).
The rise of Jewish memory: There was a parallel rise of a separate French Jewish 
memory of the Second World War in the 1970s.16 This new expression of the Jewish 
memory was strongly supported by Serge Klarsfeld, president of the “Association of 
Sons and Daughters of Jewish deportees in France”. Klarsfeld publicly investigated the 
behaviour of Vichy France towards foreign and French Jews, as well as towards exiled 
politicians who were deported to Nazi-Germany. He further collected information and 
statistics on the extent of French collaboration in the extermination of French Jews 
(Klarsfeld, 1982).
Moreover, in France, as in West Germany, the Eichmann process had an important 
impact, but it was, above all, the trials in Germany against high-ranking officers of the 
SS and Gestapo working in France, such as that of Herbert Hagen in 1980, that 
especially fuelled a reconsideration of Vichy and gave new prominence to the French- 
Jewish memory (Conan and Lindenberg, 1992:11). Thus, “in French memory 
Auschwitz, the symbol of the politics of extermination of the Jews, replaced 
Buchenwald, the symbol of the politics of oppression against resistance fighters” 
(Rousso, 1992:602-3). What became an important symbol of French complicity (in 
particular by the French police) was the rounding-up and deportation of Jews in Paris on 
16 July 1942 at the Velodrome d ’Hiver, generally referred to as “Vel d’Hiv”, whose 
story became increasingly known.
16 On the marginalisation of Jewish memory in post-war France until the 1970s see: Wolf, 2004.
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Challenges from a new post-war generation: Like in Germany, the challenge to the 
belief in France in resistance came from the post-war generation of the end of the 1960s, 
combined with a political transition (in France: end of Gaullism). This questioning was 
also triggered by the films mentioned above.
Trials on Vichy: The first person to be tried and be found guilty of crimes against 
humanity was the German Klaus Barbie, head of the SS in Lyon, who had been 
extradited from Bolivia. The trial against Barbie influenced the discussion on the 
memory of the Resistance and gave the Jewish memory of the Vichy regime, which 
clashed with the Resistance memory, an increased voice (Rousso, 1991:213).
Four Frenchmen were charged with crimes against humanity: Paul Touvier in 1972, 
Jean Leguay, assistant of Secretary General of the Vichy Police in 1979, Jean Bousquet, 
Secretary of State for the Police in Vichy, who played a decisive role in the cooperation 
with the German Gestapo, in 1991, and Maurice Papon, Secretary General of the 
department Gironde, in 1998 (Rousso, 1992:594). Touvier’s case deserves special 
attention. He was arrested in 1988, and in 1992 the first trial against him took place. In 
April 1992 the French High Court acquitted Touvier of all charges, on the grounds that 
the law was not applicable in his case. The verdict was based on an interpretation of the 
Vichy regime by the High Court. Vichy France, reads the verdict, collaborated on 
pragmatic terms with Nazi Germany, but was not possessed by the same policy of 
ideological hegemony as Nazi Germany was. This judgment was welcomed by many 
Vichyites and conservatives, but rejected by many families of Jewish deportees, as well 
as by historians, such as Rene Remond, who charged the Court with outright historical
1 7revisionism. In turn, the trial against Maurice Papon, which lasted until 1998, shed 
light on Papon’s role in the Milice of the Vichy government in Bordeaux (Rousso, 
2003). Those trials also signalled a shift in war memories: In his first trial in 1949, Rene 
Bousquet had been charged with helping the Germans to find clandestine radio stations 
of the resistance in France in 1949. In his second trial in 1992, he was charged for his 
role in the deportation of French Jews during the Vichy government (Conan and 
Lindenberg, 1992:10).
17 On the court ruling and the reactions in France see: Fritz-Vannahme, 1992:11.
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The 1990s in France, finally, saw the acceptance of the contribution of the Vichy 
government to the Holocaust, as well as the differentiation between political currents 
during the Second World War. Thus, in the 1990s, France officially and definitely 
abandoned the totalising narratives of “France in Resistance”. Although in 1993 
F rancis Mitterrand made 16 July, the day of Vel d’Hiv, a national commemoration 
day, he refused to offer an apology in the name of the French people.
F rancis Mitterrand said in 1993: “The 'Etat frangais’ that was the Vichy regime, not 
the Republic. Don’t ask the Republic to be accountable for that -  it did what it should 
have done” (quoted in: “Ende eines gaullistischen Mythos”, in Der Tagesspiegel, 18 
July, 1995). In a similar fashion Lionel Jospin claimed in a parliamentary debate: 
“France did not become guilty under the German occupation. It is the resistance that 
represents France, but not Vichy” (quoted in “Ende eines gaullistischen Mythos” in Der 
Tagesspiegel, 18 July, 1995). The apology would however be made two years later, by 
Jacques Chirac, the Gaullist president who stated: “Yes, the criminal madness of the 
German occupant was supported by the French, by the French State” (quoted in 
Franfurter Rundschau, 22 October, 1997). The acceptance of France’s responsibility 
was a clear break with the idea that France had been essentially in resistance, as well as 
a confirmation of the existence of another France, Vichy France - something that the 
Gaullists and many politicians has vividly denied for fifty years. Another myth that 
came increasingly under attack was that of the Resistance, whose alleged reach, 
magnitude and unity were strongly questioned by historical research in the 1990s 
(Conan and Lindenberg, 1994; Laborie, 1994). Even today, some authors feel that the 
Resistance is still mystified.
Between 1945 and 1980 France faced a similar problem to Germany: what to do with 
the memory of Vichy France? By all political standards neither the support of Nazi 
Germany in its pursuit of its racist policies, nor the Etat Frangais of Petain is connoted 
or interpreted by the republican parties in a positive way. The way of dealing with this 
past in France was, in the beginning, similar to the early strategies in West Germany: 
i.e. silencing and, whenever acknowledgement is inevitable, declaring it the 
responsibility of a few misguided individuals. These approaches became untenable in 
the 1970s and 1980s, among other reasons, because marginalised memory groups (such 
as the French Jews or the members of Vichy France) contradicted the official version.
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However, once the memory of those “dark days” had found public expression, it could 
no longer be ignored. The public acceptance of the role of the French government in the 
persecution of fellow French citizens in the 1990s formally acknowledged that.
This move from a totalising remembering focusing on the external enemy to a 
differentiated remembering focusing inside France and on different political values and 
regimes can also be identified in the history of war commemorations in post-war 
France. In 1945, both world wars were remembered in France on 11 November. It was 
only in 1953 that 8 May became a holiday (“jour ferie”) and national commemoration 
date of the victory over Germany. The status of holiday was removed by de Gaulle in 
1959, although it remained a commemoration day. In the name of European integration 
and Franco-German friendship, in 1975 French president Giscard d’Estaing abolished 8 
May as a commemoration day altogether. This decision was condemned by associations 
of war veterans and the Communists. However, the decision was maintained until 1981, 
when F rancis Mitterrand reversed it.18 In the late 1940s and 1950s, 8 May was 
celebrated by Gaullists and Communists as a military victory over another country. Yet, 
others (Socialists, many members of MRP, Radicals) celebrated that date as the victory 
over a political regime. In France, like in Germany, the memory of the Second World 
War is too heterogeneous to unite the French people. This does not only refer to the 
specific memory of groups (domestic or exile resistance, deportees or prisoners of 
wars), but also to the subject of remembering:
The French commemorations regarding the Second World War face the problem 
of defining their object. At the end of the day, what is commemorated? The 
liberation? The victory over Germany or over Nazism? The victory of France or 
the victory of liberty? The victory of the resistance fighters or the victory of the 
entire country? [...] The multiple contradictions and celebrations are 
characteristic of the rituals themselves and the schedule of all the celebrations 
(Frank, 1984:289).
The different object of remembering as well as the different political values 
commemorated during anniversaries of the Second World War are expressed in rival
18 “The 1975 abolition of 8 May as a national holiday was intended to draw an official veil over the 
fratricidal war for Europe, as Giscard put it in his letter to the members of the European Council. A side 
benefit [...] was that a veil would simultaneously be drawn over France’s internal conflicts.” Rousso, 
1991:184.
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commemoration sites and ceremonies. Thus, while on 8 May Gaullist-inspired 
commemorations stress the unity, the “rassemblement” and appeal to national unity and 
“France une et indivisible”, parallel commemorations by the Communist Party 
emphasise the domestic resistance against Nazism and similar regimes (i.e. Vichy, 
which is also portrayed as a “treason of a certain class”) (Frank, 1984:284). At the same 
time, the Union of War Veterans commemorates the end of the war as the victory of 
France over Germany. In fact, on 8 May there are always two commemoration 
ceremonies that take place in different sites: one on Mount Valerien, dedicated 
specifically to the war veterans and another general commemoration headed by the 
President at the Etoile.
The post-war French governments (most of them dominated by the MRP) have stressed 
the fact that 8 May was a victory over a political system, not another nation. It was a 
victory of the free people over oppressive regimes that denied the dignity to human 
beings (preamble of the constitution of the Fourth Republic from 27 October 1946). By 
pointing to the suffering of many Germans under the Nazi regime, many French 
politicians of the Centre and Left, as well as the organisations of deportees, stressed the 
difference between the German people and the Nazi regime. It was with the aim to 
celebrate the victory of democratic and republican values that suggestions for a joint 
Franco-German commemoration of 8 May were made by French politicians. As 
F rancis Mitterrand, reflecting upon the meaning of 8 May, declared in Berlin 1995 in 
one of his last speeches before his death:
Are we remembering a defeat? Or are we remembering a victory? And a victory 
of what? It is without any doubt a victory of freedom over oppression, without 
doubt [sic]. But in my eyes, it is -  and that is the only message I would like to 
leave behind -  a victory of Europe over itself (Quoted in: Dubiel, 1999:272).
In the same vein, Jacques Chirac celebrated on 25 August 1994, the 50th anniversary of 
the liberation of Paris, not a victory over Germany, but a victory over a political regime:
This was a defeat of an ideology, Nazism, which tried to deny that which is 
inherent in human nature: That is the reaffirmation of the rights that France has 
spread throughout the entire world for two hundred years (quoted in Le Monde, 
25 August, 1994, p.l).
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Thus, the commemoration of the 8 May in the 1990s was now seen also by a Gaullist 
president (as by the preceding Socialist president) as a victory over a political regime, 
over certain political values, not as a victory over a political community in the first 
place. This separation accommodates, I would argue, the inward-looking memories of 
the Second World War in France that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s. It also prepares a 
reflection on political and moral values that resorts to the memory of past wars and its 
commemoration as its material. I would therefore claim that a shift from a .
to an advanced conventional level of social learning is identifiable in France in the 
1990s. This shift refers to the entire political spectrum, except for the French 
Communists and the Vichyites.
This shift from commemorating a national past to celebrating political values is also 
visible in the late 1980s and 1990s, when traditional commemorations of the French 
nation were concerned. Since the 1970s there have been repeated and stronger 
challenges to the nearly one hundred years of French memory institutionalised by the 
Third Republic:
It was through this division [between national collective history and private 
memories of specific French groups] that traditional French identity was 
constructed and developed for a century, and this was the mould that cracked. It 
cracked under a double movement: the internal collapse of the myth that bore the 
national project and the emancipation that liberated the minorities (Nora, 2001a: 
xiv).
The Third Republic had institutionalised a national memory that was top-down and 
consciously marginalised other memories. But in the late 1980s and 1990s the challenge 
of this strategy can be illustrated by two specific commemorative occasions: 14 July 
1989, and the commemoration of Clovis’ baptism in 1996. Although 14 July has been a 
traditional national day of commemoration in post-war (Republican) France, there was
tVian enormous controversy around the celebration of the 200 anniversary of the French 
Revolution in 1989. This re-opened a debate already present in nineteenth century in 
France, when the (more conservative) legitimists debated with the republicans about the 
achievements of the French Revolution. Among others the book by Rene Sedillot on the 
French Revolution published in 1987 shed light on the costs of Jacobin rule, the 
Terreur, and what many regarded as the genocide of the inhabitants of the Western
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provinces.19 In fact, Sedillot, a French economist, argues that the French Revolution is 
only celebrated and remembered in such a positive way thanks to the successful 
Napoleonic wars (by a monarch) that followed. If only what happened during the 
French Revolution were celebrated, it would be, argues Sedillot, the commemoration of 
genocide. As a result of this controversy, in 1989, only the declaration of the human 
rights was celebrated, but many historical events were left out of the official 
commemorations.
In 1996, the French government attempted to celebrate 1500 years of the baptism of 
Clovis, the Franc king, whom French official memory and historiography celebrate as 
the founder of France (although most contemporary historians agree that the Franc king 
Philippe Auguste was historically the first “King of France”) with a ceremony of 
“baptism of France and the French nation” together with the Pope. But for many 
Frenchmen and women this was the Catholic, royalist and anti-republican France that 
was to be celebrated here, challenging the separation between State and Church 
prevalent in France since 1905. This image of Christian France was further fuelled by 
Jean Marie Le Pen’s declarations in the sense that Clovis was the symbol of the real, 
Christian France. After massive protests, these celebrations were called off. The 
controversy around both the French Revolution and the Baptism of Clovis as 
cornerstones of French national memory, together with the discussion on Vichy France, 
show that the French collective memory shaped by the Third Republic became 
increasingly contested. Moreover, not only the memory, but also the historiography on 
which it stands, i.e. the historiography of the Third Republic that was so dominant in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries in France has come increasingly under attack.
Memory groups that had been marginalised in the past no longer accepted to be left 
outside the official French memory: Between the Petainist myth of Vichy (double game, 
saving France) and the resistentialist myth by Gaullists and Communists (reducing 
French action to resistance) many memories were left out, for example, from those 
living under the occupation, deportees and forced labour (Rousso, 1991:303). In fact, 
more and more groups demanded in France the acceptance and inscription of their
19 In Sedillot's appreciation 2 million Frenchmen and women died during the French Revolution and the 
Napoleonic Wars that followed: 400,000 in warfare during the revolutionary period, 1 million during the 
Napoleonic wars, and 600,000 through the “Franco-French civil war and the Guillotine”. This is, 
according to Sedillot, more killed than during the First and Second World War together (Sedillot, 1987).
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memory in the national memory: the descendants of those killed during the Terreur, the 
children of the Jewish deportees, the families that lost their homes during decolonisation 
(Dupuy, 2002). Other claims that compose the official French memory, such as the 
civilising mission or the claim of a Grande Nation have also been challenged, for 
example, by the wars of de-colonisation in Indochina and Algeria. The succession of 
wars (1914-1918, 1939-1945, Algerian War) led, on the one hand, to a real loss of 
French power; on the other hand, it contradicted the claim for greatness. These 
instances, again, show that unifying collective war memories are increasingly disputed 
in France. Different memory groups assert their own version of the past, different 
political memory groups openly challenge official, unifying memories.
The late 1980s and the 1990s also led to a growing awareness of the opposing political 
currents since the French Revolution that had not been reconciled. One element that 
contributed to that perception was the reinterpretation of Vichy in the 1970s and 1980s, 
which shed light onto the “other”, non-republican France. The achievements and costs, 
the remembering and forgetting of the French past since the Republican synthesis and 
the remembering of the French Revolution (as an event that divided the country) was 
made increasingly the subject of public debate. Since the 1980s historical interpretations 
of what is now called the Franco-French war (“/a guerre franco-frangaise”) that went 
on for more than one hundred years, have appeared ever more frequently. As Stanley 
Hoffmann points out:
[...] Vichy had, at the same time, new and old elements to it. The old one, which 
is recurrent in French history, is the will to reject an abolished regime, to redraw 
if not memory then at least the patrimony [...]; this is the strategy of 
excommunication and exclusion; this is, in short, the Franco-French war that has 
never really ended (Hoffmann, 1992:40-41).
The late 1980s and 1990s heralded the emergence of a consciousness that the familiar 
national history and memory excluded and marginalised alternative voices and fostered 
certain political values. Thus, the empirical claim that this official national memory 
captured the entire nation was contradicted by the existence of at least a republican and 
laicist France of the Left and a monarchical, hierarchical and Catholic France of the 
Right (Dupuy, 2002). Without neglecting the important differences and specific nuances 
in each epoch, there appears to be a continuity of political memory groups or -  at least -
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proximity between the Action Fran9 aise, Vichy France and the National Front opposing 
the official French memory supported by the liberal-radicals, the national bloc, the 
Cartel des Gauches and the republican consensus in post-war France. The coincidence 
of the political values and the memories they stressed lends support to the thesis that 
this conglomerate can be identified as a political memory group. This consciousness 
challenges from within totalising narratives on national war memories.
With the remembering of the Second World War in a more inward-looking way, the 
remembering of Germany was also transformed: in the 1940s and 1950s, essentialising 
memories of Germany prevailed among the Gaullists and Communists, as well as the 
Radicals. With an increasing experience of post-war West Germany and an increasing 
separation of the German polity from specific political values to be remembered, 
essentialising remembering of Germany steadily declined. One remnant of that 
essentialising memory of Germany that has been nurtured particularly by the French 
Communist Party, however, seems to have exerted political weight even in the 1990s: 
the theme of the “expansionist Germany”, particularly after the end of the Cold War and 
German reunification in 1990. While the fear of military expansionism disappeared with 
the integration in multilateral defence systems in the 1950s, the concern with economic 
expansionism remained alive among the Left and some Gaullists. This is a trait of the 
essentialising image of Germany that was developed in the late nineteenth century.
Interestingly, it was also the Communists and some intellectuals on the Left who 
preserved and reproduced in the first three decades of the post-war era the idea of a two- 
Germanys-theory, East Germany being the good part of Germany and West Germany 
being the Fascist, capitalists and militarist part. These images coincided with the self- 
legitimisation of the Communist regime in East Berlin. By contrast, the moderate Right 
and Left (UDF, RPR, and PS) in France clearly broke with these essentialising images 
of Germany and reflected upon the conditions that had led to the three wars between the 
two countries between 1870 and 1940. A clear distinction was made between the 
political system and the German nation in the treatment of West Germany. Thus, a 
reflected collective war memory prevailed in the French moderate Left and Centre that 
led to new possibilities for dealing with Germany. Even the far Right of the FN that
20 This aspect will be discussed in more detail in chapter 7.
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gave the Vichy past more -  and positive -  prominence did not resort to the 
essentialising remembering of Germany a la Bainville, but focused on the domestic 
battle against a republican France, like the monarchical Right did in the late 1930s.
However, a reflexive turn, like the one that took place in West Germany in the late 
1980s, did not happen (yet) in France, despite the public acceptance that any totalising 
empirical claim of representing French war memories (such as de Gaulle’s 
resistentialism) was untenable and notwithstanding the fact that the silence on the 
internal conflicts within France had been broken, as the cases of the rise of Vichy 
memory and the controversies surrounding the commemorations of the French 
Revolution evidenced. Thus, while the conventional way of remembering was 
challenged and signs of advanced conventional remembering are now visible, there has 
not yet been a move towards a reflexive appropriation of the collective past, as authors 
such as Suzanne Citron deplored at the end of the 1980s:
[...] there is no great debate, like there is among German historians, about the 
meaning of the past in general, about the memory of the national identity; and 
the way of reconstructing the past has been hidden. Personally, I think that this 
reveals a taboo: even our most renowned historians do not want to cast a general, 
critical view on the great republican synthesis elaborated by their university 
colleagues of the Third Republic (Citron, 1989:35).
Thus, while there are clear signs of crisis of the national war memories and their 
practical-moral imperatives in France during the period analysed, the future way of 
structuring the remembering of those past wars was open. The acceptance of the 
negative sides of the past, the acceptance of diversity of memory groups, however, is a 
first important step that has been taken in France to prepare a possible transition from a 
conventional to a post-conventional remembering of past wars in the future.
5.3 Conclusion
In Chapter 3 Habermas’ theory of social learning was applied to the collective 
remembering of past wars and used for the analysis of Franco-German collective war 
memories in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. With the help of those categories it
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could be seen that collective war memories can be structured in different ways and thus 
pre-form practical-moral imperatives in different directions. An essentialising form of 
remembering a war with a political entity precludes the possibility of change and 
eternalises certain traits and behaviour. By contrast, the more the political values and 
imperatives advanced by that political entity are remembered and differentiated, the 
more the future is open to change and the more political values become central in the 
public commemoration of the past. Collective war memories can become a vehicle for 
change, once the essentialising images have been overcome.
If collective war memories are no longer fixated exclusively on the object, but also on 
the reflecting subject, a practical-moral debate on political, ethical or moral values can 
be conducted using the collective war memories as its material. In both cases, France 
and Germany, such a move from a remembered object to a reflection on the 
remembering subject took place to certain degree. In other words, memories, in 
particular those of the Second World War, turned inwards. Three steps could be 
identified in post-War West Germany and France that describe that move: (1) The 
increasing acceptance of diversity of memory groups that challenge totalising narratives 
of national war memories (such as the victims of war and terror regimes in West 
Germany and the French resistance in France); (2) the realisation and public debate on 
the different political values and currents underlying different memory groups; (3) the 
discussion of political values and a conscious moral judgement on them, instead of 
focusing on individual guilt and responsibility for the past war. This latter aspect seems 
also a matter of generations: in West Germany as well as France, the lack of a more 
moral and general judgement on the last war was clearly linked to the biographical 
entanglement of post-war politicians in both countries.
Such reflective and critical approach is clearly different from the conventional approach 
aimed at finding an agreeable collective memory and history that can accommodate the 
increasing diversity of memory groups, which assert their voices and right to be heard. 
The referent of one’s own political community and the object of the other political 
community become increasingly problematic. The acceptance of diversity of war 
memories within, and the differentiation of different groups in other countries, often go 
together, as the analysis of post-war France suggests. While there may be certain delays, 
caused by personal shame or guilt, the generation to follow, which has no biographical
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link to the events, may question specific silences or acts of judicial forgetting (amnesty 
laws). Thus, it may not always be possible to overcome silence, but it becomes more 
and more difficult in national and international relations to silence those memory groups 
that feel their experience should be validated too.
The rejection of totalising war memories increases the pressure to structure collective 
war memories in a different way. One option to do so may be a post-conventional way 
f of remembering. Such an option seems only feasible, if  a democratic, permeable public 
sphere is available. Where this public sphere is absent, “official” war memories may be 
disseminated, but not necessarily accepted and used as a collective frame for war 
memories. This absence can be seen in the case of official war memories promoted by 
the East German Communists. While there were many signs of post-conventional 
remembering of the ruling Communist class, this latter did neither engage in a public 
debate with other memory groups nor depart from an acceptance that empirical variety 
existed. In the absence of such a debate, which belatedly took place in West Germany 
and France in the 1980s, the acceptance and defence of that interpretative framework 
proved to be rather limited: with the fall of the Communist regime, commemoration 
sites in East Germany were changed, celebrations altered and the old sense of 
superiority was taken away without much contestation in the public sphere of reunified 
Germany.
This chapter has analysed developments from the nineteenth century to the end of the 
twentieth century, which show a transition from early conventional to first signs of post- 
conventional levels of remembering past wars. The early, essentialising forms of 
remembering may well correlate with the nation-building stage and the levels of warfare 
discussed in chapter 3. This highlights the fact that Habermas’ theory of social learning 
is not merely an ethics or a political agenda, but also a means of grasping developments 
in the collective remembering of past wars. The fact that post-conventional social 
learning was somehow possible in West Gemany, however, was not simply a matter of 
higher Reason, but, as I wish to argue, also a consequence of three historical facts: the 
fact that West Germany assumed the legal heritage of the German Reich and thus could 
not escape the memory of its collective past (unlike East Germany, Austria and Italy); 
the magnitude of destruction, suffering and murdering that had taken place in the name
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of Germany that made silencing extremely difficult; and, finally, the occupation and 
enforced construction of a wholly new German state by the victorious powers.
It is necessary to stress that these different levels of social learning do not follow 
automatically or collectively. As a matter of fact, different levels of social learning may 
coexist side by side as the historians’ debate in Germany shows. What Habermas’ 
theory of social learning suggests is that while there is the possibility, the potential of 
social learning with respect to collective war memories, there is no telos in history, no 
automatism or inevitability.
With the help of Habermas’ theory of social learning an additional element of collective 
war memories can be better appreciated and analysed, especially the different practical- 
moral imperatives derived from remembering past wars. By applying the different levels 
of social learning as analytical tools, those differences become apparent. This adds a 
new dimension to the study of collective war memories to the previous critical studies, 
which have often focused on who dominates the official memories (the sociology of 
memory).
As the case of Franco-German relations has shown, practical-moral imperatives derived 
from collective war memories can make a difference in international relations. Clearly, 
these practical-moral imperatives have to compete with other imperatives in decision­
making. Thus, it is far from clear whether or not these imperatives played any 
significant role in the actual decisions in Franco-German relations. This possible 
impact, and this is my argument derived from Habermas, can only be assessed within a 
communicative concept of political legitimacy. Elaborating on this concept is the aim of 
the following chapter.
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C. Studying the Impact of Collective War 
Memories on international politics with a 
Habermasian concept of political 
legitimacy
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Chapter 6
Conceptualising the Impact of Collective 
War Memories on International Politics: 
A communicative notion of political legitimacy
Some answers to the question of how collective war memories influence international 
politics have already been advanced: chapter 1 highlighted the importance of political 
memory groups, their practical-moral imperatives derived from war memories and their 
role within political parties and the respective political systems. Chapters 2 and 3 
pointed to the level of social learning in the collective process of public remembering as 
an important factor in understanding the kind of impact collective war memories might 
exert on politics. These different impacts based on different levels of social learning 
were illustrated in chapters 4 and 5 in the cases of France and Germany.
As chapter 1 suggested, many scholars stress that collective war memories are “used” or 
even “abused” to legitimate political orders or specific policies (Buffet and Heuser, 
1998). Yet, these authors usually fail to provide a notion of political legitimacy that 
explains exactly how this alleged legitimating effect is to be understood. It is the aim of 
this chapter to fill this gap. More specifically, here I seek to develop a theoretical 
framework of political legitimacy, which can be applied to empirical studies on the 
impact of collective war memories on issues of foreign policy and international politics. 
This theoretical framework is based on Habermas’ theory of communicative action and 
provides useful analytical tools to identify the empirically different impacts of collective 
war memories on political legitimacy. By consequence, this framework rejects an 
absolute and general assertion about the relationship between collective war memories 
and political legitimacy and accommodates different empirical outcomes of this 
relationship.
The chapter is structured as follows: The first part highlights why certain notions of 
politics screen out a notion of political legitimacy and, thus, fail to provide a conceptual
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basis for clarifying the relationship between collective war memories and political 
legitimacy. After having identified the shortcomings of those notions of politics, the 
second part develops a communicative notion of politics and political legitimacy, based 
on Jurgen Habermas’ concepts of ‘communicative action’ and ‘political discourse’. 
Finally, by outlining a possible research programme, the third part highlights how this 
notion of political legitimacy can be applied to empirical cases.
6.1 Towards an applicable notion of political legitimacy
[...] The tradition [ofIR theory] is defined by negation, by what it is not. And what it is 
not, by most accounts, is political theory. Sometimes this is intended to suggest that it is 
concerned with human relationships that are not subject to a centralised authority, as if  
centralised authority were a precondition for political life in general rather than a 
characteristic of some forms ofpolitical life in particular.
Robert B J. Walker (1993:33)
It is a consensual view in the literature, that the term political legitimacy refers to a 
notion of rightfulness or acceptance of political outcomes based on judgement. The 
notion of legitimacy, so conceived, sheds light on the question of why people accept or 
even support a political outcome (empirical claim) or why they should do so (normative 
claim). Nonetheless, the understanding of political legitimacy depends heavily on the 
notion of politics being used.
There are, in fact, numerous definitions of politics; some stress the precise description 
of an actual process (empirical definitions), while others describe what politics should 
look like (normative definitions). Empirical definitions of politics highlight with 
varying emphasis (a) the distribution of power; (b) the fact of authority that indicates a 
certain permission, acceptance or legitimacy of decision-making powers and their 
results; (c) rules or regularities of political outcomes that are to be differentiated from 
spontaneous, unpredictable and entirely informal processes. Normative definitions of 
politics, in turn focus on the question of what a political process should look like, what 
kind of political values should prevail. The most common definition of politics, 
however, is that offered by Max Weber, who claims that politics is the “authoritative
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allocation of rules and values”.1 Hence, politics refers in general terms to collectively 
binding decisions made by institutions and actors that are entitled (authorised) formally 
or informally with certain capabilities (powers) to contribute to those decisions that are 
binding for an entire body politic.
In the domestic realm, politics so conceived is evidenced by (a) an established and 
institutionalised division of power that characterises the polity (constitution, party 
system, law-making and law-enforcing procedures), (b) the ideas and normative content 
of policies that are the outcome of the competition among different ideas and values 
and, finally, (c) the procedures and processes followed in order to establish specific 
policies through alliance-building or, more generally, all forms of formal and informal 
power exerted in order to shape and influence the outcome of policies.
6.1.1 Politics without legitimacy: utilitarian notions of politics
Only political orders can have and lose legitimacy; only they need legitimating. 
Multinational corporations or the world market are not capable o f  legitimating.
Jurgen Habermas (199la: 179)
The empirical notion of politics just mentioned refers to a tension built into the political 
process itself: the feature o f  struggle between different interests and ideas to shape 
orders, authority, rules, norms and policies, on the one hand, and the feature o f  
acceptance of the binding character of these rules and norms, indeed of political 
authorities and their decisions themselves -  even by those who did not prevail in the 
political struggle -, on the other hand. These two features beg the question of why those 
who were not able to shape orders, authority, rules, and norms accept them.
Ranging from Hobbes to Max Weber, the prevailing strand of political thought, which is 
based on a utilitarian notion of politics (Habermas, 1988c) regards the political process 
as a strategic interaction between egoistic actors. Thomas Hobbes and Machiavelli are
1 On Weber’s notion of politics and alternatives see: Dahl, 1963.
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prominent representatives of this school. Relevant actors in this idea of politics are 
usually conceptualised (for heuristic purposes) as isolated units that pursue their goals 
in a success-oriented manner. In a similar vein, rational or social-choice theories depict 
politics as the interaction between success-oriented egoistic individuals (Elster and 
Hylland, 1986). Political outcomes and the acceptance of political power, then, rest on 
compromises between interests or the imposition of one’s will over that of others.
Theorists who advocate a utilitarian notion of politics can also be found in the discipline 
of IR. Prominent members of this school within the IR literature are the Realists and 
authors of works on game theory or rational-choice theory. In the Realist view, for 
example, the outcome of international politics is the clash of will or interests, where the 
final arbiter is power within a structure characterised by the distribution of power 
among actors. Looking at the compromises between different interests and the 
distribution of power among actors, so the Realist answer, helps us to understand the 
particular shape of a political order, the acceptance of outcomes and certain 
international rules. Other utilitarian political thinkers would add one more explanation 
for acceptance by quoting Thucydides: “The strong do what they can and the weak 
suffer what they must” (quoted in Kratochwil, 1993:63). Enforcement may be carried 
out by a central government in domestic politics or by a hegemonic power or a coalition 
of states in international politics. Utilitarian notions of politics, which focus on the 
aspect of struggle (be it for power or a struggle between different belief systems), 
explain the acceptance of the outcome of politics either with reference to fears of 
sanctions or with reference to strategic (present or future) interests. Such a utilitarian 
notion of politics rejects, however, any role of ideational factors in the shaping of the 
acceptance of international politics and, consequently, lacks a notion of political 
legitimacy.
6.1.2. The shortcomings of utilitarian notions of politics
A fundamental problem arises over politics being conceptualised in this utilitarian 
fashion. If the political process can be characterised this way, why should rational
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egoists accept a political outcome that is not in their interest? Such an acceptance would 
contradict the assumption that political actors are strategic actors. In fact, if  political 
orders and binding rules and norms are the outcome of politics as defined above there is 
no place for stable political orders to develop - at most there is room for shifting 
alliances that emerge and disappear according to the shifting goals of political actors. 
Stability may be desirable, but there is no room for explaining this stability if  we define 
politics as the interaction between rational egoists. As Talcott Parsons states it:
A purely utilitarian society is chaotic and unstable, because in the absence of 
limitations on the use of means, particularly force and fraud, it must [...] resolve 
itself into an unlimited struggle for power (quoted in Habermas 1988b:315).
In other words, utilitarian approaches cannot account within their theoretical 
assumptions for any stability or order that is not imposed permanently from the 
outside.2 This applies both to domestic and international politics. Yet, the stability of 
many domestic orders (and the different elements of the polities) defies this (general) 
notion of politics. Likewise, in international politics this utilitarian assumption has been 
refuted (Kratochwil, 1989). In other words, utilitarian notions of politics cannot 
sufficiently accommodate the two opposing features of politics mentioned above and 
reduce politics, to a great extent, to the feature of struggle.
This shortcoming has been admitted by some utilitarian political thinkers themselves. 
For example, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke agree that repression and imposition 
cannot secure the acceptance of political outcomes alone or provide a sufficient basis 
for collective action.3 Both authors regard a minimum of agreement or adherence by the 
ruled that is inter-subjectively shared, as necessary for any political system to survive. 
This admission by Hobbes causes what Richard Ashley refers to as the “Hobbesian 
problem”:
[...] In the absence of a framework of norms consensually accepted by its 
members, it might be possible momentarily to establish an orderly social
2 This idea of order as coercion from outside has been developed in the term “hegemonic stability44 within 
the Neo-Realist tradition. On hegemonic stability see: Keohane, 1984; Gilpin, 1981.
3
On Thomas Hobbes see: Albrecht, 1990:137. John Locke argues along similar lines in: Locke, 1975.
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aggregate [...] among instrumentally rational individuals. Except under 
conditions of total stasis, however, it cannot be maintained (Ashley, 1986:278).4
Since utilitarianism cannot explain when, why and how the ruled (being rational 
egoists!) should accept or even support outcomes that are against their instrumental 
interest, the claim to acceptance by those who do not prevail in a political struggle 
remains entirely an appeal by Hobbes and other utilitarian thinkers that is not a logical 
conclusion from their theoretical assumptions.
Secondly, utilitarian notions of politics screen out the impact of the perception and 
interpretation of interaction between actors in politics. Political outcomes are taken as 
objective givens or results, not a as matter of constant interpretation by political actors 
(Kratochwil and Ruggie (eds.), 1994:4-19). This inter-subjective nature of politics and 
norms is actually an important part of understanding politics and, as one application 
thereof, norms and regimes. They, therefore, neglect the important role of discourse on 
authority, orders and rules that has been highlighted by political thinkers, philosophers 
and IR scholars alike.5 This is also the reason why such notions of politics could not 
possibly provide any understanding of how the three dimensions of collective war 
memories discussed in chapter 1, namely, the emotional, the cognitive and the practical- 
moral dimensions, might influence politics.
A third shortcoming of utilitarian notions of politics is these approaches’ silence on the 
formulation process of the actors’ interests. Some utilitarian theories, such as game- 
theories, take a certain formulation of interests as given, while others such as Realism 
refer to objective interests caused by structural or natural necessity (Griffith, 1992). The 
former type of theories is silent on the process of formulating collective interests while 
the latter defines interests in objectivist terms, whatever the actors’ subjective definition 
of interests might be. Thus, utilitarian notions of politics either have no explanation for 
the formation of interests of actors or face the problem to accommodate different
4 Emphasis added. E.H. Carr had already conceded: “Just as within the state every government though it 
needs power as a basis of its authority, also needs the moral basis of the consent of the governed, so an 
international order cannot be based on power alone, for the simple reason that mankind will in the long 
run always revolt against naked power. Any international order presupposes a substantial measure of 
general consent.” (Carr, 1993:235-6).
5 This fundamental meaning of inter-subjectivity in social and political life has been put forward very 
forcefully within philosophy by Gadamer, 1975; in social sciences by Dallmayr and McCarthy, 1977 and 
in IR theory by Hollis and Smith, 1991; as well as by Linklater, 1990.
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outcomes within an assumption of fairly constant interests. These shortcomings are 
consequences of the definition of politics, not a methodological neglect. At the same 
time, such a definition either rejects or is unable to conceptualise the influence of 
collective war memories on the formulation of collective interests.
As the previous discussion shows, any attempt to conceptualise the possible impact of 
collective war memories on international politics is heavily informed and influenced by 
the notion of politics used. Departing from a utilitarian notion of politics entails, 
however, facing the “Hobbesian dilemma”, i.e. the lack of explanatory value why and 
how the ruled should accept outcomes that are against their strategic interest. Moreover, 
utilitarian notions of politics disregard the modes of interaction in politics and remain 
silent on the reasons for the changing formulation of collective interests.
6.1.3. The special condition of international politics: no need for a notion of 
politics?
Authors such as David Easton or Max Weber argue that a necessary precondition for a 
political system is a mechanism for enforcing the authoritative allocation of values and 
ideas. This enforcement is not guaranteed in international politics in the same way it is 
in domestic politics. The lack of a central political authority in the international realm 
has made many scholars and political thinkers question whether the international realm 
is a political realm at all, preferring to call it the realm of “international relations”. Other 
theorists, such as the Realists and Neo-Realists, regard international politics as a 
specific political realm, namely, that of survival and thus of necessity, where there is no 
place for ethics, morality, or legitimacy.6
Both the stronger claim (the international realm as a non-political realm) and the weaker 
claim (international realm as the political realm of survival) were used to separate the 
sphere of domestic politics from international politics. This alleged separateness has 
been challenged conceptually, empirically and normatively in recent years. Firstly, it 
has been argued, foreign policies are part of a political process originating in the 
domestic realm, but related to issues of the international realm and -  as far as the 
implementation of specific foreign policies of governments is concerned -  controlled by 
domestic politics (Hill, 2003:1-24). Secondly, despite the absence of a central political
6 On this argument see: Waltz, 1959: 159-223; Wight, 1966:12-33. For a critique of these assumptions 
see: Jackson, 1996; Linklater, 1990a, Hutchings, 1999:1-27.
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authority, there are political structures in the international realm, such as international 
law and international institutions, some of which are even endowed with independent 
decision-making and rule-enforcement mechanisms (such as the European Court on 
Human Rights, the World Trade Organisation, The Commission and the Court of the 
European Union), something that defies the claim that political authority rests only 
within states and points to aspects of global governance. Thus, it seems appropriate to 
refer to “international politics” as a political realm, where there is a lower degree of 
guaranteed implementation and a greater uncertainty of guaranteed implementation of 
rules than there is in domestic politics, but nevertheless a political realm.
So conceptualised, international politics can also be identified with the double feature of 
struggle and acceptance of policy outcomes, orders or authorities. We are thus faced 
with the same shortcomings of utilitarian notions and puzzling question of political 
philosophy in international politics: how can we understand the acceptance and a sense 
of moral obligation in that realm? As Robert Jackson has stated, “international political 
theory and domestic political theory diverge at certain points, but they are two branches 
of one overall political theory which is fundamentally preoccupied with the conditions, 
arrangements, and values of organised political life on the planet Earth” (Jackson, 
1996:204).
It is my contention that a notion of political legitimacy based on Habermas’ theory of 
communicative action provides this link between individuals and the realm of states. 
Such a notion will be developed in the next part (6.2.) by applying Habermas’ Critical 
Theory, in particular, his notion of ‘practical discourse’ and the ‘ideal speech situation’, 
to politics. But before proceeding in that direction, some general requirements for a 
useful notion of political legitimacy (6.1.4) and specific requirements of political 
legitimacy in international politics (6.1.5) will be discussed.
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6.1.4 General requirements for a notion of political legitimacy
No political society, national or international, can exist unless people submit to 
certain rules o f conduct. The problem why people should submit to such rules is 
the fundamental problem ofpolitical philosophy.
E.H. Carr (1993:41)
The shortcomings of utilitarian notions of national and international politics are the 
product of a deficiency of the very notions themselves, not a mistake of application. 
Thus, the very concept of politics needs to be reconsidered. Habermas suggests that, in 
order to overcome these intrinsic limitations of utilitarianism, it is necessary to add a 
notion of moral obligation in the theoretical assumptions and conceptualisations o f  
politics, a sense of rightfulness, to both the political process and political outcomes that 
goes beyond strategic interests and that explains the acceptance and acceptability of 
outcomes:
Social orders cannot be explained in terms of some collective instrumentalism; a 
de facto order issuing from the competition between purposive-rational actors 
for power and/or wealth remains unstable so long as the moral moment of 
conscience and obligation -  that is to say, the orientation of action to binding 
values -  is missing (Habermas, 1987b:213).
The legitimate distinguishes the morally acceptable from the morally unacceptable in 
politics without necessarily coinciding with the factual. The adherence of politics to the 
concept of political legitimacy should (at least in the long run) add to political stability, 
while the fact of political stability does not automatically indicate legitimacy. To equate 
stability with legitimacy leads to a tautology with little explanatory value. The concept 
of legitimacy has to provide ways of differentiating mere stability from moral obligation 
towards a political order and its outcomes. Political legitimacy is, thus, a critical 
standard within politics, judging the rightfulness of political orders, processes and 
outcomes.
Legitimacy can refer to different aspects of politics, i.e. the political order, political 
norms and results or specific policies. It entails a claim to express the interest or will of 
all those affected. Thus, the addressee of legitimacy is always the sum total of all those
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affected by a specific norm, political order or policies. In the case of domestic politics, it 
is usually the entire body politic, whereas in international politics this may vary 
between a regional group of political communities or even encompass humankind. If a 
decision or order were overtly expressed only in the interest of some, it would be 
difficult to see how it should command an obligation of those, in whose interest it is not. 
This claim, however, in the sense that legitimacy represents a general interest is subject 
to sustained critique: claims to legitimacy in politics are often criticised for being 
“really” in the interest of some groups only, and by no means in the interest of all
n
affected. Yet, these kinds of critique may question specific ways of legitimating, but 
they usually do not defy the formal category of legitimacy. In fact, the standard for 
criticising empirical forms of legitimacy is often provided by another notion of 
legitimacy.
Legitimating is the process leading to legitimacy, a status that can be reached, 
maintained or lost. There may be different ways of legitimating in order to reach a status 
where the ruled wish to accept and support the assumptions, structure, processes and 
outcomes of politics. However, a meaningful notion of legitimacy faces two 
fundamental challenges that explain why E.H. Carr regards it as such a difficult notion 
to grasp. For one, if we hold an empirical notion of legitimacy, i.e. one that describes 
and identifies the factors that make a political order legitimate in the eye o f  the ruled, 
we rely on descriptions of a current state of legitimacy. Max Weber, for example, 
identifies three forms of legitimating political rule: (1) legality, (2) charisma (of 
political leaders) and (3) ultimate values (either embedded in tradition or ultimate
o
principles). Yet, scholars and social scientists do not judge the reasons for those 
factors’ attaining political legitimacy. In fact, they seldom dwell on the precise causes 
for this identified belief in legitimacy. Why and how, say, certain ultimate values, lend 
legitimacy to a political order in the eyes of the ruled is something Max Weber does not 
address. This answer is also absent in procedural notions of legitimacy, such as those 
provided by the systems theories of Talcott Parsons or Niklas Luhmann. One might, in 
fact, conclude with Gerhard Beisenherz that empirical notions of legitimacy raise more 
questions than they provide answers:
7 This has been a critique o f Marx and Marxist writers on the liberal ideas of representation and politics. 
See: Marx, 1978. For IR this critique has been raised by Ashley (1986:270).
8 For an introduction and critical appraisal of Weber’s notion of legitimacy see: Speer, 1978: 86-92.
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It is obvious where “legitimating through procedures” and “ultimate reasons” 
converge: in the lack of justification of the reasons for the legitimating [effect] 
and a [...] reference to facticity (Beisenherz, 1980:54).9
Thus, the first challenge of a notion of legitimacy is to avoid equating legitimacy with 
the factual adherence to norms or to avoid only describing the subjective belief in the 
legitimacy of politics.
For another, if the notion of legitimacy we adopt is a normative one, that is to say a 
notion that focuses on the factors that should render a certain order legitimate, the 
challenge we face is to justify our own criteria -  a difficult task in the so-called post­
metaphysical era and in modem, pluralistic societies. Both strands of theories on 
political legitimacy (empirical and normative), therefore, have to fulfil certain 
requirements in order to be usefully applied to politics. First, if  an empirical notion of 
legitimacy seeks to elucidate the question raised by E.H. Carr, namely, why people 
submit to mles, it needs to provide an understanding of the reasons why the ruled accept 
certain features of politics as legitimate by which effect. Second, if  a normative notion 
of legitimacy should command any philosophical and scientific credibility it needs to be 
able to justify its own standards that are not arbitrarily posed from outside. These 
general features need to be specified for the case of international politics. Doing so is 
the task of the following section.
6.1.5 Legitimacy in international politics: specific requirements
The categorical separation of “international politics” and “domestic politics” that many 
authors on international relations make, may beg the question whether this “great 
divide” (Clark, 1999:15-32) between the two spheres require different concepts of 
legitimacy. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to engage in an analysis of the practical, 
conceptual or normative corollaries of this debate, but I want to discuss briefly the 
requirements of a concept of political legitimacy that is not strictly limited to domestic
9 A closer look at the often-quoted modes of legitimacy reveals that the “ultimate reasons” for legitimacy 
in Weber’s writings refer either to belief (affection or value-based legitimacy) or to an acceptance of the 
factual (tradition and legality). On this aspect see: Speer, 1978: 86-7.
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politics, but also takes into account the legitimating effects in international politics or 
foreign policies.
There is a broad literature in the IR discipline that, far from claiming that the domestic 
and the international spheres of politics are necessarily the same, does empirically, 
conceptually, as well as normatively, challenge the idea of “The Great Divide”.10 Ian 
Clark has argued convincingly that international orders affect the internal composition 
of states and vice versa. For example, the spread of the democratic state after 1945 has 
paved the ways for international norms and regimes of human rights protection. In the 
context of present tendencies of globalisation, Clark regards states as a “bidirectional 
valve” that has to mediate pressures from the international sphere and the domestic 
sphere and highlights this mediating function in several key areas of international 
politics, such as security and economics (Clark, 1999:67). I believe that this metaphor 
of “bidirectional valve” of states between the domestic and the international politics can 
also be usefully applied to the question of political legitimacy.
If we follow the argument in the sense that the sphere of international politics is the 
realm where states still occupy a primary role, then, the question arises as to how we 
conceptualise “moral obligation or acceptance by states”. Even the English School, 
which focuses on commonly agreed rules of the “international society”, fails to provide 
such an understanding of how this mutual acceptance has been reached in the period of 
popular sovereignty (Bull, 1977). I wish to argue that this conceptual deficit is due to 
the lack of theorising the relationship between state and domestic society. In fact, a 
sense of acceptance or moral obligation without a link to political communities and their 
members seems to be conceptually hollow. Authors such as Holsti have discussed the 
different relationships between states and society with reference to “state strength” in 
international politics (1996). Holsti points out that a weak link between state and society 
may give the state more margin of manoeuvre in international politics, but it also means 
a “weak” or no support from the domestic realm for those interests pursued or the 
outcomes of international politics (Holsti 1996; see also: Halliday, 1994:79). Holsti 
argues that this “strength” comes from different forms of legitimacy. However, he fails
10 For an overview on the normative implications of this divide see: Hutchings, 1999. On the empirical 
and conceptual implications of this divide see: Clark, 1999.
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to conceptualise the legitimating effect of each form. Thus, states act as mediators in the 
processes of legitimating international politics in the interaction with other states and 
their own political community. This, I argue, is the first instance where states play this 
role of legitimating valve.
The second mediated process is the issue of representation. States in the international 
realm officially claim to represent the political will and common interest of their ruled 
and thus mediate between the domestic constituency and the international sphere. Such 
a claim, however, is not simply a normative one, but also reflects the current practice of 
international politics and, in consequence, of international political legitimacy. 
Historically, and ever since the order of Westphalia was instituted, states have not only 
monopolised the political representation of a certain territory abroad, but with the shift 
from absolutism to popular sovereignty, they have also claimed to speak on behalf of a 
certain people that inhabit a specific territory under effective control. Speaking on 
behalf of a people is empirically one among several necessary pre-conditions to be a 
legitimate actor of modem international politics (in addition to mutual recognition, a 
claim to effective control of a territory). Unlike private actors in international politics 
such as trans-national corporations and international non-governmental organisations, 
states do not represent specific interests but, rather, the political will and common 
interest of those governed. This necessary claim of representing the collective will or 
collective interest of a certain people renders governments legitimate in international 
politics, but also opens the door to a possible immanent critique from those represented, 
who may question the truthfulness of the claim that certain interests are actually pursued 
in their name.11 Thus, while the claim of governments to represent the collective 
political will of the ruled abroad is a constitutive element of international political 
legitimacy, this very same claim has a regulative function in domestic politics, i.e. 
within the political community. These two aspects of political legitimacy are 
inextricably linked to each other.
11 As Ulrich Albrecht claims the concept o f “national interest” entails a basic democratic power that 
transcends any governmental formulation of national interest: “Those who speak on behalf of the national 
interest or in the name of a nation in the media need to be aware that the respective constituency might 
ask questions regarding the legitimacy of those definitions." Albrecht, 1986:62. On such a critique see, 
for example: J. Hoffman, 1998; Richmond, 2002.
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This regulative function within political communities refers to the formulation of the 
collective interest as a formal category, which commands more legitimacy domestically 
than particular interests - although it seems futile to define a particular content of this 
collective interest from a scientific viewpoint.12 Moreover, the content of what is 
regarded as the collective interest of a political community may vary from case to case. 
Each state represents a formulated national interest in the international sphere. 
Outcomes in international politics require, therefore, at least a legitimating at two levels:
(1) the reconciliation between the different national interests discussed outside the 
political community and (2) within each political community. To give an example: 
legitimating the war in Iraq does not only require the consent of the Security Council of 
the United Nations, but is also a matter of legitimating within the political communities. 
Both levels interact, as the different positions and their attempts to reconcile them have 
shown. Again, the metaphor of the states as bidirectional valves, which have to mediate 
between pressures from one’s own political community with pressures from other 
political communities seems useful.
Finally, there is no neat separation of both legitimating effects on each level. When 
governments negotiate, say, the International Convention on Climate Change, non-state 
actors try to influence the debate and the legitimating of certain outcomes by mobilising 
cross-national information and debates (sometimes even organising alternative 
summits). In other words, there is a certain discursive permeability between the two 
levels of legitimating discourses in international politics, rendering the two levels 
merely concepts (in Weber’s sense: ideal types) for heuristic purposes that do not 
necessarily coincide with empirical manifestations. This tendency has been grasped in 
recent discussions on world public opinion and the tendency towards public diplomacy 
(Hill, 2003:262-280). Non-state actors interfere in international discussions and 
negotiations but also in domestic debates and discourses for legitimating certain foreign 
policies.
12 There has been growing criticism of objectivist or scientific uses of this concept. As Joseph Frankel 
points out: ‘“National interest’ is the most comprehensive description of the whole value complex of 
foreign policy. It is also an exceptionally unclear concept.” (1970:26). For a critique of scientific concept 
of national interest and an introduction of “national interest” (or public interest) as a formal and 
communicative concept see: Kratochwil, 1982.
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In conclusion, a general concept of political legitimacy seems useful and necessary for 
international politics. Such a concept of legitimacy of international politics should take 
two aspects into account: (1) the mediating role of states between legitimating efforts 
from outside the political community (by states as well as non-state actors) and inside 
the political community on issues of international politics (including foreign policies);
(2) the inclusion of the political community and, ultimately, individuals and their 
relation to states, in order to account for the actual legitimating effect or the legitimising 
force that an international institution, outcome or structure commands.
Needless to say there are other motives or reasons for accepting or supporting certain 
decisions, such as strategic interests, but political legitimacy focuses on the aspect of 
acceptance and obligation towards international politics. Such a notion will be 
developed in the next section (6.2) by applying practical discourse and the ideal speech 
situation, concepts which were introduced in chapter 2, as yardstick for judging 
decisions in politics. The third and final section (6.3) of this chapter will develop a 
notion of political legitimacy and illustrate how that theoretical notion can be 
operationalised and applied to empirical research in foreign and international politics.
6.2 A notion of political legitimacy based on Haberm as’ concept of 
communicative action
In his works Theory and Practice and Facticity and Norms, Habermas himself raises the 
question of how a sense of obligation is achieved in different political orders, as well as 
in specific discourses in politics, taking into account the requirements for a meaningful 
notion of political legitimacy mentioned above. In a nutshell, his answer lies in the 
conditions o f  the practical discourse. Habermas rejects any content or proposition as 
legitimate a priori (in the so-called post-metaphysical condition) and points to the 
necessity of a democratic procedure to be followed to establish political legitimacy:
[...] Only democratic procedures of political will-formation can in principle 
generate legitimacy under conditions of a rationalised lifeworld with highly 
individuated members, with norms that have become abstract, positive, and in 
need of justification, and with traditions that have, as regards their claim to
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authority, been reflectively refracted and set communicatively aflow.
(Habermas, 1987b:344)
This is in line, Habermas argues, with the development of Western democracies since 
the eighteenth century, where the idea of a procedural notion of political legitimacy was 
first developed. The attainment of legitimacy of norms, rules and laws, in what 
Habermas calls post-conventional societies, requires, on the one hand, a certain legal 
procedure and, on the other hand, a public deliberation which gives citizens the chance 
to be actively or passively involved. Both aspects, Habermas claims, are necessary 
conditions for political legitimacy; pure legality (the following of a certain procedure in 
the establishment of laws and rules) is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
legitimacy (Habermas 1996c: 110-111).
Habermas derives his notion of political legitimacy from the assumptions of a practical
discourse, which he describes as the “ideal speech situation”. As was explained in
chapter 2, every participant in a practical discourse needs to make the assumption that
the certain conditions are sufficiently met. In a nutshell, those conditions refer to an
equal participation where outside force or manipulation is excluded and, therefore, the
1 ^only force to be accepted is the forceless force of the better argument. If participants 
realise that those conditions are not sufficiently met, they will abandon the discourse or 
reject any validity of the outcome. Otherwise they will be willing to engage in a 
practical discourse and accept political outcomes that are not strictly in their strategic or 
instrumental interest. The identification of the conditions of the practical discourse is 
Habermas’ attempt to reconcile the two seemingly opposing features of politics, the 
feature of struggle and the feature of acceptance. By pointing to the necessary 
conditions of political discourse derived from speech act theory, Habermas also tries to 
live up to the requirements set out for a notion of political legitimacy: it does not 
necessarily coincide with the empirical fact of adherence to norms and rules, while 
justifying the standards of critique with reference to a reflection on the necessary 
conditions of discourses from within discourse and not applying arbitrary or 
metaphysical standards from outside.
13 On full account of the conditions of practical discourse see: Section 2.4 of this thesis.
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In analogy to practical discourses, it could be argued that there is only a sense of moral 
obligation in post-conventional societies if the conditions of the “ideal speech situation” 
are sufficiently institutionalised in the political order and the political process. 
Habermas defines this institutionalisation in the political process as the “deliberative 
model of democracy”, which entails:
• A rule of law that guarantees the equal application of laws to everybody and the 
enforcement of laws to everybody
• Individual rights that guarantee the possibility to participate in the deliberation of 
the political process in an equal and free (meaning: non-compulsory) fashion
• A network of non-governmental spheres of the public, where deliberation on 
political decisions can take place spontaneously and freely
• The principle of popular sovereignty guarantees that laws passed are self-given and 
in the public interest (Habermas, 1998a: 155-157).
Those four prerequisites are all equally valid and necessary to institutionalise the 
presuppositions of practical discourses in politics (Habermas, 1998a:399-467; 
Habermas, 1998b:239-252). In modem societies political legitimacy can only derive 
from a self-giving of laws that treats each political subject as free and equal. The 
procedure to produce laws, then, derives its legitimacy from the principle of popular 
sovereignty. Individual rights, including the mle of law, guarantee that everybody can 
influence the constituting of political power and participate in the free deliberation of 
political processes. Consequently, the more the establishment of political order and 
norms assumes the form of the idealised conditions of a practical discourse, the more 
the political order and its outcomes (laws, rules, and decisions) will command 
legitimacy by the ruled. This “democratic principle” is a derivative of Habermas’ 
discourse principle and informs Habermas’ understanding of political legitimacy.
The more a debate on political orders, policies or decisions approaches the model of 
deliberative democracy, the more political legitimacy is granted. If the conditions of the 
practical discourse are met, it is, in the final instance, the arguments presented that 
create the ultimate rational basis of legitimacy -  arguments that can be accepted or 
rejected:
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Legitimacy means that there are good arguments for a political order’s claim to 
be recognised as right and just; a legitimate order deserves recognition. 
Legitimacy means a political order’s worthiness to be recognised. This 
definition highlights the fact that legitimacy is a contestable validity claim; the 
stability of the order of domination (also) depends on its (at least) de facto 
recognition (Habermas, 1991a:178).14
With this notion of political legitimacy Habermas also tries to reconcile the formulation 
of collective interests that may not always be in a narrow strategic or instrumental 
interest of all those concerned: the more the conditions of a deliberative democracy are 
institutionalised in the political order, the more this formulation of collective interest or 
will commands a sense of moral obligation by all those in whose name it is put forward. 
Whether or not political outcomes or norms are in the interest of all those concerned 
cannot be decided from the outside, but only through a practical discourse by all 
affected members of a political community themselves (Habermas, 1999c:305). Central 
to Habermas’ notion of political legitimacy is, therefore, the institutionalisation of 
public deliberation of political decisions. In addition to general elections and the 
representation of interests in parliamentary bodies, the power of questioning, arguing 
and deliberating proposed laws, and the putting of issues on the political agenda, is 
central to the creation of political legitimacy in post-conventional societies. This is what 
Habermas calls the “communicative power” that can be mobilised against 
administrative power in politics (Habermas, 1998a:228-9; Habermas, 1990:11-50). One 
important component and locus of this communicative power is a widespread and de­
centralised network of informal, autonomous public spheres. These public spheres allow 
all citizens to participate in deliberation if  they choose to. In the same vein, public 
parliamentary debate opens the space of politics to public deliberation. Those public 
spheres can also transcend national boundaries and be organised internationally and 
regionally.
Habermas is very much aware that modem mass media should not be confused with 
free deliberation, although the former provide the necessary basis for a deliberative will 
formation. But he insists that there are important gradual differences that cause different 
qualities of public opinions. The more those publics are controlled by the administrative 
power and the more the assumption by the body politic that the public spheres are not a
14 Italics in original.
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locus of free deliberation prevails, the less political legitimacy is likely to exist and the 
less political outcomes are accepted by the ruled. Without effective communicative 
power there is no political legitimacy (1998a:446). This claim also applies to the 
attempts to manipulate the public sphere. If an attempt to manipulate becomes public, it 
automatically loses its argumentative power (Habermas, 1998a:441).
In addition to the conditions of political discourse producing political legitimacy, 
Habermas also identifies three main types of arguments within the political discourse 
that are commonly used to legitimate politics: (1) moral, which refers to arguments 
based on universally valid norms; (2) pragmatic, which refer to the right means to reach 
given ends or to decide between different aims and (3) ethical, which are a self- 
reflection of the past and present being of the political and cultural community.
The difference between ethical-practical and moral-practical arguments is more difficult 
to discern empirically, although both types of arguments relate to different political 
communities (Habermas, 1993a: 1-18). Ethical arguments refer to specific political 
communities and their becoming. Here, Habermas admits that certain moral obligations 
may be valid for some political communities but not for others. The difference is caused 
by the specific values and moral commitments that are based on a collective lifeworld 
and its reflexive appropriation: A political community’s critical self-reflection on its 
own history highlights the values present in it as well as a judgement on the continuous 
validity of those values (Habermas, 1998a: 199). Moral-practical discourses are about 
norms in general, while practical-ethical discourses refer to a specific ethos, linked to a 
specific political community, although practical-moral arguments (with general validity 
of rightful norms) should not contradict specific practical-ethical arguments.15 However, 
practical-ethical discourses may go beyond practical-moral discourses and reflect the 
collective form of life and its history.
Legitimate laws and legitimate political orders need to prevail in all three types of 
arguments in political discourses, not just in one set of arguments:
15 On this difference between the two types of discourses in the context o f IR see: Brown, 1992 and 2002; 
Linklater, 1998.
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Legitimate law must pass a discursive test that potentially engages the entire 
range of different types of discourses. These include [...] moral and ethical 
discourses [...]; in addition, in so far as an issue involves conflicting particular 
interests and values that do not permit consensus, a legitimate legal regulation of 
the issue must involve fair compromise (Rehg, 1996:179).
In conclusion, Habermas’ discursive model can be applied to politics and provides a 
useful notion of political legitimacy. Political legitimacy depends upon the 
institutionalisation of an idealised practical discourse as Habermas defines it. The more 
those conditions are absent, the less likely a sense of moral obligation towards political 
orders or outcomes exists. This notion of political legitimacy based on Habermas’ 
universal pragmatism and discourse ethics, presented in chapter 2, avoids the 
shortcomings of empiricist notions of political legitimacy (i.e., ultimately not knowing 
the reasons for the belief in the legitimacy) and tries to avoid the charge of being a 
subjective and metaphysical wish-list. By looking at the inclusion or exclusion of the 
publics, it is possible to discern in how far communicative power could be developed 
for issues of international politics. Thus, Habermas theory of communicative action 
provides a critical standard within his notion of political legitimacy that can be applied 
to existing political norms and rules. By looking at the way those political discourses 
are organised we also avoid the charges against naive discourse analysis that focuses 
entirely on the content of discourses and fails to take into account the conditions of 
discourse.
Habermas also points to different types of arguments that may be mobilised within a 
political discourse (practical, ethical, moral). It is precisely ethical arguments, 
arguments linked to the self-reflection of a specific political community, which are of 
great relevance to the possible influence of collective war memories in politics: 
practical-moral imperatives derived from collective war memories may be prominent 
ethical arguments in political discourses and thus shape the legitimacy of political 
decisions. With such a notion of politics and political legitimacy we will move on to 
defining a Habermasian notion of political legitimacy that is suitable for international 
politics.
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6.3 Studying the impact of collective war memories on international politics: 
applying a Habermasian notion of political legitimacy
6.3.1 A Habermasian notion of political legitimacy for international politics
As I have already suggested, Habermas’ concept of political legitimacy can be applied 
to the study of politics in general and, with some adaptations, also to the study of 
international politics. Various reasons account for this. First, the different types of 
arguments within the public spheres can be discerned when discussing issues of 
international politics within political communities: are they pragmatic, ethical or moral 
arguments in order to support or reject certain validity claims? Second, the moral 
obligation that international political norms and institutions command within political 
communities can be assessed in very much the same way as domestic political orders 
and outcomes. The more they adhere to the idealised presuppositions of a practical 
discourse, the more they can claim political legitimacy within the political community. 
Thus, political legitimacy goes beyond governmental discourses and looks into how 
citizens could participate in the deliberation of political decisions actively or -  if they so 
wish -  passively. Third, the application of Habermas’ discursive model to the analysis 
of political legitimacy also provides a general critical standard that applies to both 
domestic political structures and international political structures and outcomes from the 
point of view of the political communities and the outside analyst.
While the concept of political legitimacy developed here focuses on the legitimating 
effect within political communities, Habermas has suggested that this concept of 
political legitimacy, which is based on general political theory and philosophy, might 
also apply the international realm itself. As Habermas points out:
Since morality based on principles [prinzipielle Moral] is sanctioned only 
through the inner authority of conscience, its conflict with the public morality, 
still tied to the concrete citizen, is embedded in its claim to universality; the 
conflict is between the cosmopolitanism of the ‘human being’ and the loyalties 
of the citizens (which cannot be universalistic as long as international relations
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are subject to the concrete morality of the more powerful). If one follows [...] 
the developmental logic of global systems of social norms [...] resolution of this 
conflict is conceivable only if  the dichotomy between in-group and out-group 
morality disappears, the opposition between morally and legally regulated areas 
is relativised, and the validity of all norms is tied to discursive will formation 
(Habermas, 1976:87).
Habermas claims, first, that international politics in general commands less legitimacy 
than domestic politics, precisely because it fails to institutionalise conditions of the 
practical discourse mentioned above. At the same time, Habermas defines a political 
project that aims to advance a discursive will formation in international politics that is 
more in line with those conditions. This, I would argue, is a logical conclusion from 
Habermas’ own theory. This political project, to overcome the divide between citizens 
and men, is also central to Andrew Linklater’s justification for an “ideal of a universal 
communicative community” (1998:107), which draws heavily on Habermas’ discourse 
ethics. This comes very close to the project of “cosmopolitan democracy” (Clark, 
1999:155), a project that Hutchings also links to Habermas and his work (1999:159- 
162).16
Habermas’ concept of political legitimacy is not only the normative basis for 
transforming present barriers to a political and practical discourse on international 
politics. It also provides guidance to the analysis of legitimating effects towards issues 
of international politics. It is my contention that, in the final instance of Habermas’ 
analysis, it is individuals that assume a sense of obligation toward a political decision, 
order or structure; it is they who grant legitimacy to international politics, not 
governments or states conceptualised as abstract entities. What Habermas’ 
communicative concept of political legitimacy points to is, then, the need to analyse the 
different conditions of political discourse on issues of international politics (1) within 
political communities, and, (2) beyond the political communities. In this context, 
barriers to the ideal speech situation of a political discourse may provide indication of a 
possibly low legitimating effect in international politics. The notion of international 
political legitimacy appears, therefore, not as an ideal-type or critical (but utopian) 
yardstick, but, to different degrees, observable -  and thus useful for empirical research.
16 On the potential of transforming political community through transforming, among others, practical 
discourses in international politics see also: Proops, 1996.
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The central question of this thesis, that is, how are we to study the impact of collective 
war memories on international politics, defies a direct and straightforward answer. The 
answer provided in this chapter is that collective war memories can influence political 
legitimacy, depending on the conditions of the practical discourse (taking the ideal 
speech situation and its institutionalisation in political structures and processes as a 
critical yardstick) and the type of arguments (pragmatic, moral, ethical) prevailing in the 
political discourse. However, as is the case with the concept of social learning, 
Habermas’ concept of political legitimacy is still a very abstract one, having been 
developed by debating issues of political legitimacy within political philosophy. The 
final section of this chapter explains how this general concept of international political 
legitimacy can be operationalised in order to guide empirical research.
6.3.2. Understanding the impact of collective war memory on international 
politics: a research agenda
This thesis rests on the assumption that it is necessary to distinguish the discourse on 
collective war memory from the political process. This made it necessary to develop a 
notion of political legitimacy, which provides the framework for analysing the 
empirically changing impact of collective war memories on political legitimacy. This 
notion suggests two areas of empirical research, which provide, in their totality, helpful 
insights as to whether or not collective war memories had an impact on legitimating 
specific decisions or processes of international politics:
• the empirical analysis of the arguments used in a public discourse, including an 
analysis of the type of arguments put forward (ethical, pragmatic, moral)
• an analysis of the conditions of that practical discourse, using the criteria of the 
ideal speech situation as yardstick and judging the degree to which those 
empirical arguments might have contributed to a sense of moral obligation 
(legitimacy) toward the decisions, orders or policies
There may be certain objections to this research programme. One may be the usefulness 
of assessing the establishment of international norms and orders by using as critical 
yardstick the presupposed conditions of an ideal speech situation, which are already 
difficult to fulfil in the domestic realm. The conditions set by the ideal speech situation
232
in the diplomatic realm -  as being the “area least affected by democratisation” (Hill, 
1991:86) - seem entirely unreachable in practice. The same arguments have already 
been made for domestic politics. And the same answer given for that realm applies to 
international politics. If the source and sense of obligation towards the process and 
outcome of international politics should be assessed, this is one credible set of criteria to 
do so. And it may, in fact, highlight the reasons for a weak legitimacy of international 
politics. In other words, the seemingly utopian level of political discourses may actually 
identify the real level of moral commitment, and thus be useful for the analysis.
Another critique might point to the fact that most issues of international politics are 
dealt with outside the public deliberation by “secretive states”. However, the analysis of 
public discourses does not preclude the possibility of clandestine or secret political 
decisions that shape international politics. On the contrary, it is often the case that those 
decisions need to be taken out of the public eye precisely because they contradict the 
prevailing moral and ethical codes.
For specific decisions in international politics circumstantial factors must not be 
excluded altogether. One aspect is to focus on the political groups that participate in the 
practical discourse. Another is to take the international factors into account as well. 
Both dimensions help to grasp the specific context of a decision or policy to be 
formulated. In order to assess the legitimating effect of collective war memories in 
international politics, it seems necessary to take the following three dimensions into 
account in empirical research:
• international factors and developments that shaped the decision analysed or 
the legitimisation discourse itself;
• the political sociology within each society, the empirically identifiable 
arguments put forward (pragmatic, ethical, moral arguments) and their 
relation to practical-moral imperatives derived from collective war memories
• the conditions of the political discourse and the assessment of the degree to 
which those empirically identified arguments contribute to political 
legitimacy.
The second dimension also highlights the prominence of practical-moral imperatives 
derived from collective war memories in the political discourse. But only if this analysis
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is juxtaposed to the conditions of the political discourse are we able to pass a judgement 
as to the extent to which those practical-moral imperatives actually contributed to 
legitimating the decisions in international politics. Such a two-step analysis (analysis of 
arguments put forward AND the analysis of the conditions of political discourse) is 
different from deducing directly a legitimating effect from the empirical presence of 
historical analogies.
The third dimension is directly taken from Habermas’ notion of political legitimacy. 
Habermas states that a legitimating effect of political decisions is more likely if a 
previous political discourse has taken place, which fulfils the requirements of the ideal 
speech situation. This is, first and foremost, a matter of the structure of the political 
system, which provides indications about the possibility to engage in a political 
discourse on specific decisions and to weigh the different arguments and options. In 
addition to the question of political structure, there are two further areas of research that 
highlight a degree of permeability of the political discourse: (a) the degree of 
information dissemination by governments that take different and controversial 
arguments into account; (b) the reflection of different arguments present in the wider 
public in the parliamentary debate as well as the wider media. The second issue inquires 
in particular whether parliament or the media act as so-called gate-keepers for certain 
arguments and discussions, letting pass some and withholding others. The more 
parliament and the mass media act as gatekeepers of arguments, the less permeable is 
the political discourse.
Habermas’ concept of political legitimacy can be applied to all the different levels of 
discourse within and, even, beyond political communities. While clearly an exhaustive 
analysis of decisions in international politics would require looking at legitimating 
efforts both within and beyond political communities, in the context of this thesis I will 
limit myself to illustrate the application of the Habermasian concept of political 
legitimacy to legitimating efforts within political communities, where states play an 
important role of mediating between legitimating efforts from other states and their own 
political communities. It is my contention that the mediating function of states in the 
domestic realm, by confronting the political community with legitimating attempts from 
other states, can be analysed. However, it would simply be beyond the scope of this
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thesis to include an analysis of the conditions of political discourse beyond political 
communities.
As the literature on international politics and foreign policy analysis suggests, the 
relevance of collective memories in general and collective war memories in particular 
may vary according to the topics under discussion. Collective war memories deal, by 
definition, with an experience of national survival, an existential experience by warfare 
with other groups or countries. Thus, by the very definition of this experience, 
collective war memories exert a great influence on present threat perceptions, decisions 
and courses of action in the realm of defence and security (Heuser, 1998:199). To a 
lesser extent, and this is the second hypothesis, this may also apply to acts of 
transferring substantial sovereign power to supra-national bodies, as happened in the 
course of the European integration process between 1945 and 1995. Precisely because it 
is sovereignty which appears to be at stake, it is not far fetched to assume that, in those 
cases, collective war memories might have a stronger impact on actual decisions than in 
other areas of international politics. This pre-selection does not limit the applicability of 
the concept of international political legitimacy but rather directs us to certain policy 
areas where practical-moral imperatives of collective war memories are more likely to 
play an important role. It is with this hypothesis as guidance that I now turn to the 
examination of the decisions in France and Germany concerning the establishment of a 
European Defence Community (EDC) and the institution of a European Monetary 
Union (EMU).
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Chapter 7
The impact of collective war memories on selected issues of 
Franco-German relations between 1945 and 1995: 
EDC and EMU
As the previous chapter stated, the actual impact of collective war memories on 
decisions in international politics cannot be read off directly from the implicit, or 
sometimes explicitly stated practical-moral imperatives derived from collective war 
memories. In fact, as with any mono-causal explanation, a general causal claim cannot 
account for differences of outcomes. While chapters 4 and 5 of this work illustrated 
different practical-moral imperatives derived from collective war memories in France 
and Germany, the present chapter seeks to highlight how prominent or important those 
practical-moral imperatives actually were in legitimising political action in the domestic 
realms, where states have to mediate between the domestic and international sphere on 
international issues. It is my contention that the concept of political legitimacy based on 
Habermas' theory of communicative action and its research programme (developed in 
section 6.3.2) provide an adequate framework to assess the actual impact that collective 
war memories had on such decisions.
Many authors have claimed that Franco-German relations after 1945 were heavily 
influenced by collective war memories in both countries. A comprehensive analysis that 
would put that claim to the test in important decisions in Franco-German relations is, 
however, clearly beyond the scope of this thesis. Yet, as was stated in chapter 6, it 
seems likely that decisions concerning security matters, as well as decisions related to 
transfers of sovereignty, should be legitimated by collective war memories to a higher 
degree than those decisions related to other fields of international politics. This is why 
this chapter aims to apply the concept of political legitimacy to the decisions, first, to 
form a European Defence Community (EDC) between 1950 and 1954 (section 1) and, 
second, to conform a European Monetary Union (EMU) between 1990 and 1993 
(section 2). Selecting two decisions that are separated by a considerable time span might
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also help us to identify possible developments in the impact of collective war memories 
on Franco-German relations.
Each of those two sections proceeds in four steps: in the first one, the national and 
international contexts that contributed to the tabling of a specific decision are discussed, 
the second part analyses the empirically identifiable arguments of political currents, 
clusters them according to Habermas’ categories (pragmatic, ethical, moral) and locates 
the prominence of practical-moral imperatives derived from collective war memories 
within those arguments. The third part, in turn, highlights the conditions of the political 
discourse using Habermas’ ideal speech situation as critical yardstick. The fourth part 
assesses the extent to which collective war memories legitimated the decisions in 
France and Germany with regard to EDC and EMU. The international factors and the 
political groups that put forward certain arguments during the exchange of political 
discourses will be identified by using secondary material, while the empirical arguments 
and the conditions of the political discourse will be analysed by using primary sources, 
such as newspapers from France and Germany, as well as official protocols from 
parliamentary debates and press releases by political actors.1 The chapter concludes 
with an evaluation of the concept of political legitimacy and assesses the usefulness of 
the Habermasian approach to analyse the legitimating effect of collective war memories.
7.1. The European Defence Community (EDC) in the 1950s: a victim 
of collective war memories?
7.1.1 The international factors leading to EDC negotiations
After the Second World War the Western Allies assumed political power in their 
occupation zones in Germany. It was at the London Conference in 1948 that it became 
clear that there was no hope of reaching an agreement between the four powers on the 
political future of Germany. Thus, the three Western powers continued to negotiate 
certain recommendations regarding the future of the Western occupation zones. Those
1 Unless otherwise stated, the translations of all these materials are my own.
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recommendations entailed the creation of a West German state by fusing the three 
occupation zones and the equal participation of that West Germany-to be in the 
European Reconstruction Programme.
In March 1948 the Soviets left the Allied Control Council in Berlin and began a 
blockade of (West-) Berlin soon afterwards. The Berlin blockade and the toppling of a 
democratically elected government in Czechoslovakia by the Communists were signs of 
the looming Cold War in Europe. Discussions in the State Department of the United 
States began about organising the defence of Western Europe. In 1948 the Brussels Pact 
was formed and in April 1949 NATO was founded. Five years after the end of the 
Second World War the discussions of a new form of cooperation in form of European 
integration gathered pace in Western Europe. 1949 saw the rise of additional 
international organisations such as the Council of Europe and the OEEC (Organisation 
of European Economic Cooperation) as a framework for the Marshall Aid Plan 
(European Reconstruction Program). West Germany did not take part in any of the two 
organisations.
As early as 1949 the German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, offered a defence 
contribution by West Germany. But until 1949 the policies of demilitarisation were still 
the guiding principles towards West Germany and the West Allies were hesitant to 
rearm it. Even after the Federal Republic of Germany was founded the Allies created an 
office of military disarmament to supervise the future demilitarisation.
French governmental policies towards Germany between 1944 and 1949 were 
predominantly informed by the policies formulated after the First World War 
(Auerbach, 1990:587). Although some political currents influenced by the Resistance 
and former deportees, had formulated different strategies towards Germany, these did 
not have any practical impact before 1950, when international circumstances proved the 
hitherto applied policies futile and favoured a different approach towards Germany. But, 
between 1944 and 1950 French politicians were still “obsessed by a possible revival of 
the German danger” and de Gaulle himself stated February 1945 the goal of France in 
“to make sure that no German aggression will be possible in the future’ (Poidevin, 
1991:331-332).
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The USA and Great Britain, but also the Soviet Union, disagreed with most of the 
French suggestions of de-coupling certain regions from Germany or, at least, creating a 
lose political order in that country. With the fusion of the American and British zones in 
1947, some restrictions to German sovereignty were lifted. Further concessions 
followed after the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949 under the so- 
called Petersberg Protocols. From its inception, the West German government was 
interested in reducing and abolishing the controls imposed by the Allied powers in 
industrial production as well as in the area of rearmament.
Within the United States government, and, also, informally with Chancellor Adenauer, 
discussions about a German defence contribution to Western forces began in 1949 
(Ziebura, 1997:78). But the French government was not willing to consider the 
rearmament of Germany, and was completely opposed to an independent national 
German army, which would contribute in the context of NATO to joint Western defence 
efforts (Herbst, 1989:90). With the Marshall Aid and monetary reform, the increase in 
industrial production and the “economic miracle” in West Germany gathered pace. 
There were numerous concerns in France that Germany would soon overtake and, then, 
dominate economically and, later, politically Western Europe as the first industrial 
power.
The official Allied policy of demilitarisation in Germany changed dramatically, when 
Communist North Korean attacked South Korea in June 1950. The parallels and 
coincidences between Korea and Germany abound and a similar scenario happening in 
Germany did not seem so remote to many decision-makers and politicians at that time. 
The USA officially demanded a contribution by West Germany to the defence of 
Western Europe within a multilateral framework. Adenauer reiterated in two 
memoranda from August 1950 his offer for a West German contribution to Western 
military defence in return for a re-establishment of West German sovereignty (Herbst, 
1989:95-96). In September 1950 Truman asked France and Great Britain to accept a 
German defence contribution (which implied West German rearmament) within NATO 
or to face a possible reduction of US troops in Europe. Under those international 
circumstances, the French government changed its policy towards Germany in 
1949/1950. The new solution was ‘Europe’:
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During this time, the relationship of the two peoples was transformed from the 
deepest hatred, inspired by the unparalleled inhumanity of Nazi domination, to 
close cooperation and even friendship. [...] Yet this understanding would not 
have been lasting if  a new character had not entered into this relationship a deux. 
That character was Europe. The attempt to reconcile France and Germany was 
merged in the construction of Europe [...] (Willis, 1965:vii).
As French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman later explained, if more members were 
involved, who accepted restrictions on their sovereignty, it might be easier for Germany 
to accept them as well (Willis, 1965:104). Apart from this very realistic argument, 
however, there was an intention to create a Europe that was more than an international 
organisation. Such integration should help maintain European peace and make a war 
between France and Germany structurally impossible and ‘unthinkable’. Between 1950 
and 1955 the Western Allies, including France, were able to trade the increased return 
of sovereign rights for increased West European integration. It was made clear to 
Adenauer and the West German government, that, in return for integration in the area of 
coal and steel, as well as in the realm of defence, the rights of the Allied powers would 
be considerably reduced and, in the case of a defence contribution, altogether abolished.
Another concern in France was that a more sovereign West Germany might shift toward 
the East, in order to attain reunification with East Germany at the price of neutrality. By 
“binding” West Germany firmly to Western organisations that temptation should be 
avoided (Trausch, 1995:112). Finally, given the economic pace at which West German 
industry was recovering and an army being amassed of roughly 500,000 men with 
modem equipment a fear of German domination in a new Europe without certain 
restrictions and rules seemed almost inevitable to the French government, in general, 
and Schuman, in particular. Binding West Germany more strongly to the West implied, 
however, two significant prices to be paid: it postponed the outlook of German 
unification (which the Social Democratic opposition and some members of Adenauer’s 
cabinet stressed) and it meant that all other participating countries (including France) 
also had to sacrifice sovereign rights.
The Schuman Plan (for a European Community for Steel and Coal - ECSC, proposed in 
May 1950) and the Pleven Plan (for a European Defence Community - EDC, proposed 
in October 1950) shared, therefore, a similar logic developed in the French Foreign 
Ministry by Jean Monnet. Members should give up certain sovereign rights to a High
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Authority (or, in the case of EDC, European Defence Minister) to be controlled by a 
council of ministers and a parliamentary assembly. The nature of the trade-off between 
the two sets of interests was made clear by linking the different treaties with each other: 
The Pleven Plan would only be ratified once the Schuman Plan had come into effect. 
The abolition of the Allied control rights over Germany (with few exceptions) as 
identified in the Basic Agreement (also called Bonn Agreement) was to be signed, once 
the EDC treaty had been ratified. In the case of the Schuman Plan, the treaty was signed 
on 18 April, 1951 and came into effect on 10 August, 1952. With the signing of the 
Schuman treaty the Tittle revision’ of the Occupation Statute was carried out on 7 
March, 1951. On 9 July, 1951, the declaration of the end of war between the Western 
Allies and West Germany had been signed; and on October 9, 1951, the Allies 
renounced all supervisory powers for West German federal and Land legislation. 
Finally, on July 25, 1952, the International Authority of the Ruhr (IAR) surrendered all 
its competences to the High Authority of the ESCS. The ratification of the Schuman 
treaty in January 1951 was secured in West Germany by the majority of the governing 
coalition (CDU, DP, FDP, BHE) and opposed by the Social Democrats and the 
Communists.3 In France, the Socialists (SFIO), the Centrist MRP (Schuman’s party) 
and the left UDSR secured the majority in the National Assembly for the Plan, opposed 
by the Gaullists, the Communists and the Progressivists (Grosser, 1956:101-102).
The Pleven Plan accepted German rearmament, but, from the outset, sought to include 
the German units in an integrated West European army. Thus, Germany could 
contribute to Western defence without having an independent national army. Pleven 
proposed a defence minister who would oversee joint military planning in a chiefs of 
staff committee, supervised by a parliamentary assembly. The smallest unit possible 
(battalion) should be kept national, but any unit above should be European. There was 
meant to be a European Armament Agency and joint procurement for armaments. 
Certain controversial weapons should not be produced in “strategically exposed” areas 
(i.e. in Germany, which was considered to be at the frontline of the East-West
2 In return, West Germany assumed all debts of pre-World-War-II Germany and paid all the 
reconstruction aid (Herbst, 1989:96).
3 “The [German] Communists joined the Socialists in opposing the pool on the ground that it would 
deliver German industry into the hands of foreign capitalists, assure the loss of the Saar, and invite the 
seizure of Germany’s natural resources. Their attitude was in striking contrast to that of the French 
Communists, who claimed that the pool would hand French industry over to German imperialism and the 
neo-Nazis.” Willis, 1965:129.
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confrontation). Support and aid by third parties (especially the United States) would be 
given to EDC as a whole and then divided among its members. Thus, no national 
contingent would be self-sufficient, because it would neither have a national supply 
system nor an independent budget. The national armies that already existed were 
allowed, under specific circumstances, to exist, albeit outside the EDC (overseas 
territories, military action within a UN mandate). According to special procedures, 
member states could withdraw temporarily certain parts of the army. The entire EDC 
armies were to be under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe 
(SACEUR) of NATO.
But there were also marked differences between the original proposal by Pleven in 1950 
and the EDC treaty that was signed in Paris on 27 May, 1952.4 The largest national unit 
now was declared a division (12,000 to 13,000 men); the European Defence Minister 
should be replaced by a “Defence commissariat” or “Board of Commissioners” 
consisting of 9 members (2 each from France, Germany, Italy and one each from the 
Benelux countries). Many decisions required unanimous support by the Council of 
Ministers, giving each country veto rights. Finally, the USA and Great Britain added 
security guarantees in case Germany withdrew from the treaty. The Occupation Statute 
would be abolished in the Bonn Agreement, once the treaty on EDC was ratified.
7.1.2 Legitimising decisions on EDC: arguments and groups
7.1.2.1 The groups and arguments in Germany
The parliamentary Left opposed this treaty based on arguments related to the national 
interests of Germany and its status, put forward by Kurt Schumacher between 1950 and 
1952, and, after Schumacher’s death, by Erich Ollenhauer, leader of the SPD. 
Schumacher regarded EDC as another step away from a possible reunification with East 
Germany and complained about the ‘blackmail’ entailed in offering sovereign rights in 
return for rearmament. Although the SPD did support the anti-militaristic and pacifistic 
“Without-Me-Movement” (Ohne-mich ’-Bewegung), whose political position was very
4 For a more detailed account of the treaty and the changes made during the negotiations see: Furdson, 
1980.
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much informed by the lessons of the Second World War and was supported by Allied 
re-education, its main arguments revolved around issues of both national equality 
(which they saw violated in the paragraphs on EDC that treated Germany in a 
discriminatory way as a ‘strategically exposed zone’ and because of the fact that 
Germany would not have any troops outside EDC) and unification.
One important argument in the debate was the “Korea analogy”. While the government 
argued that without rearmament West Germany faced the fate of South Korea, the 
opposition was not convinced that Germany was comparable to Korea (given the 
presence of US-American troops in Germany). Although the SPD clearly favoured 
economic, cultural and overall-political orientation and integration into the West, it 
rejected the idea of military integration, which, it feared, might even trigger an arms 
race in Europe. The West German Communists rejected the claim that the international 
situation required a military alliance including German troops. Deputy Reimann, from 
the Communist Party, even claimed that the “threat from the East” fitted perfectly into 
Goebbel’s Nazi propaganda against the East in general and the Soviet Union in 
particular (Stenographsches Protokoll des Deutschen Bundestags, Session 190, 7 
February, 1952). Thus, the Communists and the Social Democrats in Germany resorted 
to quite nationalistic arguments, departed from a different threat perception as the 
government and saw little benefits for Germany in those treaties.
By contrast, the governing CDU/CSU of Adenauer emphasised the need for West 
German rearmament (independent of any changes in the occupation statute in return of 
rearmament) in the face of the Communist threat in Eastern Europe and Korea. At the 
same time, Adenauer regarded military integration as another step (together with the 
Schuman Plan) towards European integration and, finally, Franco-German 
reconciliation. In turn, other members of CDU/CSU, like Franz-Joseph Strauss, 
admitted that the issue of rearmament had arrived very abruptly, given the efforts 
already made to re-educate the German people:
We have taken seriously the principle of ‘re-education’ or ‘re-orientation’, we 
have not regarded it as a propaganda instrument, we have taken it so seriously 
that we would have foregone any military activities in our political lifetime and 
that of our next generation (Stenographschisches Protokoll des Deutschen 
Bundestags, Session 190, 7 February, 1952).
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But Strauss then went on to attack the “Without-Me-Movement” as playing into the 
hands of the Soviet Union by not realising the current threat from the East. The 
governing FDP reiterated the claim that -  in particular after the Berlin-blockade -  any 
pacifism would help the cause of Soviet expansion. Opposition and governing parties 
thus differed sharply on the interpretation of the international security situation in 
Europe.
Adenauer countered Schumacher’s argument about EDC’s being a step away from 
German reunification by arguing that German reunification had to be achieved from 
strength, not from weakness. Adenauer claimed that through strength within the 
Western alliance there was a possibility for substantive negotiations with the Soviet 
Union, not before. Finally, there were those parties that, in principle agreed to the 
treaties, but attached conditions to their approval. The BHE joined the government 
coalition in supporting the EDC treaty when Adenauer promised to ask for a prior 
settlement of the Saar question. The FDP, in turn, demanded the “rehabilitation of the 
ordinary German soldier” in the context of the EDC treaty (Stenographisches Protokoll 
des Deutschen Bundestags, Session 190, 7 February, 1952, p.8132).What the FDP most 
objected to was the foreseen unequal treatment of West Germany. The FDP insisted 
upon a motion that requested the government to negotiate towards equal treatment.
Both the end to the occupation regime and the restrictions to German sovereignty, as 
laid out in the Bonn Agreement, was generally welcomed by all parties in the German 
parliament. The CDU/CSU pointed to the fundamental difference between a national 
army that was meant to boost national pride and status, and an army included in a 
defence system that protected certain values. As Deputy Jaeger from the CDU/CSU 
admitted, young Germans would be only willing to fight under a European flag, not 
under a sole German flag {Stenographisches Protokoll des Deutschen Bundestags, 
Session 191, 8 February 1952, p.8178). Adenauer was able to win the support of the 
FDP by insisting upon equality of EDC members together with the German Party by 
demanding a change of treatment of the German war criminals. The German parliament 
linked several conditions (“motions”) to the support of the government to sign the EDC 
treaty and the Bonn Agreement:
• equality of rights should be maintained
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• restoration of democratic rights in the Saar region
• equitable distribution of defence costs
• release of the war criminals
• end of the occupation regime (Willis, 1965:156)
The most important of these conditions was a clear mandate by Adenauer to negotiate a 
new text that would insist on the equal treatment of all participants of EDC (Press 
Release CDU/CSU, Deutschland-Union-Dienst (DUD), 9 May, 1952, p.2). On March 
19, 1953, the Bundestag adopted the EDC Treaty and the Bonn Agreement by a vote of 
224 in favour and 166 against.
Outside the West German parliament two groups or movements mobilised for or against 
the treaty: the pacifists and the former career soldiers in West Germany. With the 
announcement of an EDC treaty in his cabinet, Adenauer faced strong criticism from his 
Interior Minister, Gustav Heinemann, who finally left the government and formed his 
own party, the All-German People's Party (Gesamtdeutsche Volkspartei). This party 
opposed the EDC treaty on two accounts: first, the rejection of militarism and German 
rearmament, and, second, the policy preference of Western integration at the expense of 
German reunification. Heinemann, the president of the Synod of the Protestant Church, 
found strong support among the two churches, as well as among the ‘Without Me’- 
Movement’. Throughout the debates on EDC, the anti-rearmament attitude displayed by 
Heinemann and his party reflected the majority opinion within West German society 
(Willis, 1965:145). Another internal criticism of this treaty came from Jakob Kaiser, the 
Minister for all-German questions and former member of the East German CDU. He 
considered military integration into the West as yet another step away from German 
reunification (Herbst 1989:106-107).
By contrast, former career officers of the German Wehrmacht saw in military 
integration an opportunity to rehabilitate their reputation and regain an accepted status 
(Willis, 1965:147-151). They openly linked the willingness to contribute to Western 
defence to an end of war-crimes trials against soldiers, a position Adenauer and his 
government adopted in the negotiations with the Allied High Commissioners in Bonn.5
5 “Thus, by 1951 Germany’s ex-soldiers had entered the debate over the Pleven Plan with vigour and 
organisation. For the first time since the end of the war, they faced the federal and Allied governments 
from a position of strength that added weight to their demands: renunciation of the doctrine of collective 
guilt and rehabilitation of the German soldier’s honour; release, or at least judicial review, for soldiers
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But that enthusiasm fanned fears in Germany, France and other countries that ‘Hitler’s 
generals’ and the former ‘officer caste’ would be reinstalled.
Despite the support of former career soldiers, who had not committed any personal 
crimes, Adenauer and the governing centre-right parties acknowledged the still fresh 
memories of the Second World War. From the outset, Adenauer accepted an integration 
of German units into an integrated army, thus avoiding a German national army. He was 
also willing to accept the limitations on the German army as a means of creating trust 
among the other members of EDC. Realising the fears in other countries, the CDU/CSU 
parties tried to reassure the neighbouring countries on the motives and policies of a 
German member of EDC:
Germany does not seek any domination, neither in a united nor in a non-united 
Europe. It neither wants war nor does it want a war for the ‘liberation’ of the 
Germans behind the Iron Curtain [...]. On the other hand, we are aware of the 
still very active mistrust of the foreign countries toward the Germans. And this is 
also a reason why we are in favour of those treaties, because their binding 
character prevents any aggressive policy and any policy that aims at domination 
(Press Release, Deutscher Unionsdienst, 24 September, 1953, pp. 1-2).
Adenauer fought off any ideas of German neutrality (in exchange for German 
unification or avoiding German rearmament), because he thought Germany would not 
survive such a position and rejected the idea that neutrality meant avoiding German 
rearmament.6
The pacifists in West Germany clearly referred to moral, as well as ethical, arguments to 
oppose the Treaty. They were very much informed by memories of the Second World 
War. By contrast, the Social Democrats referred to more pragmatic arguments in their 
opposition to EDC. For them, it was the wrong means of achieving national 
independence (or sovereignty) as well as German reunification. Practical-moral 
imperatives derived from collective war memories were not very prominent in the 
arguments of the SPD. The Social Democratic Party displayed a surprisingly 
nationalistic line of argumentation, although former deportees within the SPD had
punished as war criminals; and equal status for the German soldier and officer in the European army and 
for the German state in the European union.” Willis, 1965:150.
6 See Adenauer’s declarations in this respect in Die Welt von Morgen, Monthly journal, February 1952.
246
formulated imperatives focusing on reconciliation, and overcoming nationalism and
n
militarism in West Germany.
The governing CDU and CSU, by contrast, used a fairly balanced mix of pragmatic and 
ethical arguments in their political discourse: on the one hand, they put forward such 
pragmatic arguments as the current threat perception of the East and Westintegration as 
a means of getting rid of Allied controls of Germany. On the other hand, 
Westintegration was indeed seen as an ethical argument on the reflected history of 
Germany (especially the idea of a special path of Germany in the past) and a 
strengthening and tying of West Germany to Western democracies. The willingness by 
the CDU/CSU to adhere to controls of Germany by European integration was justified 
publicly by Adenauer and other conservative politicians with reference to the still 
existing distrust and fear towards Germany and, thus, as a confidence-building measure. 
These ethical arguments were clearly informed by collective war memories within the 
CDU/CSU, although the stress of a new situation (threat from the East) was much more 
prominent than the argument of Franco-German reconciliation or that of overcoming 
nationalism or militarism.
The other governing parties, DP, BHE, and FDP, used fairly pragmatic arguments and 
conditions for their support of EDC (equal treatment, solving of related problems 
through those negotiations) and referred less to ethically or morally informed 
arguments. The German Party and Adenauer seized the opportunity of rearmament to 
end war-crimes trials and to rehabilitate the German soldiers. Finally, the West German 
Communists drew heavily on historical parallels between the anti-Soviet policy of Nazi- 
Germany and the current debate on EDC. Moreover, they referred to the moral as well 
as ethical arguments of pacifism and disarmament. Given the spectrum of political 
currents and arguments put forward in West Germany regarding EDC, practical-moral 
imperatives were not too prominent. Only the governing CDU/CSU, to a certain degree, 
and the Communists drew more heavily on arguments informed by collective war 
memories. Others, notably the SPD, used different types of arguments.
7 In fact, as meetings of the Socialist International, such as the 6th congress of the Socialist International in 
May 1953 in Paris show, the SPD was fairly isolated in such a position, whereas most European Socialist 
parties supported EDC on the grounds that it helped to overcome nationalism, national militarism and was 
a means to create trust among former enemies. On this congress see: Europress, 3 June, 1953.
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7.1.2.2 The groups and arguments in France
When the Schuman Plan was ratified in the French National Assembly, there were some 
remarkable speeches against, but also in favour of the treaty that were heavily 
influenced by collective war memories. General Aumeran was the most outspoken, 
warning against a new German expansionism, while Gaston Palewski, from the 
Gaullists RPF, warned against a German hegemony within the Europe of the Six 
(Grosser, 1956:100-102). The Communists aired similar concerns and feared that the 
French coal and steel industry could be handed over to warmongering Nazis and 
German imperialists (Willis, 1965:129). The support by the Socialists, MRP the UDSR 
and many Radicals secured a majority for the ratification of the Schuman Plan in the 
French National Assembly. But many, if not all, of these arguments would resurface in 
the debate on EDC.
There were four governments during the ratification period, from Antoine Pinay (The 
Independents; March to December 1952) to Rene Mayer (Radicals; January to May 
1953) to Joseph Laniel (Independent; June 1953 to June 1954) and, finally, Pierre 
Mendes-France (Radicals; June 1954 to February 1955). The Pinay government was 
supported by the ‘European coalition’ (MRP, SFIO, UDSR, Radicals), while Mayer, 
Laniel and Mendes-France depended upon Gaullist support. At the same time, the 
influence of the MRP declined, and the SFIO went into opposition. As in the German 
parliament, members of the French National Assembly attached various conditions 
before the signing of the EDC treaty and the Bonn agreement in its session in February 
1952. Some conditions simply referred to other matters that should be solved before 
signing these treaties. Those issues were:
• A solution to the Saar problem
• The subordination of the European army under a political authority with limited 
but clear competences
• A security guarantee by the United States that it would deploy US American 
troops on European soil
• A close association of Great Britain to EDC (if not actual membership) (“Neuer 
Kompromiss im Kabinett Laniel” in Neue Zurcher Zeitung,\S April, 1954).
Unlike the United States and Great Britain, for French parties the integration within 
NATO did not seem to provide far enough control of German forces to avoid a
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development that might be directed one day against France. Thus, the objective of 
furthering European integration seemed to provide (a) a Western European defence 
against the threat of the Soviet Union, (b) a controlled rearmament of West Germany, 
(c) a protection or assurance that this German force could not -  again -  be used against 
France. This last motive, clearly informed by memories of the Second World War and 
other Franco-German wars, was strong within the MRP, the Radicals and the SFIO. 
Foreign Minister Georges Bidault put forward this argument very forcefully during the 
debate in October 1953 in the French Senate {Neue Ziircher Zeitung, 31 October, 1953). 
In particular the MRP used the slogan “EDC or Wehrmacht” in order to rally support for 
EDC (Neue Ziircher Zeitung, 30 January, 1952). The Socialists and the MRP saw a 
means of overcoming Franco-German hostility, to create trust and to overcome old 
forms of nationalism and militarism (especially SFIO). Many parties, including the 
SFIO, in particular the Conservatives, Gaullist, some Radicals and Communists were 
against German rearmament at this time altogether {Neue Ziircher Zeitung, 16 
September, 1953).
The opposition to EDC varied and also changed over time. The party opposed from the 
very beginning to EDC was the Communist Party. For the PCF, German rearmament 
would lead to the re-establishment of old officer castes, of authoritarianism, “a Europe 
of Adenauer, the Americans and the Vatican”, all directed against the Soviet Union {The 
Times, London, 20 November, 1953). The Communists also stressed the loss of French 
sovereignty and French independence. Thus, the main argument was a general rejection 
of German rearmament in any form. Some Gaullists and all Communists and
o
Progressivists composed this group, forming sometimes a quite unusual alliance.
A second group of opponents did not believe in the effectiveness of the control of 
Germany within EDC. It did not matter how many safety clauses were included therein, 
they feared that, in the long run, Germany would dominate and even impose its own 
objectives (like reunification with East Germany) onto EDC. This fear was very 
widespread among Conservative, Independents (like M. Reynaud) and radical deputies 
(like Edouard Herriot and Edouard Daladier). The repeated explanation of the current
8 “One of the odd sights of the preliminary debate has been Communists and nationalists periodically 
sharing the same platforms ‘as in the Resistance of war time’, as they have expressed it, condemning the 
German rearmament plan.” “France is divided on EDC”, in New York Herald Tribune, 18 February, 1954.
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procedures (unanimity for certain decisions, procedures and structures) could not clear 
those doubts. It was over the credibility of those safeguards against Germany provided 
by EDC where the judgments differed (“Party Differences on European Defence, The 
Times, London, 20 January, 1953).
The question of safeguards against a possible renewed German aggression was the 
particular concern of the Socialists. As their secretary general, Guy Mollet, stressed 
time and again, the SFIO was willing to support ratification of EDC and the Bonn 
Agreement, if three conditions were met: security guarantees by the United States, 
closer association of Great Britain with EDC and a political authority supervising EDC.9 
The Radicals demanded similar guarantees and set some additional conditions before 
ratification could proceed (a prior agreement of the Saar problem and the ratification of 
the additional protocols) (“Die Radikalsozialisten stellen Bedingungen” in Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, 21 September, 1953). Others, like Bardoux from the Farmers’ Party 
claimed that ‘Little Europe’ (Europe of the Six) would fulfil the “wishes of the 
Pangerman League before 1914 or the aims of a greater German Reich” (quoted in Neue 
Ziircher Zeitung, 19 November, 1953).
A third group was not willing to pay the necessary price of supra-nationalism, a certain 
loss of sovereign rights for France, in order to exert the desired control on German 
rearmament. That view was most widespread among the Gaullists, although the Gaullist 
Party (RPF) was also split between those who preferred a certain control over Germany 
and those who wanted less control of Germany, but full independence and sovereignty 
of the French military. De Gaulle himself was first in favour of integration, whereas he 
later insisted that France should not give up its sovereign rights, even if that implied 
Germany’s having its own national army albeit integrated in a confederation (like in the 
case of NATO) (Le Monde, 27 February, 1953). Some Gaullists, like Michel Debre, 
followed him in this direction, while others, like M. Beaumont, preferred a tighter 
control over Germany (see: Le Monde, 19 October, 1953).
9 This was the position of SFIO during 1953. In a resolution on an extraordinary congress in May 1954, 
the SFIO supported the ratification of the treaty as it considered that the three conditions had been 
sufficiently met. See: New York Times, 31 May, 1954. Despite this resolution, half of the deputies 
defected from that party line in the final vote on EDC in August 1954.
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Many politicians refused to accept the inevitability of a German rearmament during the 
ratification debate. The French government clinched on to a possible agreement with the 
Soviet Union between 1950 and 1954, always hoping that some form of agreement 
among the four victorious powers of the Second World War might prevent the need for 
German rearmament. The repeated attempts to halt ratification and to push for a Four- 
Powers-Conference on Germany between 1952 and 1954 count as one of its objectives 
to overcome the original reason for the swift rearmament of Germany. This explains the 
many delays that occurred when a possible conference with the Soviet Union seemed an 
option to French politicians.10
A fifth group was worried about the young Bonn democracy and the re-establishment of 
the old military through EDC. Thus, the concern was a rise of militarism and 
nationalism and a weakening of the young Bonn democracy by re-establishing the old 
career soldiers’ elite that had fought the Second World War. This was a very significant 
concern among deputies of the Left and newspapers with roots in the resistance (Neue 
Ziircher Zeitung, 30 January, 1952, p.2). In contrast to those opponents of EDC, the 
supporters of the treaty argued that the alternative to EDC was “ Wehrmachf\ meaning 
precisely a national German army that would have authoritarian repercussions for the 
Bonn democracy. This was an argument put forward by supporters of EDC in the SFIO 
(like Guy Mollet or Pierre Commin).11
During the ratification period in France there were numerous attempts to fulfil the 
requirements set by various French parties for a ratification of the EDC treaty. The 
United States gave a formal guarantee as a form of annex to the treaty committing itself 
to continuous deployment of forces in Europe. Great Britain did commit her troops to be 
deployed in the framework of the Brussels Pact (later renamed Western European 
Union). Parallel to the negotiations on EDC, an ad-hoc committee headed by the 
Belgian Paul-Henri Spaak drafted a treaty on the European Political Community that 
was presented, in January 1953, to the enlarged parliamentary assembly of ECSC and 
later to the foreign ministers of the Six in summer 1953. This political authority was to
10 “The fact that the traditional French fear of Germany has not been displaced by fear of the Soviet 
Union explains much of French opinion regarding the pending treaty.” The New York Times, 25 August, 
1954.
11 See Commin’s speech at the National Assembly reprinted in: Das Parlament, 18 November, 1953.
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be the overarching construction for EDC, mentioned in Article 38 of the EDC treaty. 
This treaty was to be ratified once France (and Italy) had ratified the EDC treaty and the 
Bonn agreement. But in 1953 the French government added a number of pre-conditions 
to the treaties, many of them at the demand of the Gaullists:
• Unity between French troops overseas and in EDC
• Weighting the votes of France in case of temporary withdrawal
• Free movement between different deployments without prior agreement by 
SACEUR
• Links between Great Britain and EDC should be strengthened
• An agreement between France and Germany on the Saar
• A Four-Power-conference with the Soviet Union
• A political authority of EDC
Another issue was the burden-sharing in Indochina, where France was heavily 
dependent upon US American material and financial support. That should be dealt with 
before Mayer, himself a supporter of EDC, accepted to proceed with the ratification of 
the treaty. The Four-Power-Conference was called off, while the political authority 
existed in a draft version to be discussed in a meeting of the Foreign Ministers in 
September 1953. The talks on the Saar, however, did not advance, but France received 
so-called ‘interpretative documents’ by other prospective EDC members that declared 
the unity of French troops and the possibility to move troops from overseas to EDC and 
vice versa.
When Prime Minister Pierre Mendes-France came to power in 1954, the new 
government was asked by the Gaullists to negotiate amendments to EDC treaty. This 
time, the supra-national character of EDC should be abolished or, at least, suspended for 
8 years. Mendes-France tried to convince other members of EDC in August 1954 in 
Brussels to agree to those substantive changes to the treaty. All other five members 
rejected the proposal. When Mendes-France presented these (Gaullist) positions to the 
French public, Robert Schuman (MRP) and Andre Philipp (SFIO) issued statements to 
the press in the sense that they and many of their fellow deputies would no longer 
support the ratification of such a watered-down treaty. This instance is a good example, 
how states sometimes have to mediate within and between political communities. 
Within the French parliamentary system, the positions drifted further apart. A majority 
for a supranational EDC seemed ever more remote. What was voted on in the final
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session on 28 -  30 August 1954 was a compromise document between a Gaullist- 
influenced government and 5 member states who had waited for more than a year to 
know whether or not France would ratify this treaty. Mendes-France referred to this 
impatience in his opening speech in August 1954:
They [the other five EDC countries] told me: the rearmament of Germany was 
proposed to you, you proposed the European army. The European army was 
proposed to you and you asked for additional protocols. They were given to you 
and then you asked for prior conditions. They were given to you, too, and today 
you ask something new, pending a new Premier who in six months will ask for 
something else again (quoted in The New York Times, 29 August, 1954, p.5).
In the final vote on 30 August 1954 the treaty was defeated, 319 in favour, 264 against 
the defeat (12 abstained, 31 were not present at this session). Those in favour of the 
defeat were the Communists and the Social Republicans, those clearly against the defeat 
of EDC were the Christian Democrats (MRP, the party of Robert Schuman). Those who 
made the difference (as compared to the vote on the Schuman Plan) were the Radicals 
and the Socialists. Both parties were evenly split between supporters and opponents of 
the treaty, thus giving the opponents of the treaty an overall majority. The Gaullists 
(RPF) were also split, although a slight majority rejected the treaty.
The French parties (from the Communists to the Gaullists, but also in the Centre) 
referred to arguments that were heavily informed by collective war memories (French 
independence, control of Germany, safeguards against a future German threat) and 
combined them with pragmatic arguments for solving other issues through those 
negotiations. Opponents and supporters of EDC alike referred to the possible German 
threat as an argument to strengthen their position. The memory of the 1930s and early 
1940s were still very prominent (with some politicians from that period still present at 
the debates). The practical-moral imperative of independence and national greatness, as 
well as the mistrust of being left alone with Germany, still afforded very powerful 
arguments in the political discourse. Thus, it can be argued that collective war memories 
and the practical-moral imperatives that political memory groups derived from them 
were quite prominent in the French discourse on EDC -  much more prominent than in 
West Germany. Opinion polls of that period suggest that this predominance in the 
parliamentary realm in France reflected the views of the wider French public. To what
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extent did those ethical arguments had a legitimising effect on politics? This is the 
question I aim to tackle in the next part.
7.1.3 The conditions of the political discourse on EDC in France and Germany
France as well as West Germany had general media coverage on the negotiations 
concerning the Schuman Plan as well as the Pleven Plan. But, as Jean Monnet later 
admitted, one of factors that contributed to ratification of the Schuman Plan was that 
there had been no wider public debate on the treaty (Trausch, 1995:120). Monnet 
presumably saw no majority or support in the French public for such a step only five 
years after the end of the Second World War. A quick ratification, as in the case of the 
Schuman Plan, apparently was not an option in the case of the Pleven Plan, given the 
parliamentary divide on this decision. The treaties (EDC and Bonn Agreement) were 
discussed twice in the French National Assembly, on October 24-26, 1950 and February 
11-19, 1952, before being signed. Between signing and voting for the ratification there 
were few public debates on EDC in France: No government official made an effort at 
the beginning or during the two years of the ratification process to explain the treaty and
1 *7its details to the French public. Only in late 1953 did the first public debates in the 
National Assembly and the Senate take place:
• October 27, 1953 (in the Senate)
• November 17-27, 1953 (National Assembly)
• August 29-30, 1954 (when the National Assembly defeated the ratification of 
the treaties)
This means one and a half years passed, during which the treaty was only discussed in 
specialised committees but hardly in a wider parliamentary public sphere. Since 1953, 
there were several press conferences by general de Gaulle, denouncing the treaty as the 
end of France and French sovereignty. Other opponents of EDC also gave ample press 
conferences, thus dominating the public debate in France (Frankfurter Allgemeine
12 “Robert Schuman, former Foreign Minister of France, went far ahead of French opinion in accepting 
the European army treaty, which would have provoked far less sharp opposition if it had been explained 
more fully to the French people.” The New York Times, 29 February, 1953, p.2. The Times complains in a 
similar vein: “Neither at this early stage [signing of the treaty] nor indeed at any subsequent time did the 
Government’s representatives, from M. Robert Schuman and M. Pleven downwards, pay nearly enough 
attention to enlightening public opinion or to answering the charges made against the treaty.” The Times, 
London, 17 August, 1954, p.l.
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Zeitung, 14 November, 1953). Meanwhile, the press covered the events widely, 
although quotes from politicians (however accurate they were with regard to facts) were 
often left uncommented. However, opinion polls at that time suggest that the French 
parliament did not act as a gatekeeper of arguments but did reflect the prevailing and 
existing arguments present in French society at that time.
There may be different reasons for this lack of information (including a pessimistic 
outlook by the supporters of EDC for a likely result against EDC), but, from a 
Habermasian point of view, the conditions of political discourse in France lacked many 
instances that suggest a legitimating effect of the discourse: there was little information 
and even less public exchange on the different arguments concerning EDC in France 
between 1952 and 1953. This only changed in late 1953 and 1954, when the debates 
acquired a high intensity, evident in the length of the debates (the debate in November 
1953 lasted over a week). While the information of the wider public may have been 
rather limited, the level of exchange in parliament was very open by late 1953. These 
are indicators of a limited but, nevertheless, considerable legitimating effect by those 
arguments presented in France.
The conditions of the political discourse in West Germany, however, were further away 
from those of an ideal speech situation than they were in France. Chancellor Adenauer 
aimed at a quick ratification of the treaty, probably because of its unpopular corollary of 
rearmament. The German government did not give much information concerning the 
two treaties. This was a widespread complaint by opposition leaders, but also members
1 o
of the governing parties. Thus, neither the public nor parliament felt very well 
informed. The German public was informed by the press about some features of the two 
treaties, but the government did not explain the treaties to the public and did not invite 
public debates. As in the French case there may be various reasons for this lack of 
debate in the wider public (widespread opposition to rearmament and the concern that 
military integration into the West would further lessen hopes for German reunification), 
but the fact remains that the popular “Without-me” Movement had no strong voice in 
the parliamentary debate (not even among members of the SPD) and was moreover 
denounced by the governing parties as advancing the cause of Soviet expansionism. The
13 On those complaints see: Stenographisches Protokoll des Deutschen Bundestags, Sessions 190 and 
191,7 and 8 February, 1952.
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German parliament clearly acted as a gate-keeper of arguments and did not engage -  
unlike in the French National Assembly -  in a lengthy or intensive debate. There were 
two general debates on EDC before the signing of the EDC treaty in the German 
Bundestag: on 8 November, 1950 and on 7-8 February, 1952. After the treaty had been 
signed in May 1952, there were three short parliamentary debates in West Germany on 
the ratification of the treaty on 9-10 July, 1952, 3 December, 1952 and 19 March, 1953.
It is worth noting that West Germany had already ratified the treaties (EDC and Bonn 
Agreement) when France had not had a single debate in the National Assembly on the 
treaties. In each reading the deliberation was rather short- -  sometimes even less than a 
day. Thus, in the case of West Germany the conditions of the political discourse suggest 
a less legitimating effect on the decision on EDC than in France.
7.1.4 The actual impact of collective war memories on the decisions concerning 
EDC: an assessment
As the analysis under 7.1.3 suggest, the French political discourse took on board more 
practical-moral imperatives derived from collective war memories than the West 
German one. The fear that, in the medium term, France would be dominated by 
Germany, and the fear that Germany might use EDC for revenge policies, particularly 
recovering lost territories, prevailed over trust in Germany and the structure of EDC. 
Although this fear seems to have been very widespread in the different French political 
currents and the wider French public, the strategies to counter that perceived threat were 
different, even opposed, to each other: while the Gaullists and conservatives insisted on 
independence and relative autonomy, many Centrists saw supranationality and 
safeguards within the structure of EDC as the best cure to that threat. Thus, for the 
supporters of EDC the supranational character was pivotal, which was not acceptable to 
the Gaullists. If this is added to the conditions of political discourse that were deficient, 
but still more permeable than in West Germany, it is not far fetched to say that 
collective war memories had more of a legitimating effect and, therefore, more impact 
on the actual decision concerning EDC in France than in West Germany.
The rather limited impact of collective war memories in West Germany may also have 
been an outcome of the ‘decade of amnesia’ described in chapter 4. However, the
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parliamentary majority was very different from the majority thinking on rearmament in 
German society, and its support of the rehabilitation of former soldiers. Adenauer took a 
certain risk when he asked for the rehabilitation of the German soldiers. Although this 
was more accepted in German society, there were clear fears both within German 
society and neighbouring countries that ‘the old generals’ might be back.
Many authors argue that the time was premature to advance European integration in the 
area of a common defence only five years after the end of the Second World War 
(Herbst, 1989:86; Remond, 1994:536; Lord Beloff, 1993; Duke, 1999: chapter 1). 
Others claim that the French society and political class were simply not ready yet to let 
go of the past (Lemer and Aron (eds.), 1957). Interestingly, the arguments and the 
different groups did not differ so much between the Schuman Plan and the Pleven Plan 
in France, except for the Socialist and the Radical parties. But a comparison with the 
internal debate in other prospective EDC countries (Italy, Benelux) shows that although 
similar arguments were used in those countries, different recommendations for political 
action and decisions on EDC were drawn.14 In particular in the Benelux countries EDC 
was seen as the best means of overcoming mistrust, exerting a certain degree of control 
over German rearmament and strengthening Western defence against the Soviet Union. 
In other words, all came out strongly in favour of EDC, although the same arguments 
were considered as in France. Similar remembered pasts, thus, may result in different 
practical-moral imperatives.
This first section of this chapter tried to illustrate the application of the notion of 
political legitimacy to empirical research in order to help to provide an informed answer 
to the question of the degree to which collective war memories influence international 
politics. As has been argued throughout this and the previous chapter, this illustration 
does not want to deduce the entire decisions and course of action with reference to 
collective war memories. It rather tries to provide a theoretical grounding of an answer 
to what degree -  or in comparison between different political communities -  collective 
war memories did have an impact on decisions in international politics.
14 “In the parliamentary debates of the Benelux almost the same arguments have been discussed as in the 
French National Assembly. However, the results in the Benelux countries were strong majorities in 
favour of EDC, a confirmation of the insight that EDC is the best means to bury mutual distrust, to create 
mutual trust and to secure the common peace.” (Die Neue Zeitung, 22 August, 1954, p.8).
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The next section turns to another area of European integration that deals with an 
important national symbol, a national currency, which was to be merged with those of 
other members of the European Communities. The analysis of a decision in the 1990s 
also helps to identify some shifts or changes within the West German or French society 
of the impact of collective war memories on Franco-German relations.
258
7.2 European Monetary Union (EMU): thanks to collective war memories?
We want the Euro not as a means o f  dealing with the past hut as an option for  
our future.
Gerhard Schroder, German Chancellor in 1998 (quoted in Schaefer, 1998:11)
The move towards a single currency in the European Communities between 1989 and 
1993 marked a very important step forward in the European integration process. It 
deeply affected the means of national states and demanded many competences that had 
hitherto lain with the national states to be transferred on a so-called supra-national level. 
This implied first and foremost the area of monetary policies and the future role of the 
central banks and their relation to national fiscal and economic policies. But, above all, 
it meant the replacement of a national currency by another currency shared by several 
nations. Thus, an important symbol of national identity and pride, but also an important 
means of state sovereignty, was at stake.
It is important to note the process character of the decision to establish an Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU). While the conditions and the timetable were agreed upon in 
the negotiations 1990 and 1991 finishing in the final round of negotiations in Maastricht 
in December 1991, there were intermediate steps on the road to EMU, which was finally 
established with the circulation of the Euro in January 2000, replacing the national 
currencies of Spain, France, Germany, Greece, Finland, Austria, Ireland, Portugal, Italy. 
In other words, while there were some fundamental and important decisions made 
before and actually at Maastricht, other decisions remained open due to the evolution of 
the process towards the second and third, and final, phase of EMU. This analysis only 
covers the debates to the point when the ratification process was finished (November 
1993) and provides some hints on later discussions only as they directly related to 
previous debates.
It is my contention that after the debate in 1954 about a common defence, implying the 
end of an entirely national, independent army and a strictly national policy of defence, 
this debate in 1989 to 1993 about the decision to join or not an Economic and Monetary 
Union was, by far, the most important decision concerning state sovereignty and
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national identity in the post-war period in Europe. However, almost 40 years elapsed 
between these two decisions. This period was marked by continuous cooperation within 
the European Economic Community (EEC) and EURATOM, both created in 1958, the 
defence cooperation within the Atlantic Alliance and the West European Union. France 
and Germany not only experienced periods of cooperation and conflicts within the 
European Communities, but also ever closer bilateral cooperation. With the signing of 
the Franco-German friendship treaty on January 20, 1963, regular consultations every 
six months were institutionalised. In 1988, a Franco-German defence council, an 
economic and monetary council as well as a council on cultural affairs were established 
to enable ever closer bilateral coordination between these policy areas.
At the same time, there was a more open debate on the experience of the memory and 
lessons of the Second World War in Germany as well as in France. The Vichy 
Syndrome, brought into the public by Henry Rousso and others in France, as well as the 
Historians’ Debate in Germany, led to an ever more intense debate on issues of the past, 
as well as to a debate on the practical-moral implications of remembering those events. 
Thus, the decision on EMU falls within a more frank and open, sometimes heated, but 
also generally more reflected debate on the Second World War, where some of the ‘first 
generation’-members, with personal memories of the Second World War discussed the 
content and meaning of collective war memories with a ‘second generation’, who had 
no personal, first-hand experiences.
7.2.1 The international factors leading to EMU negotiations
The European Communities had gradually established an internal market by removing 
tariff and non-tariff barriers between 1958 and 1968, establishing a customs union, and 
gradually lifting certain limitations to the movement of capital within the EC. From the 
early 1970s, the EC member countries had also aimed at coordinating their monetary 
and economic policies. In 1971, EC countries created the ‘snake in the tunnel’ system, 
where the currencies floated freely on the international monetary market together and 
were pegged, within certain margins, to the German Mark (Steinherr (ed.), 1994). Given 
the economic turmoil and the very divergent economic policies of EC countries, this 
system had to be abandoned that year. At the same time, early ideas of moving from the
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‘snake’ to a monetary union were dropped. The German Chancellor Schmidt and the 
French President Giscard d’Estaing created the European Monetary System, where a 
calculated basket currency, the ECU, was created that coordinated the joint floating on 
the international currency market. Parallelly, supply-driven economic policies, 
sometimes combined with considerable deficit-spending were increasingly abandoned 
by most EC countries by the late-1970s and early 1980s. Thus, there was an increasing 
convergence in the 1980s between the economic, monetary and fiscal policies of the EC 
member states, while the value of stability and a strong currency gained in importance.
It was only in the mid-1980s that the economic and monetary conditions were ripe for 
further economic integration. This was achieved in 1985, where the EC commission 
proposed the ‘completion of the internal market’ based on four freedoms to be 
established by January 1993: the freedoms of capital, labour, goods and services. Over 
two hundred directives and a move towards the majority voting principle in the EC, 
were agreed upon in the Single European Act (SEA), in force since 1987. This further 
economic integration was meant to complete an internal market and the first step 
towards a possible Economic and Monetary Union.
However, given the convergence in economic and monetary policies and the 
liberalisation of the common market created by the late 1980s, the German Bundesbank 
exercised a strong influence. Within the logic of further strengthening the common 
market project of the EC, many members within the EC Commission and the member 
states regarded a single currency, which would exclude certain risks and further lower 
transaction costs (in particular of changing currency from one country to another) within 
the internal market of the EC as the next logical step toward further economic 
integration (Emerson and Huhne, 1991). At the same time, some member states, 
especially France, hoped to overcome the dominance of the German Bundesbank and 
make monetary policies a joint EU responsibility (Ziebura, 1997:346).
With the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s the EC was seen as a ‘stability anchor’ 
in Europe. Many foresaw in 1990 a huge challenge to the EC and its institutions, if  a 
considerable number of new member states were to join the EC. In particular, this might 
render further integration more difficult. Given that logic, many member states 
(particularly France and Italy) and the EC Commission (headed by Jacques Delors)
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regarded a deepening of the integration of EC, before new member states were 
admitted, to be vital for the future stability of the EC institutions (Spence, 1992). The 
EC first had to become an actor with the necessary tools in order to play an active role 
in Europe.
After 1989 the separation of the two Germanys became ever more untenable. With the 
opening of the Austro-Hungarian borders in mid-1989 and Gorbatchev’s assurance that 
the Soviet Union would not intervene, East Germans put pressure on the timetable for 
German reunification by leaving East Germany in huge numbers.15 This caused a 
speeding-up of international and internal negotiations on German reunification. A treaty 
on German economic, monetary and social union was signed on 1 July 1990, while the 
last remaining issues on external aspects of German unification were settled in the sixth 
round of the 2+4-treaty talks in Moscow on 12 September, 1990. The five new Lander 
of East Germany joined West Germany under Article 23 of the Basic Agreement (West 
German constitution) on 3 October 1990. United Germany remained a member of the 
North Atlantic Alliance and the EC. The coincidence of German unification and the end 
of the Cold War in 1989/1990 heralded the end of the post-war order without a clear 
new structure arising. This caused great concerns about the future orientation of a united 
Germany, but also sparked the discussion within Germany about its future foreign 
policy orientation (Markovits and Reich, 1997):
When the Berlin wall was breached and German unification became a distinct 
possibility, the idea initially sounded alarm bells throughout Europe. Some 
feared a revival o f  German desire for hegemony in Europe as a whole and 
certainly within the Community (Spence, 1992:137, emphasis added).
The French President, Mitterrand, expressed particular concern at the beginning of the 
process that led to German unification. When he realised that German unification would 
come much sooner than expected and when it was clear, by February 1990, that the 
Soviet Union would not block German reunification, he urged a speeding up of 
European integration. Still in November 1989 Mitterrand warned the German Foreign 
Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher: “Either German unification will happen after 
European unification, or you will be faced with a Triple Alliance (France, Great Britain,
15 How much this aspect affected the timetable of German unification, which was originally forecast by 
Chancellor Kohl and other European countries to take years, is documented in: Teltschik, 1991.
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Russia), and that will lead to war. If the German unification follows that of Europe, we 
will help you” (quoted in Ziebura, 1997:366). Helmut Kohl tried to reassure other 
countries that a united Germany would not abandon the path of European integration, a 
reassurance he gave in March 1990 and on numerous occasions to other European 
leaders and publics (Teltschik, 1991:329).
At the European Council meeting in Strasbourg on 8 and 9 December 1989, President 
Mitterrand pressured the German Chancellor to accept a conference on EMU within a 
year. He also promised Kohl to support enlargement of EC to Central and Eastern 
Europe as well as German reunification in exchange (Ziebura, 1997:360). Kohl agreed 
to that quid pro quo:
For Kohl, Germany had to facilitate the acceptance of the unification by its 
partners, by reassuring them with a most profound integration of Germany into a 
European group, to tie an uncertain Germany [...] and to avoid any nationalistic 
tendencies among German compatriots. In Paris, the government was willing to 
follow that suggestion since March 1990, because the relaunching of the 
European construction was seen as the only remaining means to control of 
Germany (Soutou, 1996:402).
Chancellor Kohl and foreign minister Genscher had great interest in achieving German 
unification with the consent of its allies and neighbours. The German government was 
determined to speed up European integration from early 1990 in order to calm any fears 
about the traditional “German uncertainty’, i.e. a possible German ‘swing policy’ 
between East and West and the fear of German domination of Europe, particularly of 
Central and Eastern Europe. Helmut Kohl kept stressing that German unification and 
European integration are two sides of the same coin. Thus, I would argue, that the 
timing of the EMU negotiations and the interest of Germany and France in negotiating 
an EMU was very much linked to German unification.
The ever more certain possibility of a German reunification triggered, at the end of 1989 
and during 1990, a certain re-emergence of historically charged images with regard to 
Germany in the Western public, which reinforced those fears even more: in March 1990 
Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of Great Britain, had a seminar on the consequences 
of the perspective of German reunification at Chequers near Oxford. In this seminar
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Charles Powell, Mrs. Thatcher’s foreign policy advisor, was said to have listed a series 
of features of present German character such as “angst, aggressiveness, assertiveness, 
bullying, egotism, [and] inferiority complex” (quoted in Spence, 192:137). Newspapers 
in France asked whether a resurge of Bismarck’s policy was due; a general feeling of 
fear of dominance was fuelled by historical memories, many of them linked to the last 
war. In France, the term Mitteleuropa became synonymous for German domination in 
Central and Eastern Europe. These fears were further nurtured by a book published by 
Pierre Behar (1990), who warned of the German ‘Drang nach Osten’ (pull towards the 
East); in turn, Georges Valance, from L'Express, saw, as the title of his book suggested 
(France-Allemagne -  Le retour de Bismarck, Paris 1990) a return to Bismarck’s 
policies. These books reinforced the fears of a dominance-seeking, restless, irrational 
Germany that had been prevalent in the interwar-period.
These contributions in the French and European press and public spheres reconfirmed 
certain fears and concerns regarding a unified Germany in the uncertain post-Cold War 
Europe. From March 1990 Germany, together with some allies within the EC, 
demanded a parallel process of negotiation for a Political Union. These negotiations 
should start at the same time as the negotiations leading to EMU. Germany and France 
co-ordinated their ideas regarding the two conferences and both, Chancellor Kohl and 
President Mitterrand, formulated joint proposals to the EC Presidency in 1990 (Dyson 
and Featherstone, 1999; Mazzucelli, 1997; Teltschik, 1991; Attali, 1995). In April 1990 
the heads of states of the European Communities decided to add an Intergovernmental 
Conference (IGC) on Political Union to the agenda. France demanded negotiations on 
EMU, leading to a single currency in return (Soutou, 1996:405). Thus, Mitterrand and 
Kohl linked the treaty on EMU, the treaty on Political Union and German unification.
The opening of the two intergovernmental conferences on EMU and the Political Union 
was announced in Rome in December 1990 with the mandate to aim at concluding those 
negotiations within a year. Those negotiations came to a final stage with the heads of 
states negotiating between 9 and 11 December 1991 for more than 30 hours the “Treaty 
on the European Union” in the Dutch city of Maastricht (therefore often referred to as 
“Maastricht Treaty”). Formally this treaty was signed on 7 February 1992 by the 
European Community Finance ministers (Corbett, 1992; Cafruny and Rosenthal (eds.), 
1993).
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In this treaty EMU was one of the three “pillars”; another pillar was the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) between the governments of the EU. Finally, a 
closer cooperation was agreed upon in the area of visa policy, asylum policies and 
immigration issues. As part of the Political Union a new type of “co-decision” between 
Commission, Council and Parliament was introduced that strengthened the role of the 
parliament in certain areas, especially linked to the domestic market. The general 
principle of subsidiarity was also introduced into the treaty, however, without being 
clearly defined. It was also agreed in Maastricht that a review meeting in 1996 by the 
European Council would decide whether further steps towards political union could be 
made.
While the results on CFSP and Political Union remained rather vague and open, the 
results on EMU were more precise. The establishment of an EMU would happen in 
three phases. The first phase had already been reached by June 1990, ending all controls 
to the movement of capital and a high degree of economic and monetary convergence. 
In a second phase, forecast to be reached by end-1993, a European Central Bank System 
would be established composed of independent central banks obliged to safeguard, 
above all, currency stability. The responsibility for monetary policies was to rest firmly 
with the national central banks. In a third phase, which would not start later than 1999, a 
single currency, supervised by an independent European Central Bank, would be 
introduced. By the latest in 1996 a European Council would decide, with qualified 
majority, which countries qualified for the third phase and would set a date to begin 
with the third phase. If at least 7 countries qualified before 1996, EMU could also start 
earlier. If there were not enough countries to qualify by 1996, those countries fulfilling 
the economic criteria had to form an EMU by the end of 1998 (automatic transition 
between phase 2 and phase 3). There were several criteria referring to macro-economic 
data like public debt, new debt, inflation rates that needed to be objectively fulfilled, 
before countries could join the single currency.
The European Central Bank (ECB) was to be independent of any political guidelines 
and its primary objective the safeguarding of currency stability. A Social Chapter was 
annexed to the Treaty and was signed by all EC member states except Great Britain 
(who signed it in 1997). There was no mention of an “Economic Government” or 
political guidelines for the ECB, but the cohesion and regional funds of EC would be
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used to support economic convergence for those countries that did not yet qualify for 
the third step of EMU. These were the main results and outcomes of the Maastricht 
Treaty, which became the subject of debate in the EC member states during the 
ratification procedures.
7.2.2 Legitimising decisions on EMU: arguments and groups
7.2.2.1 The groups and arguments in Germany
In Germany the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty required approval of the parliament 
(Bundestag), where the centre-right government consisting of CDU, CSU and FDP had 
the majority, but also the second chamber of the Lander (Bundesrat), where the SPD 
had the majority. After the negotiations, the parties assessed the results in a 
parliamentary debate on December 13, 1991. The ratification process lasted roughly one 
year. The final debate on the Treaty of the European Union and, thus, on the ratification 
of the treaty by the German parliament, took place on December 2, 1992 with two 
additional motions, one on EMU, the other on Political Union, being passed.16 Germany 
had to amend the Basic Law (German constitution) in several aspects, including the 
article concerning the Bundesbank and the right of EU citizens to vote in local German 
elections. Additionally, new articles were included to grant the Lander more say in steps 
towards future European integration (von Werner and Schwarze, 1992).
Yet, the ratified treaty could not be deposited in Rome as planned, because several 
charges of presumed incompatibility between the German Basic Law and the Treaty of 
Maastricht had to be clarified by the Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe. Manfred 
Brunner, the head of cabinet of Martin Bangemann, the German commissioner on the 
internal market of the EC Commission, filed a complaint at the constitutional court 
arguing that -  given its democratic deficit -  the treaty was not compatible with the 
German Basic Law (Brunner (ed.), 1994; Appel, 1994). The Greens filed similar 
charges against a lowering of environmental standards through majority voting in the 
EC (Hugenroth, 1993). Only after a positive decision by the Constitutional Court on 
October 12, 1993, about the compatibility of the treaty with the German Basic Law, the
16 See: German Bundestag, Drucksache 12/3905 (resolution on Maastricht treaty) and Drucksache 
12/3906 (resolution on EMU).
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German government could deposit the ratified treaty. The Maastricht treaty thus went 
into effect on November 1,1993.
The governing CDU/CSU and FDP coalition, as well as the opposition parties (the 
Greens and SPD), generally welcomed a deepening of European integration and steps
17toward EMU. The political class of Germany was clearly pro-European integration in 
both areas, EMU and Political Union. In Germany, I argue, five sets of arguments could 
be discerned in support of an EMU (assuming that it took the shape demanded by the 
German parties):
• The economic benefit for the German economy
• EU as an anchor in the new Europe
• The new geopolitical situation
• Avoidance of falling back on new and old nationalisms
• Avoidance of fears or uncertainties by other countries concerning Germany
It is worth noting that in many debates in the German parliament arguments for (rarely: 
against) Maastricht and the virtues of European integration in general were often 
blended. This was also the case with the argument of the economic benefits of EMU. 
This refers to the argument that an export nation such as Germany needed open access 
to markets. As the governing CDU stated:
[...] more than 55 per cent of our exports go to the member states of the EC. 
Additionally, there are the undisputable advantages of a larger ‘domestic market’, 
which the German industry needs in order to be able to compete on the world 
market. It is equally important that Europe comes ever closer together economically 
and politically on the world markets, in order to speak with one voice. In the long 
run, this implies a stable currency with an independent central bank (“Zu Maastricht 
gibt es keine Alternative”, in Deutscher Unionsdienst, 46, 155, p.2).
The German economy would benefit from that increased integration. Similar arguments 
were put forward by the Minister of Finance, Theo Waigel (1993:65). This argument, 
however, was not very prominent in the public debate and was only mentioned 
sporadically. These economic advantages were also put forward by many authors in the
17 See: Joint Motion “Gemeinsamer Entschliessungsantrag der CDU/CSU-, FDP- und SPD Fraktion im 
Bundestag zu den Verhandlungen von Maastricht” from December 5, 1991, reprinted in: BT-Drucksache 
12/1747.
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general debate on European integration, as well as by members of the German banking 
sector (Hof&nann and Kramer (eds.), 1991; Issensee (ed.), 1993).
But the argument of the EC as a stability anchor had more weight in the German 
discussion, because it linked EMU to the need (from the perspective of many German 
politicians) to make the EU institutions ‘fit’ for Europe (especially the integration of 
Central and Eastern Europe) together with advances in the Political Union. The speaker 
of the opposition SPD on European affairs, Heidemarie Wieczoreck-Zeul, stressed 
therefore that “in this unstable situation in Central and Eastern Europe, the EC is needed 
more than ever as a European actor”: “A signing of the treaty to EMU without a 
Political Union is not acceptable” (Interview, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 1 
December, 1991). This view and, particularly, the link between the EC as a stability 
anchor and the need for further political integration was shared by the governing parties.
Another argument was the new geopolitical situation of united Germany. Since 
Germany was now in the centre of Europe, a need for a joint Community, uniting East 
and West was the best solution possible for Germany. As, for example, Thomas Goppel 
(CSU) explained:
Whether we like it or not, whether we are conscious of it or not: Germany, 
placed in the middle of this continent that grows together, can and will define its 
interest only within that context. There is no German special or single path; 
Germany’s self-understanding will always be a European understanding. [...] A 
natural, absolutely autonomous, self-understanding of the Germans has always 
been impossible (Goppel, 1993:31).
This argument points to two important practical-moral imperatives from the collective 
war memories that were debated between the 1960s and 1980s: The avoidance of a 
‘swing policy’ between East and West, which was made responsible especially for the 
First World War, and the avoidance of a ‘special path’. With the European Community, 
which will eventually include Central and Eastern Europe, the argument goes, this 
structure renders a temptation or need for a ‘swing policy’ obsolete and avoids a single 
or special German path within Europe. At the same time, as Rudolf Scharping (SPD), 
the new opponent of Helmut Kohl in the 1994 elections, pointed out to an audience in
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Paris in late 1993, such a binding of Germany would help to overcome distrust of 
Germany:
A Germany tightly linked (“corsettee”) into the European integration is also the 
best guarantee that Germany will not distance itself from Europe and seek 
dangerous and isolated policies, which bear the risk, in the end, of justifying old 
prejudices against Germany and of re-awakening old historical fears of our 
neighbours. These might lead to the isolation of Germany or to the forming of 
alliances against Germany (Scharping, 1993:25).
This argument in favour of EMU and European integration was linked to two other 
arguments that were very prominent in the German debate on Maastricht; namely, a fear 
that member states of EC might, with the end of the Cold War and the end of a 
Communist and Soviet threat, relapse into nationalistic foreign policies or might put 
national interests before European integration. This relapse might, in the worst case, as 
Helmut Kohl repeated time and again, even lead to a war - a view that was clearly 
shared by the governing parties, as well as the SPD opposition (Banchoff, 1997). The 
SPD also introduced a motion in the debate on Maastricht on 8 October 1992 titled 
“Against falling back into nationalism: for a democratic Europe with a stable currency”. 
In this motion the SPD urged parliament:
Germany must not give way once more to the danger of nationalism. Europe 
needs to be spared the horrible trespasses of old and new nationalisms. As no 
other country in the middle of Europe, Germany depends upon the Community. 
[...] We want a strong Europe, to which the larger Germany can join its entire 
force. (Bundestag-DR., 8 October, 1992, emphasis added).
Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher argued in March 1992 that the alternative to 
Maastricht was a new nationalism in Europe and Germany. Helmut Kohl also stressed 
several times that the process of EMU was a means to avoid the relapse into
1 Snationalism. As Ziebura points out, European integration of Germany was also meant 
to counter any nationalistic temptations within Germany (Ziebura, 1997:377). Thus,
18 The argument of European integration’s preventing a relapse into nationalism was also prominent 
among Germany’s Left. See: Glotz, 1990; and Ludwig, 1993.
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Kohl’s strategy was directed at European neighbours and allies, but also towards 
Germany itself.19
Reliability was, therefore, a key objective of the governing parties as well as of the SPD 
opposition: there should be no room for perceived fears or uncertainties about the new 
Germany. The upsurge of historically charged ideas where Germany might turn (or 
return) to, fuelled the concern that collective war memories might gain importance 
again. Debates about the ‘return of Bismarck’, of a renewed German dominance, 
encoded in terms like ‘Fourth Reich or ‘Mitteleuropa’, seemed to suggest that Germany 
had to do its utmost to be reliable and avoid anything that might awaken these 
memories.
While the justification to join EMU was very much informed by ethical arguments, 
there were also important pragmatic arguments. The best way of achieving a successful 
EMU for German parties was to adhere to three principles in its construction: the new 
currency had to be as stable as the German Mark, the European Central Bank had to be 
very similar to the Bundesbank (independent and primarily responsible for the 
safeguard of currency stability) and there should be no financial transfer across member 
states or financing of state deficits. Thus, while there were ethical arguments in favour 
of EMU that were heavily informed by practical-moral imperatives of collective war 
memories, there were also pragmatic arguments on the design of EMU.
In the Single European Act German (SEA) politicians identified a ‘democratic deficit’ 
in important areas: since the SEA had introduced majority voting, decisions -  against 
the expressed will of Germany -  might, nevertheless, become binding for Germany. In 
some areas this binding decision would lack any parliamentary, democratic control
(neither the European Parliament nor the German Parliament could control that
00decision). For all German parties the Maastricht Treaty was an opportunity to close 
this democratic gap. All parties generally welcomed the results on EMU, but were quite
19 Even in the broader public debate this argument was hardly disputed. One of the few authors to 
challenge this argument was Bruno Bandulet, who actually criticised Kohl for having agreed to 
Maastricht as a ‘victim of a German inferiority complex’. See: Bandulet, 1992.
20 On the democratic deficit of the EC see the motion o f the SPD in the parliamentary debate on 
December 5, 1991, “Starkung der Rechte des Europaischen Parlamentes”, in BT-Drucksache, 12/1746.
270
disappointed about the results concerning the strengthening of the European institutions
0 1and the political union.
In conclusion, the entire German political class -  with some exceptions to be discussed 
in 7.2.3 -  favoured EMU with arguments that had clear references to practical-moral 
imperatives of collective war memories. This was mixed with some pragmatic aspects 
of geopolitical situation, the EC as the best stability anchor in a united Europe and clear 
ideas regarding how best to achieve a stable and durable EMU. Thus, overall, 
historically-laden arguments reigned very prominently in the parliamentary debates to 
legitimate EMU in Germany between 1990 and 1993.
1.2.2.2 The groups and arguments in France
In 1992 a constitutional council decided that the French constitution had to be amended 
in order to be compatible with the Maastricht treaty. Thus, the French government 
agreed to four amendments (related to EMU, asylum and immigration and voting rights 
for EC citizens in France) into the final text and the consent to pass a 7oi organique’ on 
European citizenship (Appleton, 1992:10). With those amendments the French Senate 
passed the treaty on June 16, 1992, and the National Assembly on June 18, 1992. The 
extraordinary constitutional congress (members of the Assembly and the Senate 
together) met in Versailles on 23 June, 1992 and voted for the constitutional 
amendments (and the revised text) overwhelmingly in favour (592 in favour, 73 against, 
14 abstentions) (Raoux and Terrenoire, 1992). The president signed the text the 
following day, and on June 26, 1992 the text was published in the Journal Officiel. 
President Mitterrand announced on June 3, 1992, that a referendum would be held on
September 20. In that referendum the French citizens voted in a very tight result in
00favour of EMU and the Maastricht Treaty. By end-September 1992, the ratification 
process had concluded in France.
The party of F rancis Mitterrand, the PS, the UDF and a majority of Gaullists (RPR), as 
well as the Greens (Les Verts) supported further moves towards European integration, in
21 Some members of the opposition party SPD, such as Peter Conradi, were so disappointed with the 
results, that they recommended a rejection of the treaty. See: Conradi, 1992:30.
22 The exact result was: 13.786.574 yes votes (51.05%); 12.623.582 no votes (48.85%), 30.32% 
abstentions. On these figures see: Huwe, 1992: 359-361.
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general, and EMU, in particular. These parties resorted to five arguments during the 
parliamentary debate and the later debate prior to the referendum:
• EMU as the last chance to tie reunited Germany to the West
• Increase of French influence in monetary issues
• Europe as a stability anchor in a new Europe
• Way of overcoming the dominance of the German Bundesbank
• Stability and a hard currency as the basis of competitiveness and sustainable 
growth
For the French government, headed by the PS and Francis Mitterrand, an important, if 
not the central, argument for EMU at that point was to ‘tie’ a now larger Germany to the 
West and into European integration (The European Times, 4 June, 1992, p.2). A 
European framework to “dilute the German power” had become a priority for them 
(Spence, 1992:140). It was either EMU or a national German foreign policy leading to 
German dominance of Europe. The ‘yes’ camp, including President Mitterrand in the 
pre-referendum campaign, clearly referred publicly to the argument that Germany 
should be ‘bound’ by EMU. Minister Rocard even said that “Maastricht had to be 
approved in order to ‘keep Germany from its demons’, for ‘after two generations of 
democracy, Germany might be tempted by romantic irrational forces, and pursue 
interests backed by the all-powerful Deutschmark’” (quoted in Criddle, 1993:234). This 
position was also echoed by some former or actual government officials (Attali, 1994; 
Bianco, 1992). So it was particularly the French Socialists who referred to this argument 
that was laden with collective war memories.
On the one hand, European integration was to absorb German power and limit freedom 
of action, but EMU should also curb the dominant position of the Bundesbank in 
European monetary and economic affairs (Criddle, 1993:230). However, the political 
class and media were divided in their judgment whether EMU was actually a means of 
controlling and curbing the power of Germany and the German Bundesbank or, in fact, 
either a means of extending and increasing that power or an insignificant instrument for 
that purpose, which, at the same time, cost a very important part of French sovereignty. 
By contrast, in particular the Communists and the group around Chevenement from the 
‘no’- camp did not believe that EMU would prevent a German dominance. On the 
contrary, given the neoliberal outlook of EMU, many opponents of EMU regarded it as
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the first step toward German domination of Europe. As Marie-France Garaud pointed 
out, “the idea of hamstringing Germany through the Maastricht Treaty is ludicrous; 
rather, the treaty installs the preponderance of German power in the Community” 
(quoted in: Criddle, 1993:235).
The Centrist parties (UDF, UDC) did subscribe to the argument that the economic 
future lay with EMU and that France had a chance to increase its competitiveness and 
its say in European monetary affairs through EMU (as compared to the previous 
situation, where the German Bundesbank decided unilaterally the European monetary 
policy) (Schmuck, 1992:98). More political and economic integration seemed to be a 
necessity after the end of the Cold War. Europe should become a strong actor and an 
anchor of stability in Europe. Those two parties also defended the stability-oriented 
monetary philosophy of the Maastricht negotiations (Guigou, 1994 and Lequiller, 
1994).
Those arguments were echoed by the ‘yes’ camp during the debate prior to the 
referendum. This camp, partly organised in the ‘Comite national pour le 'ou i'\ by the 
Minister of Culture, Jacques Lang, comprised members of the ruling Socialist Party, 
including President Mitterrand, the French President of the European Commission, 
Jacques Delors, Michel Rocard, French Minister for European Affairs, Elisabeth 
Guigou, the centrist-right UDF with ex-President Giscard d’Estaing as party chairman, 
the UDC, the centrist splinter group of the UDF, and segments of the ecological party 
Les Verts with Antoine Waechter and Brice Lalonde.
Now, while the French Socialist government was convinced that joining EMU was in 
France’s best interest, its idea of how best to design EMU was significantly different 
from that of the German government. Indeed, Mitterrand was interested in an inter­
governmental Council of Ministers of the Economy and asked for a ‘social Europe’ and 
a “European Economic Government” (Baneijee, 1995:411-412). The understanding of 
monetary policy’s being part of economic and fiscal policies in order to stimulate 
growth and employment is in accordance with traditional French monetary policy -  
even given the changes in French monetary policies in the 1980s (Solms, 1997:827- 
828). Such an Economic Council would, on the one hand, provide political guidance on
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monetary policies, but also give France a right of veto. This proposal did not find 
entry into the final text of the Maastricht Treaty.
Some Gaullists, the Communists and the Extreme Right opposed the Maastricht Treaty 
for sometimes very different reasons. However, three main arguments can be identified 
that also found some support among the other parties:
• Preventing the end of French (monetary) sovereignty and French sovereignty in 
general
• The negative effects on employment and fiscal spending
• The negative effects of migration
A considerable number of deputies from the Gaullist RPR chose to abstain from the 
votes on the Maastricht Treaty. Their main concern was with the remaining sovereignty 
of France once the EMU had been established. In fact, there were three ‘defectors’ from 
the Right, the former Minister Charles Pasqua (RPR), Philippe Seguin (RPR) and 
Philippe de Villiers (UDF) from the province of Vendee. All three opposed the 
ratification of EMU and the Maastricht Treaty, because they were against the loss of 
sovereignty and the demise of the French currency (Guyomarch and Machin, 1992:66). 
This latter argument was shared by many Gaullists who were against the Maastricht 
treaty precisely because of the loss of sovereignty that seemed to signal the end of the 
French nation-state. Marie-France Garaud strongly criticised supra-nationality and 
demanded a return to inter-governmental cooperation (Garaud, 1992; and Garaud and 
Seguin, 1992).
Another argument that was linked to the loss of sovereignty was the clear democratic 
deficit of EC and an aversion to the ‘gentle dictatorship of the Brussels technocrats’ 
who were increasingly in charge of former national policies (Goybet, 1992). On the 
extreme Right, Jean-Marie Le Pen, from the Front National, argued that EMU and 
European integration, in general, would increase migration from the Mediterranean area 
and entail the end of French sovereignty (Bouret, 1992:140-147).
23 This was also a solution to what Soutou described as the ‘ambiguous French position’: “France wanted 
to control Germany within a European framework, but without losing its own freedom of action by 
reserving its veto rights.” Soutou, 1996: 403-404.
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On the Left, the former Minister of Defence, Pierre Chevenement, was opposed to the 
loss of sovereignty, but also to the social and economic policies that the move towards a 
strong currency implied. Philippe Seguin (RPR) regarded the ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty, after France was faced in 1993 with more than 3 million of 
unemployed, as a “new Munich Agreement with its social consequences” (quoted in 
Baneijee, 1995:414). The Communists regarded EMU as the “Europe of the bankers 
and multinationals”, which would lead to further job cuts, rising unemployment and a 
lowering of the standards of the French social security system (Criddle, 1993; Herzog, 
1992). In other words, the negative economic and social effects of EMU were at the 
centre of the critique by the PCF, strongly supported by former Defence Minister Pierre 
Chevenement. The latter regarded the Maastricht treaty as “a masochistic, deflationary 
proposal which would drive a number of member states into real austerity and thereby 
threaten French export markets” (Criddle, 1993:233; Chevenement, 1996) and warned 
of the transfer of citizens’ rights “in favour of the capital oligarchies” (quoted in Der 
Tagesspiegel, 21 April, 1992). This was also the critique of some renowned French 
economists (Feldstein, 1992; Mallet (ed.), 1993). Compared to Germany, there was 
much more controversial debate, and the economic implications of joining EMU were 
clearly central to this debate.
These arguments against the Maastricht Treaty were reiterated during the debate that 
preceded the referendum in the heterogeneous ‘no’ camp, which was organised in the 
'Non de Gauche pour VEurope contre Maastricht’, headed by Max Gallo, former 
member of the Socialist Party (Gallo, 1992), the ‘ Comite pour une autre Europe’ 
dominated by dissident-Socialists, left-Gaullists and Communists, the ‘Rassemblement 
pour le ‘non ' au referendum’ headed by Seguin and Pasqua, and de Villiers’ ‘Combat 
des valeurs\
7.2.3. The conditions of the political discourse on EMU in France and Germany
It appears that there was a widespread consensus among the political class of Germany 
on EMU. In distinction to France, there existed a broad agreement, far beyond the 
political class, that a stability-oriented monetary policy should be maintained. Except 
for the reformed East German Communists, nobody proposed to return to inflationary
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financing to stimulate growth and employment, especially in East Germany. But the 
political class of Germany was not representative of widespread opinions within 
Germany and of most German economists on the timing of EMU. According to opinion 
polls, the Germans were afraid to give up their national currency and opposed EMU at 
that time.24 A group of 62 leading German economists supported the arguments against 
the timing of EMU. To them, it seemed premature to rush to EMU, given the burden of 
German reunification and the still existing differences between the possible member 
states joining a single currency. Surprisingly, the debate within the political class did 
not reflect those concerns on EMU. One of the few politicians to make the argument 
that Germany should learn from the German economic and monetary union and not 
hasten to European EMU, repeating previous mistakes, was Oskar Lafontaine from the 
SPD (Zellentin, 1992:701, footnote 10). In fact, Lafontaine recommended a rejection of 
the Maastricht Treaty on the grounds that EMU was insufficient and would lead to a 
similar catastrophe as the German economic and monetary union (Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, March 6, 1992. p. 10). Neither his position nor his arguments 
appeared in the parliamentary debate on EMU (in fact, Lafontaine, having been the 
previous Socialist candidate as chancellor, never spoke on that matter at the German 
parliament) or in official documents of the SPD. This lack of parliamentary debate 
over Teaming from the German EMU’ was also in stark contrast to the process in other 
member states of EC:27
Perhaps the most important lesson for member states, bearing in mind the 
proposals for European Economic and Monetary Union contained in the 
Maastricht Treaty, has been the short-term failure of German EMU. [...] As to 
German views on deeper European integration, the evidence from the integration 
of the two Germanys has not led the German government to increase 
circumspection (Spence, 1992:157 and 159).
24 In January 1992 the Allensbach Institute fur Meinungsforschung reported that 57% of the surveyed 
Germans thought it was a “bad decision” to abandon the Mark. Only 10% were in favour of speeding up 
European integration, while 30% were in favour of slowing it down. This contrasts with 51% in 1988 
who favoured swift European integration. Survey results quoted in: Zellentin, 1992:705. Eurobarometer 
in 1992 and 1993 suggested that the Germans would reject EMU, if they were asked in a referendum. 
See: Eurobarometer, no. 38, Bulletin CE 11/1992, no. 1.3.247 and Eurobarometer, no.39, Bull. CE 
5/1993, no. 1.2.151.
25 The Anti-Maastricht manifesto was published in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 11 June, 1992; in 
English translation in: The European Times, 13 June, 1992. The latter newspaper also claimed that “80 
per cent of the public is opposed to surrendering the mark”.
26 Outside parliament, several authors placed this argument in the public debate. See: Baader, 1993; 
Krause, 1992; Nolling, 1993; Schauer, 1993.
27 On the ratification debates in other EC countries see: Laursen and Vanhoonacker (eds.), 1994; Chitti- 
Batelli, 1995.
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In other words, there was no general debate in Germany on EMU and, instead, there 
was an almost consensual reaffirmation of the ‘how’ of EMU among the German 
political class. The German parliament seems to have functioned as an active gate­
keeper of debates. Press critiques were criticised for their ‘negativity’, which fuelled 
fears of losing the Mark (Geiger, 1991:211). German parliamentarians complained that 
there had been too little information about the progress of the negotiations by the 
government, but also the representatives of the Lander complained about the lack of 
information during the negotiations 1990-1991 (Stenographisches Protokoll des 
Deutschen Bundestages, 12/50, October 17, 1991, pp.4140 and 4154). While the 
government was interested in informing the public about the Maastricht treaty28, it did 
not agree to the suggestion to hold a referendum on EMU. Thus, taking the ideal speech 
situation as a yardstick to look at the level of legitimacy achieved during the public 
debate that preceded the signing of the Maastricht treaty, it seems that certain 
fundamental and general points of objection were excluded from the very beginning 
from the parliamentary public. A wider debate, as the one that took place in France, did 
not occur in Germany. This suggests that the decision in Germany was based on a broad 
parliamentary legitimacy, but not necessarily on a broad public legitimacy among the 
majority of the East and West Germans. Given the critical debates in the broader public 
and the arguments against EMU (particularly against “EMU now”) that were not 
reflected in the parliamentary debates, some observers complained about a “thoughtless
29and conformist plenary debate” in Germany (Ziebura, 1997:383).
While there was comparatively little exchange of views and debate during the 
parliamentary ratification process in France (with the exception of the interventions by 
de Villiers, Seguin, Pasqua and Chevenement), the referendum forced many political 
groups and parties to take a position toward EMU and the Maastricht Treaty. Over the 
summer a majority for the yes-vote seemed certain by approximately 60%. However, in 
a poll from 23-24 August the ‘no’ vote was, for the first, time a majority. Thus, the ‘yes’ 
camp, of which the entire government was part, started to engage in a debate, which
28 See for example the governmental information on Maastricht: Presse- und Informationsamt der 
Bundesregierung. Der Vertrag von Maastricht iiber die Europaische Union: Fragen und Antworten. 
Bonn, Oktober 1992.
29 An observer of those debates later deplored: “This is the revenge for the fact that the discussion on the 
Euro has been led so one-sidedly, above all in Germany. For fear of irritating the German citizens and 
voters and thus reinforcing the mistrust towards the new currency, the political controversies with the 
neighbours and the partner France have been hidden all too often and too easily” (Solms, 1997: 828).
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included televised and other public discussions. A highlight was certainly the debate at 
the Sorbonne on September 3, 1992 between Philippe Seguin and F rancis Mitterrand 
with a video link with Chancellor Kohl in Bonn (Criddle, 1993:235). There was also no 
stark contrast or reduction of the arguments presented in the wider French public and 
the parliamentary debates. Thus, the French parliament did not act as a gatekeeper, like 
the German parliament appears to have done.
Whatever Mitterrand’s reasons for deciding in favour of a referendum, which was not a 
necessary requirement in the ratification process, the campaign before the referendum 
created the possibility and, in fact, required the government and the political class in 
France, to engage in an open debate on the reasons why France should ratify this 
treaty.30 The reasons for the decisions of the Frenchmen in the referendum, which took 
place on 20 September 1992, may have varied and might not have been related to 
Maastricht or EMU. However, the preceding public debate was a very good way to 
increase the legitimacy of this decision. Again, judged against the ideal speech situation 
as a yardstick, the decision in France on EMU and the Maastricht treaty counted on 
more legitimacy than it did in Germany.
7.2.4 The actual impact of collective war memories on the decisions concerning 
EMU: an assessment
Looking at the arguments in the German public debate, the impact of collective war 
memories on the decision in Germany in favour of EMU was considerable, not to say 
paramount. I would even argue that, without reference to the practical-moral 
imperatives derived from collective war memories, this decision in Germany, in 
particular its timing, cannot be adequately understood. However, it seems that it was the 
coincidence of the end of the Cold War, looming German reunification and the 
substantive change in national sovereignty that were responsible for this surprising 
influence. The issue of a single currency by itself might not have been informed and 
influenced by collective war memories, but, rather, by the present concerns about the 
dominant Bundesbank. Yet, the conditions surrounding the political discourse on EMU
30 It has been claimed that Mitterrand wanted to boost his (then low) popularity and divide the political 
right (UDF/UDC -  RPR) on the issue. On these presumed motives of Mitterrand see: Appleton, 1992:3-5.
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in Germany suggest that this decision could count on a high parliamentary legitimacy 
but not necessarily on a wider legitimating effect -  on the contrary. Many fears and 
arguments mentioned in the mass media were branded as “negativity” of the media or 
marginalised.
The strong impact of collective war memories on the discussion in the parliamentary 
realm might also explain why a more open debate did not take place in Germany. While 
many critics argued on economic grounds, the political class was more concerned about 
the future perception and acceptance of Germany in Europe. EMU was a mere step, an 
example, to reassure the rest of Europe that Germany would not depart from the 
common path, that Germany would be reliable. This motivation seemed to be partly 
based on an interest in ‘tying’ Germany to the West and to European integration. This 
attitude of Germany, which puzzled many observers, can only be grasped with reference 
to the practical-moral imperatives, based on collective German war memories, sustained 
by the German political class.
In France practical-moral imperatives of collective war memories were most prominent 
within the Socialist Party, which focused on the need to tie Germany to the West. In this 
argument, memories of German expansionism and domination (this time limited to the 
economic area) reinforced current concerns in the economic and social fields. While 
Schuman and Mollet argued in 1954 ‘ Wehrmacht or EDC’, some supporters of EMU, it 
seems, said ‘German domination of Europe or EMU’. Whether EMU actually fostered 
or curbed that domination was a matter of dispute. Thus, fear of German domination 
reigned quite prominent in the French debate, but not as prominently as during the 
debate on EDC. Advocates of a new Germany, of Franco-German friendship, such as 
Joseph Rovan, wrote disappointed:
For some of those voting ‘yes’ [...] the primary goal of the European Union was 
to ‘tie Germany’ in order to prevent it from becoming dangerous [...]. Strange 
way to talk about your primary partner. [...] Maastricht was for some the 
instrument of German imperialism that will again dominate the continent, 
finishing a project that has been tried [...] in two world wars. For others, 
Maastricht is an instrument, which has to prevent all that. The obsession with the 
German danger remains very strong in France and this is the bottom of the 
business, which is easily exploited (Rovan 1992:3).
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Another imperative, the need for independence of France was an important argument 
among the Gaullists. Although many authors claimed that the years before Maastricht 
had actually shown that France had de facto lost its sovereign power over its monetary 
policy, the formal abdication of that policy area was of great concern to many 
Frenchmen (Ferri and Tibaud, 1992). The imperative of a strong, national, independent 
state remained a political factor in France, although with much less force than in 1954. 
Other, more pragmatic arguments that were unrelated to collective war memories also 
bore considerable weight, such as Europe as a stability anchor, the democratic deficit or 
the expected impact on migration. There was more controversy over the right monetary 
and fiscal policy stipulated by EMU and a fear of huge social and political costs caused 
by the austerity imposed by EMU.
Given the conditions of the political discourse in France on EMU, particularly before 
the referendum, one can assume that the two arguments based on collective war 
memories (tying Germany to the West to avoid dominance in Europe; maintaining 
national sovereignty) had a strong legitimating effect on the French decision on EMU. 
In each case, the decision on EDC and EMU, supporters and opponents alike referred to 
European integration either as a means to prevent a return of ‘old’ Germany (thus being 
in favour of the institution) or the fact that this institution would either be a useful 
vehicle for or a useless obstacle to German domination (Ziebura, 1997:383). In each 
case the historical fear of Germany was central.
7.3 Conclusion
The empirical results of the review on the two decisions that affected Franco-German 
relations, EDC and EMU, give an insight into the impact of collective war memories on 
Franco-German relations after 1945 and some hints of the changes in this impact 
between 1950 and 1990. The fear of German expansion and German domination 
remained a considerable, in the case of EDC, even paramount, argument of supporters 
and opponents alike. But it also played an important role in the French discussion on 
EMU. The plea, most notably among the Gaullists, but also among the Communists, to
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maintain national independence and sovereignty, was also an important argument to be 
found in both political discourses in France. It is therefore striking that there were quite 
similar arguments in France on the decision regarding EMU and the decision on EDC 
despite the passage of more than thirty years: The fear of a return to pre-1945 conditions 
was very strongly informed by collective war memories. This referred to the feared 
‘neutrality’ of a reunified Germany, combined with an orientation towards Central and 
Eastern Europe (summarised by the notion of ‘Mitteleuropa'*). EMU was also discussed 
by a considerable part of the political class and French public either as a means of ‘tying 
the giant before it is too late’ or a means of future European domination by Germany. 
The pessimists did not believe in the containing effect of EMU, while the supporters 
and optimists did.
However, there are also marked differences in the French political discourse on the two 
decisions. The issue of European integration was much more accepted, even within the 
Gaullist RPR and even many Communist voters (if not Communist deputies). The 
voting on EMU in the French Senate and French National Assembly shows just how 
strong support for European integration and EMU had become. In this debate a 
considerable part of French politicians and public saw genuine advantages in European 
Economic and Monetary Union and had a very favourable attitude toward European 
integration. Thus, while some arguments concerning a ‘restless and dangerous 
Germany’ seemed similar to those in the debate of 1954, their political weight in the 
French parliamentary realm clearly decreased.
The empirical results of the two cases also suggest that the impact of collective war 
memories on legitimating German decisions in international politics actually increased. 
In 1952-53, the Social Democratic Party was surprisingly nationalistic and did not share 
the arguments, put forth by fellow Socialist parties or Adenauer, regarding the need to 
use EDC to overcome distrust toward Germany. This is in stark contrast to the SPD of 
1990 that strongly supported EMU on the grounds that it was necessary to prevent a 
‘relapse into nationalism’ or a ‘special path’ of Germany. This, I would argue, is part of 
the social learning process that took place between the 1960s and 1980s: given the idea 
that a ‘swing policy’ had been responsible for the First World War, the ‘special path’ 
concept clearly suggested a deepening of European integration. Finally, the rejection of 
militarism and nationalism was a strong argument in the German parliamentary debate.
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This chapter also aimed at illustrating the application of a the concept of political 
legitimacy as a framework to assess the actual impact of collective war memories on 
decisions affecting international, in this case Franco-German, relations. This concept, 
derived from Habermas’ theory of communicative action, proposed a two-step analysis 
that focuses on the empirically identifiable arguments and the analysis of the conditions 
of political discourse. This research agenda focuses on the presence of political memory 
groups and the respective practical-moral imperatives derived from collective war 
memories they propose and the legitimating effect read off by the communicative 
conditions of the political discourse. This approach seems particularly suitable for 
assessing specific decisions in international politics that can count on a wider public 
interest. A debate, limited in time (such as the end of a ratification process) with a clear 
decision at the end has the advantage of facilitating the analysis of the specific 
legitimising basis of that decision.
However, specific decisions are always subject to many, also circumstantial factors, 
which render single-factor explanations weak or unconvincing. Thus, it can only be 
claimed that collective war memories ‘mattered to a certain degree’. One of the 
limitations of the approach is, therefore, the difficulty of weighing certain arguments. 
How significant or how dominant was one argument as compared to others? The 
previous two sections have tried to give an idea of the dominant arguments by referring 
to key documents (motions, ratification resolutions etc.), the number of publications 
and, finally, the number of political actors and groups using this argument. However, 
there remains a considerable degree of subjective assessment and pre-selection. This 
research agenda also includes a critical aspect, because it reflects on the conditions of 
the discourses it analyses. By using the ideal speech situation as a yardstick of 
legitimising force, a critical means of qualifying public utterances is provided. In cases 
of Western democracies the differences may not be too significant. However, if 
authoritarian regimes or manipulative governments are also included in such analysis, 
the concept of political legitimacy advanced in this work provides a means of taking 
those differences into account.
The initial hypothesis of this chapter stated that collective war memories are of 
particular relevance in cases of substantive loss of sovereignty or existential issues, such 
as defence or international peace and security. The two empirical cases discussed in this
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chapter appear to confirm this hypothesis. Cases that are dealt within bureaucratic 
procedures of foreign policy are less useful for such an approach, because the 
legitimacy of those decisions can hardly be tested. Thus, the concept seems particularly 
useful for the cases stated above and less for ‘normal procedure’-decisions in 
international politics. There may be other areas of international politics that are subject 
to public debate and public discourse, where, at the end, a decision is made. In such 
cases an analysis may find that collective war memories are of little or no relevance. 
This, however, is not a theoretical weakness of the concept of legitimacy, but an 
empirical result that actually allows a negative answer to the question, whether or not 
collective war memories had an impact on specific aspects of international politics. This 
possibility of a negative answer, I would argue, is one of the greatest strengths of this 
concept of political legitimacy.
This dissertation aims to advance the study of collective war memories by providing a 
theoretical concept of political legitimacy that helps to analyse whether or not collective 
war memories affect international politics. The research agenda developed in chapter 6 
provides some ideas regarding the possible origins of a changed impact: changing 
international factors, the analysis points to the “good reasons” mobilised for or against a 
certain decision, the changing conditions of the political discourse. Moreover, as 
chapters 3, 4 and 5 suggest, an analysis of the level of social learning also highlights the 
source of different practical-moral imperatives derived from collective war memories. 
All those aspects also provide indicators for a changing impact of collective war 
memories on international politics. The analysis of the legitimising basis, grounded in 
arguments that a post-conventional society requires in order to create legitimacy a 
posteriori, allows us to understand the differences, changes and dynamics that concepts 
such as “collective identity” are usually unable to grasp. Although many additional 
aspects may be included (such as the transformation of political memory groups -  as for 
example within the German SPD or the French Gaullists) for a full account of the 
reasons why the impact of collective war memories may have changed, the concept of 
political legitimacy avoids any totalising correlations or assumptions and can therefore 
accommodate explanations of change and transformation to a certain degree.
This thesis has tried to advance the question of how to analyse the impact of collective 
war memories in politics, in general, and international politics, in particular. The answer
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has been twofold: it depends, first, on the level of social learning, which in turn, 
influences the practical-moral imperatives that derive from collective war memories. 
Secondly, it depends upon the role of collective war memories in legitimating decisions 
in international politics. Certainly, this makes the analysis more laborious and limits the 
scope of generalising assumptions and results. This two-step approach may not provide 
the most parsimonious answer to the question posed at the outset of the thesis. But I am 
convinced that, despite its limitations, the two-step answer helps us to understand 
differences, provides a critical self-understanding of collective war memories and 
avoids the trap of reifying concepts such as “identity”, “collective consciousness” or 
“images” that always beg the question of their becoming, transformation and variety of 
outcomes.
Finally, I wish to stress that both the concept of social learning and the concept of 
political legitimacy, elaborated here, are not only theoretical concepts that advance 
knowledge on the relationship between politics and collective war memories, but also 
provide certain approaches to a critical practice towards collective war memories. It is 
precisely this consideration which I turn to in the next and final pages.
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Final remarks
From the theory to the critical practice 
of remembering past wars
This dissertation has focused on the question of how to conceptualise the impact of 
collective war memories on international politics. In its attempt to tackle this question, 
the thesis provided not one parsimonious, general theory or assumption but, rather, 
proceeded in several steps: chapter 1 highlighted the first step; namely, the 
differentiation between the dimensions of collective memories (emotional, cognitive 
and practical-moral) and the identification of the memory groups that put forth specific 
practical-moral imperatives (sometimes referred to in the public discourse as “lessons 
from the past” encapsulated in the formulation of collective memories). Chapter 1 
defined those particular groups as “political memory groups”. The position - and this is 
the first answer offered by this thesis -, and the influence of those political memory 
groups in the political system, in general, and within political parties, in particular, give 
a first insight into how collective war memories enter politics.
Chapter 3 not only provided an insight into the socio-historical factors that led to the 
rise of national war memories in modernity (type of warfare, political revolution, 
industrial revolution), but also pointed to the Habermasian concept of social learning, 
which structures remembering and has a considerable influence on the formulation of 
practical-moral imperatives in politics. The different levels of social learning in 
collective war memories influence heavily the formulation of practical-moral 
imperatives derived from collective war memories. In this context, the more an object is 
remembered as being eternal or fixed in time, as is the case of the early conventional 
level of social learning, more general and repetitive imperatives are likely to be 
formulated. The more political groups within a polity are remembered differently, the 
more differentiated the practical-moral imperatives. The act of remembering itself 
shows different levels of openness. At a post-conventional level of social learning, at 
the level of reflexive remembering, attention turns away from the remembered object, 
focuses on the remembering subject and reflects upon the meaning that remembered
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events have for political communities. Thus, a second answer to the question of the 
thesis is: the impact of collective war memories on politics depends on the prevailing 
level of social learning within a society and its influence on the formulation of practical- 
moral imperatives.
While the two answers offered thus far focus entirely on the process o f  remembering 
and the dimension of practical-moral imperatives, they also suggest an analytical 
approach of the political process by identifying the position of political memory groups 
within that process. In chapter 6, however, the argument was taken further by stating 
that collective war memories, in general and practical-moral imperatives in particular, 
also influence the legitimating of political decisions and outcomes. Based on Habermas’ 
theory of communicative action, which focuses on the conditions of practical discourses 
and the types of arguments used in politics, the chapter provided a notion of political 
legitimacy that should enable us to identify where and how collective war memories 
may influence political decisions, particularly in international politics. Thus, the third 
answer to the question of the thesis lies in the analysis of the conditions of public 
political discourse of decisions in international politics and the arguments put forward 
to legitimate them during this discourse.
The two concepts introduced here to the study of collective war memories, namely, the 
concept of social learning and the concept of political legitimacy, are developed from 
Habermas’ Critical Theory. In the final instance, both concepts point to the importance 
of communicative action and reflection in remembering past wars. Both the formulation 
of collective war memories and their practical-moral imperatives, as well as the 
legitimating of political decisions, focus on public debate, on public exchange of views. 
Thus, the analytical contribution of the thesis lies in pointing to the aspects of 
communicative action, as defined by Jurgen Habermas, in the analysis of the “politics- 
memory nexus” (Muller (ed.), 2002:2), discussed in the introduction of this work. The 
reflection on those communicative aspects of collective war memories does not remain 
at the level of reflection but can usefully be operationalised to guide empirical research. 
This guidance to empirical research is illustrated, for the case of social learning in 
remembering past wars, in chapters 4 and 5, and, in the case of legitimating political 
decisions through collective war memories in chapter 7.
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The theoretical contributions of this thesis also quality certain findings of the literature 
in IR on collective war memories. For one, the puzzling question posed in chapter 1, of 
how collective war memories may fuel further violence, in some cases (like Yugoslavia, 
or Northern Ireland), and rapprochement and more peaceful relations, in other cases 
(such as France and Germany), was answered in this thesis with reference to the role of 
communicative action in national and international politics. The violence-memory-more 
violence cycle described by some of the literature on protracted conflicts screens out the 
communicative elements of this effect by referring to cognitive-psychological theories. 
But, again, by focusing on the political memory groups and the way of legitimising 
political decisions in those conflicts, the practices that lead to an escalation or 
reproduction of violence -  or even war - may be explained. In the cultural sphere, 
collective memory is not a simple given, a residue on the hard drive of societies, but an 
outcome of practices and conscious action, such as history classes, poetry, films, 
parades, commemoration days, dances. This thesis argues that the same applies to the 
political sphere: certain memories are not simply there, influencing politics, but are 
formulated, reproduced and rehearsed whenever a possibility occurs, particularly in the 
case of practical-moral imperatives advanced by political memory groups. The memory 
of the special path in Germany about its past is a case in point.
This thesis also contributes to the literature that describes political communities within 
state boundaries as social and historical entities, whose processes of collective 
communication and reflection provide important insights into the formulation of 
policies in international politics, but also towards other political communities (regarding 
them as social and historical units themselves). Following one of the central elements of 
Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School, part of a self-reflective approach is to become 
aware of the historicity of the observed object. This work, therefore, tries to avoid the 
pitfalls of static theories, by pointing to different factors of the becoming of collective 
war memories, of their continuities and their changes. Changes in the impact of 
collective war memories on national and international politics may in fact occur as a 
result of a modified relation between political groups, different levels of social learning, 
a change in the practical-moral imperatives derived from those memories, changed 
conditions of discourses and debates on collective war memories or changes in the 
international environment. In addition to those factors, there is also a socio-historical 
dimension that has been highlighted in chapter 3 of this thesis: the role of national war
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memories within political communities is a modem phenomenon itself and may be 
about to change. This insight, derived from a notion of praxis that grasps the societal 
context, in which collective war memories are embedded, adds to the efforts made in 
this thesis to provide a theoretical understanding of the changing impact of collective 
war memories in international politics.
These are some of the heuristic values identified in this thesis on applying the 
communicative action concept of Habermas for the analysis of the relationship between 
politics and collective war memories. Their specific strengths, but also weaknesses, in 
terms of guiding empirical research were discussed in the previous chapters. Yet, there 
is a general critique of discourse analysis and communicative action that also applies to 
the approach developed here. The approach focuses on the public debate on collective 
war memories, as well as on the publicly formulated arguments in favour of certain 
policies, decisions or actions to be taken. Obviously, there are limits and filters that 
select certain arguments and suppress others. In fact, some arguments might be 
formulated in private but, for lack of approval, not publicly. Admittedly, this is a risk 
that this approach faces. However, the counter-argument that, for example, the public 
arguments used by, say, Adenauer, were false and ‘in reality’ he had quite different 
motives from the ones stated publicly at the time o f public debate and deliberation} 
also needs to proven. Often, the same limits of sources that make us doubt that people 
act according to their publicly formulated arguments and legitimisations, apply to the 
opposite claim. In the final instance, I would argue, this is a question of truthfulness: do 
actors behave according to what they publicly say and express? Truthfulness cannot be 
‘proved’ once and for all, but only be made plausible by comparing words and 
subsequent deeds. If they coincide, we may believe that the practical-moral imperatives 
and cognitions gained from collective war memories are truthful guides to action and 
perception.
Some authors argue that certain arguments and memories are not publicly debated 
because they are repressed or, in fact, only present in the collective unconscious (and 
therefore beyond the conscious control of individuals). Theodor Adorno, for example,
1 At a later stage we may be in a position to test those arguments against evidence in archives, once that 
information has been made available. Still, at the time of public debate we may be left without this 
possibility.
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referred to the 1950s as the time of repression of the memory of the Second World War 
in Germany. Forgetting is the necessary opposition to remembering and always a 
complementary part of memory. While the concept of the “collective unconscious” is 
difficult to grasp (and sometimes close to reification), it is my contention that a 
comparative analysis of social learning and legitimising through collective war 
memories across different political communities may help to identify particular “blind 
spots” or repressions of certain memories in specific political communities (like in the 
case of Germany in the 1950s, also identified in the ratification debate on EDC) -  
without relying on the concept of the collective unconscious and its methodological 
problems.
Beyond the heuristic values identified above, I would claim that Habermas’ theory of 
communicative action applied to the relationship between politics and collective war 
memories also provides important guidance to a critical practice towards the politics- 
memory nexus. In other words, this Critical Theory forms part of those approaches that 
do not limit themselves to best describing and analysing the changing impact of 
collective war memories on politics, but actually poses the question of how to transform 
the impact of collective war memories. This leads inevitably to the question of ethics of 
collective war memories, and, as a consequence, to the question of what should be done 
(critical practice) about collective war memories and their impact on politics.
I believe that these critical approaches can be found in each of the three dimensions of 
collective war memories mentioned in chapter one. For one thing, the emotional 
dimension of collective war memories has been the subject of numerous psychological 
and psycho-analytical works, particularly on the topic of trauma. The sense of sacrifice, 
of loss, the need for collective survival and victory are some of the most important 
emotional aspects of collective war memories. The psychological literature suggests, as 
a practical step, ways of dealing with the emotional dimensions of trauma, such as guilt, 
shame, sense of superiority, or repression through therapeutical methods such as 
melancholia, trauma-work, or working-through. These practices suggest ways of 
‘freeing’ the subjects from the uncontrolled emotions they experience each time those 
memories are invoked. They also help people to get a grip on those emotions, to control 
them to a certain extent and to be able to function in normal life. These therapeutical 
practices are very much linked to personal memories of survivors of genocide,
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Holocaust or extreme mass violence, yet they are often suggested to nations or groups 
as well. It must be kept in mind, however, that silence does not necessarily entail 
absence of memories and their emotional dimension. Much to the contrary, the 
emotional power of some memories might be so overwhelming that self-censuring 
occurs, as the case of returning Frenchmen from the Algerian war or returning deportees 
in the Second World War demonstrates. But, as long as they are not made the subject of 
public commemoration, this approach will find it difficult to identify the three 
dimensions of collective memory.
Many authors who focus on the spiritual aspect (often related to Christianity) of coming 
to terms with past extreme experiences, like war, refer to the concept of reconciliation 
(Muller-Fahrenholz, 1997; Tutu, 1999). This alludes to acts (or rituals) of forgiveness or 
acts of apology, public acceptance of past wrongdoings. In the former case, individuals 
or groups refrain from demanding punishment or restitution for the sake of better future 
relationships. In the latter case, former perpetrators accept their wrongdoing and ask the 
victim group for forgiveness. Here several aspects of dealing with the emotional 
dimension of collective war memories can be identified: this often implies that former 
enemies meet (like the former soldiers from both sides of the trenches during the Allied 
landing of the Normandy in 1944), that they converse, that the victims are confirmed 
and reaffirmed by those who perpetrated certain violence and that the latter admit to 
wrongdoing. These acts often liberate former victims or those who suffered mass 
violence and enable them to let go of the search for an apology, for an understanding, or 
an acceptance of wrongdoing by those who permitted or carried out crimes in wars. In 
this sense, there are emancipatory practices in the emotional dimension of collective 
war memories. The approach developed in this thesis does not contribute to this fairly 
well developed literature on critical practices concerning collective war memories.
However, there are also critical practices in the other two dimensions of collective war 
memories, namely, (1) the factual basis of collective war memories and (2) the 
discourse on the practical-moral dimension. As chapter 3 highlighted, there is a growing 
control of the factual basis of collective memories by governments through their archive 
policies or their withholding of documents. This means that the factual aspects of 
collective war memories can be manipulated. On the other hand, the increasing 
availability of information and its storage increasingly counters such governmental
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intentions. The availability of information, often hampered by governments with 
reference to present international relations or national security, becomes ever more 
pressing. In fact, the complete opening of the secret files of East Germany after the 
downfall of the Communist regime is a case in point, where the (West German) 
government chose to make almost all the information available to the individual 
citizens. This prevented the emergence of certain assumptions about secret files held 
back and countered successfully some attempts of myth-making (by former 
Communists). Thus, another critical practice on collective war memories is the 
openness to data and information on past wars.
In contrast to national collective war memories, the ‘voices from below’ acquire 
increasing importance. State-sponsored offers for the structuring of collective war 
memories may still be the basis for the dominant narratives on past wars, but they are 
being increasingly challenged by groups who feel that their particular experiences are 
not sufficiently appreciated or articulated. This has been the case in France and 
Germany with regard to the Jewish memory. Totalising narratives on collective war 
memories, which claim that a certain narrative captures the empirical sameness of the 
experience, can be challenged from within by giving different groups a voice. This 
strategy of totalising memory, I argued in chapter 3, was prominent in the process of 
nation-building in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Its corollary was the 
marginalisation of perceived negative aspects and partial memories that did not fit into 
the national narrative. Given the increased self-consciousness of different memory 
groups and the availability of information about their particular experience, it is 
increasingly difficult to sustain those totalising narratives. The point, however, is not to 
“celebrate diversity” for the sake of it. It is rather a challenge to any claim to represent 
collective experience all citizens can identify with.
As I argued in chapter 4 and 5, the challenge to any totalising claim to represent the 
empirical experiences of all groups within society is a chance to advance another level 
of social learning: instead of selecting “positive” memories of past wars that the 
political community can identify with, the political community should accept positive as 
well as negative memories and experiences in the past and pass a conscious moral 
judgment on them. The identification, then, is not with the claim of empirical sameness 
of experience, but with the joint experience of reflection on different experiences. By
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consciously challenging those empirical claims such a change of reflection can be 
advanced. Such a change can also be advanced by conscious public debates on the 
meaning and the practical-moral implications of past wars. The chapters on France and 
Germany suggest, however, that such a debate is easier, or even only possible, after the 
generation of those actively and biographically involved in the wars is gone. Otherwise 
a more general, morally and ethically informed debate is conflated with the question of 
personal responsibility and guilt -  which is altogether different (Jaspers, 1947). 
Practical-moral imperatives are usually implicit in many messages, but rarely the 
subject of debate. Matters, however, can be advanced by specifically tabling a debate on 
the ‘lessons’ and the practical consequences of dates, events and results remembered 
from the past. A conscious debate on the practical-moral messages provides the 
possibility of challenging the often implicitly present moral codes.
Another critical practice that this thesis suggests is the challenge to essentialising 
remembering, as discussed in chapters 4 and 5: in cases where the object of 
remembering is grossly over-generalised or even essentialised (the same actor 
throughout time), the possibility of change is closed. In the worst case, the future is a 
repetition of the past. Such an option is not only empirically false, but it politically 
forecloses conscious efforts to overcome the present state of international relations. The 
early stage of conventional learning implies a closed image of the self and the other. 
However, such an image can be challenged from within by questioning the alleged 
sameness of different political groups. This has been the constant work of authors such 
as Joseph Rovan and Alfred Grosser with regard to French narratives on Germany. Yet, 
this line of questioning can equally be used to challenge the assumed sameness of 
countries or groups. In fact, providing theoretical frameworks that precisely highlight 
the possibility of change and transformation is itself a critical device against 
essentialising or general theorising the relationship between memory and politics.
Habermas’ notion of ideal speech situation, the foundation of his discourse ethics, also 
provides an important critical yardstick for communicative action concerning the level 
of social learning, as well as the legitimating impact of collective war memories on 
specific political decisions. Are the conditions of free deliberation as described in 
chapter 6 fulfilled? The empirical cases of East and West Germany suggest a huge 
difference in remembering past that responded to the absence or presence of a public
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sphere that allowed -  or not- the free deliberation described by Habermas. The same 
critical judgment can be applied to the claim that collective war memories did or did not 
legitimate certain political decisions: By looking not only at the empirically identifiable 
arguments in the political discourse, but also at the conditions of that discourse, an 
informed judgment on the actual impact of collective war memories on politics, but also 
a critique of that discourse is possible. The standards of critique provided by Habermas’ 
ideal speech situation also suggest practical ways of changing the present political 
discourse towards free deliberation, the permeability of public spheres and the 
participation of all interested. This, I would argue, is ultimately the critical agenda of a 
Habermasian Critical Theory applied to the study of collective war memories.
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